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 ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis focuses on aspects of the work of South Africa's unique children's 
courts in care cases.  Chapter 1 provides an outline of the scope of the thesis. It also 
explains a methodological utilisation of selected primary evaluative criteria.  Throughout 
the thesis extensive use has been made of these to assess the sufficiency of relevant law 
and practice.  In chapter 2 the historical origins and early impact of the children's courts are 
explored.  It is shown that these courts have been shaped by a complex interaction between 
English colonial influences, progressive and liberal initiatives asserting the appropriateness 
of serving all children, and contrary government policies driven by racial prejudice.  
Chapter 3 investigates whether there is still a need for specialised care courts in a world 
where ADR is becoming increasingly prominent.  Based upon a comparison of the 
respective advantages and disadvantages of courts and other resolution methodologies 
(including the Scottish children's hearings system) it is concluded that an interactive model 
involving both courts (as authoritative partners) and ADR is ideal.  In chapter 4 the 
feasibility of encouraging direct participation at court by children and other family 
members is considered.  It is asserted that, contrary to the situation in some systems, a 
direct participatory system is feasible, accords with South Africa's international obligations 
and for some cases is a superior method. Chapter 5 evaluates the reasons for insufficient 
and often inadequate legal representation of parties in the children's courts.  It provides 
recommendations on a selection process for state subsidisation, training and what the basic 
functions of lawyers should be.  Chapter 6 focuses on presiding magistrates.  It asserts that 
there is an urgent need for rules of court to transform their function from an accusatorial to 
a predominantly inquisitorial one.  It provides some discussion on the wording of these 
rules.  It is contended that the Children's Act 38/2005, whilst expecting much more from 
children's court adjudicators, counterproductively diminishes specialisation and staff 
resources.  Chapter 7 presents an argument for considerably greater and better-guided use 
of the children's courts to provide emergency and interlocutory relief.  It proposes 
guidelines in the form of rules of court to enable this.  Chapter 8 provides a critique of the 
new approach to dispositive care proceedings in the Children's Act 38/2005.  It appreciates 
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the significance of some valuable advances but also shows that there are fundamental 
structural and other deficiencies.  It contains recommendations on how the Act should be 
both amended and supplemented by means of regulations.  Chapter 9 summarises the main 
findings of the thesis.  It is concluded that, whilst our law is still poorly developed in many 
important respects, the lag in systemic progress which resulted particularly during the 
apartheid period can now quickly be overcome.  This can be done by introducing solutions 
proposed in the thesis which are, on the whole, financially modest. Children's courts could 
at last become a highly effective mechanism within our child protection system (possibly 
within a family court network) if these solutions are implemented. 
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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1  General Introduction 
 
This thesis has two primary aims. Firstly, to provide a structured and theoretically 
consistent critical examination of selected aspects of the South African law pertaining to 
court-imposed, legally-binding alternative care measures for children. And secondly, to 
formulate recommendations for improvement of our law.  The concept of alternative care 
is broadly interpreted in the thesis to include not merely measures requiring removals of 
children from dysfunctional familial groups but also supportive measures intended to avoid 
the need for such removals.1 It is asserted that our child care law framework remains 
inadequate in many important respects despite recent major reform initiatives.  The thesis 
further aims to demonstrate, however, that the shortcomings in our law can be overcome 
by means of appropriate solutions such as legislative amendments or supplementary 
provisions.  
 
The thesis evaluates relevant substantive and procedural law, and some of the 
court-related functions of the professionals most commonly involved in care cases.  
Personnel whose services are considered include investigative social workers, the staff of 
the children's courts and lawyers who appear in those courts.2 Care proceedings at the 
children's courts3 have been selected as the main focus. These courts are an important 
                                                 
1 The conception of alternative care utilised in this thesis is thus broader than that in art 29 of the Draft UN 
Guidelines for the Appropriate Use and Conditions of Alternative Care for Children (18 June, 2007).  In this 
provision 'alternative care signifies a formal or informal arrangement whereby a child is looked after at least 
overnight outside the parental home…'.  The Guidelines were accessed at 
<http://www.crin.org/docs/DRAFT_UN_Guidelines.pdf>. Final dates of access for materials electronically 
sourced are indicated in the thesis bibliography and not in footnotes. 
2 Additionally, aspects of the work of other professionals such as psychologists and psychiatrists in providing 
expert assessments and rehabilitative services are briefly referred to in parts 7.2.1.1, 7.4.2 & 8.3.2, below.  
Unless otherwise specified all references to 'parts' are cross references to different locations within the thesis.  
The first digit indicates the chapter.  A two-digit reference indicates introductory material in a main part prior 
to commencement of any subpart. 
3 Despite the importance of their functions children's courts are not courts of senior status. The present 
hierarchy of South African courts is established in the Constitution as contained in the Republic of South 
Africa Act 108/1996.  As indicated in s 166(3)(a) of that Act the constitutional court 'is the highest court in 
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component in our child protection system.  One of their functions is to serve as forums of 
first instance when alternative care hearings are required on behalf of children. The 
importance and inherent difficulty of many of these cases cannot be overemphasised.  
Court rulings in care matters obviously tend to have serious consequences.  An incorrect 
decision to leave a child in her current situation might result in her death being caused by 
an abusive or neglectful caregiver.4 But a decision to remove a child from her family or 
community must only be taken as a drastic last resort because it will be likely to affect 
bonding (and the child’s healthy development in other respects) by separating her from 
those who have previously nurtured her.5  
 
Recognition was accorded to the work of children's courts by Goldstone J of the 
constitutional court in Minister for Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick.6 
Rather than viewing them only narrowly as performing limited functions within strict 
statutory parameters he described them more generally as 'charged with overseeing the 
well-being of children'.7  For much of their history, however, children's courts have been 
restricted by statute to the provision of only a few alternative care remedies.  This is 
certainly true under the Child Care Act 74/1983 (hereafter 'the 1983 Act') which currently 
governs the services of children's courts. It is only recently with the promulgation of 
extensive new legislation in the form of the Children's Act 38/2005 (partially implemented 
                                                                                                                                                    
all constitutional matters'. Next in seniority is the supreme court of appeal.  It is laid down in s 168(3) that 
this 'is the highest court of appeal except in constitutional matters'.  As is clear from s 166 read with s 169 the 
high courts (prior to 1996 entitled 'supreme courts') are next in seniority.  Section 166(d)-(e) of the 
Constitution indicates that the least senior courts are magistrates’ courts or other courts of similar status.  As 
is further explained in parts 2.3.3 and 6.2.4 below children's courts have since their inception fallen into the 
latter category. On the status of children's court see also N12, below. On a point of clarity it should be noted 
that in the South African system the terminology 'juvenile court' refers to a magisterial criminal court in 
which young offenders are prosecuted. Modern South African children's courts do not try children who are 
alleged to have committed crimes. On the development of different functions for juvenile courts and 
children's courts see generally the next chapter. 
4 In the thesis a reference to one gender should be taken as including the other except where the context 
indicates otherwise.  Although equivalent statistics are not available for South Africa it has been estimated 
that in the USA approximately 2000 children die from maltreatment each year: BL Bonner, SM Crow & MB 
Logue 'Fatal Child Neglect' in H Dubowitz (ed) Neglected Children: Research, Practice and Policy (1999) 
156 at 159.  
5 On the last resort principle see further B Van Heerden 'Judicial Interference with the Parental Power: The 
Protection of Children' in B Van Heerden, A Cockrell & R Keightly et al (eds) Boberg’s Law of Persons and 
the Family (1999) 497 at 612 N386.  
6 2000 (3) SA 422 (CC); 2000 (7) BCLR 713 (CC). 
7 Ibid at para 31. 
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at the time of writing8 and hereafter 'the 2005 Act') that the legislature has favoured 
broadly empowered children's courts which will be able to order a wide range of care 
services.  This is the most important development since the official establishment of 
children's courts in 1937 and relevant aspects of the 2005 Act are considered throughout 
the thesis. 
  
In part 1.2 of this chapter a motivation for the thesis is provided.  In part 1.3 the 
methodology is explained.  In part 1.4 the scope of the thesis is explicated in more detail 
and a brief overview of subsequent chapters is included. 
 
 
1.2  Motivation for the Thesis  
 
Three related reasons may be advanced as indicative of a need for this thesis.  
These are, firstly, insufficient attention to the work of the children's courts by researchers 
and commentators; secondly, a lack of development in our law; and thirdly, the extreme 
vulnerability of affected families in the absence of such development.  These arguments 
are developed in turn. 
 
 The South African children's courts, despite the fact that they have been officially 
in existence since 1937 (and unofficially for more than a decade previously), have 
remained largely unstudied.  This is particularly true for the period prior to the 1990s9 
because subsequently researchers have begun to investigate some aspects of children's 
                                                 
8 In terms of Proclamation 13/2007 published in Government Gazette No.30030 of 29 June, 2007 the 
following parts of the Act came into force on 1 July, 2007: ss 1-11, 13-21, 27, 30, 31, 35-40, 130-34, 305 
(1)(b) & (c), 305(3)-(7), 307-311, 313-315; and items 2, 3,5, 7 & 9 of Schedule 4.  Some of these provisions -
notably ss 1, 10, 14 & 18-21- have immediate implications for the functioning of children's courts: see the 
discussion in parts 4.2.5, 4.3.1, 4.3.2.2 & 8.2.2, below.  Before other parts of the Act providing new functions 
for children's courts can be implemented it will be necessary to repeal the 1983 Act, publish regulations, train 
children's court staff and budget for court-ordered services.  It is thus likely to be some time before the new 
legislation governing children's courts is fully implemented. 
9 L Chisholm Reformatories and Industrial Schools in South Africa: A Study in Class, Colour and Gender, 
1882-1939 (Unpublished PhD Thesis: University of the Witwatersrand, 1989) referred to some aspects of 
their functioning prior to 1939 although she focused mainly on institutional care. TH Van Reenen Handbook 
on the Children's Act (1953) provides some information for the mid 20th century. 
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court work and analyse parts of underpinning legislation.10 Although a start has been made 
there has been no analysis of consequences of the historical evolution of relevant 
legislation and no substantial study of the work of the children's courts. It is thus not 
surprising that, aside from views recorded and proposals put forward by the South African 
law commission during its inquiry into child care legislation in 1997-2002,11 there has 
been little debate about how the role and functions of these courts needs to change in a 
new, democratic South Africa. A low status accorded to the children's courts and the fact 
that it is difficult to obtain information about them because their hearings are held in 
camera and their decisions have never been published in law reports may have rendered 
them unattractive to potential investigators.  This perhaps accounts for the absence of 
major studies.12  By comparison with other courts children's courts have been neglected by 
researchers and legal commentators despite the fact that they are performing crucial 
functions in a society confronted, for example, with the consequences of an AIDS 
pandemic.13 
 
 A second reason which may be cited as a motivation for the thesis is that as 
suggested above our law concerning the state’s responsibilities towards children who 
require alternative care measures is generally poorly developed.14  This is in spite of the 
fact that South Africa is fortunate in having a part of its Constitution15 -s 28- which lists 
fundamental rights for children.  Of particular importance to the concerns of this thesis is 
s28(1)(b)-(d).  These provisions indicate that every child in South Africa has the right: 
                                                 
10 The modern South African studies are referred to in subsequent chapters, below.  However, at the time of 
writing no commentaries on relevant aspects of the 2005 Act had yet appeared.  It is for this reason that the 
analysis of the Act in this thesis is that of the candidate without supporting secondary sources. 
11 South African Law Commission: Review of the Child Care Act: First Issue Paper (Issue Paper 13, 1998) 
70-78; Collation of Comments on the Review of the Child Care Act Discussion Paper 103 (2002) 61-68; 
Report on the Review of the Child Care Act (RP 17/2003) part 2 pp290-310. 
12 The department of justice noted in 1996 that very little research had been done on the children's courts and 
that these had 'an extremely low status in relation to other structures of the judiciary': Department of Justice 
National Plan of Action for the Children of South Africa and the Role of the Department (File Reference: 
8/6/Kind/1 of 19th April, 1996) 14. 
13 J Sloth-Nielsen & B Van Heerden 'Proposed Amendments to the Child Care Act and Regulations in the 
Context of Constitutional and International Law Developments in South Africa' (1996) 12 SAJHR 247 at 252 
referred to children's courts as 'the most "hidden" from scrutiny of all our courts'. 
14 The reasons for this are explored in the next chapter. 
15 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa op cit note 3 above (hereafter 'the Constitution'). 
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'(b) to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when removed from the family 
environment; 
(c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services; 
(d) to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation;' 
 
Also of significance is the powerful enunciation in s 28(2) of the Constitution that '[a] 
child's best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child'.  
Section 28 clearly has the potential to provide a foundation for the development of more 
detailed law pertaining to alternative care cases but our courts are still in the early stages of 
interpreting it.16 
 
Although the constitutional court has begun to address the nature and extent of the 
state's obligations towards children in need there are many aspects which remain unsettled.  
And, of course, the extent to which courts can direct the executive in regard to socio-
economic rights for children is a thorny issue. In Government of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others (hereafter 'Grootboom')  the constitutional 
court considered the nature of children's right to alternative care in terms of s 28(1)(b) of 
the Constitution in conjunction with their right to shelter under s 28(1)(c).17  In an 
interpretation which Friedman and Pantazis have described as 'impoverished' it held that 
even where children were shown to be in need of shelter the state could only be compelled 
to address this outside its ordinary scheduling of social services if they had been removed 
from their parents into the child protection system.18  Although the court was primarily 
seized with the state’s obligation to provide accommodation for a group of homeless 
persons of all ages Grootboom appeared generally to limit its responsibility to provide care 
measures of a kind that might enable children to remain with their families.19  
                                                 
16 See generally A Friedman & A Pantazis 'Children's Rights' in S Woolman (ed) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa (2004) 47-1; and J Sloth-Nielsen 'Children' in MH Cheadle, DM Davis & NRL Haysom (eds) South 
African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2005) 507. 
17 2000 BCLR 1169 (CC); 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). 
18At paras 76-77.  See Friedman & Pantazis (2004) op cit note 16 at 47-6.  For a detailed discussion of the 
judgment from a children's rights perspective see ibid at 47-6 to 47-13. 
19 As noted by J Sloth-Nielsen 'The Child's Right to Social Services, the Right to Social Security, and 
Primary Prevention of Child Abuse: Some Conclusions in the Aftermath of Grootboom' (2001) 17 SAJHR 
210 at 225 this was because the court did not expressly restrict its limitations upon the claims of children still 
in the care of their parents only to shelter. See also Friedman & Pantazis (2004) op cit note 16 at 47-12. 
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Subsequently, in Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and 
Others (hereafter 'TAC') the constitutional court considered whether the state could be 
compelled to supply a drug free of charge to impoverished mothers.20  The drug was one 
which reduced the chances of mother to child transmission of HIV/AIDS.  In an approach 
which could be interpreted as somewhat different to that taken in Grootboom the court 
ordered that the drug be supplied.  In Bannatyne v Bannatyne,21 in the context of a dispute 
concerning the maintenance obligations of parents, Mokgoro J held that under s 28 of the 
Constitution: 
'children have a right to proper parental care …While the obligation to ensure that all children are 
properly cared for is an obligation that the Constitution imposes in the first instance on their parents, 
there is an obligation on the state to create the necessary environment for parents to do so'.22 
 
It could not be said that the TAC and Bannatyne cases dealt specifically with the alternative 
care needs of children in dysfunctional families.  However, the judgments generated by 
them arguably showed a somewhat wider recognition than in Grootboom of the need for 
proactive measures that can benefit children whilst they are still under parental care.23  
 
  In a situation where the constitutional court had so far been able to provide only 
limited and somewhat confusing guidance about the state's responsibilities the legislature, 
in the 2005 Act, decided to provide the children's courts with broad new powers to order 
social services at state expense for children who needed these in order to remain with their 
families.24  It is important to note, however, that the Act provides merely an initial 
framework for a new model of court-directed alternative care.  It currently requires but 
lacks regulations to guide its implementation and has very little to say about procedures.  
The Act is incomplete in another sense.  Parts of the draft Bill on which it was based were 
                                                 
20 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC). 
21 2003 (2) BCLR 111 (CC). 
22 Ibid at para 24. 
23 See Sloth-Nielsen (2005) op cit note 16 at 520-21. 
24 For a detailed discussion of this aspect of the legislation see part 8.3.2, below.  See also parts 7.2.2.2 & 
7.4.2, below. 
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left out for possible introduction in parliament at a later stage.25  These included clauses 
providing for additional measures supporting abused and neglected children.26  
 
With the currently-applicable 1983 Act being silent, deficient or different in 
relation to many aspects of care cases27 it will need to be entirely repealed when the 2005 
Act is fully implemented. Since the children's courts have never had their decisions 
reported and with relatively few litigants in care cases able to afford the cost of higher 
court appeals or reviews in recent years28 we do not have a substantial body of recently 
reported cases to assist with interpretation of the new legislation.  It may therefore be 
suggested that a thesis such as the present one is timely because there is a need for a 
structured, critical evaluation to indicate appropriate interpretation, amendments and 
supplementation (by means of rules of court and regulations) of the 2005 Act.   
 
As a final part of the motivation for this thesis attention may be drawn to the 
typical characteristics of children and families involved in cases where welfare personnel 
seek mandatory alternative care measures.   It has been internationally recognised that in 
these cases family members tend to be affected by severe problems such as poverty, 
domestic violence, alcoholism, drug abuse, psychological disabilities and serious 
illnesses.29  A great challenge in South Africa is how to address these and other social 
                                                 
25 These have been published as the Children's Amendment Bill 19/2006.  For an explanatory memorandum 
see Government Gazette No. 29030 of 14 July 2006. 
26 As noted by Sloth-Nielsen (2005) op cit note 16 at 523 the two-stage process was because parts of the Bill 
were regarded by parliament as requiring input from government representatives at provincial level.  Aspects 
of the 2006 Bill are referred to in parts 8.3.2 & 8.3.3, below. 
27 Gaps, deficiencies and differences in the 1983 Act will be noted in the more detailed discussion which 
follows in subsequent chapters, below. 
28 See part 2.3, below. 
29 While statistics are not available for South Africa this has been recognised in other systems. RS Sackett J 
'Terminating Parental Rights of the Handicapped' (1991) 25 Family LQ 253 at 290 mentioned that '[c]ases 
involving the termination of parental rights because of inability to parent almost always involve poor parents.  
There are many parents who suffer mental illness, drug addiction, or alcoholism, whose parental rights are 
never subject to court scrutiny because they have the financial resources or family support to supplement 
their parental responsibilities'. See also H O'Donnell 'What's Wrong with the Picture: the Other Side of 
Representing Parents in Child Protection Cases' (2005) 4 Appalachian Journal of Law 73 at 74 & 76. J 
Waldfogel 'Protecting Children in the 21st Century' (2000) 34 Family LQ 311 at 327 stated that evidence 
from a number of countries indicates a close relationship between low incomes and child neglect.  She also 
noted (ibid, at 325) that data collected in the USA indicated that drug addiction by parents is a factor in at 
least 70% of child abuse and neglect cases which come before courts. See also SH Ramsey 'Child Protection: 
New Perspectives for the 21st Century' (2000) 34 Family LQ 301; and RF Kelly 'Family Preservation and 
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problems in ways that will benefit children.  And a consequential question is whether there 
are new and creative ways in which courts can support families and encourage community-
based approaches to child care.  Can courts become supportive facilities that offer 
remedies that will strengthen natural support systems? It may be argued that there is a need 
at the present time for research to help establish how children's courts can be more 
creatively used.  Amongst other benefits this would bring relief to an overburdened 
protection system and the free up social workers to deal with the most serious cases.  
 
From a Canadian perspective Grover has rightly argued that in view of the 
vulnerability of those involved in care cases it is essential that well-developed systems of 
law governing mandatory state interventions be evolved.  These must effectively protect 
the rights of highly vulnerable family members. They must do so by clearly indicating the 
responses required of the state in specific situations and by compelling appropriate positive 
action.30  In this thesis it is hoped to contribute to the evolution of such a system of care 
law in South Africa.  This will be done by undertaking comparisons with other 
jurisdictions and applying the evaluative criteria which will be described in the next part 
below to aspects of our law governing the work of children's courts in care cases. 
 
 
 1.3  Methodology 
 
 The methodology applied in this thesis has been formulated in accordance with the 
two primary purposes of critically evaluating aspects of South African law and practice 
regarding children's court services for children in need of alternative care and 
recommending reforms. In relation to sources, pre-existing local, international and foreign-
national materials have mainly been utilised.  The only data generated specifically for the 
                                                                                                                                                    
Reunification Programmes in Child Protection Cases: Effectiveness, Best Practices, and Implications for 
Legal Representation, Judicial Practice, and Public Policy' (2000) 34 Family LQ 359 at 389.  Professor MCJ 
Olmesdahl, having represented caregivers in South African children's courts for more than twenty years, 
expressed the view that these problems similarly affect many adult parties in this country (personal 
communication, 28 Oct 2002).   
30 See S Grover 'Nowhere to Turn: the Supreme Court of Canada's Denial of a Constitutionally-Based 
Governmental Fiduciary Duty to Children in Foster Care' (2004) 12 International Journal of Children's 
Rights 105 at 106-07 & 111-14. 
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thesis came from some interviews with practitioners. It was found necessary to include 
interview data to fill gaps in information resulting from the current situation of few 
reported cases and limited available published research concerning the work of children's 
courts as referred to above.31  
 
Comparative research has been undertaken.  Materials drawn from selected foreign 
systems have been used (keeping in mind local differences) to explore the possibilities for 
solutions that might improve our system.  Categories into which foreign national systems 
were divided for the purposes of the thesis, and the methodological implications of these 
categories for comparative analysis, are explained in part 1.3.1, below. 
 
An important aspect of the methodology is the application of evaluative criteria. As 
further discussed in part 1.3.2, foreign national materials, the South African Constitution 
and also selected international sources were used to develop primary evaluative standards 
(hereafter 'criteria') against which to test our law. South African law and practices in the 
children's courts have been analysed in the light of these criteria. They are utilised both for 
criticism of existing approaches and to discern how the law pertaining to children's court 
services in care cases ought to be improved. 
 
 
1.3.1  Utilisation of Foreign-National Materials 
   
Although local differences have been kept in mind foreign solutions to problems 
which need to be overcome in developing our law governing children's court services in 
care cases have been considered throughout this thesis.  Since the potential pool of foreign-
national materials is vast and rapidly expanding, materials have been selectively drawn 
upon for the limited purpose of illuminating and solving specific problems in the South 
                                                 
31 Since children's court proceedings are conducted in camera and never reported practitioner-interviews 
were essential for obtaining detailed information about practices and procedures. The interviews were 
conducted in accordance with the 'conventional' validity criteria noted by EG Guba & YS Lincoln 
'Competing Paradigms of Qualitative Research' in NK Denzin & YS Lincoln (eds) The Landscape of 
Qualitative Research: Theories and Issues (1998) 195 at 213 para 3. They were semi-structured and included 
open-ended questions for eliciting both factual and qualitative information. Direct quotations have only been 
reproduced where they were transcribed verbatim.   
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African system. As a means of assisting with selection foreign-national sources have been 
broadly categorized as explained below.  It has been assumed that in assessing the value of 
foreign solutions from a comparative perspective it is important to appreciate the historical 
contexts within which they have evolved. As the worldwide search for ways to more 
effectively implement international instruments such as the CRC continues it has become 
clear that in many jurisdictions child care law is still inadequately developed.32 Even 
foreign legislation which appears modern since it is relatively recent may be flawed 
because it is based upon a limited experience of children's rights within the country 
concerned.33  
 
In some systems there has been a lack of development because children are still 
almost exclusively seen as subject to the authority of their families rather than that of the 
state.   Mandatory interventions are thus uncommon.34 In other countries large and 
regimented alternative care institutions which remain isolated from surrounding 
                                                 
32 JK Peters 'How Are Children Heard in Child Protective Proceedings in the United States and around the 
World in 2005: Survey Findings, Initial Observations and Areas for Further Study' (2006) 6 Nevada LJ 966 
at 968 found that most signatories to the CRC have only recently begun to consider how to enable children's 
voices to be heard in protection proceedings. And almost three quarters of children are living in countries 
where compliance with art 12 is poor. G Van Bueren & R Wanduragala 'Annual Review of International 
Family Law' in A Bainham (ed) The International Survey of Family Law: 2001 Edition (2001) 1 at 3 noted 
poor development of child care law in many systems and concluded '[t]he existence of street children in 
many parts of the world points to a situation where State responsibility is either minimal or nonexistent'. For 
the slow pace of reform in Malta see R Farrugia 'It's All Happening in Family Law in Malta' in Bainham 
(ibid) 285 especially at 288 & 290. On inadequate development of Chinese law see H Lihua 'Chinese 
Adoption: Practices and Challenges' LXXX (2001) Child Welfare 529 at 534-35. For the problem of 
underdevelopment in Bulgaria see generally V Todorova 'The Bulgarian Child Protection Act: the Start of 
the Child Welfare Reform?' in A Bainham (ed) The International Survey of Family Law 2002 Edition (2002) 
91.  For similar concerns about South Korea see S-H Baek 'Crisis of Family Dismantlement in Korea' (Paper: 
11th World Conference of the International Society of Family Law, 2002. Accessed at 
<http://www.jus.uio.no/ifp/isfl>). 
33 Awal cited s 20 of the Malaysian Children Act 2001.  Poor wording in this provision allowed for a child to 
be subjected by a welfare officer to medical or psychological treatment or assessment without either the 
child’s or a court’s prior consent: see NAM Awal 'Rights of Children:  The Malaysian Experiences' (Paper: 
11th World Conference of the International Society of Family Law, 2002: accessed at 
<http://www.jus.uio.no/ifp/isfl>) 9. In some legal systems child care law has only recently begun to achieve 
recognition as worthy of separate treatment in a specific organisational category. 
34 See S Minamikata & T Tamaki 'Family Law in Japan during 2000' in Bainham (2002) op cit note 32, 221 
at 227-28. K McK Norrie 'The Rights of Children' (2004) The Juridical Review 55 at 61 noted that in most 
countries in Europe 'a parent’s right to bring up his or her child as he or she thinks fit is given almost 
unfettered reign'.  He is critical, ibid, of the European court’s support of this by a focus more on parents’ than 
children’s rights in some judgments.  
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communities have been too heavily relied upon.35  These have been a legacy of Western 
colonialism in some parts of Africa.36  In the postcolonial period a lack of resources has 
retarded the development of alternatives to congregate institutional placements in many 
African countries.37 This combined with significant demographic changes has made it 
difficult to re-establish original indigenous approaches which emphasised child placements 
within extended families rather than in institutions.38  
 
For providing authoritative decisions on mandatory alternative care measures some 
systems have relied mainly or exclusively upon administrative tribunals which do not have 
the status of courts.  Even decisions to forcibly remove children from their families have 
thus been treated as merely administrative rather than juridical in nature.39 In other systems 
which do use courts for key decision-making specially trained staff with expertise in 
alternative care measures are not employed.40  It must be concluded, therefore, that 
                                                 
35 See H Agathonos-Georgopoulou 'Greece' in MJ Colton & W Hellinckx (eds) Child Care in the EC (1993) 
96 at 101-02 & 107; and M Calheiros, M Fornelos & JS Dinis 'Portugal' ibid 177 at 182. 
36 See, for example, MN Wabwile 'Child Support Rights in Kenya and in the UN Convention on the Rights 
of the Child 1989' in Bainham (2001) op cit note 32 at 267 N1.  The problem was also noted by P Kakama 
'Parental Responsibilities and Children's Rights in Uganda' (Paper presented at the Conference: 'The Trend 
from Parental Rights to Parental Responsibilities and Children's Rights' (Cape Town, 13 April 2000). The 
historical significance of this approach in South Africa is discussed in the next chapter. 
37 The widespread problem of insufficient resources has adversely affected the development and 
implementation of child care law in a variety of ways. See, for example,  F Nyalali 'The Child and the Court' 
(1997) February-May Issue The Tanzania Lawyer 26 at 27; and B Maripe 'The Recognition and Enforcement 
of Children's Rights in Domestic Law: An Assessment of the Child Protection Laws in Botswana in Light of 
Prevailing International Trends' (2001) 9 International Journal of Children's Rights 339 at 343-44.   
38 See B Rwezaura 'The Concept of the Child’s Best Interests in the Changing Economic and Social Context 
of Sub-Saharan Africa' (1994) 8 International Journal of Law and the Family 82 at 83; B Rwezaura  
'Competing "Images" of Childhood in the Social and Legal Systems of Contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa' 
(1998) 12 International Journal of Law, Policy and the  Family 253 at 261-62; B Rwezaura ' "This Is Not My 
Child": The Task of Integrating Orphans into the Mainstream of Society in Tanzania' in Bainham (2001) op 
cit note 32, 411 at 434; and R Sayson & AF Meya 'Strengthening the Roles of Existing Structures by 
Breaking down Barriers and Building up Bridges: Intensifying HIV/ AIDS Awareness, Outreach, and 
Intervention in Uganda' LXXX (2001) Child Welfare 541 at 547. Despite the problems, in some African 
systems there have been innovative attempts to give modern legislative form to indigenous approaches: see J 
Sloth-Nielsen & B Van Heerden 'New Child Care and Protection Legislation for South Africa?  Lessons from 
Africa' (1997) 3 Stellenbosch LR 261 at 266-76. 
39 See J Melbye 'Denmark' in Colton & Hellinckx (1993) op cit note 35, 34 at 41-42. In relation to Bulgaria 
see Todorova (2002) op cit note 32 at 103. See also the discussion of 2001 amendments to the Slovenian 
Marriage and Family Relations Act of 1976 by M Gec-Korosec & S Kraljic 'Judicial and Administrative 
Interventions in Legal Relations Between Parents and Children (In Parental Rights) With Intention to Protect 
Child's Best Interests' (Paper: 11th World Conference of the International Society of Family Law:  
Copenhagen and Oslo, 2-7 Aug 2002. Accessed at <http://www.jus.uio.no/ifp/isfl>).  
40 For the example of Spanish rural courts hearing appeals from administrative panels see F Casas 'Spain' in 
Colton & Hellinckx (1993) op cit note 35, 195 at 199. 
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limitations which have affected many systems require a cautious approach when 
considering the value of remedies developed within them from a comparative perspective. 
  
By contrast with what have been referred to above as undeveloped foreign national 
systems it is postulated for the purposes of this thesis that there is a second category of 
relatively better-developed systems. A distinguishing characteristic of these is extensive 
experience in courts over at least the last decade with the implementation of child care 
legislation which allows for a range of measures including support for a child in her 
family.  Some salient developmental influences and characteristics which need to be kept 
in mind when drawing upon these systems for solutions that might be effective in 
improving South African law are briefly described below.  
 
In relation to evolutionary influences an important development that was to impact 
significantly upon the law in many jurisdictions was the formulation in the USA in the 
early 1960s of the concept of the 'battered child syndrome' by Kempe, Silverman, Steele, 
Droegmueller, and Silver.41  Parton argues that, whereas child abuse was '(re)discovered' 
in the 1960s as a result of their work and characterized 'as essentially a medico-social 
problem, where the expertise of doctors was seen as focal', it had by the late 20th century 
been reconstituted as a socio-legal problem requiring pre-eminently legal expertise.42 This 
was encouraged by a discrediting of the social work and medical professions as the media 
continued to publicise failures to remove children who were subsequently murdered by 
caregivers43 and a belief that child protection systems could be legally ordered.44  It led 
initially to attempts to develop child-abuse prevention laws emphasising criminal 
                                                 
41 See generally CH Kempe, FN Silverman, BF Steele, W Droegmueller & HK Silver 'The Battered Child 
Syndrome' (1962) 181 Journal of the American Medical Association 107. This led to what Gelles has termed 
'the rediscovery of child abuse in the 1960s' (particularly in English-speaking countries) and 'focused 
attention on life-threatening acts of physical violence directed at young children': see RJ Gelles 'Policy Issues 
in Child Neglect' in Dubowitz (1999) op cit note 4, 278 at 286. 
42 N Parton 'Protecting Children: a Socio-Historical Analysis' in K Wilson & A James (eds) The Child 
Protection Handbook (2002) 11. See also ibid at 15-16 for a detailed discussion of how the 'battered baby 
syndrome' has been reconceptualised and extended since the 1960s. 
43 See ED Hutchison & LW Charlesworth 'Securing the Welfare of Children: Policies Past, Present and 
Future' (2000) 81 Families in Society: The Journal of Contemporary Human Services 576 at 581.  On the 
discrediting of other professions see also the so-called Cleveland affair as referred to in note 48, below.   
44 M King A Better World for Children? Explorations in Morality and Authority (1997) 72 concluded that 
legal systems began to dominate because they were able to characterise child welfare systems as 'in need of, 
and amenable to, legal ordering'.  
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proceedings and subsequently to attempts to refine non-criminal law covering alternative 
care for children.45  The general shift to legal decision-making led to an expanded role for 
courts as the most important forums for selecting outcomes in care cases.  
 
 When considering aspects of the work of courts in developed systems in 
subsequent chapters below it is assumed that a basic distinction needs to be drawn between 
two fundamentally different approaches to care cases which emerged within them in the 
late 20th century.  For convenience, these are referred to as the legalistic and anti-legalistic 
approaches.  In this thesis the legalistic approach denotes developed foreign national 
systems based on the view that a detailed body of legal rules is ideal for child care law in 
general and for court care-proceedings in particular. These systems are premised upon the 
idea that if sufficiently nuanced authoritative guidance can be built up to cover all 
conceivable situations serious mistakes by practitioners will become a rarity.  
 
Because of their ability to provide a constant stream of new rules on points of detail 
as experience builds up courts (and especially those of higher status which set precedents) 
tend to play an essential role in legalistic-approach systems.  Since their function is 
intended to be neutral and focused on the development and correct application of   legal 
rules adjudicators tend to interact with families in a somewhat formal, authoritative 
manner.  An authoritative function for judicial officers is also sometimes seen as necessary 
to control the actions of welfare. It may therefore be justified as helping to shield 
vulnerable families against welfare intrusiveness.46 Examples of legalistic jurisdictions are 
found within Canada,47 the United Kingdom48 and the USA. 
                                                 
45 For example, by 1967 all US states had enacted child-abuse reporting laws but improvements in child care 
law in the USA came only later: see JM Wilton 'Compelled Hospitalization and Treatment During 
Pregnancy: Mental Health Statutes as Models for Legislation to Protect Children from Prenatal Drug and 
Alcohol Exposure' (1991-92) 25 Family LQ 149 at 161. 
46 For example, in England in Re G [1993] 2 FLR 839 at 845 Waite LJ stressed the importance of courts 
protecting children and families by having 'the ability to maintain strict control of any steps taken or 
proposed to be taken' by welfare representatives in a care case. For a similar approach in the US see note 49, 
below. 
47 See N Freymond 'Using Intermediary Structures to Support Families: An International Comparison of 
Practice in Child Protection' 1 (Canadian Partnerships for Children and Families Project, 2001 -accessed at 
<http://www.wlu.ca./pcfproject>). On the motivation for the use of detailed rules in Canada see RB Howe 
'Implementing Children's Rights in a Federal State: The Case of Canada's Child Protection System' (2002) 9 
International Journal of Children's Rights 361 at 371. 
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In the USA, guidance provided by the US supreme court has caused care law to 
develop from the axiom that the family (and, by implication therefore, the parents) have a 
strong right to freedom from interference by the state except in the most compelling 
circumstances.49  Provision of alternative care for children has thus been approached from 
the perspective of overcoming legally-powerful nurturing rights of parents -and the 
terminology 'termination of parental rights' is thus often applied to alternative care cases.50 
The onus placed upon state welfare representatives has encouraged a legalistic approach by 
requiring strict and correct applications of increasingly-detailed substantive and procedural 
law in many US state systems.51  From a comparative perspective the US emphasis on 
protecting families from undue interference makes its care law a useful point of reference 
when considering reforms in South Africa although it must be kept in mind that US courts 
tend not to accord the same weight to the best interests of the child52 and the US has not 
bound itself to apply the CRC. 
 
   
                                                                                                                                                    
48 In England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland reliance on detailed legislation to guard against serious 
errors in care cases was encouraged by the so-called Cleveland affair in 1987. In the space of a few weeks, 
two paediatricians and some social workers assisting them at a hospital in Middlesbrough in England caused 
more than 100 children to be removed on grounds of sexual abuse.  Most of these cases were later found to 
be unsubstantiated and some previously accepted diagnosis techniques such as anal dilation tests and the use 
of anatomically correct dolls were discredited as a result: see Parton (2002) op cit note 42 at 17. 
49A seminal authority was Meyer v Nebraska 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Subsequently, as noted by TB Harding 
'Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights: Reform Is Needed' (2000-2001) 39 Brandeis LJ 895 at 903, the 
supreme court 'has continued to reach decisions on the premise of the constitutional right to raise children 
free from government intervention'. See also J Wriggins 'Parental Rights Termination Jurisprudence: 
Questioning the Framework' (2000) 52 South Carolina LR 241 at 248-49.  US judges have sometimes been 
concerned to guard against a perceived danger of overzealous welfare officials misusing their powers to 
overwhelm the rights of parents to keep their children: see, for example, In the Interests of La Rue 366 A.2d 
1271 (Pennsylvania 1976) at 1275. 
 50 See, for example, the US supreme court decisions in Stanley v Illinois 405 U.S. 645 (1972) and Santosky  
v Kramer 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
51 As noted by Harding (2000-2001) op cit note 49 above at 897 '[a] State may only terminate parents’ rights 
involuntarily in an adversarial proceeding while still complying with strict constitutional and statutory 
safeguards'.  
52 It has been held by US courts that to terminate parental rights on the ground of the child's interests alone is 
unconstitutional. It is instead essential to determine whether the parents are unfit: see the New Mexico cases 
of: In re J.J.B., 868 P.2d 1256 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993); and In re Termination of Parental Rights of Eventyr J., 
902 P.2d 1066 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995). BB Woodhouse  ' "Who Owns the Child?" Meyer and Pierce and the 
Child as Property' (1992) 33 William & Mary LR 995 especially at 997 criticised this approach as 
insufficiently child-centred. 
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Despite the arguments in its favour the legalistic approach is by no means 
universally regarded as the ideal for care cases.   Its central premise has been challenged by 
anti-legalistic practitioners and commentators. In their view a constant attention of courts 
to establishing fine points of practice and procedure steadily erodes the scope of action for 
social workers and also ultimately restricts courts themselves.53  It has more generally been 
argued that legalism causes professionals to focus disproportionately on technical 
requirements -such as whether there is sufficient proof- rather than on working 
constructively with children and their families.54   Legalism has therefore sometimes been 
characterised as antithetical to appropriate care services.55  In some systems where this 
view is accepted an effort has been made to reduce both the accretion of detailed rules and 
formality in court proceedings.56   
 
In New South Wales, France and Germany, in an attempt to avoid stigmatising 
caregivers, no legislatively prescribed threshold criteria for state intervention need be 
proved in court.57 In what is sometimes described as a family service model, in some 
developed European systems presiding officers avoid a rule-based technical approach.    
They interact supportively and informally with children and their families.58  In Germany, 
for example, family members are encouraged to speak out on almost equal terms with  
                                                 
53 See the views of Australian social workers cited in R Sheehan Magistrates' Decision-Making in Child 
Protection Cases (2001) 62. Canadian commentator Freymond generally characterises Anglo-American 
systems as inappropriately adversarial ones in which legislatures 'have narrowed definitions and tightened 
procedures' to the extent that legal responses to child maltreatment have become far too restricted: see 
Freymond (2001) op cit note 47 at 25. See also G Cameron & N Freymond 'Canadian Child Welfare: System 
Design Dimensions and Possibilities for Innovation' (2003) 9: accessed at 
 <http: www//.wlu.ca/documents/7180/Canadian_child_welfare_systems_design.pdf>. 
 Some English concerns about problems created by an overly technical and legalistic approach in care cases 
are noted by Parton (2002) op cit note 42 at 22.                                    
54 Cameron & Freymond (2003) ibid at 33. See also King (1997) op cit note 44 at 78. 
55 G Cameron, N  Freymond & D Cornfield et al  'Positive Possibilities for Child and Family Welfare: 
Options for Expanding the Anglo-American Child Protection Paradigm' (2001) 86: accessed at 
 <http:www//.wlu.ca/documents/7171/positive.pdf>. 
56 P Parkinson 'The Child Participation Principle in Child Protection Law in New South Wales' (2001) 9 
International Journal of Children's Rights 259 at 263 described the philosophy behind the Children and 
Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 of New South Wales, Australia as one which allows for 
proceedings to be based on requests for assistance by children or caregivers 'without any need for labelling or 
categorising the situation in terms of abuse or neglect'.  On France and Germany see Freymond (2001) op cit 
note 47 at 13. 
57 Sheehan (2001) op cit note 53 at 214-15.  See also part 8.2.1, below. 
58 Cameron, Freymond & Cornfield et al (2001) op cit note 55 at 79 & 83; Howe (2002) op cit 
note 47 at 371.  
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judges59  and even children are encouraged to speak directly to them if they are able to 
cope well with this.60 In these systems judges focus particularly on whether support 
services could be used to enable a child to remain with her family.61 
 
In anti-legalistic systems judges exercise a wide degree of discretion and every 
effort is made to reach agreement with families about care arrangements.  Courts tend to 
impose orders that are against their wishes only as an absolute last resort.62  The 
relationship between courts, families and welfare thus differs in some respects from what 
tends to apply in legalistic systems.  It requires courts to act as partners (albeit ones with 
authority) and to negotiate with families and social workers.63  Waldfogel noted that this 
entails a 'more active' role for courts which involves case management, case monitoring 
and more use of discretion.64 In her view a limitation of many modern reform proposals in 
legalistic systems 'is that they have tended to be silent about the role of the courts, and how 
that role would need to change' to achieve more active engagement.65 
 
  In this thesis   it is not suggested that either a legalistic or anti-legalistic approach 
should be exclusively chosen as the model upon which to base all reforms.    Instead, the 
respective strengths of both have been kept in mind when considering how best to improve 
South African law.  Following this flexible approach legalistic solutions have been 
proposed where detailed rules appear to be the best means of solving problems.   
Elsewhere, however,   it has been contended that other difficulties or shortcomings can 
best be dealt with by indicating realms of discretion for involved professionals such as 
                                                 
59 Howe ibid. Kuhlman noted that German court staff tend not to stand on status and frequently sit down 
together with parties round a common table (Ute Kuhlman -visiting researcher at the People's Family Law 
Centre, Cape Town: personal communication, 4 April 2003). 
60 H-C Prestien J 'The German Child Law Reform of 1998 As Seen by a Practitioner: Does It Go Far Enough 
in Making the Child's Voice Heard?' (Autumn 2003) VI The Judges’Newsletter/La letter des juges 44 at 45-
47.  Referring to the role of adjudicating officers N Lowe  'The 1996 Hague Convention on Protection of 
Children -a Fresh Appraisal' (2002) 14 Child and Family LQ 191 at 202  stated 'Germany, for example, sets 
great store by making extensive provision for listening to children and would certainly do so in cases where 
England might not'. 
61 Sheehan (2001) op cit note 53 at 15-16 mentions the examples of France, Germany and the Netherlands.  
See further part 8.3, below. 
62 Freymond (2001) op cit note 47 at 13. 
63 Waldfogel (2000) op cit note 29 at 322; Cameron,  Freymond & Cornfield et al (2001) op cit note 55 at 81. 
64 Waldfogel ibid 322-23.   
65 Ibid 311.   
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children's court adjudicators.    Both legalistic and anti-legalistic proposals have been put 
forward in different parts of the thesis according to which appears the better for resolving 
specific problems.66  The two approaches have thus been drawn on as alternatives and used 
as secondary analytical tools to assist with the application of the primary evaluative criteria 
referred to in part 1.3.2., below. A final point is that because of our historical roots as 
explained in the next chapter particular attention has been paid in this thesis to successful 
attempts by Anglo-influenced jurisdictions to modernise their care legislation and improve 
the services of courts. 
 
 
1.3.2 Utilisation of Primary Evaluative Criteria 
 
In relation to the methodology used for analysis this thesis applies selected criteria 
as primary evaluative tools.  They are used implicitly and sometimes explicitly to test the 
efficacy of our present law and discern what reforms are required.  They are drawn 
primarily from authoritative formulations of fundamental rights for children.67  The 
formulations are ones designed to create entitlements which are widely regarded 
internationally as vitally important.  They are to be found in our Constitution, the 1989 UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereafter 'CRC'), the 1990 African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child (hereafter 'ACC') and the 2007 Draft UN Guidelines for 
the Appropriate Use and Conditions of Alternative Care for Children (hereafter 'UN 
Guidelines, 2007'). 68  The criteria are described immediately below.  
 
A foundational criterion against which our care law must be evaluated is the extent 
to which it protects children against unnecessary or premature removals from their families 
                                                 
66 This is consistent with an application of the primary criteria described below. As noted by A Griffiths & 
RF Kandel 'Hearing Children in Children's Hearings' (2000) 12 Child and Family LQ 283 at 295 the CRC 
contains a combination of both technical, rights-based wording and broader references to interests and is 
therefore 'a hybrid of two approaches to the law of children'.  The same may be said of the ACC; and our 
Constitution (as is clear from the discussion above) generally frames children's rights in very broad terms. 
67 Regard has been had to the fact that similar rights sometimes appear in varying formulations in different 
authorities. Examples of this are noted below.  In this situation different aspects covered have been treated as 
providing further scope for measuring our law but, when necessary, the formulation providing the most 
extensive protection for children in need of care has been favoured. 
68 On the UN Guidelines see note 1, above. 
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by the state.69 As directed in art 13 of the UN Guidelines, 2007 removal must 'be seen as a 
measure of last resort' and be maintained only 'for the shortest possible duration'. In 
particular, as indicated in art 20 of the UN Guidelines, 2007, institutional placements of 
children should be limited as much as possible.70  And as further recommended in art 22 
placements in large residential facilities are to be seen as the least desirable of all.71  
 
Reducing removals entails effective support for families. As noted above s 28(1)(b) 
of the Constitution states that every child has the right 'to family care or parental care, or to 
appropriate alternative care when removed from the family environment'.72  The sequence 
of this wording is important.73   It implies that in subsidiary law such as our care 
legislation nurturing by a family or parents must wherever possible be accorded priority 
over other forms of care. In relation to support for familial care arts 14(2) and 18 of the 
CRC specifically require states parties to respect the nurturing rights and duties of parents 
and legal guardians and provide them with 'appropriate assistance'.74 And art 19(2) 
requires implementation of programs to support caregivers.75 Article 20(2) of the ACC is 
to a similar effect although there is more emphasis in its wording on basic material 
support.76  
                                                 
69 As noted in part 1.1 above these are inherently damaging to children. 
70 As Van Heerden (1999) op cit note 5 at 612 N386 has noted 'it is universally agreed that 
o remain in that environment, shall be 
o align our law with indigenous African culture by 
heir extended families. 
, treatment and follow up of instances of child maltreatment, 
esent Charter shall in accordance with their means and 
 and support programmes particularly with regard to nutrition, health, education, clothing and 
ld-rearing and ensure the 
institutionalization of children should be a step of last resort'. 
71 This article directs states to develop 'de-institutionalisation' strategies in order to eliminate these. 
72 For a detailed discussion of this provision see E Bonthuys (revising author) 'Children' in I Currie & J De 
Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 599 at 605-11. Article 20(1) of the CRC refers to the position of 
children in alternative care as follows '[a] child temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family 
environment, or in whose own best interests cannot be allowed t
entitled to special protection and assistance provided by the State'. 
73 Sloth-Nielsen (2005) op cit note 16 at 518-19 has postulated that the frontal placement of 'family care' in s 
28(1)(b) suggests that the intention of the legislature was t
strengthening children's ties with t
74 The latter in terms of art 18(2). 
75 It requires (in relevant part) that states-parties establish 'social programmes to provide necessary support 
for the child and for those who have the care of the child, as well as for other forms of prevention and for 
identification, reporting, referral, investigation
and, as appropriate, for judicial involvement'. 
76 This provision reads: 'States Parties to the pr
national conditions take all appropriate measures: 
(a) to assist parents and other persons responsible for the child and in case of need provide material 
assistance
housing; 
(b) to assist parents and others responsible for the child in the performance of chi
development of institutions responsible for providing care of children; and 
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 In the UN Guidelines, 2007 there is an extremely strong emphasis on measures to 
support children within their families. In art 3 it is stated that 'efforts should primarily be 
directed to enabling the child to remain in or return to the care of his/her parents, or when 
appropriate, other close family members'. And art 35 proposes, inter alia, that states must 
implement 'social protection measures' which include: 
 
'(a) Family strengthening services such as day care, parenting courses and sessions, the promotion of 
positive parent-child relationships, conflict resolution skills, opportunities for employment, income 
generation and, where required, social assistance; 
(b) Supportive social services such as mediation and conciliation services, substance abuse 
treatment, financial assistance, and services for parents and children with disabilities …'  
 
It is further recommended in art 54 that states must develop care legislation which gives 
'priority to family- and community-based solutions'. Clearly then, an important measure of 
the South African children's courts is the extent to which they are empowered to provide 
remedies that can, in suitable cases, assist children to remain in or rejoin their families. 
 
In terms of process, art 9(1) of the CRC, whilst not providing detailed directions, 
provides that: 
 
'States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their 
will, except  when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with 
applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best interests of the child.  
Such determination may be necessary in a particular case such as one involving abuse or neglect of 
the child by the parents, or one where the parents are living separately and a decision must be made 
as to the child's place of residence.' 
 
From this provision it is clear that a standard against which our system needs to be tested is 
whether grounds for state intervention in the lives of families include wording that 
appropriately balances the need to avoid unnecessary interference with sufficient 
protection for children.77  The reference to procedures in art 9(1) is important. Gerwig-
                                                                                                                                                    
(c) to ensure that the children of working parents are provided with care services and facilities'. 
77 K McK Norrie 'The Children Acts in Scotland, England and Australia: Lessons for South Africa in 
Rhetoric and Reality' (2002) 119 SALJ 623 at 624 has made the point that application of child law generally 
'is and always has been an uneasy balance between conflicting principles and interests'.  As he further notes, 
ibid at 624-25, frequently 'the court’s role is to identify a reasonable and rational compromise between 
factors pulling in different and sometimes opposing directions'.  On the tension between family care and 
child protection see Norrie (2004) op cit note 34 at 61-62. 
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Moore and Schrope have made the point that the sheer vulnerability of children means that 
their rights will often receive scant attention even in courts unless detailed procedural rules 
are in place.78  As they also point out another reason in favour of detailed procedures is 
that they make it easier for higher courts to provide effective oversight when receiving 
appeals or reviews.79 The UN Guidelines, 2007 at art 76 directs that '[a] regulatory 
framework should be established to ensure a standard process for the referral or admission 
of a child to an alternative care setting'.  Thus, a test which is applied to children's courts in 
this thesis is whether sufficiently developed procedures are in place to enable a fair and 
uniform aking. 
mpartial representative' in all judicial or administrative proceedings affecting 
the child.81  
                                                
 approach to care decision-m
 
In order for our law to uniformly facilitate the most appropriate kinds of care 
remedies in each case it must promote an appreciation (especially by court adjudicators) of 
the views of the persons who will be most affected. This requires firstly an openness to 
hearing the voices of children who will be the subject of care orders. Article 12 of the CRC 
is of course widely recognised as a significant provision which requires attention to the 
opinions of children who are capable of forming them in all kinds of proceedings and other 
situations where their interests are at stake.80  Article 4(2) of the ACC requires that an 
'opportunity shall be provided for the views of the child to be heard either directly or 
through an i
 
78 S Gerwig-Moore & LS Schrope 'Hush, Little Baby, Don't Say a Word: How Seeking the Best Interests of 
the Child Fostered a Lack of Accountability in Georgia’s Juvenile Courts' (2007) 58 Mercer LR 531 at 567. 
79 Ibid. 
80 This provision reads (in relevant part): 
 '1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express 
those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in 
accordance with the age and maturity of the child. 
2.  For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and 
administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative… '. In 2003, the 
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child stressed the crucial importance of art 12 and made the point that it 
requires not merely listening, but more importantly creating ways to ensure that due weight is given to the 
views of children: General Comment No 5 (34th session: 19 Sept-3 Oct 2003) para12, pp 4-5.  Accessed at 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/>. 
81 For a detailed comparative discussion of  the wording of art 12 of the CRC and art 4(2) of the ACC in 
relation to the right of children to participate in family law proceedings in South Africa see D Kassan  'The 
Voice of the Child in Family Law Proceedings' (2003) 36 De Jure 164 at 165-67. A wide recognition of the 
importance of children's right to be heard is shown by the fact that it is also included in other international 
instruments; for example: art 13 of the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction, art 13 of the 1984 Inter-American Convention on Conflict of Laws Concerning the Adoption of 
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The UN Guidelines, 2007 at art 6 proposes that all decisions on alternative care 
'should respect fully the child's right to be consulted and to have his/her views duly taken 
into account in accordance with his/her evolving capacities'. The potentially drastic 
consequences of state-imposed care measures for children -including frequently a 
deprivation of liberty-82 also make it particularly important to facilitate communication by 
them in care cases wherever they have the capacity.  For the purposes of this thesis, 
therefore, an important measure of our children's courts is how well geared they are, not 
only to passively hearing children, but also to encouraging communication by interacting 
supportively with them. 
 
Since not only children but parents and other primary caregivers are likely to be 
significantly affected by mandatory care measures it is crucial that an appreciation of their 
views also be facilitated by our care legislation. In South Africa language differences and 
poor standards of education impact negatively upon the ability of many family members to 
communicate during children's court cases.83  Article 9(2) of the CRC requires that where 
child placement proceedings are held 'all interested parties shall be given an opportunity to 
participate in the proceedings and make their views known'. And specifically hearing the 
voices of parents or other caregivers is essential because both art 18 of the CRC and art 
20(1) of the ACC require states to recognise that they have 'the primary responsibility for 
the upbringing and development of the child'.84  
                                                                                                                                                    
Minors and r 14.2 of the 1985 United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile 
Justice [the 'Beijing Rules'].  
82 The freedom of movement and association of children is often curtailed whilst and after they are the 
subject of care proceedings. As will be further discussed in part 7.2 below under our system a child may be 
deprived of her liberty even before a matter is heard by a children's court. This raises constitutional issues 
because s 21(1) of the Constitution states that '[e]veryone has the right to freedom of movement' and this 
obviously includes children.  Sloth-Nielsen (2005) op cit note 16 at 530 has noted that there is growing 
international support for the view that children who are placed in welfare institutions under circumstances 
where they are not permitted to leave are deprived of liberty. 
83 C Matthias Removal of Children and the Right to Family Life: South African Law and Practice (1997) 49-
52; N Zaal 'Hearing the Voices of Children in Court: A Field Study and Evaluation' in S Burman (ed) The 
Fate of the Child: Legal Decisions on Children in the New South Africa (2003) 158 at 162. 
84 Article 18(1) mentions '[p]arents or, as the case may be, legal guardians' whereas art 20(1) of the ACC 
refers more broadly to '[p]arents or other persons responsible for the child'. The preamble to the CRC 
requires support for families 'as the fundamental group of society'. 
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It is noteworthy that the European court in interpreting the right to family life in art 
8 of the European Convention85 (hereafter 'ECHR') has required that parents be provided 
with opportunities to be heard in care cases.86 In art 67 of the UN Guidelines, 2007 it is 
stated that '[t]he preparation, enforcement and evaluation of a protective measure for a 
child should be carried out, to the greatest extent possible, with the participation of his/her 
parents or legal guardians…'. An analytical measure used in this thesis, therefore, is the 
extent to which our care legislation has rendered children's courts accessible to hearing and 
interacting meaningfully with caregivers -and especially those whose parenting is in the 
best interests of their children but is adversely affected by factors beyond their control. 
 
A system designed to facilitate meaningful participation by nonlawyers obviously 
requires care legislation with full explanations and language clear enough to be easily 
understood.  As indicated in art 74  of the UN Guidelines, 2007 this is relevant even for 
older children because '[c]hildren in alternative care should be enabled to understand fully 
the rules, regulations and objectives of the care setting and their rights and obligations 
therein'.  A measure which is therefore applied in this thesis -and particularly to the new 
2005 Act - is the extent to which care has been taken by the drafters of statutory provisions 
to avoid unnecessary complexity in their structure and wording. 
 
If children's courts are to hear and take sufficient account of the views of those 
most affected in care cases they must clearly be accessible.  Section 34 of the Constitution 
is entitled '[a]ccess to courts' and provides a right for any person 'to have any dispute that 
can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court…'.  
Whilst public hearings are not appropriate for care cases it is certainly important that 
                                                 
85 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950. 
86A Pantazis & T Mosikatsana 'Children's Rights' in M Chaskalson, M Kentridge & J Klaaren et al (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa (2005) 33-1 at 33-6. See also Norrie (2004) op cit note 34 at 61. 
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hearings be fair.87 Article 37(d) of the CRC is especially relevant because it relates access 
specifically to children deprived of their liberty.  It states: 
 
'Every child deprived of his or her liberty shall have the right to prompt access to legal and other 
appropriate assistance, as well as the right to challenge the legality of the deprivation of his or her 
liberty before a court or other competent, independent and impartial authority, and to a prompt 
decision on any such action.'      
 
As can be seen appropriate access does not involve merely being able to appear before a 
court or other forum.  It entails a capability to test the state’s proposed alternative care 
measures by subjecting them to real challenge. And this relates to the concept of a fair 
hearing because it will only be possible to offer a substantial challenge and put forward 
alternatives to the proposals of welfare where procedural law facilitates effective and 
uninhibited communication by vulnerable family members. The question of hearing 
appropriate voices is therefore related to our procedural law as applicable in the children's 
courts.  
 
  In some cases a necessary means for facilitating appropriate communication is 
legal representation. Section 28(1)(h) of the Constitution states that every child has a right 
'to have a legal practitioner assigned to the child by the state, and at state expense, in civil 
proceedings affecting the child, if substantial injustice would otherwise result'.  In this 
thesis the question of when substantial injustice would tend to result in the absence of 
representation for children is considered with reference to care cases in the children's 
courts.  Concerning representation for parents it is recommended in art 48 of the UN 
Guidelines, 2007 that where removal of their child would be against their will parents must 
be provided with 'access to appropriate legal representation'.  Because of the pervasive 
factor of parental vulnerability in care cases the extent to which our system provides 
appropriately for caregiver-representation in children's courts is considered in this thesis. 
Our system is assessed to establish the degree to which it facilitates access to competent 
legal representation and provides clarity about the functions of lawyers. 
  
                                                 
87 In Europe the right to a fair trial in art 6 of the ECHR has been used to challenge court findings in care 
inquiries on grounds of procedural unfairness: see CM Lyon 'Child Protection and the Civil Law' in Wilson 
& James (2002) op cit note 42, 191 at 226. 
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 In relation to the criterion of the best interests of children it has been noted above 
that s 28(2) of the Constitution requires these to be treated as paramount.88  It thus 
notionally sets a higher standard than either the CRC or the ACC.89 The best interests 
criterion has been expressly linked to alternative care, and also to establishing the wishes 
of children, in art 19(1) of the ACC.  This provides a basic right for children to live with 
their parents and further states (in relevant part) that '[n]o child shall be separated from his 
parents against his will, except when a judicial authority determines in accordance with the 
appropriate law that such separation is in the best interest of the child'.  It thus requires a 
more direct role for a legally trained adjudicator than the equivalent art 9(1) of the CRC as 
quoted above.90  
 
As has been recognised internationally, however, the best interests criterion must 
be carefully applied on behalf of children with due appreciation of its lack of specificity.91  
Legislation which facilitates uncritical applications of the best interests standard is 
dangerous because it may produce counterproductive results.92  The approach taken in this 
                                                 
88 In Minister for Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick 2000 (3) SA 422 (CC); 2000 (7) BCLR 
713 (CC) at para 17 the constitutional court, per Goldstone J, held that the paramountcy of children's best 
interests extends beyond their rights as enumerated in s 28(1) of the Constitution.  It thus applies wherever 
their interests arise for consideration in our law.  There are, however, limitations: see the discussion of cases 
in Bonthuys (2005) op cit note 72 at 600 N1. 
89 Article 3(1) of the CRC sets the best interests as 'a primary consideration'.  Article 4(1) of the ACC 
requires it to be treated as 'the primary consideration'. 
90 The latter requires merely judicial review rather than primary decision-making.  
91Amongst the problems that have been raised is that an inquirer attempting to establish what is in the best 
interests of a child may be faced with difficult and perplexing questions.  See Robert H Mnookin as quoted 
by DN Duquette 'Legal Representation for Children in Protection Proceedings: Two Distinct Lawyer Roles 
Are Required' (2000) 34 Family LQ 441 at 447. Fifteen years later, Hutchison & Charlesworth (2000) op cit 
note 43 at 578 noted that there was still little consensus about what is in the best interests of children.  
Lansdown has contended that the best interest standard is so inherently vague that it may even be harmful 
rather than beneficial for children.  He warned in 1994 that 'the operation of a best interests principle should 
not be seen as inherently beneficial to children.  It can be, on the contrary, a powerful tool in the hands of 
adults, which can be used to justify any of their actions and to overrule the wishes and feelings of children'. 
See G Lansdown as quoted by C Hallett & C Murray 'Children's Rights and the Scottish Children's Hearings 
System' (1999) 7 International Journal of Children's Rights 31 at 47-48. Norrie (2002) op cit note 77 at 625 
warned similarly that 'the test is used too often as a blind to furthering of adults’ rather than children’s 
interests'. 
92 In a criticism of proposed English legislation S Harris-Short 'The Adoption and Children Bill -A Fast 
Track to Failure?' (2001) 13 Child and Family LQ 405 at 423 warned that legislative provisions which 
establish the best interests of children as paramount may be interpreted in ways that result in insufficient 
attention being given to the responsibilities of parents. Bonthuys (2005) op cit note 72 at 620 cautioned that 
'[a]n individualistic focus on the rights of the child at the expense of parental interests would be 
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thesis is that in the context of care cases best interests must not be simplistically applied to 
support removals of children in a manner which artificially disregards related parental 
problems such as poverty or inadequate social services which are very relevant in South 
Africa. Article 3(2) of the CRC appropriately requires a balanced approach because it 
directs states parties to ensure protection and care for children in a way that takes into 
account the rights and duties of parents, guardians 'or other individuals legally 
responsible'.93  In this thesis best interests is therefore not treated as a self-sufficient 
criterion –rather, consideration is given to whether there is sufficient clarification on how it 
is to be established. 
 
 An important measure of our children's court services arises from the need in many 
cases for alternative care   remedies   as an incremental, monitored process over time rather 
than as a once-off 'final' court order carved in stone.  As recommended in art 55 of the UN 
Guidelines, 2007 states need to establish systems which are capable of producing separate 
decisions on emergency, short-term and long-term care. In order to protect children 
properly it is also important that there be a facility for effectively reviewing these 
decisions. Article 25 of the CRC directs that: 
 
'State Parties recognise the right of a child who has been placed by the competent authorities for the 
purposes of care, protection, or treatment of his or her physical or mental health, to a periodic 
review of the treatment provided to the child and all other circumstances relevant to his or her 
placement.' 
 
And art 16(2) of the ACC states: 
'Protective measures under this Article shall include effective procedures for the establishment of 
special monitoring units to provide necessary support for the child and for those who have the care 
of the child, as well as other forms of prevention and for identification, reporting, referral, 
investigation, treatment, and follow-up of instances of child abuse and neglect.' 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
counterproductive if it has the effect of impeding the ability of parents to provide for the social, economic an 
emotional needs of their children'. In relation to the particular difficulties posed by care cases see generally B 
Walter, JA Isenegger & N Bala ' "Best Interests" In Child Protection Proceedings: Implications and 
Alternatives' (1995) 12 Canadian Journal of Family Law 367.  
93 Article 3(2) is supported by art 5 which requires states parties to respect the responsibilities and rights and 
duties of parents or 'where applicable' members of an extended family or community, legal guardians or other 
persons legally responsible for a child. 
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It is clear that in care cases a periodic review of the child’s circumstances by an 
authoritative body may potentially be needed at any time after the child comes to the notice 
of welfare authorities.94   
 
Articles 5 and 69 of the UN guidelines, 2007 recommend specifically that 
mechanisms be created for thorough reviews of the appropriateness and success of 
alternative care arrangements.  And art 13 proposes that these are essential where children 
have been removed from their families.  On involvement of courts art 48 recommends that 
there must be a 'judicial review' of '[a]ny decision to remove a child against the will of 
his/her parents'.  As further suggested in art 56 reviews should be broad enough in scope to 
evaluate the extent to which 'all entities and individuals engaged in the provision of 
alternative care' have fulfilled their obligations.  It is again emphasised in art 108 that, 
rather than concentrating only on family members, involved agencies and facilities must 
also be reviewed.  Given the importance of reviews and the fact that welfare agencies and 
facilities cannot conduct these because they themselves need to be reviewed, in this thesis 
the role of children's courts in providing monitoring is critically evaluated. 
 
  An incremental approach to care decision-making requires the flexibility to deal 
with consequential aspects.    For example, if initial alternative care measures have 
separated a child from her family questions of an appropriate degree of contact may arise.  
Article 19(2) of the ACC states that '[e]very child separated from one or both parents shall 
have the right to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a 
regular basis'. The UN Guidelines, 2007 at art 52 recommends that '[r]egular and 
appropriate contact between the child and his/her family specifically for the purpose of 
reintegration should be developed, supported and monitored'. And art 79 states more 
broadly that '[w]hen a child is placed in alternative care, contact with his/her family, as 
well as with other persons close to him or her such as friends, neighbours and previous 
carers, should be encouraged and facilitated, in keeping with the child's protection and best 
                                                 
94 The final part of art 19(2) of the CRC could be read as supporting this approach wherever there is abuse or 
neglect because it refers to children's right to '…follow-up of instances of child maltreatment, and, as 
appropriate, for judicial involvement'. On the need for managing and monitoring see also the text 
accompanying note 64, above.  
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interests'.  A test of our system that will be applied in this thesis, therefore, is the extent to 
which our law has empowered children's courts to be readily available to provide 
adjustable, ongoing support in relation to important consequential aspects such as contact.  
 
A final measure applied to children's courts in this thesis is whether they are 
sufficiently effective in protecting children who are subject to alternative care 
arrangements. At different stages of a case issues concerning the current commitment or 
capacity of parents, involved welfare professionals or an alternative caregiver (including a 
state or private institution) may become urgent. In relation to institutions art 131 of the UN 
Guidelines, 2007 states  '[a]gencies and facilities providing alternative care services should 
be held legally responsible' for ensuring suitable quality of care.  And art 132 adds ' 
[a]gencies, facilities and professionals involved in case supervision should be accountable 
to a specific public authority'.  In this thesis the role of children's courts in helping to 
ensure accountability is therefore considered. 
 
 
1.4  The Scope of the Thesis 
 
 Child care and protection law is obviously an extremely broad field which traverses 
many sub-areas within public and private law, criminal and civil law, and statutory and 
common law.  The thesis is not a general study of South African law in this field.  As its 
title suggests the focus is upon selected court services for children whose care 
arrangements require investigation by representatives of the state. The services chosen for 
evaluation are those provided by our children's courts where social workers bring 
applications with a view to establishing that children are in need of mandatory alternative 
care measures.  Relevant law evaluated in this thesis therefore pertains to determining 
whether children need court-ordered care services and deciding what these should be.95  In 
terms of extent, the thesis primarily evaluates the law relevant to some important aspects of 
                                                 
95 In the current South African terminology this would be the law relevant to children's court 'inquiries' to 
establish whether a child is in 'need of care': see ss 12-14 of the 1983 Act.  The 2005 Act at s 156 refers 
somewhat differently to a children's court reaching a 'finding' on whether a child is in need of care and 
protection and then issuing a relevant 'order'.  On the significance of the terminological changes see further 
part 8.2, below. 
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care proceedings from the time that a case is instigated through to the issuing of a 
temporary alternative care order at the completion of the case in court.96   
 
Although the law providing for temporary care orders is critically evaluated, in 
order to retain a manageable scope this thesis does not extend to an analysis of subsequent 
adoption cases that might be instigated and brought before children's courts once a 
temporary care order has been issued. Permanent alternative care remedies are thus not 
covered. It should also be noted that the focus is primarily upon the role of children's 
courts rather than other courts.  For reasons of space (and also because they have played a 
limited role in recent decades) the functions of higher courts in temporary care cases have 
been considered only briefly and primarily in relation to their impact on children's courts. 
Cases in criminal courts arising from neglect or abuse of children fall entirely outside the 
scope of the thesis and are thus not dealt with at all. In part 1.4.1 below the scope of the 
thesis is further explained by providing a brief overview of what is discussed in the 
following chapters. 
 
 
1.4.1  An Overview of the Chapters 
 
Chapter 2 traces the origins and most significant historical influences upon the 
South African children's courts.  It is contended that an inherited English framework which 
blurred differences between crime and care, and locally-developed forms of racism against 
children, were the two main factors which produced an inadequate legislative framework 
for the children's courts as received by a newly democratic South African government at 
the end of the 20th century.   
 
Chapter 3 places the modern South African children's courts in context as merely 
one of a possible variety of forums or means for dealing with care cases.  It addresses the 
key question of whether courts should even be used for these cases.  It is argued that in 
                                                 
96 Although space has precluded a detailed analysis, in part 8.4.3 below some suggestions are offered on a 
further ongoing role for children's courts during the subsistence of alternative care orders.  An aspect which 
has not been dealt with at all is the transfer of cases between children's courts in different jurisdictions. 
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South Africa at the present time there are strong reasons in favour of the continuance of 
courts as an important (although not necessarily exclusive) forum for providing significant 
decisions on alternative care measures. 
 
Chapter 4 explores means for directly achieving effective communication by 
vulnerable children, family members and other persons who appear in the children's courts.  
It asserts that a participatory model which achieves this in care cases is essential and 
practicable.  Chapter 5 follows the question of communication further by evaluating the 
role of legal representatives.  It discusses the extent to which lawyers who represent 
children should focus on what is in their best interests or else what their wishes are.  It 
asserts that our law governing the functions of representatives for children, caregivers and 
social workers needs to be clarified. It is shown that much better provision can be made for 
training and the employment of lawyers at state expense. 
 
Chapter 6 focuses on the role of presiding officers in children's courts.  It develops 
an argument that our current system of requiring them to rely primarily on procedures 
followed in civil magistrates’ courts has caused confusion.  It is contended that specialised 
rules on adjudicator role functions can and should be developed.  It is shown with 
reference particularly to anti-legalistic systems that an ideal mode for adjudicators would 
be an inquisitorial one which emphasises supportive interactions with other participants. It 
is asserted that in the case of South Africa legislative provisions are required to introduce 
this.  
 
In chapter 7 it is shown that a serious gap in our law results from a failure to utilise 
children's courts properly for the provision of interlocutory remedies.  It is demonstrated 
firstly that there is inadequate access to children's courts where emergency removals of 
children are undertaken.  It is more generally argued that a poor development of procedural 
law and failure to recognise sufficiently that care cases should often be incrementally 
managed by courts have tended to block access.  It is shown that this problem subsists 
throughout interim periods after cases have been initiated but are still being investigated by 
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welfare instigators.  Solutions for the improvement of interim court services are put 
forward. 
 
Chapter 8 deals with what is often the most important stage in court involvement -
the dispositive proceedings which follow completion of welfare’s investigation.  At this 
stage the two main issues are whether there is sufficient justification for mandatory care 
measures and, if so, what those should be.  The chapter provides a critical evaluation of the 
new approach to grounds and dispositive children's court remedies in the 2005 Act.  It is 
shown that the Act complicates dispositive proceedings unnecessarily by failing to 
distinguish sufficiently between grounds and remedies. It also enables technical defences 
by linking grounds to restrictive definitions and even allows grounds to be avoided 
entirely. The chapter provides recommendations for overcoming these deficiencies.   
 
On the positive side, it is shown in chapter 8 that a significant advance produced by 
the 2005 Act is a considerably increased range of children's court orders.  And further, the 
role of children's courts in care cases has been transformed and rendered potentially much 
more constructive.  Instead of being mainly concerned with removals they are now 
expected to consider whether to order social services designed to enable children to remain 
in their families or else return to them in the future.  It is argued that these sweeping 
changes in substantive law require a commensurate development of procedural law.  It is 
shown that the key to such development would be the division of dispositive proceedings 
into logical phases.  Proposals on these are put forward.   
 
In the concluding chapter 9 the main findings of the thesis are drawn together.  
Some final recommendations are put forward in the light of the primary criteria and 
recurring themes. The latter relate to overcoming communication and access barriers, the 
need for more detailed rules and procedures, and the need for improved training and 
greater status and independence for children's courts in view of the introduction of a family 
service model in the 2005 Act. Finally, some recommendations on directions for further 
research are put forward. 
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The date up to which the law and related materials have been considered in this 
thesis is 30 September, 2007.  
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 CHAPTER 2 
 
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF LEGISLATION AND COURT SERVICES FOR 
CHILDREN IN NEED OF CARE  
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
As Freymond has noted '[t]he relationship between private family matters and State 
authority is complex, value laden, and firmly rooted in the historical, cultural, political and 
economic foundations of society'.1 For a proper understanding of our current approach to 
alternative care measures it is necessary to appreciate significant historical developments 
which impacted upon court services for children.  In this chapter the primary aims are to 
identify the most important of these developments and evaluate their influence.  The 
discussion proceeds in four stages. Some early external influences, the wording of South 
African care legislation, the implementation of that legislation by courts, and recent 
attempts to establish more effective courts and legal representatives for children are each 
briefly considered. 
 
  In part 2.2 of this chapter an attempt is made to uncover some seminal aspects of 
early Western and particularly English assumptions concerning responsibility of the state 
which led to the use of courts as gatekeepers for placements of children in need of 
alternative care.  As might be expected, English influences were particularly important 
during the British-colonial period in South Africa.  In part 2.3 key South African 
legislative provisions relevant to mandatory alternative care measures and court precedents 
in which these were interpreted are identified and discussed in chronological order. The 
main focus is on 20th century provisions providing for court services in care cases.  
Wording as it evolved in successive statutes dating back to the pre-Union period is  
                                                 
1 N Freymond 'Using Intermediary Structures to Support Families: An International Comparison of Practice 
in Child Protection' (2001) 2: accessed at the Canadian Partnerships for Children and Families Project 
Website: <http://www.wlu.ca./pcfproject>.  
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analysed and compared in order to establish the most important developments.  The origins 
and early work of children's courts are discussed. 
 
 It is argued in part 2.4 that an unduly positive impression of the work of children's 
courts might be obtained by merely considering the wording and not the application of care 
legislation as it evolved historically.   It will be suggested that, in a manner which was 
often covert, racism had a long-term impact on the availability and quality of court services 
for children in need of care.  Since racism exerted a subtle but powerful influence 
throughout the 20th century it has been singled out for thematic attention in part 2.4.  It 
will be shown that a growing fixation on racial considerations grafted onto originally 
English thinking confusing crime and care does much to explain serious weaknesses in our 
care legislation and related children's court services inherited by the first democratic 
government in 1995. 
 
 In part 2.5 the history of recent attempts in South Africa to overcome some of the 
deficiencies by establishing more broadly-empowered courts, state-employed specialist 
legal representatives and improved legislation for children is briefly surveyed.  Setbacks in 
these initiatives help to explain the persistence of many fundamental shortcomings in our 
modern care law.  In the concluding part 2.6 the most important historical developments 
identified in the chapter are summarised and related to the primary evaluative criteria used 
in the thesis. 
 
 
2.2  Early Influences in the Wider World 
 
 It is well-known that since the earliest times in many countries abandoned and 
orphaned children have been taken in and cared for by religious organizations or private 
benefactors.  As noted in part 1.3.1 above according to the customary norms of many 
African tribes there would be no formal removal into alternative care institutions. This was 
because nurturing would be supplied automatically where needed by members of extended 
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families or local communities.2 Children who needed substitute-parents would therefore 
often continue to grow up in their original home environments.  Child-protective 
provisions for limiting the rights of abusive parents were by no means unknown in African 
customary law, but typically they did not require removal of a child from her community.3 
The Western concept of moving children to separate institutions was imported to South 
Africa during the colonial period.4  Also imported was the system, dating from the Middle 
Ages and utilised in many European systems,5 of boarding out selected children with 
private individuals to serve as apprentices.  
 
By the 17th and 18th centuries the labour potential of destitute children was widely 
exploited in European countries.  Harsh conditions were frequently imposed in 'children's 
houses' and foundling homes. This was allegedly to prevent poor children from flocking 
into them to receive free board and lodging; but in reality it was to keep out those who 
were not strong and healthy enough to work.6 In European colonies such as those 
maintained by the Dutch East India Company at the Cape racial policies were an additional 
factor which influenced the selection of children for placement in child-rearing 
establishments.7 In the 18th and 19th centuries the numbers of orphanages in European and 
European-colonised countries increased. Typically, children were accommodated in large 
                                                 
2 For example, if a child’s parent died the surviving parent and senior members of the child's extended family 
would typically decide what new care arrangements within the family would best suit the welfare of the 
child.  This was recognised as the approach that would normally be taken under African customary law in 
Esnad Ndebele and Josiah v Togo Ndebele 1965 AAC 23.  TW Bennet Human Rights and African 
Customary Law under the South African Constitution (1995) 96 has pointed out that care for children was 
often provided by non-parental members of the extended family because in customary law there was 'no 
fixed idea that children have constantly to be in the physical custody of their biological parents'. See also JG 
Storry Customary Law in Practice (1979) 64. 
3 Storry ibid at 67. A Shangaan custom that a father who kills his child must forfeit all rights to the custody of 
any other children by the same wife was recognised in Hlomani v Mjayi and Mawengi 1933 SRN 53.  
4 The earliest South African institution was established by the Dutch East India Company in Cape Town in 
the mid-17th century partly for the purpose of nurturing slave orphans: see FN Zaal 'The Ambivalence of 
Authority and Secret Lives of Tears: Transracial Child Placements and the Historical Development of South 
African Law' (1992) 18 Journal of Southern African Studies 372 at 380. 
5 W Hellinckx, B van den Bruel & C vander Borght 'Belgium and Luxembourg' in MJ Colton & W Hellinckx 
(eds) Child Care in the EC (1993) 1 at 2. 
 6 J Melbye 'Denmark' in Colton & W Hellinckx ibid 34 at 39. See also H Colla-Muller 'Germany' ibid 71 at 
76. 
7 At some stations, the Dutch East India Company resorted to forcibly removing partly white extra-marital 
female children from their Asian mothers.  In pursuit of a ‘whitening’ policy these children were incarcerated 
in isolated institutions where they were trained to become future wives of Dutch colonists:  see Zaal (1992) 
op cit note 4 at 377-78. 
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groups and impersonal social climates.  As a result of thinking dating back to the early 
monastic orders these children tended to be kept cut-off from the outside world and 
education was mainly by rote and drill.   
 
The idea that states should take over direct responsibility for managing at least 
some children's institutions was a significant mid-nineteenth century development. The 
earliest government care institutions were conceptualised as providing structured 
environments for large numbers of children similar to those in prisons and this was one 
reason why conditions tended to be harsh.   In an important development in South Africa 
during the late 19th century a dual system of government 'reformatories' and 'industrial 
schools' for children was imported from Britain, where it dated from the mid-19th 
century.8  As the term 'reformatories' suggests, the idea behind these was to use 
intensively-controlled regimes as a means of rehabilitating children.  The primary aim was 
to transform delinquent children convicted by criminal courts 'into useful citizens and 
docile workers'.9 British industrial schools took in unconvicted destitute children.10  
However, as noted by Cretney the regimented routine at the two forms of institution was 
often very similar.11 Significantly, reformatories and industrial schools both carried the 
analogy to prisons to the extent of utilising court orders as an entry mechanism. These 
orders may be seen as the historical precursors of modern court care orders.  
                                                
 
In the late 19th-century child-saving societies 'For the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children' began to spring up in the US, England and continental Europe.12 In 1889 a public 
and political campaign by the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children 
produced the first legislation in England specifically designed to outlaw cruelty to children 
 
8  Reformatories in England dated back to 1838 but it was only in 1854 that English magistrates were 
empowered to commit young offenders to registered ones.  The English Industrial Schools Act 1857 allowed 
unconvicted children thought to be in 'moral danger' to be similarly committed by magistrates to industrial 
schools.  For a discussion of the English reformatory and industrial schools legislation see S Cretney Family 
Law in the Twentieth Century: a History (2003) 630-31 & 645-46.   
9 The quotation is from W Hellinckx, B van den Bruel & C vander Borght (1993) op cit note 5 at 3. 
10 Cretney (2003) op cit note 8 at 630. 
11 Ibid. 
12 The ideology of child saving was characterised by metaphors of religious conversion. It was advocated in 
Europe and the USA in the period 1890-1920.  As will be shown it produced infant life protection legislation 
in England and subsequently in South Africa. 
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and give state authorities powers to intervene and even remove them from their families.13 
The idea that children could be rescued and moulded into good citizens underlay the 
ideology of child saving.  This justified the removal of particularly lower class children 
from families where there were considered to be bad influences.  Court orders provided the 
necessary legal authority.14 Subsequently the idea that adjudicators needed to be 
experienced enough to recognise which children deserved rescue rather than mere 
punishment encouraged the development of specialised juvenile courts.15 In South Africa 
the concept of child saving was eagerly embraced shortly after it emerged overseas.16  The 
assumption upon which it was based of course provided a rationale for rejecting the 
indigenous African approach which (as noted above) required keeping children in family 
groups and communities rather than removing them. 
 
Despite rhetoric of rescue and transformation, during the period of its greatest 
influence on South Africa delinquency of children of the lower classes remained the major 
preoccupation affecting child care legislation in England. Until the late 20th-century 
neglect of children was primarily of concern there because of its perceived linkages with 
juvenile delinquency and, as Parton puts it 'the threat to public order which this would 
entail'. 17  This can be seen in the way that court involvement in care cases was originally 
conceived.  In England the courts could at first only be involved where a child needed to 
be removed into alternative care because either the child or a parent had committed a 
crime.18 Punishable delinquency or maltreatment was thus usually required. Jurisdiction 
over care cases was accorded to juvenile courts staffed by magistrates who were 
accustomed to dealing with criminal cases.  This was unfortunate because they treated 
                                                 
13 The Prevention of Cruelty to, and Protection of, Children Act, 1889: see further N Parton 'Protecting 
Children: A Socio-Historical Analysis' in K Wilson & A James (eds) The Child Protection Handbook (2002) 
11 at 12; and Cretney (2003) op cit note 8 at 633-34. It was only in 1948 that this legislation was 
significantly improved with the promulgation of the 1948 Children Act. 
14 Cretney ibid at 647. 
15 MDA Freeman 'Introduction: Rights, Ideology and Children' in MDA Freeman & P Veerman (eds) The 
Ideologies of Children's Rights (1992) 3. Cretney ibid at 647-48 points out that in practice specialised 
magistrates were not always appointed. 
16 L Chisholm Reformatories and Industrial Schools in South Africa: A Study in Class, Colour and Gender, 
1882-1939 (1989) 161 & 185. 
17 Parton (2002) op cit note 13 at 12-13.  
18 Hellinckx, Van den Bruel & Vander Borght (1993) op cit note 5 at 3. 
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children in need of care similarly to delinquents.19 As will be seen, the idea that criminal 
courts could impose prisonlike placements and thus remove lower class children in need of 
care from society was to have a great impact in South Africa.20 
 
Although in England for most of the 20th-century a quasi-punitive approach tended 
to be applied in care cases heard in the magistrates’ courts there was also a much longer 
history of using courts supportively to protect certain interests of children. In 1660 what 
had come to be called the court of wards was replaced by the court of chancery.  This now 
began to exercise powers of what was referred to as 'upper guardianship' over the property 
and persons of infants -initially mainly those who had inherited interests in land.21 Largely 
as a result of English influence, the South African supreme court also began to exercise 
broad discretionary powers 'as upper guardian of all minors'.22  This was significant 
because it created opportunities for wealthier litigants to avoid lower courts by going 
directly to the supreme court.  As will be shown, the adoption of this dual-access system in 
South Africa led to some confusion about the respective roles of courts at different 
levels.2
 
3  The Development of South African Law 
  
                                                
3 
 
2.
   From the late 19th century onwards in South Africa the legal placement of 
children in mandatory alternative care was governed by a series of statutes which gradually 
became more detailed.  A selection of the most important of these is discussed below. 
Particularly in the early decades much of their wording was influenced by English 
legislation.   Although the majority of children in need of care in South Africa were black, 
 
19 Cretney (2003) op cit note 8 at 649 & 667.  
20 See part 2.4.1, below. 
21 OM Stone The Child’s Voice in the Court of Law (1981) at 123-24. 
22 In Botes v Daly 1976 (2) SA 215 (N) at 222H, James JP stated that this was 'substantially in accordance 
with the power assumed by the courts in England'.  However, continental European and particularly Roman-
Dutch influences also shaped the exercise of upper guardianship powers: see B Van Heerden  'Judicial 
Interference with the Parental Power' in B Van Heerden, A Cockrell & R Keightly et al, Boberg’s Law of 
Persons and the Family (1999) 497 at 500N7. 
23 See parts 2.3.3 & 2.3.4, below. 
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indigenous African norms had no effect on the wording and little influence on the 
interpretation of our legislation.     Pre-existing Roman-Dutch common law also had little 
impact.   
ce the jurisdiction and practice of lower courts which heard the majority of care 
cases. 
uring this period legislation deteriorated and the care 
nctions of courts were subverted.  
                                                
 
Until the number of appeals and reviews from lower courts dropped off sharply 
from the 1980s24 South African supreme court judgments significantly influenced the 
development and implementation of care legislation. Both legislative recognition of its 
status and its own incorporation of the English concept of upper guardianship enabled the 
supreme court to play a decisive role. 25  As will be seen this not only impacted directly 
upon the small minority of litigants who could afford to appear before it but allowed it to 
influen
  
   In relation to the role of lower courts it will be shown that it was particularly the 
adoption in South Africa of the English system of reformatories and industrial schools 
which led to  magistrates playing a significant role in child care cases from the late 19th-
century onwards.  Their functions were increased even further at the turn of the 20th-
century with the importation of infant life legislation designed to protect young children -
again along English lines. From the 1920s until the mid-20th century some children 
benefited from lower court specialisation and innovative new legislative provisions which 
appeared as part of a progressive initiative to produce a new South African approach rather 
than merely copy English legislation.  However, in the late 20th century there was a 
decline in South African care law.  D
fu
 
 
 
 
24 That such appeals and reviews were common until the early 1950s can be seen from the cases cited by TH 
Van Reenen Handbook on the Children's Act (1953) at xi-xviii.  That they still occurred regularly although in 
much smaller numbers until the late 1970s can be seen from MCJ Olmesdahl Parent and Child Casebook 
(1998) part M. By contrast, Olmesdahl, ibid at pp M4 & M18, recorded only two post 1970s cases.  And HM 
Bosman-Swanepoel & PJ Wessels A Practical Approach to the Child Care Act (1995) ix-x listed only three. 
25 On the changing nature of its influence see parts 2.3.3, 2.3.4, 2.4.2 & 2.4.3, below. 
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2.3.1  Pre-Union Legislation 
 
terms of the Cape 
Reform tory Institutions Act 6/1879 28 and was not racially segregated.  
dren continued to be 
used for meeting the demand by white farmers for young labourers.30 
                                                
From the beginning of the colonial period in South Africa orphanages and mission 
stations privately accommodated some children (especially those regarded as European or 
Christian) who were bereaved and had no suitable family members available to care for 
them.  It was thus religious or charitable organisations rather than the state which were 
responsible for placement decision-making in these cases.  Eventually during the period of 
British Empire courts became involved. Under s 7 of the Cape Act 15/1856 it was rendered 
possible for them to place juveniles convicted of less serious offences into apprenticeships 
with private individuals. This was mainly intended to benefit white farmers who needed 
labour.26 The first state-run care institution in South Africa was established at the Cape in 
1880.  It was called Porter Reformatory and was intended for training youths convicted of 
less serious offences in agricultural work. It was modelled as closely as possible on the 
English reformatories of Redhill and Parkhurst.27 It was established in 
a
 
The 1879 Act was replaced by the Cape Reformatory Institutions Act 4/1892.29 
Section 4 of this Act considerably extended the role of magistrates’ courts by according 
them functions relevant to children in need of care who had not been convicted of any 
crime.  They were empowered 'to apprentice such child to any relative or any fit and proper 
person'. If this did not prove feasible they could recommend a ministerial placement of the 
child into an 'industrial home' or, if this was 'found impracticable,' a reformatory.  The 
English binary system of 'industrial' and 'reformatory' institutions was thus now fully in 
place in the Cape and ostensible care placements of unconvicted chil
 
26 Van Reenen (1953) op cit note 24 at 152. 
27 Chisholm (1989) op cit note 16 at 35. 
28 Cape of Good Hope Statutes 1652-1895 vol 2. 
29 Cape of Good Hope Statutes 1652-1895 vol 3. 
30 Referring to the previous century, Van Reenen (1953) op cit note 24 at 152 concluded that court directed 
apprenticeships had remained predominantly exploitative. 
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 The next important legislative development at the Cape was the promulgation of 
the Destitute Children's Relief Act 24/1895. This was significant because it enabled more 
favorable treatment for 'European' children who required consideration for possible 
removals into alternative care.  In terms of s 4 magistrates were directed 'forthwith to 
institute a full and proper enquiry' upon gaining knowledge of any such child.  To protect 
these children, for the first time in South Africa grounds were introduced which 
magistrates were required to apply before reaching a decision that a child must be removed 
from her present situation.31 If the magistrate found that a ground applied he was obliged 
to report the case to the colonial secretary. Section 5 of the 1895 Act provided that, upon 
receipt of a magistrate’s finding, the colonial secretary could: 
l available for the purpose as the Colonial Secretary shall 
name in such order.'  
 a proviso to s 5 directed magistrates placing out destitute European children 
as follo
at the managers of 
such school or institution shall be willing to receive such child.'  
 
                                                
 
'… issue an order directed to such Magistrate authorising him to take charge, 
control and custody of such child, and to commit such child either to such suitable 
institution as may be approved of by the Colonial Secretary, or to some public and 
denominational schoo
 
In one of the earliest South African legislative provisions designed to facilitate family 
reunification
ws:  
'Whenever it may be practicable such institution or school shall be situated within 
the town or district in which the father, mother or lawful guardian of the child shall 
be resident at the date of such committal and provided, further, th
It would appear that the Cape Destitute Children's Relief Act of 1895 created a dual 
system for magisterial care inquiries.  White children were protected by the need to prove 
 
31 A 'European' child could be held to be 'destitute' in terms of this section if she was found to have been: 
'(a) habitually begging, 
(b)…wandering and not having any home or suitable place of abode, or proper guardianship, or visible 
means of subsistence,   
(c)… in a state of destitution without means of support, and who shall be without father, mother or lawful 
guardian, or whose father, mother or lawful guardian shall be unable to provide for its support and education, 
or 
(d) … residing in a brothel or with a prostitute.' 
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grounds, placements in the best available alternative care situations near to their families, 
and post-placement oversight by a magistrate acting under the authority of the colonial 
secretary himself. Care cases involving children who were not regarded as European could 
be more quickly disposed of by magistrates since the 1895 requirements did not apply.  
Such children could therefore continue to be allocated to reformatories, industrial schools 
or apprenticeships with white farmers in terms of the simpler 1892 Act. Western concepts 
had thus been combined with a locally-developed form of racial discrimination in 
procedures and placements.  
essor, 
rovided for licensing and inspection of private care institutions for the very young.  
                                                
 
In the Cape the only further significant legislative development in the pre-Union 
period was the promulgation of an Act designed to protect very young children. In 1897 in 
England concern had been expressed by members of the child saving movement after 
sensational media reports about the evils of 'baby farms' where abandoned infants of poor 
single mothers allegedly died in large numbers.  In response, the Infant Life Preservation 
Act had been promulgated.32  Along very similar lines, the Infant Life Protection Act 
4/1907 was enacted in the Cape.33  The Cape version, like its English predec
p
 
 Child legislation as developed in the Cape under British influence had a 
considerable influence upon that of the other South African colonies at the turn of the 20th-
century and in the years immediately before Union. The Orange Free State utilised the 
Cape Destitute Children's Relief Act of 1895 (and particularly the idea of reserving certain 
care services for the more privileged European group) as a model for its Destitute White 
Children Law 3/1899.34  Natal promulgated a less obviously titled Children's Protection 
Act 58/1901.  The Transvaal drew heavily upon the 1907 Cape Infant Life Protection Act 
when formulating its Infant Life Protection Act 24/1909. 35  The latter shows how the role 
of magistrates in care matters was continuing to expand. This Act dealt only with 'infants'. 
These were defined in s 1 as children under the age of seven.  Subsection 2(1) of the Act 
 
32 See Cretney (2003) op cit note 8 at 632-33. 
33 This was subsequently amended by the Cape Infant Life Protection (Amendment) Act 35/1909. 
34 With mainly other children in mind the Free State also passed a Juvenile Offenders’ Removal and 
Apprenticeship Ordinance 5/1904. 
35 Statutes of the Transvaal, 1909 (1909). 
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required all persons 'retaining or receiving an infant for the purpose of nursing or 
maintaining such infant apart from his or her parent or parents for a period longer than 
three days'  to inform the local magistrate or field cornet in writing.36   In terms of s 9 a 
agistrate receiving such a notice had to: 
 
order the removal of such infant to the care, custody, and control of some other person or institution 
willing to receive and maintain such infant, as to such magistrate may seem meet.' 
became established in the Transvaal in the late 19th and early 20th 
enturies.37    
 
d mainly for a separate class of 
hildren regarded as 'European' in physical appearance.   
2.3.2  arly Union Legislation 
m
'…cause inquiry to be made into the circumstances of the case and shall have power, should he be 
satisfied that it is not in the best interests of the infant to remain with the person giving such notice, to 
 
By comparison with the 1895 Cape Act it can be seen that here magistrates gained full 
decisionmaking powers and did not need to refer cases to a senior administrative authority.  
For older children a system of court placements into apprenticeships, industrial schools or 
reformatories 
c
It may be concluded that by the early 20th century a gradual shift in child-
placement decisionmaking from private charities and administrative officials to magistrates 
had left the latter with extremely wide powers throughout South Africa. An alternative care 
system closely modelled on that in England was becoming established. Unlike in England, 
however, the best resources were already being reserve
c
 
 
E
 
 In 1910 the erstwhile South African colonies were joined together in an 
independent Union of South Africa.    Soon after Union the law providing for 
reformatories was standardised throughout the country in terms of the Prisons and 
                                                 
36 This was to be done within 48 hours in a municipal area and within one week in a rural area. 
37 See generally Transvaal Act 8/1909 and ss 1-3 of the Transvaal Industrial Schools Act 7/1910. 
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Reformatories Act 13/1911.38  The same was done with industrial schools under the 
Children's Protection Act 25/1913 (hereafter 'the 1913 Act'). Echoing concerns in 
contemporary England it was stated in s 33(1) of this Act that the main purposes of these 
schools were to prevent 'destitute and waif and stray children …falling into crime and for 
training and educating them'.  The Act introduced parallel jurisdiction. Both the supreme 
court and magistrates’ courts could now serve as forums of first instance in care cases.39 
As will
ed as 'certified institutions'. In s 38 it was 
stated that their primary purposes were 'the reclamation of children of immoral or criminal 
habits o
 Unfortunately s 10(3) limited the use of 
laces of safety to children against whom offences had been committed by their parents or 
guardia
                                                
 be shown below this had some unfortunate consequences.40 
 
 In the Union period private organisations continued to play a significant role in 
providing alternative care.41  Private residential facilities (often maintained by religious 
organisations) tended to be smaller and more specialized42 than state ones. Section 2 of the 
1913 Act required them henceforth to be licens
r … the maintenance of poor children'.  
 
Not merely private but also short-term emergency alternative care of children was 
brought within the ambit of the law in 1913.  Section 2 of the 1913 Act included the 
concept of a 'place of safety' so that courts could authorise temporary care pending the 
resolution of applications which were to be heard by them. From a modern children's-
rights perspective an interesting provision was s 10(2).  This stated that a child might of his 
own volition 'seek refuge in a place of safety'.
p
ns -again betraying a fixation on crime.  
 
 
38 The Union Statutes 1910-1947 (1950) vol 2. Subsequently, detention in a reformatory was provided for 
e court or magistrates’ court could be approached to 
ures in terms of the Act. 
 institutions, 200 were managed by voluntary organisations:  see Van 
h catered mainly for young babies, children with particular 
under s 350 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 31/1917. 
39 Section 34(3) clearly indicated that either a suprem
impose alternative care meas
40 See parts 2.3.3 & 2.3.4.   
41 In 1953, out of a total of 225 recorded
Reenen (1953) op cit note 24 at 46-49. 
42 For example, there were facilities whic
disabilities or orphans: see ibid at 313.  
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Section 34(1) of the 1913 Act provided rudimentary guidance on how care hearings 
should be conducted.  It required proof of a ground that a child was in need of alternative 
care. The wording of the grounds was mostly drawn from s 2 of the Cape Destitute 
Ch
wa
rel
 
a
y under s 12(1) it could issue an order that would 'commit' a child to the 
ustody of another private person who would then have 'control over the child as if he were 
his par
ther, stepmother or grandmother of a child whose father was 'by 
ason of ill-health or other reason caused by circumstances beyond his control unable to 
suppor
                                                
ildren's Relief Act 24/1895 and s 58 of the English Children Act of 1908.43 If a ground 
s proved a court could select a placement option in terms of s 34(3). This read in 
evant part: 
'The judge or magistr tes’ court, if it shall appear to be in the best interest of the child may, instead of 
ordering the child to be sent to a government industrial school or to a certified institution, make an order 
removing the child from the custody of his parent or guardian and committing him to the care of a relative 
or other fit person or may order the child to be apprenticed to some useful calling or occupation until he 
has obtained the age of 18 years, or may order such child to be boarded out…'. 
 
  Alternativel
c
ent'.  It can be seen that the 1913 Act greatly increased the powers of courts in care 
cases and involved them more in long-term placements with private individuals or private 
institutions. 
 
Whilst the advances in court capabilities in 1913 were considerable, perhaps the 
most innovative legislative development for the early 20th century came in 1921. Section 
11 of the Children's Protection Act Amendment Act 26/1921 empowered courts, after 
holding a care inquiry, to recommend the payment of a special monthly state grant if they 
had found that this would enable an impoverished child to remain within her family.  The 
grant was payable to a mo
re
t such child properly'.  It is noteworthy that this provision directed payment to a 
female caregiver.  Grant inquiries soon became a significant part of the work of courts 
dealing with care cases.44 
 
 
ension of the work of children's courts, alongside 
stitutions and industrial schools'. 
43 For a discussion of the 1908 English grounds see Cretney (2003) op cit note 8 at 648-49. 
44 Chisholm (1989) op cit note 16 at 145-46 reviewed case returns and concluded that through the 1920s and 
into the 1930s these inquiries 'formed an important dim
committals to private in
 44
 The 1920s was also a period when the supreme court exerted an important 
influence.  In 1920 it held in R v Du Plessis that, in contrast to reformatories, industrial 
schools were not intended for children 'who are manifestly criminal'.45 A fundamental 
distinction was thus established.  Industrial schools were for children who were thought to 
be less of a threat to society and therefore merited less strict conditions and more in the 
way of educative resources than were appropriate in reformatories.  This appeared to 
follow 
d. It was to have significant consequences 
for institutional placement practices in lower courts.   
haract
3 Children's Protection Act was 
redominantly remedial in nature and geared towards the protection, reclamation and 
welfare
 
                            
the approach in England.46 However, as will be further discussed in part 2.4.1 
below the distinction was to be racially interprete
 
In a second important supreme court decision in R v Smith in 1922 Wessels JP 
erised the 1913 Act benignly as follows: c
 
'The principle underlying this Act is that the State should not punish a child of tender years as a 
criminal and stamp him as such throughout his after-life, but that it should endeavour by taking him 
out of his surroundings to educate him and uplift him and to make him gradually understand the 
difference between good conduct and bad conduct.'47 
 
This of course supported the practice of removing children and could be seen as a classic 
enunciation of the child-saving ideology. Following an approach very similar to that in 
Smith, in the 1924 case of Attorney-General, Transvaal v Additional Magistrate, 
Johannesburg48 Innes CJ stressed that the 191
p
 of children.49  In attempting to conform to this dictum and in the aftermath of its 
clash with the attorney-general, in the mid 1920s the Johannesburg magistracy began to 
select magistrates for specialisation in care cases.50    
                     
45 1920 TPD 178. 
46 See part 2.2, above. 
47 R v Smith 1922 TPD 199 at 201. 
481924 AD 421. 
49 Ibid at 426. 
50 Chisholm (1989) op cit note 16 at 144 noted that in 1926 the first 'children's court' with its own specialist 
magistrate was set up at Auckland Park.   
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The caseloads of the new courts expanded rapidly and by 1926 the Australian 
terminology 'children’s courts' began to be informally applied because they were dealing 
almost entirely with care matters.51  The so-called children's courts conducted care-grant 
and alternative placement inquiries on behalf of children.52 They were subsequently 
regarded by the department of justice as a most successful innovation.53 They became part 
of the magistrates’ courts at most larger urban centres and continued to operate without 
n a decade.54 
937 (hereafter 'the 1937 
ct'). In some respects this Act appeared to place South African child care law ahead of 
that 
any enabling legislation for more tha
 
 
2.3.3  The Children's Act 31/1937 
 
In 1937 following upon recommendations by the Interdepartmental Committee on 
Destitute, Neglected, Maladjusted and Delinquent Children and Young Persons55 
Parliament replaced the 1913 Act with the Children's Act 31/1
A
in many other countries at the time. It established basic features and much of the 
wording of our care legislation which are still applicable today.   
 
  Importantly, s 4(1) of the 1937 Act formally constituted a network of what were 
now officially designated children's courts.56  It described the function of these as '[t]o hold 
inquiries in order to determine whether a child is a child in need of care, and to make the 
                                                 
51 It is noted, ibi
'children's courts'
d, that the volume and complexity of work expanded so quickly that by 1927 the first 
 needed the support of four probation officers. Courts termed 'children's courts' were 
established in Australia from as early as 1905. However, these were more similar to the English juvenile 
courts than the later South African children's courts because they dealt with both care and criminal cases: see 
s Court' 
ov.au/lawlink/childrens_court/ll_cc.nsf/pages/CC_aboutushistoryofthe 
n's Bill on 18th 
937: Union of South Africa: House of Assembly Debates (1937) vol 29, at col 3430. 
eglected, Maladjusted and Delinquent 
m the Welfare Sector to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
: p 11. 
the New South Wales children's court website 'History of the Children'
<http://www.lawlink.nsw.g
childrenscourtchildpage>. 
52 Chisholm (1989) op cit note 16 at 146. 
53 This appears from JH Hofmeyr’s introductory speech at the second reading of the Childre
March 1
54 Ibid. 
55 The Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Destitute, N
Children and Young Persons (Union Government Report 38/1937). 
56 The National Council of Child Welfare (which had been established in 1924) had played a major role in 
lobbying for this: see T Matthee & L Schreuder  'Submission of the South African National Council of Child 
and Family Welfare' in Submissions fro
(1999) at Section B, Annexure A
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necessary orders subsequent to such an inquiry'.57 The status of the children's courts within 
the S
t was also an 
important success for the child-saving over the punitive school of thought because there 
woul
f a child could bring a matter to court  -and this potentially 
rendered the children's courts broadly accessible to a wide range of caregivers.  Procedural 
prote
 
outh African court hierarchy was not designated. Although adjudicators in them were 
to receive the distinctive new title of 'commissioner' they were to be selected from the 
ranks of magistrates and the children's courts were to continue to operate at magistrates’ 
court centres. 
 
Significantly, the children's courts were not accorded criminal jurisdiction.  As has 
been noted contemporary lower courts in England dealt with both juvenile crime and care 
cases.  The decision in South Africa to establish separate courts dealing only with care 
cases thus represented a break from the hitherto influential English system. I
d be no jurisdiction for children's courts to punish any children who appeared before 
them. The commitment in 1937 to an entire network of courts intended to deal purely with 
children's care needs might be perceived as a great South African achievement.  However, 
as will be shown there were to be some major limitations upon their services. 
 
In s 28 of the 1937 Act the criterion of a child 'in need of care' was established as the 
primary basis for court-ordered state intervention in care cases. This again showed 
recognition of destitute, abandoned or abused children as requiring nurturing arrangements 
rather than correction. Subsection 28(1) stated that not merely parents but also any other 
person having custody o
ction for parents was created by s 52(1). This required children's courts to give notice 
to a parent whenever any other person intended to bring a matter to court 'unless the 
Commissioner otherwise directs'.  The concept of child medical assessments was 
introduced by s 10(4).58   
                                                 
57 See also s 1 of the 1937 Act. 
58 This stated that a commissioner could at any time direct that a 'protected infant' (meaning a child under ten 
years of age brought to the attention of the court) be medically examined by the district surgeon or other 
qualified medical practitioner. 
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Because of the unique requirements of care adjudication the original 1920s policy of 
appointing full-time specialist magistrates for children's courts wherever possible was 
aintained under the 1937 Act.59 These magistrates were generally successful in 
facili
only permitted it from a child's separated unfit father to her mother. This was still 
n important capability, however, because the common-law at this time vested 
guard
 cases. The respective jurisdiction of the 
new children's courts and the supreme court was thus unclear.  A possible interpretation 
                                                
m
tating communication by caregivers and even children who as a standard norm 
appeared directly before them.60  The hearing of appropriate voices was thus to at least 
some extent regarded as important in the early children's courts. 
 
Whilst the 1937 Act produced significant advances it was also in some respects 
retrograde. Court powers to reallocate parental responsibilities were much narrower than 
under s 34(3) of the Children's Protection Act of 1913. Whereas the latter (as has been 
noted) had allowed for a transfer of parental powers to any suitable person, s 58 of the 
1937 Act 
a
ianship in the fathers of legitimate children and only custody in their mothers. In a 
dispute between married parents it was therefore fathers who possessed greater parental 
power.61 
 
 The drafters of the 1937 Act did not include the previous express references to the 
supreme court which had made it clear in the 1913 Act that it had parallel jurisdiction with 
lower courts as a forum of first instance in care
was that the supreme court should no longer be directly approached in care matters. This 
was to prove unacceptable to judges who wished to preserve an unrestricted domain for the 
supreme court as upper guardian of all minors.   
 
 
59 Van Reenen (1953) op cit note 24 at 13; Hoexter J Commission of Inquiry into the Structure and 
at encouraging discussion by keeping proceedings 
ing proper care. She thus attempted to regain 
 instituting a children's court inquiry. 
Functioning of the Courts (Fifth and Final Report RP 78/1983) 493.  
60 According to Van Reenen ibid at 6 they were adept 
amicable and informal. See further part 6.2.1, below. 
61 The usefulness to mothers of s 58 of the 1937 Act is illustrated by Weber v Harvey 1952 (3) SA 710 (T). In 
this case after a marriage relationship had deteriorated the husband removed his children to his grandparents' 
home. This he had every right to do as guardian; but in response the wife and mother opened children's court 
proceedings on the basis that the children were no longer receiv
custody of her children by
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  In order to prevent possible encroachments on its powers the supreme court used 
available opportunities to limit both the status and jurisdiction of children's courts. In 1943 
Tindall JA held in Dhanabakium v Subramanian that they were courts of inferior 
standing.62  In 1952 in Weber v Harvey Roper J even suggested that there was a possibility 
'that the children's court is not a court of justice, but that it is an administrative body'.63  In 
so doing he detracted from the status of these courts in a manner that was quite 
unwarranted.64 In 1953 in R v De Jager it was held that once the supreme court had set an 
amount of maintenance payable by a separated father for his children a children's court was 
ot entitled to alter this.65 The broader message was that, after the supreme court had 
issued an order, a children's court, as an inferior forum, had no jurisdiction to do anything 
that w
 the supreme court to assert wide 
powers at the expense of those of children's courts.67  The mid-20th-century judgments in 
which this was done stand in contrast to the supreme court's earlier, more positive 
the 1920s it had actively encouraged a more 
ent for children in the lower courts. 
n
ould have the effect of altering that order even in the light of new familial 
circumstances.  
 
The supreme court dicta which confined the jurisdiction of children's courts were 
unfortunate. Since it was not necessary to hire lawyers to bring matters before the 
children's courts they had the potential to serve as a less expensive alternative.    In 
particular, their establishment produced a haven for legally-vulnerable mothers involved in 
child-control disputes with dysfunctional fathers.66  However, the inadequate guidance on 
status and jurisdiction in the 1937 Act made it easy for
influence. As has been shown above, during 
supportive environm
 
                                                 
62 1943 AD 160 at 165.  
63Weber v Harvey 1952 (3) SA 710 (T) at 715B. 
64 The very usage of the terminology 'children’s courts' was against his interpretation.  And in s 7(1)(f) of the 
1937 Act it was specified that children's courts would issue judgments and that contempt of court penalties 
would apply when these were not complied with. 
65 R v De Jager 1953 (2) SA 197 (T). 
66 See the facts of Weber’s case in note 61, above. 
67 See also Lochenbergh v Lochenbergh 1949 (2) SA 197 (E); and Forbes v Forbes 1960 (1) SA 875 (D). The 
continuance of the problem of uncertainty under the Children's Act 33/1960 is discussed in part 2.3.4. 
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2.3.4  The Children's Act 33/1960 
 
The Children's Act 33/1960 (hereafter 'the 1960 Act') replaced that of 1937.  It will 
be shown in part 2.4.3 below that one of its purposes was a furtherance of apartheid.  
However, the partly racist motives of the legislature were to some extent disguised by the 
inclusion of many genuine reforms which resulted in a continuing evolution of child care 
law. For example, recent understanding of the concept of psychological as opposed to 
physical abuse of children led to the addition of 'mental neglect' as a new ground for 
hildren's courts to order alternative care.68  Another progressive provision enabled 
commi
 or child 
elfare officer or agency'.70 The Act also advanced our law by introducing enforcement 
ordered by a children's court they were obliged to refer the matter back to it. Section 9(5) 
ired that they must show 'a good reason' for non-implementation.72  They were 
c
ssioners to order children to be sent to observation centres so that care-needs 
assessments could take place in an appropriate environment.69 This showed that the 
concept of assessments had developed and was now viewed as including more than merely 
the medical assessments allowed for in the 1937 Act.  
 
Under s 31(2) of the 1960 Act as an alternative to removal from her family a child 
could remain at home 'on probation or under the supervision of probation officer
w
and accountability provisions.  Under s 32 a children's court was empowered to order a 
parent or guardian with whom a child was to live to comply with conditions on pain of 
committing an offence.   This jurisdiction to sentence caregivers showed that the 
legislature was prepared to go to great lengths to keep children in their families.71 
 
 Welfare officials also had to comply with children's court orders. In terms of s9(5) 
if they found that they could not implement a placement in a category of residential facility 
further requ
                                                 
68 In s (1)(i). 
69 Section 31(4).  
70 M Uys The Children's Act 1960 as Amended by Act 50 of 1965 (1978) 5 noted that children's courts had 
 S v Van Rooi 1979 (3) SA 899 (NC) at 901H & 904E it appears that a common and acceptable 'good 
.  Although not stated in the case this 
made frequent use of this power. 
71 After it had subsequently fallen away for twenty years a power to enforce compliance by means of 
criminal sanctions was again introduced in the 2005 Act: see part 8.4.4, below. 
72 From
reason' would have been a lack of vacancies in schools of industries
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thus made accountable to the court.73  Also, pending implementation of any care order they 
could temporarily keep a child in a place of safety for a maximum of six weeks -any 
further delay would again have to be defended before a children's court with a good reason. 
The new powers for children's courts to control implementation of their orders were 
ndoubtedly sound.  As will be shown in the next part of this chapter and also in chapter 
74 the
ourt.  And the 
ourt could then decide whether to confirm the placement and name the particular 
institut
he role of children's courts in what might 
e called 'private law' reallocations of parental powers as between caregivers was thus 
                                                                                                                                                   
u
8  removal of these in the 1983 Act led to delays and even complete failures in putting 
children's court orders into effect that were seriously disadvantageous to children. 
 
 As under the 1937 legislation, the supreme court continued to play an important 
role in delineating the functions of the children's courts. In S v Van Rooi the question of 
whether a children's court could choose to designate a specific, named institution for a 
child was considered.  Van der Heever J limited the powers of children's courts when he 
concluded that this would be impracticable because of uncertainties about vacancies.  In 
his interpretation a children's court could direct the category of institution, and welfare 
officials would then have to attempt to find a vacancy.  Having found a specific institution 
they were however legally obliged to refer the matter back to the children’s c
c
ion in its final order.75  This approach still afforded greater child protection powers 
to children's courts than those subsequently available under the 1983 Act.76  
 
Another significant development in the 1960 Act was an extension of the scope for 
children's courts to restrict and reallocate parental powers.  Under s 60(1) any or all such 
powers could now be exclusively allocated by a children's court to either parent. And in 
terms of s 83 temporary custody of a child (for a period of up to one year) could be 
awarded either to a parent or a third person.77  T
b
 
problem would have been exacerbated by the fact that schools of industries were racially segregated at the 
time. 
73 The court would then have the power to make an alternative order. 
74 At part 8.4.4, below. 
75 S v Van Rooi 1979 (3) SA 899 (NC) at 904E. 
76 See the next part, below. 
77 Uys (1978) op cit note 70 at 9 stated that children’s courts frequently used this provision in order to direct 
which parent a child should live with in situations where a divorce was pending. 
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greatly
e nce to evidential rules.80  He showed here a progressive appreciation of 
e unique nature and purposes of care proceedings.81 In Napolitano Marais J further held 
that ch
l
eld that it was necessary to be cautious before concluding that a 
subsequent children's court order on the question of custody was necessarily invalid.84 As 
he poi
 increased in the 1960 Children's Act although not to the same extent as had 
originally been allowed for under the 1913 Act. 
 
In 1964 in Napolitano v De Wet NO the important question of appropriate 
procedures at care hearings was considered.78 Marais J came to the conclusion that these 
might sometimes be less formal than in other categories of litigation.79 He also broke new 
ground with his recognition that the need to utilise all information which might enable a 
children's court to establish the best possible outcome for a child might be more important 
than strict adh re
th
ildren's courts were proper courts of law, thus providing a much-needed affirmation 
of their status.82  
 
Given the increased powers of children's courts in the 1960 Act it is not surprising 
that the issue of conflicts in jurisdiction between them and the supreme court remained a 
live one. In 1963 Banks J took the extreme view that even where a father assaulted his 
children a children's court could not reduce his parental powers as a located by the 
supreme court at a prior divorce hearing.83  Three years later Vieyra J preferred an 
opposite view.  He h
nted out, a child's situation might have changed for the worse subsequent to a 
supreme court order being issued.85  
 
In Murphy v Venter Erasmus J went so far as to concede that a subsequent 
conflicting children's court order might be valid if the supreme court had not been aware of 
                                                 
781964 (4) SA 337 (T) at 341-44. Confirmed in Napolitano v Commissioner of Child Welfare, Johannesburg 
 Boberg The Law of Persons and the Family (1977) 435 N86. 
64) ibid at 343H-344A. 
t see parts 6.1 and 6.2, below. 
cial Welfare 1963 (4) SA 960 (C). 
 (1) SA 756 (T). 
1965 (1) SA 742 (A) at 745. See also PQR
79 Napolitano (19
80 Ibid at 344A. 
81 For further discussion of the significance of the judgmen
82 Napolitano v De Wet NO 1964 (4) SA 337 (T) at 342F. 
83 Bergh v Coetzer and the Minister of So
84 Raath v Carikas 1966
85 Ibid at 761H-762A. 
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important pre-existing facts concerning a child's situation.86  However, in a restrictive 
interpretation in Van Schoor v Van Schoor, Muller JA of the Appellate Division held that 
the parental powers which children's courts were able to restrict under s 60(1) did not 
include access.87 He accepted that court intervention might be essential in cases where 
visitati
e improved in a number of important respects.  As will be shown in 
art 2.4.3 below, these improvements were mainly to benefit white children because 
hildren's courts became deeply involved in the implementation of apartheid during the 
ren's 
ourt services.  Aspects of the 1983 Act are considered in subsequent chapters below. In 
underst
of care was removed.  Aside from situations where there was no parent or guardian, it was 
on rights were being used as a pretext to abuse children but concluded that only the 
supreme court could be approached.88 
 
With such mixed signals emanating from the supreme court it is not surprising that 
confusion about the jurisdictional boundaries of children's courts in allocating parental 
responsibilities persisted.89 Despite this, it remains true that under the 1960 Act children's 
court services becam
p
c
currency of the Act. 
 
 
2.3.5  The Child Care Act 74/1983 
 
 The 1960 Children's Act was replaced by the 1983 Act.  This is currently, pending 
full implementation of the 2005 Act, the most important legislation governing child
c
anding its impact it is important to note at the outset that it is in some fundamental 
respects a retrograde statute when compared with the 1937 and 1960 Children's Acts.  
 
One giant step backwards was the introduction in s 14 of the 1983 Act of a fault 
approach to court intervention grounds. The long established concept of the child in need 
                                                 
86 1967 (4) SA 46 (O) at 51F-H. 
hoor v Van Schoor 1975 (1) SA 383 
mes JP struck 
een parents in regard to the 
rt to resolve such a problem'.   
87 1976 (2) SA 600 (AD) -reversing the decision of Melamet J in Van Sc
(T). 
88 Van Schoor 1976 ibid at 610.  On this case see also part 7.4.2, below. 
89 In Gold v Commissioner of Child Welfare, Durban 1978 (2) SA 300 (N) 300 at 305E Ja
down a children's court order, in part because it 'appears to resolve a dispute betw
custody of the child and it is inappropriate for the children's cou
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now necessary to prove that a caregiver was 'unfit to have the custody of the child'. And in 
s 14(4) a highly stigmatising list of categories of unfitness was included. 90 The fault-
centered grounds caused proceedings to become more adversarial as caregivers struggled 
desperately to avoid being branded by children's courts as 'unfit'.91  Ironically, the ability of 
these courts to judge parental capabilities was weakened because they had lost their 
 
 
 (and not other parental 
sponsibilities) as between separated parents, and only in situations where supervision of 
s 34(3) was 
                                                
previous power to appoint assessors (incidentally, limiting their cross-cultural capabilities).  
  In response to the uncertainty about the respective powers of the supreme court and 
children's courts to allocate parental responsibilities the 1983 Act adopted the simplistic 
solution of drastically reducing the latter courts’ capabilities. They were now permitted to 
exercise merely a very narrow power to reallocate custody
re
the new custodian by a social worker would also be required.92  
 
   With residential facility placements of children the powers of children's courts 
were also considerably reduced. It was no longer necessary for welfare to refer cases back 
for confirmation of the particular facility selected.  Children's courts thus lost their review 
capability.93 The weakening of the institutional placement powers of children's courts may 
have encouraged a tendency to disregard their authority. Under s 34(3) welfare 
representatives were required to seek written approval from a commissioner before 
amending a children's court order by transferring a child to a reform school. Bosman-
Swanepoel and Wessels have noted that this tended to be ignored because 
 
its original form read as follows: 
 
re 
intains 
d or allows him to be neglected; (viii) cannot 
lar school attendance; (ix) has 
no visible means of support.' 
(a) of the Act. 
discussion of the 1979 Van Rooi case in part 
90 Section 14(4) of the Child Care A 74/1983 in 
' At such inquiry the children's court shall determine whether- 
(a) the child has no parent or guardian; or 
(b) the child has a parent or a guardian or is in the custody of a person who is unable or unfit to have the
custody of the child, in that he-  (i) is mentally ill to such a degree that he is unable to provide for the 
physical, mental or social well-being of the child; (ii) has assaulted or ill-treated the child or allowed him to 
be assaulted or ill-treated; (iii) has caused or conduced to the seduction, abduction or prostitution of the child 
or the commission by the child of immoral acts; (iv) displays habits and behaviour which may seriously inju
the physical, mental or social well-being of the child; (v) fails to maintain the child adequately; (vi) ma
the child in contravention of section 10; (vii) neglects the chil
control the child properly so as to ensure proper behaviour such as regu
abandoned the child; or (x) has 
91 Commissioner DS Rothman: personal communication 2 Sept 2002. 
92 Section 15(1)
93 For the previously greater powers of children's courts see the 
2.3.4, above. 
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'frequently not applied in practice'.94 Also, there have often been delays or even complete 
failures
the standing of these courts as protectors of children, and the scope and 
ffectiveness of their work generally, diminished. This will be further substantiated in part 
.4.3, below. 
 
2.4
be taken.97 It will be shown that in South Africa for most of the 20th 
                                                
 to implement children's court placement orders under the 1983 Act.95 
 
The ignoring of the law by welfare may be seen as evidence of poor standards of 
implementation and a low regard for the rights of children in the late 20th-century.96  It 
also reveals a disregard for the status of children's courts. It may be concluded that under 
the 1983 Act 
e
2
 
  Implementation of the Law: the Impact of Racism 
 
 As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter the factor of racism has been 
singled out for separate consideration because of its impact upon children in need of 
alternative care.   It will be shown that it illuminates some important aspects of the 
implementation of the legislation reviewed in part 2.3. It would always have been obvious 
to those who held political power in South Africa that alternative care placements could 
result in white children being lost from the minority European group if they died because 
of inadequate nurturing or were placed with substitute caregivers of colour.  Conversely, 
children of colour might infiltrate the white group if they grew up with white substitute 
caregivers or in institutions mainly for whites.  Because of race purity concerns an 
approach directly opposite to that for which children's courts were used in contemporary 
Australia was to 
 
ct as discussed in part 7.2.1.2, below.  
 
tralia so-called Aborigines Protection Acts were utilised to remove 
: see New 
ollable were 
94 Bosman-Swanepoel & Wessels (1995) op cit note 24 at 67. 
95 See part 8.4.4, below.  
96 See also the disregard for the requirements of s 12(1) of the 1983 A
It will be shown in part 2.4.3 below that a primary focus by government officials during the 1980s was on
achieving 'correct' racial classifications and matching in placements. 
97 For most of the 20th century in Aus
children of mixed aboriginal and European ancestry for assimilation into the dominant white group
South Wales children's court website 
<http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/childrens_court/ll_cc.nsf/pages/CC_aboutushistoryofthe 
childrenscourtchildpage>. The lighter a child's skin colour, the more likely it was that she would be removed. 
Australian children's court orders based upon 'proof' that the child was neglected or uncontr
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century even partially white children were generally excluded from placement into the 
Europe
 to preserve the 
European group as racially pure.  A third aim was to create the impression of a protection 
system
in reality politically 
an group. 
 
Governmental responses in South Africa to the dilemmas posed by children in need 
of care in a multiethnic society were complex and often camouflaged.  At the time of 
Union in 1910 some persons of colour still had the vote in the Cape. Also, the liberal and 
religious sentiments of some white voters favoured protection of all vulnerable children.  
Therefore, politicians had to treat the wording of care legislation as a sensitive issue.  As 
will be shown, the covert solution adopted until attainment of democracy late in the 20th 
century was to apply legislation ostensibly promulgated for the purpose of benefiting all 
children in a biased manner.98  Primary aims were to continue to ensure that the best 
alternative care resources were reserved for children regarded as white and
 in which there were appropriate remedies for all children in need.   
 
It will be argued that courts served vitally important functions in supporting the 
covert approach. It will be shown that they helped with the superficial impression of a 
uniform child protection framework.  At the same time, they served as gatekeepers 
controlling access to resources. It could be ordered, for example, that a child of colour 
should receive less expensive alternative care benefits than would be designated for a 
white child in similar circumstances.  But courts did much more than merely provide some 
credibility and access-control to care resources.   It will be shown that under the guise of 
providing care they played a central role in ensuring removals of behaviourally assertive, 
abandoned and street children of colour from urban areas and other areas reserved for 
whites.  This was done by providing 'care' remedies that were 
                                                                                                                                                    
typically used to justify such removals: see P Parkinson 'The Child Participation Principle in Child Protection 
Law in New South Wales' (2001) 9 International Journal of Children's Rights 259 at 266. 
98 As Matthee and Schreuder (1999) op cit note 56  at 3 have stated the claim that welfare services were for 
all children in need irrespective of race, class, politics or creed was routinely touted as official policy by 
welfare officials in South Africa from the early 20th-century onwards -but in practice 'this was done in a 
segregated and unequal way'. 
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motivated. As a result, many children of colour were, compared to white children, 
 actively exploited as workers.99  
 
 
 
25/1913 was of foundational importance in establishing the beginnings of a national child 
protect
d 
particularly those with better resources- tended to be reserved mainly for white children.105 
Colour
                                                
disadvantaged and sometimes even
 
2.4.1  The Pre-apartheid Period 
  
As has been noted some expressly racist provisions which explicitly confined 
certain state care services to white children appeared in pre-Union destitute children's 
legislation.100 It has also been shown that after Union the Children's Protection Act
ion system and perpetuating a significant role for courts in care cases.101 According 
to Chisholm one of the main concerns which motivated the promulgation of this Act was 
that some neglected or deserted white children were falling into 'the black underclass'.102   
 
The 1913 Act did not expressly provide for preferential care services for white 
children.  However, in practice its care placement provisions (and after 1921 the court 
power to recommend state-grants) were selectively applied mainly on behalf of them.103  
Welfare societies assiduously followed up reports of white children left in the full-time 
care of persons of colour and immediately removed them.104 Most care facilities -an
ed (or so-called 'mixed-race') children in need of care were often seen by courts as 
 
99 D DePanfilis 'Intervening with Families When Children Are Neglected' in H Dubowitz Neglected 
Children: Research, Practice and Policy (1999) 211 at 218 similarly noted that in the USA alternative care 
plemented in ways that discriminated against black children.  
Population of South Africa 
and Reconciliation 
on A: page 1, para 1 entitled 'Colonial Roots'. 
services were for many years im
100 See part 2.3.1, above. 
101 See part 2.3.2, above. 
102 Chisholm (1989) op cit note 16 at 108. 
103 See HJ Simons Crime and Punishment with Reference to the Native 
(Unpublished MA thesis, University of South Africa 1931) 142, 147-49 & 155. 
104 See the 1919 annual report of the Johannesburg Children's Aid Society as cited in the submission of the 
Johannesburg Child Welfare Society Submissions from the Welfare Sector to the Truth 
Commission (1999) at Annexure E of Secti
105 Chisholm (1989) op cit note 16 at 6-8. 
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potential sources of labour and thus placed in apprenticeships.106 With black children, the 
most common court solution was an order of removal to a supposed tribal area of origin.  
 
By the 1920s there was intense concern about reducing the numbers of urban black 
e passage of the 1937 Children's 
ct there was a fierce and extended debate about whether to include an express prohibition 
on tran
                                                
children.   One way of doing this was to cause as many as possible to appear before 
juvenile courts. If found either in need of alternative care or guilty of any of a myriad of 
petty criminal offences they were exiled to a distant locality.107   If they returned they were 
likely to be sentenced to be whipped and sent to a reformatory or (for subsequent returns) 
even prison.108 
 
 Although covert racial discrimination had been applied under the 1913 Act the 
1937 Interdepartmental Committee on Destitute, Neglected, Maladjusted and Delinquent 
Children and Young Persons which assisted with the drafting of the 1937 Children's Act 
made an important and liberal recommendation that the unofficial dual system of using 
juvenile courts mainly for children of colour and children's courts mainly for white 
children should be terminated.109 Many members of parliament, however, wanted 
discrimination increased rather than decreased. During th
A
sracial placements in it.110 Evincing astute brinkmanship, Prime Minister Hofmeyr 
claimed that such a clause was not necessary because -revealingly- during his previous 
four years as minister of interior no children's court had allowed a child to be placed out of 
the white group.111  The Act was thus passed without an express prohibition and both 
liberals and conservatives were to some extent appeased. 
 
 
uld be charged. These included breaches of pass or vagrancy laws, or stealing chickens or 
 with regard to the 
non-Europeans'. 
bly Debates (1937) vol 29 at cols 5539-5571. 
106 Ibid at 107. See also Simons (1931) op cit note 103 at 147. 
107 As pointed out by Chisholm (1989) op cit note 16 at 142 there were numerous petty offences with which 
black children co
fruit from trees. 
108 Ibid; and Interdepartmental Committee (1937) op cit note 55 at 53. 
109 It was proposed in its report, ibid, that 'it is a wrong policy to adopt a two-fold standard
problem of dependency and delinquency, one for Europeans and one for 
110Union House of Assem
111 Ibid, col 5541. 
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When the 1937 Act was implemented the almost complete absence of expressly 
racial provisions still enabled a continuation of the covert approach. The supreme court 
assist d in promoting a liberal image of a uniform child protection system by asserting that 
t their numbers were 
pidly increasing -according to some estimates by as much as 50% per year.113 Rather 
than us
duration -and even changes- in care.115 This enabled the liberal-minded Alan Paton, at that 
atory for black boys (and later famous for drawing on 
e
it was legislation which applied equally to children of all races.112 In practice, however, 
racial discrimination was perpetuated in several ways.    In rural areas children regarded as 
'natives' were unlikely to have care hearings before children's courts. In many rural districts 
such courts were never established.  Section 3(5) of the 1937 Act foresaw this and 
provided that where there were no children's courts native commissioners (or even merely 
their assistants) could hear care matters involving black children.  
 
 In urban districts black children were equally unlikely to be brought before 
children's courts. In 1937 the authorities were still concerned tha
ra
ing the children's courts, large numbers of black children in need of alternative care 
continued to be brought before urban juvenile courts.  These courts maintained the practice 
of issuing orders removing them to distant tribal areas and, if they returned, to the few 
available badly overcrowded reformatories or prisons for 'natives'.114 An apologist for this 
use of juvenile courts could of course point to England where (as noted above) they were 
still being similarly being used for both care and delinquency cases. 
 
The 1937 Act divested both juvenile and children's courts of the power to designate 
the duration of institutional care placements.  In order to differentiate these from 
imprisonment it would be social services personnel who would in future decide upon 
time director of the Diepkloof reform
                                                 
112 R v Komgana 1939 EDL 246; R v Ngonyama 1944 NPD 395; and R v Makwena 1947 (1) SA 154 (N). 
113 Chisholm (1989) op cit note 16 at 325. 
114 As noted by A Paton Report to the Secretary for Education, Union of South Africa, 3 April, 1947 
ietermaritzburg -hereafter cited as (Document PC 1/8/1/1/1/8: Alan Paton Centre and Struggle Archives, P
'AP  Archives') 3 there was thus a differentiated system in which only some children benefited from the 1937 
Children's Act.  See also Chisholm (1989) op cit note 16 at 156-58, 326 & 329. A Paton The Non-European 
Offender (1945) 2-3 claimed that the courts often sent black children to distant rural areas where they had no 
familial connections. 
115 Union House of Assembly Debates (1937) vol 29 at cols 3431 & 3433. 
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this experience in semi-fictional works such as  Cry the Beloved Country), to challenge the 
system of punitive and labour-exploitative placements for children of colour.  He attracted 
considerable media attention by removing the sentries and barbed wire fences at Diepkloof 
and developing an educative system with many innovations (such as cottage groups and 
freed
o as a unique feature of an evolving South African child 
rotection system; but this progressive achievement is considerably limited by the fact that 
ey were largely gatekeepers for access to resources reserved for children perceived as 
e which had recommended their formalisation had 
oped that official children's courts would bring an end to the discriminatory dual-stream 
system
                                                
om passes) there.116  Although his lead was to some extent briefly followed by 
managers of other care institutions for children of colour, by the early 1940s cruel 
punishments, harsh regimes, unhygienic conditions and the poorest of available resources 
once again generally characterised these facilities.117 
 
It must be concluded that despite the fact that there were few express references to 
race in the 1913 and 1937 Acts their discriminatory implementation meant that the 
advances in care law during their currency (as noted in part 2.3) mainly benefited white 
children.  Other abused, neglected and destitute children continued to be exploited for their 
labour, exiled from urban areas to distant rural localities or incarcerated under the guise of 
court-ordered alternative care placements.  The newly developed and specialised children's 
courts could be pointed t
p
th
European.  Although the committe
h
, this did not occur. 
 
 
2.4.2  The Early Apartheid Period 
 
When the nationalist government came to power in 1948 and began to promote its 
policy of apartheid the system of unstated racism maintained under the 1937 Children's Act 
 
ory Instrument (1948) 7; and A Paton 'Flogging -Private Notes 
al relationships with individual boys':  A Paton 'Diepkloof Reformatory' (Document 
116 See A Paton Freedom as a Reformat
Written in 1950' (Document: PC 1/8/1/ 1/1/19: AP Archives) 3. In place of the previous largely-regimented 
system at black care institutions Paton considered that it was especially important that staff should attempt 'to 
establish positive person
PC1/8/1/5/6: AP Archives -Unpublished Private Notes, 1 April 1945) 1. 
117 Chisholm (1989) op cit note 16 at 357. 
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served its purposes for many years.  During the first decade of its rule it focused attention 
on state and private residential care facilities.  Firstly, it ensured that these became much 
more rigorously segregated than previously.118 Secondly, it promoted the development of 
more of them for white children whilst not doing so for other children.119 It also decided 
there that was a need for more cooperative children's court magistrates.120  During the 
1950s the previous full-time presiding officers were replaced with generalist magistrates 
who rotated between children'
s  simply by viewing their physical appearance came to be regarded as 
inadequate -especially in cases viewed as borderline.122 Since the nationalists wished to 
classify
pursuit of white racial purity.124 It made it clear to lower courts that humanitarian counter-
                                                
s courts and other courts.121 The practice of appointing 
dedicated, child-oriented adjudicators which had been regarded as a key strength of the 
children's courts since their inception in the 1920s was thus terminated. 
 
Under the nationalists’ stricter approach to segregation the longstanding method of 
classifying person
 the entire population racially it was decided to formulate legally-binding criteria 
that could guide this process in a clear and ethnically scientific manner.  As is well-known, 
classification criteria were formulated and imposed in terms of the Population Registration 
Act 30/1950.123    
 
In order to understand the juridical context within which children's courts now 
functioned it is necessary to note again the influence of the supreme court. In 
interpretations of the Population Registration Act it generally supported the nationalist 
 
epartmental guide it was stated in 1956 that '[v]irtually all institutions grant permission to a specific 
e, Pretoria Handbook for Children's 
 to the physical appearance of persons, their 'general acceptance' in regard to race, admissions about 
ere only one of a child's parents was 
118 In a d
race only': Professional Division: Department of Social Welfar
Institutions (1956) 9.    
119 See the figures provided by Van Reenen (1953) op cit note 24 at 46 & 48-49. 
120 See Hoexter Commission (1983) op cit note 59 at 493. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Handbook for Children's Institutions (1956) op cit note 118 at 9.  
123 They were not based upon ancestry and made limited use of family-affiliations.  Instead, they directed 
attention
not being white and their 'habits, education and speech and deportment and their manner in general' as 
supposedly workable criteria for racial classifications: see, in particular, ss 3, 5, and 19 of the Act.  
124 See Boberg (1977) op cit note 78 at 101. It is noted, ibid, that wh
classified as white the supreme court tended to support 'downward' classifications of such children as not 
white.  
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considerations were of limited relevance.125 With children whose classifications were 
difficult to determine, judges even considered questions such as what schools they went to 
and whether they played with other children of a particular race.126 Artificial legal barriers 
were th
 community and was validly married to her partner in accordance with 
custom y law. The couple were well established financially and living in a happy and 
stable relationship.  Nevertheless, Ogilvie Thompson J supported a racially motivated 
children'
der forcible 
removals to prevent white children from remaining in familial relationships with persons 
                                                
us created within biological or substitute familial groups where members differed 
from one another in physical appearance.127  In many cases these significantly harmed the 
psychological development of children.128  
 
A case which shows how influential racial considerations were by the mid-1950s is 
Phillips v Commissioner of Child Welfare, Bellville.129 In this matter the supreme court 
upheld a children's court order for the forcible removal and detention of a white girl named 
Alice who was found by social workers to be living with a black man.  Although 'care' 
removals of young white females involved in sexual relationships with persons of colour 
had been a standard part of the work of children's courts since the 1920s130 this case for the 
first time tested the practice at the level of the supreme court.  Alice (aged 16) had grown 
up in a black
ar
s court designation of her as 'a child in need of care' simply in order to promote 
segregation.  
 
It was thus confirmed in Phillips that children's courts could or
 
125 See M v Race Classification Board 1962 (1) 715 (T) at 722F & 722H-723A for acceptance of the view 
that it might be appropriate to classify siblings differently from each other and to change classifications 
according to alterations in physical appearance as children grew older. 
126 Du Preez v Race Classification Appeal Board 1967 (2) SA 275 (C) at 277G; and C v Sekretaries Van 
Binnelandse Sake 1967 (3) SA (T) 346 at 348H. 
127 See generally Boberg (1977) op cit note 78 at 99-100. In Pitcher v Secretary of Interior 1968 (4) SA 258 
(C) the children and mother in a family failed in their attempt to be classified the same as the father. 
128 In T v Secretary for the Interior 1966 (3) SA 565 (C) at 572A Watermeyer J treated it as appropriate that a 
son had 'deliberately made a break with his parents' in order to achieve a place in a white ballet group. In 
Francisco v Secretary for the Interior 1967 (2) SA 283 (C) at 289B Tebbutt AJ was of the opinion (obiter) 
that visits by a son to his mother 'once a week and in private' were sufficiently discreet and limited to enable 
his racial classification not to be changed to that of hers. 
129 1956 (2) SA 330 (C). 
130 See Chisholm (1989) op cit note 16 at 142. 
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of colour.  And the supreme court Population Registration Act decisions directed 
onversely that they should not allow any children who might arguably have some 
coloure
ade it was decided that the classification criteria in the Population 
Registration Act 30/1950 had proved sufficiently workable to enable the inclusion of 
express
years pkloof and was now the minister 
responsible for social welfare, introduced the Children's Bill of 1960 in parliament.131 In 
ms of the Population Registration Act (Act No. 50 of 1950), been classified as 
belonging to a race other than the race of his parents or guardian if there is in the family a child who 
belongs to the same race as the parents or guardian;'132 
he removal of clause 1(x)(j) reduced the racial emphasis in Vorster’s  initiative.  It 
ulgated. 
c
d ancestry to enter or remain in alternative care situations with whites. 
 
 
 
2.4.3  Established Apartheid in the Late 20th Century 
 
After a dec
 references to race in child care legislation. In 1960 BJ Vorster, who had many 
previously opposed Paton’s reforms at Die
clause 1(x)(j) he proposed that it should become possible to forcibly and permanently 
remove any child from his family, not because he was in need of alternative care, but 
purely because he: 
 
'... has, in ter
 
This would have taken race matching to the extent of enabling removals even from 
biological parents who had lawful guardianship and were not in any way dysfunctional.  
Fortunately, in a context where international disopprobrium had already been encouraged 
by the writings of Alan Paton this extreme provision was ultimately dropped from the 
Bill.133  
 
T
left only a single express provision when the 1960 Children's Act was prom
                                                 
131 Other purposes of the 1960 legislation have been discussed in part 2.3.4, above. 
p cit note 4 at 390. 
132 Government Gazette No. 6347 [Vol CXCIX] of 8 January 1960. 
133 For a discussion of the Bill, see Zaal (1992) o
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Section
ing white 
children and prospective alternative caregivers.  They were now to decide care matters 
involvi
designed to prevent relatives of the father from approaching children's 
courts to have the child placed with them on the basis of consanguinity.  Even more 
 
 35(2) directed children's courts as follows: '[i]n selecting any person in whose 
custody a child is to be placed or any children’s home…regard shall be had to the religious 
and cultural background and ethnological grouping of the child… and the relationship 
between him and such a person'. The rather vague phrase 'regard shall be had' meant that 
there was still no absolute prohibition on transracial child placements.134  
 
However, s 35(2) was nevertheless significant.  It indicated that children's courts 
were no longer to follow the covert practice of mainly hearing cases involv
ng persons from all groups. Although they would still be expected to preserve the 
best resources for white children, they would become actively involved in applying all of 
the classification criteria developed under the Population Registration Act.  They would 
thus train and encourage social workers to give priority to racially matching children to 
alternative caregivers or residential facilities segregated for the same race group. 
 
In 1965 it was more strongly enjoined that children's courts were to treat racial 
considerations as overriding.  Additional wording was inserted in s 35(2).135 A new 
s35(2)(b) now laid down that where an extramarital ('illegitimate') child had the same 
racial classification as his mother's but not his father's, only her relatives (not the father's) 
were to be regarded as relatives of the child.  This was clearly not in the interests of 
children. It was 
subversive of children's best interests was a new s 35(2)(c). This directed that '[a] child 
may not be placed in the custody of a person whose racial classification differs from his 
own, unless that person is his parent or guardian'.  Here at last was the express prohibition 
which right-wing members of parliament had originally argued for when the 1937 Act had 
been debated.136 
                                                 
134 Some commissioners however interpreted it as absolute: see Joffin and Another v Commissioner of Child 
 SA 506 (T) at 507H. 
 4 above at 391-92 for 
Welfare, Springs 1964 (2)
135 See the Children's Amendment Act 50/1965 at s 4.  See also Zaal (1992) op cit note
a discussion of s 35(2). 
136 See part 2.4.1, above. 
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 With matching now unequivocally required children's court commissioners became 
extensively involved in placing racial considerations before best interests. In the late 1960s 
the legislature made it even more difficult to be classified as white.137 And during this 
period the supreme court applied a strict approach which made it harder for applicants to 
succeed with other changes in race classifications.138  In relation specifically to 
classification of children as white, in 1971 James JP went so far as to hold in Barbour v 
ace Classification Board that even an appeal court could require the presence of 
applica
anthrop
aparthe
child, S
 facilities it would never have occurred to me to doubt his right 
he me
                                                
R
nts in order to view their physical appearance.139  The degree of supposed 
ological expertise arrogated to themselves by courts during the high-tide phase of 
id is graphically illustrated by the impersonal physical assessment of the young 
teven, after he was forced to stand before the court in Barbour: 
 
'In my judgment he had a European cast of face and straight hair.  He was perhaps somewhat sallow 
in colour but he had none of the typical facial characteristics usually associated with a person of 
mixed European and African blood.  If I had noticed him at all when walking down a street it might 
have passed through my mind that he was possibly of Southern European stock, and on further 
reflection that he might have a small admixture of Asiatic or Arab blood, but if I had seen him 
making use of exclusively European
to do so.' 140 
 
T ssage to lower courts was clear.  Presiding officers should view themselves as fully 
capable of determining racial classifications in borderline cases involving young children -
but they should be particularly careful and strict in a situation where entry into the 
privileged white group was at stake. 
 
  Unsurprisingly the children's courts as lower forums bound by the supreme court 
now tended to treat the achievement of 'correct' racial designations as an overridingly 
important task in care cases.141  Where siblings differed in physical appearance they 
frequently imposed different classifications even if this meant that the children would be 
 
137 By means of the Population Registration Amendment Acts 64/1967 and 106/1969. 
72 (2) SA 319 (C). 
 413 (AD) a son succeeded in changing his 
 of his mother's despite an appeal by the secretary for internal affairs. 
esburg Child Welfare Society (1999) op cit note 104 at Section A, Appendix 2 to Annexure E [UP]. 
138 For refusals to change classifications that had created divisions amongst family members see Parker v 
Secretary of Interior 1969 (2) SA 1 (C), Parker v Secretary for the Interior 1971 (4) SA 541 (C), Kolia v 
Secretary for the Interior 1969 (1) SA 287 (C) and Secretary for the Interior v Dalvie 19
In Sekretaris van Binnelandse Sake v Jawoodien 1969 (3) SA
classification to that
139 Barbour v Race Classification Board 1971 (3) SA 534 (N). 
140 Ibid at 539C-D. 
141Johann
 65
parted.142 And once satisfied that a child had been correctly classified commissioners 
applied s 35(2)(c)  of the 1960 Act strictly.  They often refused to place any child with a 
differently classified person or residential facility even if this was patently in her best 
terests.143  One consequence was that many children who could have been placed with 
extende
black children tended to be worst affected.  If commissioners could find a tribal affiliation 
                                                
in
d family members or foster or adoptive parents remained in overcrowded 
institutions or on the streets.144 Since all racial groups were supposed to be separated it was 
no longer (as previously) mainly white children who might be forcibly removed from 
racially-different substitute parents with whom they had bonded.145   
 
As might be expected under the continuance of a nationalist government very 
similar race-matching provisions were again included when the 1960 Children's Act was 
replaced by the 1983 Act.146  A new feature, however, was a carefully-gradated scale of 
foster care grants ranging from white through coloured and Indian to black-classified 
children who were to receive the least per month.147   It has been claimed that many 
children's courts interpreted this hierarchy of discrimination more broadly as indicating the 
priority children should receive on their case rolls.148   Being at the bottom of the scale, 
 
142 Matthee and Schreuder (1999) op cit note 56 at 6. 
143 Ibid.  
144 Ibid. J Maker 'The Law That Causes Untold Misery' Sunday Tribune Jan 31, 1988 at 33 claimed that 
hospitals and social work agencies received large numbers of applications from couples who were ignorant of 
the law and willing to adopt children of other groups but had to turn them away. 
145 This led to clandestine lifestyles in which parent figures hid children from the attention of authorities. 
Pinetown Highway Child and Family Welfare Society Case 18/87 (1987) records the typical situation of a 
black child growing up with a coloured family after he was abandoned with them in 1981.  In order to avoid 
the danger of removal they did not attempt to register his birth or send him to school. J Maker 'The Women 
Who Care for the Children of Prostitutes' Sunday Tribune 24 April, 1988 at 5 noted that prostitutes, as a 
group who often had extramarital children who differed from them in appearance, tended to become adept at 
concealing their existence.   
146 In s 40 of the latter Act were to be found provisions similar to those that had been contained in s35(2) of 
the 1960 Act. The new Act in s 40 continued to prohibit child placements with persons who had differing 
race classifications and again directed that 'regard must be had to the religious and cultural background and 
ethnological grouping… of the child' and any alternative caregiver.  
147 For a discussion and comparison of the amounts see Chatsworth Child and Family Welfare Society 
Submissions from the Welfare Sector to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1999) op cit note 56 at 
Annexure C of Section B, p 9. For a black foster child, a grant would often take years to come through and it 
would last only until the child was 16 years old (as opposed to 18 for other children): see the submission by 
the Greater Johannesburg Welfare Social Service and Development Forum ibid at Section A, p 11. 
148 Matthee and Schreuder (1999) op cit note 56 at Section B, Annexure A, p 2 stated that white children's 
cases were given priority by children's courts whilst children of colour were often left in situations of dire 
need. 
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they still tended to transfer them to distant 'homeland' jurisdictions where hardly any care 
resources were available. In cases where no basis for this could be found some 
commissioners are alleged to have spent the minimum time in deciding on outcomes for 
black c
ending so 
uch time with the maid that they had developed 'an unnatural liking for blacks'.150 In 
another
from social workers. Although further research is needed to fully uncover the reasons for 
this transformation, it is probably at least partly attributable to the appointment of 
hildren. It has been claimed that this sometimes resulted in placements in facilities 
where mortality rates were known to be high with social workers being refused time to 
seek suitable extended family carers.149   
 
It was of course not only persons of colour who were adversely affected by the 
intense climate of racism. A case in which Olmesdahl appeared as legal representative for 
a white single mother in the early 1980s shows how pervasively racial paranoia had come 
to affect the work of the children's courts by that time. The mother went to work every day 
leaving her children in the care of a black domestic worker. A children's court held that a 
care inquiry had been validly instigated purely because the children were sp
m
 case in 1983 the situation of a black child aged six growing up with white 
substitute parents was recorded.  In order to keep him from being discovered by the 
authorities and removed they avoided having him classified or sent to school.151 
 
An important development was that, in contrast to the earlier period when (as seen 
in the Phillips case) welfare personnel could usually be relied upon to cooperate in the 
implementation of segregation policies, by the 1980s there was considerable resistance 
increasing numbers of social workers of colour and growing anti-apartheid activism by the 
                                                 
149 See the discussion of the scandal arising from the continuation of children's court placements (despite 
in S 
 children who looked different from themselves. 
numerous deaths there) at the Van Rhyn Deep Facility from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s and the alleged 
comment of the Johannesburg chief commissioner that the babies concerned 'would die anyway' 
Mabusela Submissions from the Welfare Sector to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, 1999) at Appendix 1 to Annexure E, p 2. 
150 As it was alleged in court ‘ 'n onnatuurlike voorliefde vir swartes’: personal communication -Professor 
MCJ Olmesdahl, Durban 28 Oct 2002. 
151 Durban African Child and Welfare Society Case 13984/83 (1983).  As indicated in note 145 above, by the 
1980s it was not only white parents who needed to hide
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late 20th century.152 A governmental system of different welfare departments for different 
race groups unintentionally provided infrastructural support for resistance by reducing the 
degree of white control. 
ept would 
inevitably have a direct bearing on care resources subsequently made available. 
                                                
 
Resistance by welfare professionals was also provoked by the harsh effects of 
increasingly strenuous attempts to enforce apartheid.153 Social workers were well placed to 
impede the implementation of race matching by children's courts.  In the 1980s they often 
did so by providing limited or even false evidence about the background and history of 
children.154 The aim was usually to achieve the most favorable possible classification in 
terms of the governmental racial scale: black-Asian/coloured-white.155 The physical 
appearance of many children in relation to these artificial categories was borderline. If a 
children's court accepted that a child was alone after being abandoned or orphaned it could 
not demand to see relatives or their classification documents with a view to clarifying 
racial ancestry. And the classification which it could be persuaded to acc
  
Social workers sometimes gave false evidence that children of indeterminate 
appearance were of entirely white ancestry.156 Where this was unlikely to seem convincing 
they might instead try to prove that a child was 'coloured' or 'Indian' rather than black.  
Aside from the more general aim of gaining the best possible care resources for a child, 
selective information about social background and ancestry might also be provided to 
avoid children being removed from substitute caregivers with whom they had already 
 
152 For example, in Durban during 1984-1991 a 'Children from Nowhere Association' operated for the 
specific purpose of developing and sharing tactics intended to promote best-interests rather than racially 
motivated alternative care placements.  Only a minority of the members were white social workers: personal 
observation -the candidate served as their legal adviser.  In other parts of the country there were similar 
erned Social Workers’ Society in Johannesburg: personal 
 individual cases were an important part of the business at meetings of societies such as the 
from Nowhere Association and the Concerned Social Workers’ Society: personal observation; and 
pened because a light-
her. 
organizations -for example, the Conc
communication Priscilla Mckay MPP 21 April, 2006. 
153 Personal observation; and Mckay ibid. 
154 Whilst this could not safely be recorded in their minutes at the time, the best methods for doing so to 
assist children
Children 
Mckay, ibid. 
155 Ibid. 
156 In Durban Child and Family Welfare Society Case 406/80 (1980-1984) this hap
skinned child had bonded with a white couple. She had been abandoned with them at birth and after four 
years it was strongly in her best interests that they be permitted to foster or adopt 
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bonded, or siblings being differently classified.157 A fourth motivation was to manipulate 
the future classification of a young child so that it would match that of a suitable 
prospective adoptive or foster parent whom a social work agency had already screened.158  
ld run through the hair of children and interrogating mothers about 
eir sexual partners.161 
 
 
As it became recognised that growing numbers of social workers were not 
cooperating administrative practices were developed to make it more difficult to mislead 
commissioners. All social workers’ reports had to go through a process of what came to be 
referred to in welfare circles as 'canalisation' before they could be presented at a children’s 
court. This simply meant that the reports were evaluated by government-employed senior 
social workers who were more likely to assist with the imposition of government racial 
policies.159 A second pre-court procedure was that of requiring as yet unclassified children 
(and any available near-relatives) to be physically viewed by officials employed by the 
department of home affairs.160  These officials utilised invasive techniques such as seeing 
whether fine combs wou
th
As tactics and counter-tactics proliferated around questions of race, by the early 
1980s some children's courts became ideological battlegrounds. Commissioners responded 
to activist social workers’ classification stratagems by attempting to insure that they were 
counterproductive. One way to do so was by ordering that a child whose proposed 
                                                 
157 For example, a social worker might choose not to reveal that children of a single mother had different 
fathers who differed from each other in racial appearance: personal experience. 
158 A case which illustrates the kinds of dynamics involved is one which was dealt with by the Durban Indian 
Child and Family Welfare Society in 1985. The Society felt under pressure to ensure that a coloured child 
was successfully adopted by the Indian husband of his coloured mother. The family was living in an Indian 
area where the child had not been permitted to go to school for two years because the department of home 
affairs refused to reclassify him as Indian. The Society therefore launched an adoption application in the 
Durban children's court without including information about the classifications of the child and mother.  The 
application was successful because the busy commissioner did not wish to spend a lot of time on the case and 
assumed that the child was Indian. On the basis of the adoption it was subsequently possible to have the 
child’s classification 'corrected' by the department of home affairs to Indian: see Durban Indian Child and 
Family Welfare Society Case A1732 (1985); and Durban Children's Court Case No. 14/1/2-158/85 (1985: 
unreported). 
159 On the racist intentions underlying 'canalisation' see Mabusela (1999) op cit note 149 at p 1 of Appendix 1 
to Annexure E.  
160 Johannesburg Child Welfare Society (1999) op cit note 104 at p 1 of Appendix 1 to Annexure E.  
161 Personal experience. In Durban Child and Family Welfare Society Case 406/80 (1980-1984) as referred to 
in note 156 above department of home affairs officials eventually compelled a classification of coloured after 
checking the hair of the child. 
 69
classification appeared suspect should remain for an extended period of time in a place of 
safety which was not geared for long-term placements.  This would be done by applying M 
v Race Classification Board162 and waiting to see whether the child's physical appearance 
changed as she grew older.163 Alternatively, a commissioner could insist that a child must 
be differently classified   from what a social worker proposed even if this meant that 
extended family members who would otherwise have been available as alternative 
caregiv
to be placed or transferred'. But this is no 
longer interpreted by children's courts as standing in the way of transracial placements that 
are in the best interests of children.167 
                                                
ers were no longer eligible.164  
 
It would be wrong to classify all commissioners as heartlessly positivistic appliers 
of racial law.  Particularly by the late 1980s children's courts were sometimes willing to 
support reclassifications on humanitarian grounds especially where a white child was not 
involved.165 However, it was only on 19 June 1991 that the direct prohibition on 
placements involving persons of differing race classifications was repealed.166 By that time 
many children had been had adversely affected by it despite the clandestine struggle which 
had been waged in the children's courts throughout the previous decade. In its final form as 
still applicable today s 40 of the 1983 Act continues to direct that 'regard shall be had to 
the religious and cultural background of the child concerned and of his parents as against 
that of the person in or to whose custody he is 
 
162 See note 125 in part 2.4.2, above. 
163 Greater Johannesburg Welfare Social Service and Development Forum (1999) op cit note 147 at Section 
A, p13 para 7.2. In Case 406/80 as cited in note 156 the child's classification was delayed for two years 
because 'there is uncertainty regarding the appearance of hair which is not yet grown'. 
164 Mabusela (1999) op cit note 149 at 2.  
165 On 10 Dec 1987 the Durban children's court supported the reclassification of a child from coloured to 
Indian so that she could live legally with an Indian father figure with whom she had bonded: Durban Indian 
Child and Family Welfare Society Case A1795 (1987). On 20th April 1988 the Verulam children's court 
agreed to place an extramarital Indian-classified child with her coloured paternal grandparents and to 
recommend that they receive a state foster grant.  It accepted proof that the Indian mother had died and the 
child had bonded with the grandparents: Verulam Child and Family Welfare Society Case 4678 (1988). 
166 Under s 14 of the Child Care Amendment Act 86/1991.  
167 There has, however, been some debate about how it should be applied: see generally J Heaton 'The 
Relevance of Race Classification in Terms of the Population Registration Act 30 of 1950 for Adoption in 
South Africa' (1989) 106 SALJ 713; DJ Joubert 'Interracial Adoptions: Can We Learn from the Americans?' 
(1993) 110 SALJ 726; FN Zaal 'Avoiding the Best Interests of the Child.  Race-Matching and the Child Care 
Act 74 of 1983' (1994) 10 SAJHR 372; and TL Mosikatsana 'Transracial Adoptions: Are We Learning the 
Right Lessons from the Americans and Canadians?  A Reply to Professors Joubert and Zaal' (1995) 112 
SALJ 606. 
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2.5 
ll ongoing at the present time.  Also, the concept of a family 
court structure raises fundamental questions about the possible status and functions of 
care-pr
rk of children's courts.169 The 
Comm  there be an 'Office of the Children's Friend' to provide 
special
                                                
More Effective Courts and Legal Representatives 
  
A governmental initiative which originated during the late apartheid period 
explored the possibility of establishing family courts. Its historical evolution is briefly 
considered below because it produced some important recommendations concerning the 
children's courts and is sti
oceedings courts.   
 
During the 1970s concern about escalating divorce rates in the white population 
caused the possibility of establishing family courts in South Africa to be investigated three 
times but the reports were consistently negative.168 In the 1980s, however, there were some 
positive developments which resulted in limited improvements in court services on behalf 
of at least some children involved in domestic matters.  In 1983 the Hoexter Commission 
published a report in which it recommended the establishment of family courts which 
should, as part of their jurisdiction, take over the wo
ission further proposed that
ist assistance for children involved in litigation.170  
 
 In 1985 the recommendations of the Hoexter Commission appeared to be bearing 
fruit when a Family Court Bill was published.171 Although the Bill was ultimately rejected, 
the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act 28/1987 was promulgated with a view to 
promoting the Hoexter concept of a Children's Friend. This Act is historically significant 
 
168 The internal and unpublished Thompson Report of 21 October 1974; South African Law Commission 
Report on the Law of Divorce and Matters Incidental Thereto (RP 57/1978); and the Galgut Commission 
Inquiry into Civil Proceedings in the Supreme Court of South Africa (1980). For discussion and references to 
commentaries, see S Burman 'The New Family Court in Action: An Initial Assessment' (2000) 117 SALJ 111 
at 111-12. 
169 Op cit note 59. Part B is entitled Commission of Inquiry into the Structure and Functioning of the Courts. 
See generally Part VII which is entitled 'The Desirability or Otherwise of the Establishment of a Family 
Court'.  For a recommendation that children's court work be encompassed, see ibid at 525(e). 
170 Ibid at 510. 
171 Bill 62/1985. 
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because for the first time a network of lawyers who were expected to serve as specialists 
on behalf of children was set up.  These lawyers were titled 'family advocates' (using 
Canadian terminology) and their services were to be provided at state expense.172  
Unfortunately, the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act confined their work to 
divorce-related matters, and so the representational needs of children in other courts -such 
as the c
ently 
still operative and have slightly reduced duplication of resources and travelling costs for 
the pub
courts and also take over much of the  child-related, domestic-case jurisdiction of other 
hildren's courts- were not catered for.173 
 
As Burman has pointed out, by the mid-1990s strong political pressure to 
demonstrate a concern for women and families was being felt by the government.174 In 
1997 the Hoexter Commission published another report in which it again recommended 
the establishment of family courts. It continued to stress the importance of these having a 
comprehensive jurisdiction to include, inter alia, the work of the children's courts.175  Even 
before publication of this report the minister of justice established a family court task team 
in February 1997. In 1998 this team initiated the setting up of family court centres as pilot 
projects in a few jurisdictions. These were not actual family courts in the accepted sense of 
forums with a broad jurisdictional capability in domestic matters.  Rather more modestly, 
they merely situated courts dealing with different kinds of domestic disputes (including 
children's courts) in close physical proximity to one another.176  The centres are curr
lic but they are only a small step on the road towards creating family courts.    
 
The South African law commission in its draft Children's Bill 2002 recommended 
the establishment of broadly-empowered 'child and family courts' to replace children's 
                                                 
172 The first family advocates’ office was set up in 1990. 
173 A proposal for utilising family advocates in children's court cases is made in part 5.4.2, below. 
tion of the Provincial and Local 
mpts to establish family courts in South Africa see B Goldblatt 'A Feminist 
174 Burman (2000) op cit note 168 at 113. It is noted ibid that in June 1996 the minister of justice told 
parliament that he wished to establish a family court as soon as possible. 
175 Report 200/1997 entitled 'Commission of Inquiry into the Rationalisa
Divisions of the Supreme Court'.  Part 2 of vol 1 of the Report dealt with 'The Need for the Establishment in 
South Africa of a Specialist Family Court of Comprehensive Jurisdiction'. 
176 For more information about the pilot projects and the work of the Centres see Burman (2000) op cit note 
168 at 113-115. Generally on atte
Perspective on the Law Reform Process: An Evaluation of Attempts to Establish a Family Court in South 
Africa' (1997) 13 SAJHR 373. 
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courts.177  This proposal was not followed by the legislature and the existing children's 
court network is perpetuated by the 2005 Act.  Nevertheless, the law commission's 
recommendations in favour of much broader capabilities for courts dealing with children's 
matters did influence this Act.   As will be shown in chapter 8 below178 it transforms 
children's courts by greatly increasing the range of remedies they can offer, although their 
jurisdiction will not extend to juvenile crime cases.179  As suggested in part 1.1 above, the 
2005 Act is well arguably the most important historical development since the legislative 
recognition of the children's courts in 1937.  
re to remain as an 
important component of our child protection system for the time being.  
                                              
 
In s 55 of the 2005 Act provision has been made for state-funded legal aid board 
representatives for children in children's courts.  Significantly, however, family advocates 
have not been included and nor has provision been made for state funded representation of 
other impoverished family members besides children.180 In s 45(3) of the 2005 Act the 
legislature has committed itself to the eventual establishment of family courts.181 It is clear 
from the wording of the Act, however, that separate children's courts a
 
South Africa is thus still a long way off from the development of what are known 
in North America as unified family courts.182 The focus in subsequent chapters of this 
thesis, therefore, is on improving our present system of children's courts. It is hoped, 
however, that the reforms recommended will assist with the strengthening of what may 
   
7 Chapter 6, Draft Children's Bill 2002: see South African Law Commission Report on the Review of the 
Child Care Act (RP 17/2003) part 3.  
17
178 At part 8.3. 
179 In contrast, in Kenya it was decided to establish 'children's courts' which could deal with both civil and 
criminal matters: s 73 Children Act 8/2001 (Gazette Supplement No 95, 4 January 2002, Nairobi). 
180 Legal representation is further discussed in chapter 5, below. 
181 It opens with the phrase '[p]ending the establishment of family courts by an Act of Parliament'. 
182 In contrast to fragmented systems such as that in South Africa, such courts can efficiently 'bundle' all 
domestic and even also less serious juvenile delinquency cases involving the same family into a single court 
matter, often dealt with by a single judge. See, for example A Schepard & JW Bozzomo 'Efficiency, 
Therapeutic Justice, Mediation and Evaluation: Reflections on a Survey of Unified Family Courts' (2003) 37 
Family LQ 333 at 338-39; and CD Schwarz 'Unified Family Courts: A Saving Grace for Victims of Domestic 
Violence Living in Nations with Fragmented Court Systems' (2004) 42 Family Court Review 304 at 305-310. 
That the South African legislature has not begun to contemplate combining delinquency with domestic cases 
involving the same family is clear from its continued commitment to separate criminal courts for trying 
children: see generally the Child Justice Bill 49/2002 at <http://www.polity.org.za/pdf/ChildJustB49.pdf>. 
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eventually become a care and protection component in a future unified South African 
mily court system.   
ave 
ad a considerable impact since they were imported and reinterpreted in South Africa. The 
allocati
th state grants.  Despite some seminal 
and ma y subsequent limitations which would seriously affect the work of these courts, 
their re
and fathers. The proven policy of favouring specialist presiding magistrates was retained.  
fa
 
2.6  Conclusion 
 
 A complex and in some respects even contradictory set of factors shaped the 
emergence of modern South African care legislation and the children's courts. The most 
important external influence came from Britain.  The originally prison-like English 
industrial schools and reformatories and the idea that nonconformist children from the 
underclasses could be contained and even remoulded in suitable residential facilities h
h
on of the most important decision-making powers about child placements to South 
African courts rather than welfare workers can also be attributed to English methods.   
 
However, in the mid-1920s an important break from the English approach occurred 
with the creation of a unique system of South African children's courts.  It is significant 
that these began as part of a child saving initiative supported by the supreme court and 
often had dedicated presiding magistrates who specialised in care cases. In world terms 
they were modern because of an orientation towards keeping children within their families 
where possible by supporting female caregivers wi
n
tention primarily as care decision-making forums until the present day represents a 
remarkable achievement for a developing country.  
 
After their unofficial establishment in the 1920s the formal recognition of children's 
courts and description of presiding officers as 'commissioners' in the 1937 Children's Act 
were further important steps forward. This Act continued the modernisation of our law, 
inter alia, by providing inexpensive accessibility to children's courts for all caregivers, 
introducing medical assessment procedures, and establishing the no-fault and child focused 
'child in need of care' ground. It also helped to redress gender inequality between mothers 
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These generally developed sufficient skill to keep proceedings amicable and encourage the 
hearing of the voices of vulnerable children and caregivers.  Despite some supreme court 
judgments which limited the jurisdiction of the children's courts, the variety and quality of 
their se
thus also appears in a positive light when 
easured against the criterion of courts as an effective monitoring agent able to compel 
remedi
at in response to this concern South Africa has had a long 
history of racial discrimination in the allocation of alternative care services in general and 
specific
d in the period 1910-60.  Court remedies provided for in care 
rvices were significantly advanced during the currency of the 1937 Act. 
 
Subsequently, the 1960 Children's Act in some respects continued the process of 
modernising the children's courts.  A mental neglect ground and allowance of expert 
psychiatric evidence based on observation in controlled environments incorporated recent 
scientific knowledge. Home placements supervised by social workers were introduced as 
an alternative to removals of children -which of course accords with the primary evaluative 
criterion of removals as a last resort.  Of particular importance was that under the 1960 Act 
welfare became accountable to children's courts for proper implementation of their orders.  
Furthermore, children's courts gained a blanket power to impose criminal sanctions on any 
person impeding such implementation.  The Act 
m
es on behalf of children. 
 
The steady improvements in the wording of legislation governing the services of 
the children's courts must not, however, be viewed in isolation. The most important 
internal historical influence was undoubtedly political concerns about preserving a pure 
white population as a separate entity.  Alternative care placements were a sensitive issue 
because they could result in exfiltration of white children and infiltration of children of 
colour. It has been shown th
ally court services.    
 
As early as the late 19th-century some legislative provisions in destitute children's 
legislation expressly favoured 'European' children.  A need to accommodate various shades 
of political opinion at the time of Union and an appreciation of the problems resulting from 
inadequate population-classification criteria caused a more covert approach to 
discrimination to be adopte
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legislation during this period were not generally expressly racist, and often appeared to be 
designe
 of reformatories.  Coloured children tended to be exploited by means of 
court orders placing them in apprenticeships -although institutional placements were also a 
possibi
e care resources were 
ceived by them.  A covert binary court system based entirely on the physical appearance 
of child
d for all children.   
 
Despite the apparent neutrality in the wording of much of the legislation, and 
notwithstanding dicta about applicability equally for all children by some supreme court 
judges, discrimination against children of colour remained a pervasive feature of court 
activity in care cases until the last decade of the 20th century. In rural areas black children 
were consigned to parallel networks of native commissioners’ and later homeland courts 
where presiding officers tended to have little expertise in children's issues and care 
resources were scarce.  In urban areas children of colour were far more likely than white 
children to be brought before juvenile courts. These courts usually ordered that black 
children in need of alternative care be forcibly removed to remote tribal areas or the harsh 
environments
lity.   
 
The extensive use of juvenile courts and placements in large, prison-like 
institutions showed the lingering historical influence of England -for there too, juvenile 
courts accustomed to criminal cases dispensed care orders, and placements of particularly 
lower class children in industrial schools and reformatories remained common. Available 
evidence suggests that in South Africa white children were less likely to be subjected to 
such placements and that for the first forty years of their existence the specialised 
children's courts were used mainly for ensuring that the best availabl
re
ren was thus maintained for the first half of the 20th century. 
 
After apartheid became an official policy under the nationalist government in 1948 
residential facilities were rigorously segregated and the independent, child-oriented 
magistrates removed from the children's courts. Expressly-racist provisions reappeared in 
child care legislation in the 1960s.  This was now regarded as feasible because race 
classification criteria had been developed under the Population Registration Act 50/1950 
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and refined in supreme court interpretations. The role of children's courts was extended 
from promoting the best interests of mainly white children.  Now staffed by cooperative 
generalist magistrates, they became centrally involved in racial classification and matching 
children from all groups to substitute caregivers.  Although they continued with their 
earlier function of preserving the best resources for white children they thus played a key 
role in 
matching were supported by legislative 
amendments, supreme court precedents and administrative requirements rendering it more 
difficul
d in only limited advances, these years must with 
reference to the evaluative criteria applied in this thesis be characterised as a period of 
stagnat
segregating all children in need of alternative care.   
 
As had been foreseen by politicians earlier in the century the promulgation in the 
1960s of expressly-racial legislative provisions that were obviously applicable to 
vulnerable children engendered a degree of opposition. During the late apartheid period 
children's courts became arenas of struggle between activist social workers and pro-
government commissioners. Continuing efforts by the latter to preserve the best resources 
for white children were now impeded by selective and modified evidence put before them. 
However, their attempts to maintain race 
t to alter or ignore race classifications.  
 
It has been shown that the escalating governmental focus on ethnic considerations 
in the late 20th century harmed children and caregivers. Even the privileged white group 
suffered -in part because its distracting influence resulted in failures to modernise -and 
even retrograde measures- in the 1983 Act. As noted in part 2.3.5 these stand in contrast to 
the overall progress in children's court services (albeit with some setbacks) of previous 
decades.  Since attempts to develop family courts also failed and efforts to improve legal 
representation for children resulte
ion and even deterioration.   
 
Given the effects of the main historical influences it can be understood why in 1995 
the democratic government took over outdated and in other respects extremely inadequate 
care legislation. The extent to which it inherited children's courts where expertise in care 
matters was lacking because staff had been selected to serve as reliable race classifiers and 
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guardians of privilege can also be appreciated.  The legislature in formulating the 2005 Act 
was undoubtedly correct in its appreciation that major reforms were urgently needed. How 
far the Act makes up for lost time by optimising the role of children's courts on behalf of 
all children is evaluated in the subsequent chapters, below.
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 CHAPTER 3 
ALTERNATIVES TO COURTS 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
       It might be postulated that a logical extension of the anti-legalistic approach 
referred to in chapter 1 above would be a reduction in the role of courts -or even their 
complete removal- as decision-making forums in care cases. It is certainly true that in 
some systems increased use is being made of alternative dispute resolution (hereafter 
'ADR') methods rather than relying only upon courts for resolving differences between 
family members and welfare personnel and for reaching important decisions in these cases. 
This is supported by the UN Guidelines, 2007.1 The 2005 Act is the first South African 
legislation to provide expressly for ADR in care cases.  
 
This chapter considers the extent to which courts should continue to be used for 
alternative care cases in South Africa or else be replaced or supplemented by ADR 
processes.  The chapter is based on an assumption that this question can best be resolved 
by considering the main advantages and disadvantages of these processes as compared 
with those of courts. It will be shown that although South Africa certainly needs to 
implement less adversarial and more collaborative approaches there are important reasons 
why our courts must continue to play an authoritative part in the resolution of care cases. 
  
In part 3.2 below five ADR methods with which there has been substantial 
experience in well-developed systems are briefly described and distinguished. In part 3.3 
their main advantages and disadvantages are identified.  In part 3.4 some basic strengths 
and weaknesses of courts are noted and compared with those of the alternative methods. In 
part 3.5 a motivation for retaining courts and combining them with ADR is put forward.  It 
is recommended that our courts should at the present time continue to bear primary 
                                                 
1 Article 35(b) refers to the need for states to implement mediation and other conciliation services for 
assisting children who require alternative care measures. 
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responsibility for reaching legally-binding decisions about mandatory alternative care 
measures. It is, however, also suggested that because of its advantages in certain situations 
as proved in other systems ADR should be promoted in South Africa.   
 
In part 3.6 the framework for combined use of children's courts and ADR in the 
2005 Act is critically evaluated.  It is shown that although a fundamentally correct 
approach has been taken in providing children's courts with a managerial function the ADR 
provisions in the Act are inadequate in a number of respects. Recommendations for 
addressing these deficiencies are put forward.  Finally, in the conclusion to the chapter in 
part 3.7 the most important findings are summarised and related to some of the evaluative 
criteria as described in chapter 1. 
 
3.2  Alternative Resolution Methods for Care Cases 
 
The alternative methods selected for evaluation are:  negotiated voluntary care 
agreements, mediation, family group conferences, the Scottish children's hearings panels 
and pre-court conferences.  Although combinations have developed in some systems2 it is 
convenient for the purpose of evaluation to consider them individually. As a necessary 
precursor to an analysis of their effectiveness a brief description of basic distinguishing 
features of each is provided below.3     
 
Negotiated voluntary care agreements may be seen as a natural extension of the 
kind of interactions which family members would tend to have with investigative social 
workers in many care cases.    The idea behind them is to remove the need for externally 
directed solutions by allowing caregivers (and sometimes also children) to negotiate with 
investigative agency personnel and then voluntarily agree upon the implementation of 
                                                 
2 SM Chandler & M Giovannucci 'Family Group Conferences: Transforming Traditional Child Welfare 
Policy and Practice' (2004) 42 Family Court Review 216 at 217. 
3 As can be seen from the next footnote terminology and utilisation of methods vary slightly in different 
systems.  The purpose in the discussion immediately following is merely to identify the main distinguishing 
features which tend to characterise the five methods under consideration and give a brief idea of how they 
have commonly been used. 
 80
alternative care measures, including if necessary child-removals.4 In England opportunities 
to reach such agreements are sometimes provided at what are referred to as child 
protection conferences.5  These have become well established as a standard feature of care 
cases.  They are conducted by investigative agencies and may sometimes avert the need for 
other forms of ADR or court proceedings.6 
  
In some systems voluntary agreement negotiations may be initiated by family 
members rather than by social workers. For example, in France under the 1984 Children's 
Act provision was made for either parents or children themselves to approach social 
services rather than courts with a request for temporary alternative care.7  In British 
Columbia s 20(2) of the Child, Family and Community Service Act of 1996 allows for the 
use of specialist 'coordinators' rather than ordinary investigative social workers to negotiate 
with families. 8  
 
Mediation has been defined as a dispute-resolving mechanism for empowering 
parties to settle problems in a consensual way by means of voluntary direct engagement on 
an equal footing.  It requires the presence of an independent mediator to act as a neutral 
facilitator.9 Although it was previously mainly associated with other kinds of disputes 
mediation has been increasingly utilised in care cases during the last two decades.10   
                                                 
4 In Canada they have been so used for many years: see SE Palmer 'Mediation in Child Protection Cases: An 
Alternative to the Adversary System' (1989) 68 Child Welfare 21 at 26-27. In some US jurisdictions the 
resulting agreements with welfare are termed 'entrustment agreements' and can be revoked by parents: see, 
for example, In the Interests of La Rue 366 A.2d 1271 (Pennsylvania 1976) at 1273. In Scotland the family 
may agree to 'voluntary supervision': see C Hallett & C Murray 'Children's Rights and the Scottish Children's 
Hearings System' (1999) 7 International Journal of Children's Rights 31 at 32. 
5 If parents agree voluntary placements are possible in terms of s 20 of the English Children Act 1989. This is 
supported by the Children Act Guidance and Regulations 1991 at vol 2, para 2.25.  See further G Schofield 
'Parental Responsibility and Parenting -the Needs of Accommodated Children in Long-Term Foster-Care' 
(2000) 12 Child and Family LQ 345 at 347. 
6 See the English Protocol for Judicial Case Management in Public Law Children Act Cases (June 2003) at 
para 15.  
7 M Corbillon 'France' in MJ Colton & W Hellinckx (eds) Child Care in the EC (1993) 53 at 58. 
8 RSBC 1996: accessed at <http://www.qp. gov.bc.ca/statreg/stat/C/96046_01.htm>. 
9 This definition is adapted from G Davis 'Reflections in the Aftermath of the Family Mediation Pilot' (2001) 
13 Child and Family LQ 371. See also J Maresca 'Mediating Child Protection Cases' (1995) 74 Child Welfare 
731 at 733; and GR Savoury, HL Beals & JM Parks 'Mediation in Child Protection: Facilitating the 
Resolution of Disputes' (1995) 74 Child Welfare 743 at 744. 
10 Savoury, Beals & Parks ibid at 744. It is frequently used in the USA for care and other disputes involving 
children: see AR Imbrogno & S Imbrogno 'Mediation in Court Cases of Domestic Violence' (2000) 81 
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Because the neutrality and independence of mediators is crucial investigative social 
workers or even persons associated with their agencies cannot be utilised to undertake 
mediation with client families.  Although care mediation phases and their sequence vary in 
different systems11 it has generally been found appropriate to begin with processes in 
which the mediator interacts separately with individual family members (sometimes only 
telephonically) before deciding who should be brought together and further involved.12  
 
As pointed out by Maynard four main uses of mediation have developed in care 
cases.13  Firstly, it is used therapeutically to address problems between family members 
which cause neglect or abuse of children. The aim here is to avoid drastic measures such as 
removal.14 In some matters this may involve mediating between a child and parent.15 
Secondly, it is used to help families accept the need for temporary or permanent removals 
of their children.16    Thirdly, it is applied to resolve differences between welfare and 
members of families where there are care problems.17   
 
A fourth use of mediation is to resolve differences between original and alternative 
caregivers who need to interact during temporary child-placement periods.18    This is 
relevant in 'open' placement situations where, for example, the identity of a foster parent is 
known to birth parents who will continue to have contact with the child and the foster 
                                                                                                                                                    
Families in Society: The Journal of Contemporary Human Services 392; and AS Schepard & JW Bozzomo 
'Efficiency, Therapeutic Justice, Mediation and Evaluation: Reflections on the Survey of United Family 
Courts' (2003) 37 Family LQ 333 at 336.  Scotland, with its tradition of using out-of-court settlement 
processes on behalf of children, has placed a strong emphasis on mediation: see L Parkinson Family 
Mediation (1997) 194; K McK Norrie The Law Relating to Parent and Child in Scotland (1999, 2ed) at 296 
para 9.48; and N Freymond 'Using Intermediary Structures to Support Families: An International 
Comparison of Practice in Child Protection' (2001) at 23 (Canadian Partnerships for Children and Families 
Project Website. Accessed at <http://www.wlu.ca./pcfproject>). 
11 For a list of stages typically followed in the USA see J Lande 'Mediation: Child Protection Mediation' 
(National Centre for State Courts, 2001) at 3: accessed at < http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications>. 
12A Henry 'Mediating Child Protection Disputes: a Canadian Perspective.  Are We Leaving Room for the 
Child at the Table?' (Paper: Fourth World Congress on Family Law and Children's Rights, Cape Town 2005) 
4.  Accessed at < http://www.lawrights.asn.au/>. 
13 J Maynard 'Permanency Mediation: A Path to Adoption for Children in Out-of-Home Care' (2005) 
LXXXIV Child Welfare 507 at 507-08. 
14 Ibid at 509. 
15 Savoury, Beals & Parks (1995) op cit note 9 at 754. 
16 Maynard (2005) op cit note 13 at 507. 
17 Ibid at 508-09. 
18 Ibid at 508. 
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parent during the time of alternative care.19 As Palmer has pointed out mediation in such 
cases usually focuses on issues of access and 'plans toward reuniting the family'.20   
 
Instead of relying on the expertise of mediators, an alternative technique known as 
'family group conferences' involves utilising a child's wider extended family for deciding 
on extracurial protection arrangements.  These conferences (hereafter, 'FGC’s') were 
originally developed in New Zealand and have since been used there to reduce reliance 
upon both social workers and courts. They are based on long established indigenous Maori 
practices of utilising extended families to assist children.21 They are intended to reduce the 
decision-making powers of professionals and increase those of families.22  
 
FGC’s were first given legislative form in the New Zealand Children, Young 
Persons and Their Families Act 24/1989.23  In contrast to other processes where efforts are 
generally made to limit the number of persons present, at FGC’s an inclusive approach is 
taken.  This is to encourage groups of family members to attend.  Once the wider family 
have been brought together their most important task is usually to develop a plan of 
alternative care.  This will need to be reduced to writing and signed by those involved.24 
As part of the FGC process a 'private time' phase is often included. During this the 
facilitator leaves and family members engage in discussion alone.25 
 
In any evaluation of alternative methods for dealing with care cases it is essential to 
have regard to Scotland's unique children’s hearing panels system which has been in place 
since 1971.26  This may be characterised as an ADR method which seeks to draw upon the 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 Palmer (1989) op cit note 4 at 26. 
21 See EM Pasztor & EJ McFadden 'Global Perspectives on Child Welfare' LXXX (2001) Child Welfare 487 
at 490. 
22 Chandler & Giovannucci (2004) op cit note 2 at 219. 
23 See ss 20-38. 
24 Lande (2001) op cit note 11 at 1. 
25 Chandler & Giovannucci (2004) op cit note 2 at 219-20;  S Holland & S O'Neill ' "We Had to Be There to 
Make Sure It Was What We Wanted" Enabling Children's Participation and Family Decision-making through 
the Family Group Conference' (2006) 13 Childhood 91 at 92.  
26 For a detailed explication of the functioning of the hearing panel system and analysis of relevant law see 
generally K McK Norrie Children's Hearings in Scotland (2005).  On  origins and early development of the 
panel system see ibid at 1-2; A Griffiths & RF Kandel 'Hearing Children in Children's Hearings' (2000) 12 
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local community knowledge of unpaid, ordinary members of a child’s neighbourhood who 
are not highly trained professionals.  It could also be defined as a hybrid system (partly 
alternative and partly court) because it separates key aspects of care proceedings between 
lay forums (called hearing panels) and the local sheriff's courts. This dual system is used 
for children up to 16 years of age and is mainly governed by the Children (Scotland) Act 
1995.27  
 
 Professionally-trained officials called reporters evaluate the submissions of 
investigative social workers and prepare cases for referral to Scottish hearing panels.28  
Before initiating  a  hearing  a reporter must in terms of s 65(1) of the 1995 Act be satisfied 
firstly that a legal ground for referral exists in respect of the child and secondly that the 
child is in need of compulsory measures of supervision.29    Under s 65(5) the selected 
ground of referral must be put to the parents and also to the child if she is able to 
understand it.  If the child or family do not understand and accept the ground then the case 
must go to the local sheriff’s court. If the ground is proved at court the case goes back to 
the panel.  It will then resume the task of reaching a decision about whether compulsory 
care measures will be in best interests of the child.  Panels can impose a wide range of 
orders.30 
 
 In some systems pre-hearing conferences are available as a final process before the 
onset of full litigation in court. The parties, a representative of the investigative agency and 
any legal representatives are usually eligible to attend. They are typically facilitated by 
                                                                                                                                                    
Child and Family LQ 283 at 283-84; and R Mays & D Christie 'The Role of the Child Welfare Hearing in the 
Resolution of Child-Related Disputes in Scotland' (2001) 13 Child and Family LQ 159. 
27 Three volunteer lay persons (in the sense that they are not necessarily qualified professionals) comprise a 
hearing panel. Besides the 1995 Act, panels must have regard to many other authorities. These include the 
ECHR, the Children's Hearings (Scotland) Rules (SI 1996/3261), the Convention Rights (Compliance) 
(Scotland) Act 2001, the Children's Hearings (Legal Representation) (Scotland) Rules 2002, the Antisocial 
Behaviour etc (Scotland) Act 2004 and the Vulnerable Witnesses (Scotland) Act 2004. 
28 Hallett & Murray (1999) op cit note 4 at 32 point out that the reporter 'usually comes from a legal or social 
work background'.  On reporters see further Norrie (2005) op cit note 26 at 12-13. 
29 Under s 52 there are twelve grounds of referral, including lack of parental care (s 52(2)(c)). 
30 Under s 70 they can place children under supervision at home with or without conditions pertaining to 
access, medical examination and treatment.  In more serious cases they may place children in foster care or 
institutional care, including preliminary authorisation for possible secure accommodation.  Under s 66(4) & 
(7) they can choose not to disclose where a child is being cared for. 
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using court staff and premises.31 Just as with extra-curial ADR, the aim is sometimes to try 
to avoid the need to proceed to full court litigation.32 Since pre-hearing conferences are 
intended to produce benefits similar to other alternatives to adjudicated court proceedings 
their usefulness for care cases is evaluated in this chapter rather than that dealing with 
preliminary hearings before court presiding officers.33 For convenience they are referred to 
as a form of ADR. 
 
Pre-hearing conferences are typically intended to provide a last opportunity to settle 
differences amicably or else clarify and narrow down issues in dispute between caregivers 
and welfare shortly prior to their appearance in court.34  They have also been utilised to 
advise parties or their legal representatives about whether they have documentation needed 
for the pending court proceedings.35  In addition they have been used to explain to 
unrepresented parties what legal provisions will be most relevant and how their case will 
be conducted in court.36  They have also been used to assist judges by deriving estimates 
about the amount of court time that will be required to hear a particular case.37 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31  On the English approach see J Hunt, A Macleod & C Thomas The Last Resort: Child Protection, the 
Courts and the 1989 Children Act (1999) at 310-11. In Pennsylvania specially trained persons are used as 
facilitators: see B T’Shuvah 'Restorative Justice and the Courts' (ND) 4 -accessed at 
<http://www.nationalservicesresources.org/file manager/download/faith_justice>. 
32 Hunt, Macleod & Thomas ibid at 311. 
33 On the latter see parts 7.2.2, 7.3.1 & 7.4.1, below. 
34See for example s 65 of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 of New South 
Wales, Australia as discussed by P Parkinson 'The Child Participation Principle in Child Protection Law in 
New South Wales' (2001) 9  International Journal of Children's Rights 259 at 269. Often they are precursors 
rather than alternatives to courts. Examples of systems which make use of pre-hearing conferences in child 
protection cases are France, Germany, the Netherlands and Australia: see Parkinson ibid; & R Sheehan 
Magistrates' Decision-Making in Child Protection Cases (2001) at 218. As an example of an American 
formulation, §4038, s 3A (inserted in 2001) of the Maine Child and Family Services and Child Protection 
Act states: '[t]he court may convene a prehearing conference to clarify the disputed issues and review the 
possibility of settlement'.  See the Maine Statutes Title 22, Chapter 1071: accessed at < http://www. 
janus.state.me.us/legis/statutes/22>. 
35 PA Gagel, C Mclean & RS Moss 'Family Court Facilitators in Colorado -Part I' (2002) 31 The Colorado 
Lawyer 61 at 62. 
36 Ibid.   
37 Ibid.   
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3.3  Strengths and Weaknesses of Alternative Resolution 
 
In the discussion below the main advantages and disadvantages of the alternative 
methods described above are assessed with reference to care cases.  Some general 
characteristics that may be said to apply to all of them are noted first.  Thereafter, the 
methods are individually considered in the same sequence as followed in part 3.2, above.   
   
3.3.1  Advantages of Alternative Methods 
 
It may be claimed that generally ADR methods are less dependent on authoritarian 
decision-making and a technically correct application of formal procedures than courts.  
They less likely to restrict communication or have strict rules about party status which may 
limit participation.38  Proponents of ADR contend that this produces three fundamental 
advantages. Firstly, improved opportunities for uninhibited communication by family 
members, including children,39 result in better information-gathering.40   Secondly, ADR 
creates a greater sense of family participation in the fashioning of care solutions.41 And 
thirdly, agreed-upon solutions are more likely to be supported by family members than 
ones imposed upon them.42   The family are therefore more likely to work with welfare 
towards the return of removed children -which is often an important aim in care cases.43 
 
In relation to the specific advantages of the different categories of ADR Bullock 
has claimed that in England voluntary agreements negotiated directly with investigative 
agencies have proved successful in less serious care cases. In a significant proportion of 
                                                 
38 G Firestone & J Weinstein 'In the Best Interests of Children: a Proposal to Transform the Adversarial 
System' (2004) 42 Family Court Review 203 at 209. 
39 For example, in an in-depth study in Wales (albeit with a relatively small sample of 25 children) Holland 
& O'Neill (2006) op cit note 25 at 103 found that a high proportion of children experienced FGC’s as 
positive forums in which they were readily able to express their views.  
40 Palmer (1989) op cit note 4 at 29-30; Schepard & Bozzomo (2003) op cit note 10 at 347. 
41 Palmer ibid at 29-30. 
42 Schepard & Bozzomo (2003) op cit note 10 at 347; and Chandler & Giovannucci (2004) op cit note 2 at 
221.  For a South African study in which this view was supported by respondents who had mediated on 
children's issues in divorce cases: see F Coughlan & D Tatchell 'Perspectives on Inter-professional 
Collaboration: Mediation' (2001) 37 Social Work/Maatskaplike Werk 278 at 282.  Palmer (1989) op cit note 4 
at 30 argued that it is particularly important that children, as the main affected parties, must feel encouraged 
to cooperate in care cases. 
43 Palmer  ibid. 
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these parents voluntarily agree to remedies which involved social workers regard as 
appropriate -including frequently short-term removals of their children. As a result, 
pressure is taken off court rolls because no care orders are required.44   
 
In South Africa although children can voluntarily self-refer to shelters designed for 
street children in urban areas there is currently no legislative scope for voluntary 
placements by caregivers or child self-referrals to other categories of care facility.45 Our 
system has therefore arguably been unnecessarily overloaded because a children's court 
inquiry has had to be held in every case where a child needed to be taken into the formal 
care-protection system. In contrast, in some anti-legalistic46continental European systems 
there has for many years been an extremely strong emphasis on consensual arrangements 
with children's families that are negotiated outside court wherever possible.47 A significant 
advantage of voluntary agreements is that they do not require additional resources beyond 
those already available at the investigative agency. 
 
In relation to advantages of mediation, it has been claimed that involvement of 
properly-skilled mediators in care cases often helps to resolve problems amicably and 
results in better care arrangements for children.48  For example, Maresca described care 
mediation in Ontario as highly successful in this regard.49 Agreement was reached in 85% 
of the cases in her sample.50   She found that persons involved almost all felt that 
agreements reached were fair and had helped to heal relationships within families or with 
investigative agencies.51  Although she considered that more research was needed her 
                                                 
44 See R Bullock 'The United Kingdom' in Colton & Hellinckx (1993) op cit note 7, p212 at 216. 
45  However, voluntary agreement provisions will become applicable when the 2005 Act is fully 
implemented.  For a discussion of these, see part 3.6, below. 
46 For the meaning of this classification as assigned in the thesis see part 1.3.1, above. 
47 See W Hellinckx, B van den Bruel & C vander Borght 'Belgium and Luxembourg' in Colton & W 
Hellinckx (1993) op cit note 7, p1 especially at 4-5, 17-18 & 20.  
48 For American findings see Lande (2001) op cit note 11 at 2. On England see B Lindley, M Richards & P 
Freeman 'Advice and Advocacy for Parents in Child Protection Cases -an Exploration of Conceptual and 
Policy Issues, Ethical Dilemmas and Future Directions' (2001) 13 Child and Family LQ 311 at 319 N42. G 
Cameron & N Freymond 'Canadian Child Welfare: System Design Dimensions and Possibilities for 
Innovation' (2003) 35 concluded generally that mediation has 'demonstrated its potential' in Canada: accessed 
at <http:www//.wlu.ca/documents/7180/Canadian_child_welfare_systems_design.pdf>. 
49 Maresca (1995) op cit note 9 at 739-40. 
50 Ibid at 739.  
51 Ibid. 
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follow-ups indicated a higher rate of compliance with agreements than with solutions 
imposed by courts.52  
 
Where children are able to take part in mediation it has been found that they can 
sometimes help to correct parental misperceptions about care issues.53 There have also 
been claims that mediation may be a less expensive way to achieve placement solutions 
than court hearings.54 After conducting empirical research in Massachusetts and taking 
into account other US research Maynard contended that mediation has proved to be 
especially useful for resolving issues of access by birth parents to children already in 
alternative care.55  She pointed out that open placements typically require ongoing small 
adjustments to contact arrangements which courts are far too expensive and slow to 
solve.56  
 
                       
re
As regards the advantages of FGC’s it is noteworthy that they have received 
considerable acclaim internationally as a valuable child protection intervention 
mechanism. The original New Zealand model has been adopted for use in many other 
countries. 57  It would appear that a key advantage which has conduced to their popularity 
internationally is the manner in which FGC’s draw on the nurturing capabilities of 
extended families. In the formulation of Bell they produce 'meetings where all members of 
the wider family, including the child, meet together, and propose to the professionals the 
best ways for them of safeguarding and meeting the child’s needs'.58  There has been some 
                          
p cit note 11 at 2. 
 cit note 13 especially at 520 & 524-25. 
ver more 
 in Child Protection' in K Wilson & A James (eds) The Child Protection 
52 Ibid at 739-40. 
53 See Parkinson (1997) op cit note 10 at 192-94.   
54 See Maresca (1995) op cit note 9 at 739; and Lande (2001) o
55 Maynard (2005) op
56 Ibid at 519-20. 
57 Pasztor & McFadden (2001) op cit note 21 at 490; and M Connelly with M McKenzie Effective 
Participatory Practice: Family Group Conferencing in Child Protection (1999) 61. For some positive 
comments about FGC's in English cases see B Lindley & M Richards 'Working Together 2000 -How Will 
Parents Fare under the New Child Protection Process?' (2000) 12 Child and Family LQ 213, at 219 & 221. 
Schepard & Bozzomo (2003) op cit note 10 at 346 noted that in the USA FGC's are 'being used e
extensively in child protection cases with great success in more and more states and family courts'. 
58 M Bell 'Case Conferences
Handbook (2002) 288 at 301. 
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evidenc
latives rather than the state to take responsibility for alternative care 
decision-making.61  It has been claimed by Chandler and Giovannucci that whereas other 
approa
ars -and FGC’s appear to have some 
potential to help revive it.65 Experience in the USA indicates that they have the advantage 
of ena
removals of children,67 saved on court time and reduced state expenditures on child 
                                     
e that in the group situations they entail children feel less exposed to perpetrators 
of neglect or abuse.59 
 
The fact that it is families who do the proposing in FGC’s  results in what Lindley, 
Richards and Freeman have described as a shift in the balance of power from investigative 
professionals to the child’s family.60  This counters feelings of inadequacy in families by 
enabling children’s re
ches may 'disempower and disenfranchise' participants FGC’s 'strengthen and 
sustain the family'.62  
 
In South Africa FGC’s are of special interest because of possible analogies in the 
use of extended-family child-support systems in indigenous-African and Maori-New 
Zealand cultures.63  As was noted in the previous chapter64 our indigenous approach has 
been sidelined by legislative developments over the ye
bling families to utilise their own home-language and traditional norms as they 
design solutions which are culturally-appropriate.66    
 
Some overseas findings indicate tentatively that FGC’s have reduced the need for 
            
Giovannucci (2004) op cit note 2 at 226. 
are of the Abused Child: the New Zealand Experience' (2001) LXXX Child Welfare 
fficially used by some social workers serving rural Zulu communities: 
ion, University of 
vannucci note, however, (ibid, at 226-27) that 
as post-conference safety of children.  This is 
59 See the reference to a Washington study in Chandler & 
60 Lindley, Richards & Freeman (2001) op cit note 48 at 320.  
61 Ibid. 
62 Chandler & Giovannucci (2004) op cit note 2 at 220. 
63 J Worrall 'Kinship C
497 at 500 suggests that one reason why FGC’s have been utilised in so many countries is because they have 
proved capable of being adapted to suit other cultures.  
64 At parts 2.2 & 2.3. 
65 They are already being uno
Nontando Mathe, (social worker, department of social development, based in the rural jurisdiction of 
Mapumulo, KwaZulu-Natal) comment at a Masters seminar on Child Care and Protect
Durban-Westville, 4 Sept 2002. 
66 See Chandler & Giovannucci (2004) op cit note 2 at 218 & 220.  At 219 ibid they state '[c]onferencing is 
designed to draw on and be shaped by the cultural patterns and resources of the family'. 
67 See the US study results cited ibid at 226. Chandler and Gio
more empirical research is needed on outcome issues such 
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protection.68   A majority of studies conducted in numerous other countries support the 
view that they reduce the proportion of cases in which children are removed into the care 
of non-family members.69 The use of FGC's in South Africa would therefore accord with 
 stated that 
ey have 'been hailed as "unique", "an exciting innovation," and as "a vastly superior way 
of deal
ded that if similar panels were to be introduced in South 
frica the skills of local elders or community leaders might be used to help revive 
traditio
                                                                                                                                                   
the evaluative criterion of maximum systemic support for family care.  
 
  Like the New Zealand FGC's, Scottish hearing panels have attracted a considerable 
degree of interest and acclaim70 although they have not been emulated to the same extent.  
Some commentators have characterised these panels as having proved effective in their 
articulation with courts over a period of many years. Griffiths and Kandel have
th
ing with children and their problems than ever the old courts were" '.71   
 
It would appear that a basic strength of the panels is their facility for drawing upon 
local community expertise.  They avoid both the stultification of unduly formal processes 
and the alienation of caregivers that may result from making grounds-determinations. 
Dale-Risk and Cleland describe them as able to 'combine informality of proceedings with a 
humane, community-based decision-making process'.72  What renders them community-
based is the use of local, lay panel members who are usually in a good position to 
appreciate the neighbourhood conditions under which children who appear before them are 
growing up.  It could be conten
A
nal African approaches. 
 
Hallett and Murray have pointed out that a fundamental aim at Scottish panel 
hearings is to produce 'a non-adversarial and relatively informal setting' so that children 
 
further discussed in the next part, below.  Findings which suggest that FGC’s may be expensive because of 
their resource intensiveness are noted in the next part, below. 
ternational Society of Family Law, 7 Aug 2002): accessed at 
70 UP. 
68 Ibid at 222; Holland & O'Neill (2006) op cit note 25 at 92. 
69 See the review of research in Holland & O'Neill ibid at 92-93. 
70 K Dale-Risk & A Cleland 'Can Scotland's Children's Hearing System Survive ECHR?' UP (Paper: 11th 
World Conference of the In
<http://www.jus.uio.no/ifp/isfl>. 
71 Griffiths & Kandel (2000) op cit note 26 at 284.  
72 K Dale-Risk & A Cleland (2002) op cit note 
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and their families will feel free to participate in discussion.73  A key aspect is that direct 
child participation is given considerable legislative prominence.  Section 45(1)(a) of the 
1995 Children (Scotland) Act makes it clear that a child has a right to attend at all stages of 
 panel hearing.74 Under s 16(2) children must be given the opportunity to express views 
and ha
eans of encouraging child 
participation.79  They have proved to be so successful in England that in 1994 the Children 
Act Ad
                                                
a
ve them taken into account when sufficiently mature.75  There is a general 
presumption that children aged at least twelve have that maturity.76  
 
 In relation to pre-hearing conferences, their main advantages have to some extent 
proved to be the same in care cases as in other types of matter. They have generally been 
found to be effective for clarifying and narrowing disputed issues in care matters.77  Where 
appropriately conducted they may not only save on court time but also promote more 
amicable relationships between families and representatives of welfare services.78  In 
Australia they have been found to be effective as a m
visory Committee recommended that they should always be utilised once it became 
obvious that a care matter would need to proceed to court.80   
 
In Pennsylvania the success of an initial pre-hearing conference pilot project in 
1997 was such that they quickly became the norm for care cases throughout this state.81 In 
Colorado an initial pilot with specially appointed court facilitators who conducted pre-
 
e case'.  For a detailed 
ation see further Hallett and Murray (1999) 
69 stated that in New South Wales they have often proved to be '[a]n 
 care proceedings'. 
it note 31 at 275 N22. 
73 Hallett & Murray (1999) op cit note 4 at 33. 
74 Under s 45(2)(a)-(b) of the 1995 Act a panel, however, may dispense with the child's presence if it would 
not be in the best interests of the child or is not needed 'for the just hearing of th
analysis of s 45 see K McK Norrie Children (Scotland) Act 1995 (2004) 85-88. 
75 On s 16(2) see ibid at 51. Rule 15(4) of the 1996 Children's Hearing (Scotland) Rules allows for a variety 
of ways in which children may participate. Children may express their views in writing, by audio or 
videotape, through a safeguarder or simply by speaking directly to the panel. Under r 11 any suitable person 
can accompany the child to a hearing to assist with her participation. Under s 46(1) of the Children 
(Scotland) Act 1995 other persons may be excluded from the hearing where this is regarded as necessary to 
enable a child to speak freely.   On legislative support for particip
op cit note 4 at 44; and Norrie (2005) op cit note 26 at 64 & 122. 
76 Rule 15(5), 1996 Children's Hearing (Scotland) Rules. See further Norrie (2005) ibid at 122. 
77 Hunt, Macleod & Thomas (1999) op cit note 31 at 311; and Sheehan (2001) op cit note 34 at 218. 
Parkinson (2001) op cit note 34 at 2
important step in
78 Sheehan ibid. 
79 Parkinson (2001) op cite note 34 at 269. 
80 Hunt, Macleod & Thomas (1999) op c
81 T’Shuvah (ND) op cit note 31 at 3-4. 
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hearing conferences in care and delinquency cases was so successful that by 2002 they had 
been appointed throughout the state.82 Generally in termination of parental rights cases in 
the USA pre-hearing conferences have been found to be useful. They have been 
recommended by the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges as a standard 
easure which should be attempted before full litigation.83  It may be concluded that there 
 other ADR methods are not appropriate or 
have failed a bargaining in the shadow of the court may produce significant benefits. 
 
informed consent and then 
work successfully with caregivers continue children may remain at risk in inappropriate 
situatio
s to be utilised as a voluntary process.  It 
therefore requires free and informed consent from participants.  However, poverty, mental 
m
is certainly evidence which indicates that where
3.3.2  Disadvantages of Alternative Methods 
 
A disadvantage of all five alternative methods considered in this chapter is that they 
require involvement of highly skilled personnel who may be in short supply. Another 
general criticism is that ADR emphasises participation and partnership to an extent that 
may prejudice protection of children.   As attempts to obtain 
ns.84 In some cases parents who are not dysfunctional feel pressured to remain with 
partners who are dangerously abusive whilst ADR continues.85 
 
Further difficulties arise where consent is apparent rather than real.  With the 
exception of the Scottish panels ADR tend
                                                 
82 Gagel, McLean & Moss (2002) op cit note 35 at 61-62. 
83 Maynard (2005) op cit note 13 at 509. 
84 For some English experiences of this problem see Hunt, Macleod & Thomas (1999) op cit note 31 at 38-
39. For two Australian studies showing the danger of abusive parents continuing to have contact see E 
Mullinar 'Problem with Family Courts' (2004) 2: accessed at <http://www.asca.org.au/pdf_public>. 
85 CD Schwarz 'Unified Family Courts: a Saving Grace for Victims of Domestic Violence Living in Nations 
with Fragmented Court Systems' (2004) 42 Family Court Review 304 at 308. E McInnes 'The Best Interests 
Private Law in Australia' (2001) 16-17 points out that even of the Child?  The Interaction of Public and 
where the 'good' parent has removed the children the collaborative approach upon which alternative methods 
typically depend facilitates continued contact with the separated abusive parent: accessed at 
< http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee>. 
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illness, drug or alcohol abuse, or simply a fear of having children removed may induce 
consent which is more apparent than real.86  
 
Given the vulnerability of many family members involved in care cases the use of 
even subtle and indirect pressures to induce participation or settlements is surely 
unacceptable, but may be difficult to avoid.87 There are findings which suggest that the 
problem etimes be overcome by facilitators remaining sensitive to the 
capabil
ke an educated guess about the likely levels of stress and 
hether the child (or other vulnerable family member) would benefit from attendance 
despite
                                                
 of coercion can som
ities and genuine wishes of family members88 but it is a serious concern. Therefore, 
the availability of courts as alternatives would appear to be indicated for a significant 
proportion of cases where sufficiently full and free consent and participation of families 
cannot be obtained.   
 
Another general problem is that in alternative processes it may be difficult to guard 
against inappropriate interactions amongst attendees.  Sensitive issues may need to be 
discussed whilst dysfunctional and vulnerable family members are together in close 
physical proximity.  This may render the question of who to invite problematic. In 
particular the question of whether to include the child may be a difficult one. With little by 
way of research findings to guide them facilitators must weigh up positive and negative 
factors in each case and then ma
w
 these.89   Although informality of proceedings often encourages family 
participation there are clearly cases where the more segregated and structured environment 
 
86 Savoury, Beals & Parks (1995) op cit note 9 at 751; Maynard (2005) op cit note 13 at 521-22; and J 
Brophy Research Review: Child Care Proceedings under the Children Act 1989 (2006) 54-55: accessed at 
attended it 
aging in any consequent court case regarding custody'. 
: see Parkinson (1997) op cit note 10 at 192-94. Child participation is discussed 
<http://www.dca.gov.uk/research/2006/05_2006.pdf>. 
87 M Hester 'One Step Forward and Three Steps Back? Children, Abuse and Parental Contact in Denmark' 
(2002) 14 Child and Family LQ 267 at 277-78 conducted research which drew attention to the falsely 
'voluntary' nature of mediation produced by para 27a of the 1985 Danish Myndighedslov (Custody Law).  
She found that although this Act was designed for voluntary state-funded mediation many parents 
only because failure to do so 'could be dam
88 Maresca (1995) op cit note 9 at 735-36. 
89 Even with the longest established method of mediation there are few research-based findings about when 
to involve children directly
further in part 3.6, below. 
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of a cou
and app
as  threats by investigative 
ocial work agencies of court action without revealing that they in fact had too little 
evidenc
 with some voluntary agreements noted by Hunt, Macleod and 
Thoma
rt (with, for example, the presence of orderlies) would better promote both safety 
ropriate contributions.90 
 
Turning to specific alternative methods, negotiated voluntary care agreements have 
been found to be problematic in certain respects.  Although they appear to have the great 
advantage of families and investigative social workers producing their own mutually-
agreed-upon solutions, in practice: 
'under the guise of partnership and agreement, the degree of informal coercion exercised in these 
circumstances can be quite considerable.  Indeed, the familiar practice of persuading parents to 
agree to the child being accommodated, with the threat of a compulsory order being applied for if 
they do not comply, has been documented.'91 
 
  A variation on this noted by Hunt, Macleod and Thomas w
s
e to successfully go to court.92 From an American perspective Imbrogno and 
Imbrogno have also been sharply critical of social workers inappropriately using their 
influence to pressure family members to make concessions that will enable cases not to be 
taken to court. 93 There is clearly a general danger that if they have been closely involved 
in a case members of the investigative agency may lack the neutrality needed to permit 
family members to produce a genuinely voluntary agreement.  
 
 A further problem
s was a lack of specificity in final settlement clauses when reduced to writing. They 
found that the recorded terms negotiated between families and social workers were 
sometimes so vague that they jeopardised children's welfare and even their safety.94  Also, 
where welfare were overly committed to attempting to reach voluntary agreements with 
                                                 
90 Palmer (1989) op cit note 4 at 22. 
91 Lindley & Richards (2000) op cit note 57 at 224.  On coercion see also Hunt, Macleod & Thomas (1999) 
e 86 at 54-55.  op cit note 31 at 36 & 115; and Bropy (2006) op cit not
92 Hunt, Macleod & Thomas ibid at 37. 
93 Imbrogno & Imbrogno (2000) op cit note 10 at 392. 
94 Hunt, Macleod & Thomas (1999) op cit note 31 at 115. 
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parents this might result in long delays as negotiations continued whilst children remained 
in inappropriate and sometimes dangerous situations.95 
ferences which tend to exist in the 
ships that are common in families involved in care cases. Feminist and 
conceding that an abuse victim should never be pressured to participate 
Schwarz has argued that mediators can sometimes do a great deal to counter power-
 
Although facilitated by an independent mediator, mediation has also proved to be 
problematic in some respects.  Because it typically requires small numbers of parties to 
interact intensively upon a basis of equality mediation may be inappropriate where there 
are significant power differences. Children in care cases will almost always be vulnerable 
and thus lack power. One or both parents will frequently have a poor self image or other 
problems which could weaken their standing if expected to mediate with an investigative 
social worker.96 There is also the possible problem of power differences between joint 
caregivers such as parents.97   
 
Of particular concern are the extreme power dif
abusive relation
other commentators have criticised the use of mediation where a party has been physically, 
sexually or emotionally abused and will be expected to interact with the abuser.98    It is 
not only the danger of secondary abuse that arises in these cases. Hester found that in 
mediation between parents in abusive relationships there was a tendency for mediators to 
be misled.  The abused parent would often remain silent and the more responsive abuser 
would therefore sometimes incorrectly 'end up being viewed more positively' by 
mediators.99  Hester thus concluded that mediation could have the unfortunate effect of 
extending the power and control of abusive parents.100  
  
 Whilst 
                                                 
95 Ibid. As has been noted above this is a general problem with alternative methods; but with voluntary 
. 
396 for the example of mothers who will readily 
rful of losing custody of their children.   
is sometimes inappropriate for vulnerable parties is supported by 
avis (2001) op cit note 9 at 381 concluded that some English research showed that there are 
 in which lawyers provide better support for such parties than mediators.   
negotiations since there is no independent facilitator the likelihood of long delays may be greater
96 See Imbrogno and Imbrogno (2000) op cit note 10 at 
make concessions because they are fea
97 It is noted ibid that mothers who are not breadwinners may be economically disempowered.   
98 Savoury, Beals & Parks (1995) op cit note 9 at 745-46. 
99 Hester (2002) op cit note 87 at 278. 
100 Ibid. Hester's finding that mediation 
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imbala
 
f 
irection is a real one because they often feel tempted to speed up completion of cases.106 
 
gation, has been viewed as controversial by some commentators.109 
As regards weaknesses of FGC’s, it has gradually become clear that there are some 
hich impede their usefulness.  One problem is the resources required. 
nces. For example, they can exert control over the stronger party and allow the 
weaker party a support-person.101 She has even claimed that mediation may sometimes be 
the best process for abuse cases because 'studies have shown that abusers, due to the 
private, confidential nature of mediation, tend to take more responsibility for their actions 
as opposed to traditional adversarial ways of handling these proceedings'.102 This may 
speed the resolution of cases, help the victim to heal and improve the prognosis for 
therapy.103     
 
Not all commentators share this view. Davis has argued that there is a central 
inconsistency in expecting mediators to remain neutral and yet also redress power 
imbalances.104 Lindley, Richards and Freeman have a related concern that if care case 
mediators cease to be neutral there is 'potential for the mediator to become manipulative, 
controlling and oppressive if he is too persuasive within the mediation process'.105  
Schepard and Bozzomo point out that the danger of mediators applying subtle forms o
d
   It must be concluded that where there are significant power differences vulnerable 
parties may experience mediation as highly stressful and any agreements reached are 
unlikely to be genuine or equitable. 107   Furthermore, some studies show that mediation is 
not necessarily much less expensive than utilising courts.108 In light of the difficulties it is 
understandable that the question of whether mediation should replace courts, or even be 
used to assist with liti
 
serious difficulties w
                                                 
101 Schwarz (2004) op cit note 85 at 308. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Davis (2001) op cit note 9 at 378. She evaluated English research on mediation conducted by the Legal 
Services Commission.   
105 Lindley, Richards & Freeman (2001) op cit note 48 at 324 N57. 
106 Schepard & Bozzomo (2003) op cit note 10 at 352. 
107 Savoury, Beals & Parks (1995) op cit op cit note 9 at 746. 
108 Imbrogno & Imbrogno (2000) op cit note 10 at 395-96; and Davis (2001) op cit note 9 at 372. 
109 See Davis ibid at 377. 
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Sieppe
lly implemented requires yet more time and effort.114  It has also been 
contended by some commentators that FGC’s do not necessarily deliver on their central 
purpos
                                                
rt, Hudson and Unrau concluded that they are 'inherently a resource-intensive 
process' with exacting labour and skill requirements.110  They found that even just the 
preliminary preparations required a considerable effort from coordinators -these were 
involved in making an average of forty-one attempts to contact family members before 
each conference. 111  
 
Working with extended rather than merely nuclear families means that facilitators 
of FGC’s often have to cope with complex sets of factors.112 And the claims about cost 
savings noted in the previous part may be incorrect.  Financial expenses such as those 
arising from travel and accommodation of distant family members tend to be high.113 Even 
after FGC’s have been successfully held, following up to see that plans developed by 
families are actua
e of encouraging extensive family participation. It has been found that it is often 
easy for more powerful family members to take control and silence the dissent and 
alternative views that weaker members (including children) might like to express.115  And 
further, in some cases family members collude in efforts to silence the voices of 
children.116 
 
 A serious criticism of FGC’s is that after they have been held children are 
sometimes subjected to further harm or neglect because extended families fail to 
 
'Family Group Conferencing and Child Welfare: Lessons from a 
loway (eds) Family Group Conferences: Perspectives on Policy & Practice 
0 at 390. 
ote 57 at 66. 
arkinson (2001) op cit note 34 at 269. 
110 JD Sieppert, J Hudson & Y Unrau 
Demonstration Project' (2000) 81 Families in Society: The Journal of Contemporary Human Services 382 at 
389.    In New Zealand it has been found necessary to set up a network of specialised staff to convene FGC's: 
see S Fraser & J Norton 'Family Group Conferencing in New Zealand Child Protection Work' in J Hudson, A 
Morris, G Maxwell & B Gal
(1996) 37  at 38-47. 
111 Sieppert, Hudson & Unrau ibid at 389-90.    
112 Worrall (2001) op cit note 63 at 502. 
113 Connelly & McKenzie (1999) op cit note 57 at 70.  E Pruett & C Savage 'Statewide Initiatives to 
Encourage Alternative Dispute Resolution and Enhance Collaborative Approaches to Resolving Family 
Issues' (2004) 42 Family Court Review 232 at 241 noted that in Colorado provision of FGC’s had to be 
reduced because of the costs. 
114 Sieppert, Hudson & Unrau (2000) op cit note 11
115 Connelly & McKenzie (1999) op cit n
116 Ibid at 70.  See also P
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intervene.117 Worrall noted that the emphasis on families taking more responsibility tended 
to result less monitoring of children by social workers.118  He concluded that this may be 
especially disadvantageous for children with serious psychological difficulties placed with 
mily members who do not know how to address these.119 It has even been claimed that in 
New Z
 sufficient expertise for working with highly vulnerable children in 
stressful situations have been exposed in some cases.124 Of particular concern has been an 
apparen
fa
ealand the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 24/1989 created 'a 
confused patchwork of duties, discretions and principles' as FGC facilitators, social 
workers and judges struggled to balance the conflicting demands of respect for extended 
families and their culture on the one hand, and the best interests of vulnerable children on 
the other.120  It has also been stated that the introduction of FGC’s failed to significantly 
reduce the number of care cases reaching courts in New Zealand.121  
 
In relation to the Scottish hearings panels, some difficulties have resulted because 
panel members are not professionally qualified or extensively trained for their work.122  
Panel reporters often need to provide them with neutral legal advice. However, reporters 
are not in an entirely neutral position because they have brought the proceedings on the 
basis of a decision that there are valid grounds for intervention.123   The dangers of 
utilising persons lacking
tly widespread inability by panel members to enable children to contribute 
                                                 
117 As an example of the dangers of the strong New Zealand emphasis on keeping vulnerable children within 
their families Atkin cited the case of the child James Whakaruru. He had been victimised by an abuser known 
to welfare.  He was nevertheless left at home where the abuser continued to have contact and eventually 
2. 
's Experiences of Advocacy Support and Participation in the Children's Hearing System.  Big Words 
 training: see Freymond (2001) op cit note 10 at 11; and Norrie (2005) op cit note 26 at p10 
he Child Offender in Scotland?' in Bainham (2002) op cit note 117 
t note 26 at 296. For case examples of extremely poor empathy which was 
killed him: see B Atkin 'New Zealand: a Year of Reports' in A Bainham (ed) The International Survey of 
Family Law 2002 Edition (2002) 305 at 306-07. 
118 Worrall (2001) op cit note 63 at 50
119 Ibid at 505.               
120 B Atkin & G McLay 'Suing Child Welfare Agencies -a Comparative View from New Zealand' (2001) 13 
Child and Family LQ 287 at 297-299. See also Connelly & McKenzie (1999) op cit note 57 at 67-68. 
121 Connelly & McKenzie ibid at 66. 
122 See generally C Creegan, G Henderson & C King Getting It Right for Every Child: Children and Young 
People
and Big Tables (2006) at paras 4.13-4.38: accessed at 
<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/113343/027458.pdf>. Panel members do, however, receive 
some part-time
N11. 
123 EE Sutherland 'Scotland: Justice for t
p357, at 375.  At 378 ibid she suggests that the solution is for children's hearings to have legally qualified 
chairpersons.  
124 Griffiths & Kandel (2000) op ci
harmful to children see ibid at 293-94.   
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meaningfully and provide them with a sense of sharing in decision-making.125 Griffiths 
and Kandel noted that some panel members tended to 'diagnose' comments of children 
inappropriately 'in a quasi-parental way tinged with tones of therapy and social morality' 
whilst others displayed class prejudices that 'estranged children further, making them clam 
p or feel invisible'.126  
  relation to the use of pre-hearing conferences in care cases it would not appear 
that the
earing conferences has been strongly 
criticised for delaying cases which urgently need to go to court.  Where other methods 
have already been unsuccessfully attempted their advantages in clarifying issues may be 
u
 
 Another factor which hampers child participation is the use of confusing technical 
jargon by adults at panel hearings.127 A further problem is that some children feel that 
panel members so readily and obviously accept welfare's versions of the facts that there is 
no point in attempting to provide a different view.128 Inadequate skills in at least some 
panel members therefore appear to have made it difficult to achieve a central purpose of 
the Scottish legislation, namely, the promotion of child participation.129  
 
In
re are many inherent disadvantages.  It has, however, been suggested that where 
children have already been  directly involved in other alternative methods it is 
inappropriate to also subject them to pre-hearing conferences  if  it is now clear that  full 
court litigation will be required.130 It has also been claimed that pre-hearing conferences 
are unsuitable where only one parent is abusive. By dragging out the time during which a 
collaborative approach is required they prevent the other parent from protecting the 
child.131  
 
Generally, the unselective use of pre-h
                                                 
125 Creegan, Henderson & King (2006) op cit note 122 at paras 4.16 & 4.34-4.36.  See also Dale-Risk & 
Cleland (2002) op cit note 70 UP; and Griffiths & Kandel (2000) op cit note 26 at 288 N43. 
6) op cit note 122 at para 4.38. 
hs & Kandel (2000) op cit note 26 at 290-91. 
126 Griffiths & Kandel ibid at 296. 
127 Creegan, Henderson & King (200
128 Griffit
129 Creegan, Henderson & King (2006) op cit note 122 at para 6.4. 
130 This is because children may find multiple exposures difficult to deal with: see McInnes (2001) op cit 
note 85 at 16-17.  
131 Ibid at 17. In the absence of a court order the abusive parent will still have access to the child: see 
Mullinar (2004) op cit note 84 at 2. 
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more than counterbalanced by the extension of time during which a child remains in a 
ituation of abuse or neglect.132 It may also be suggested that the use in some systems of 
judges 
advantages and deficiencies of commonly used alternative 
methods for settling issues in care cases it is necessary to set against these the primary 
strengt
decades of the 20th 
entury.136 Part of the reason for this was because courts possess some inherent capabilities 
that ca
tection through the precedent system. 
 
s
who will later hear the proceedings proper133 blurs the difference between pre- and 
preliminary hearings.134  It may reduce informality, confuse families about the onset of 
court processes and discourage parties from making admissions and concessions which 
they believe might influence the judge later on.135 
3.4  Strengths and Weaknesses of Courts  
 
Having reviewed the 
hs and weaknesses of courts.  Although detailed aspects of the work of courts are 
considered in the remaining chapters some fundamental capabilities and limitations are 
briefly evaluated, respectively, in the next two sub-parts, below. 
 
3.4.1  Advantages of Courts 
 
As noted in chapter 1 in many developed systems there was a shift towards greater 
reliance on courts for the resolution of care cases in the last two 
c
n be of great value. For example, the training and experience of judicial officers in 
weighing up evidence objectively can be most advantageous particularly where there are 
irreconcilable differences about the need for alternative care or problems caused by 
collusion of family members. Another basic strength of courts is their potential for 
incrementally refining child pro
                                                 
132 Ibid. 
133 See Hunt, Macleod & Thomas (1999) op cit note 31 at 275 N22. 
134 Only the latter should involve courts in full session. For a detailed discussion of preliminary hearings see 
chapter 7 especially at parts 7.3.1 & 7.4.1,  below 
02: Preliminary Conferences-Listing and Cancellation 
ntry Courts' in Children's Court of New South Wales Case Law News (July 2002) vol 2(5) 
art 1.3.1. 
135 Thus the practice in some Australian children's courts is for registrars rather than magistrates to chair 
preliminary conferences:  see 'Practice Note 4 of 20
Procedures for Cou
21.  See also Parkinson (2001) op cit note 34 at 269. 
136 See p
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Unlike other forums, courts can exert a high degree of authority.  English care 
practitioners reported that in many cases once proceedings have begun parents soon 
recognise the power judges are capable of exercising. This sometimes galvanises them to 
improve care arrangements and end deadlocks with social services even before court 
proceedings have gone far.137  
 
In the case of dysfunctional parents who are entirely resistant to voluntary 
modific
 abused, it is 
portant to have court evidence of the situation for the child's future protection; 
In contrast to ADR, courts appear to be ideal where there are extreme power 
differen
ations in care arrangements the power of courts to impose compulsory measures 
may become crucially important.138  In these cases courts are likely to be the only forum 
with sufficient authority to issue orders that will protect vulnerable children from further 
harm.139 Furthermore, '[w]hen a child has been seriously neglected or
im
otherwise, parents might successfully argue the child's return without much change in the 
family environment'.140  
 
The fact that courts have permanent establishments which do not have to be 
specially set up for particular cases means that they can quickly provide urgently-needed 
short-term rulings in emergency cases where the imminent risk to a child is high. To rely 
upon alternative methods in these cases may be to waste precious time.141   
 
  
ces amongst parties. Findings by Hunt, Macleod and Thomas indicated that they 
are the best fora for such cases.  Their sample of respondents included English lawyers 
experienced in representing parents in care cases.  This group characterised court 
adjudicators as generally better at countering power-imbalances amongst parties than 
                                                 
137 Savoury, Beals & Parks (1995) op cit note 19 at 745; and Hunt, Macleod & Thomas (1999) op cit note 31 
at 115. 
138 Firestone & Weinstein (2004) op cit note 38 at 209 N18. 
oration in Family Law' (2004) 42 Family Court Review 200. Schepard 
bilities of courts in relation to vulnerable 
 319.  
139 See G Firestone 'Models of Collab
& Bozzomo (2003) op cit note 10 at 348 noted the protective capa
family members generally. 
140 Palmer (1989) op cit note 4 at 21. 
141 See Lindley, Richards & Freeman (2001) op cit note 48 at
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facilitators of other forums.142   Palmer has argued similarly that courts are necessary 
where vulnerable parties cannot sufficiently express views directly even with the help of an 
lternative method facilitator.143 
 
and Bozzomo have characterised the parent-
child relationship as a precious 'constitutionally recognised value'. They argue that where 
other p  reorganisation' courts 
should 
for exa
children' reated in s 28(1)(b).  
                                                
a
When operating under appropriate rules and the guidance of properly trained 
judicial officers courts can arguably provide a greater degree of procedural fairness than 
any other category of forum or process.144  Even where appropriate procedural rules also 
apply to ADR, facilitators may fail to follow them properly because of an absence or 
insufficiency of legal training.145  The evaluative criterion of a system able to provide care 
hearings which are substantively fair therefore indicates a continuance of courts. 
 
A crucial function which courts can best perform is the interpretation and 
affirmation of legal rights.146 Even strong protagonists of greater reliance on ADR in care 
cases have conceded that courts must remain for providing 'rights-based dispute resolution 
backups'.147 As has been shown in chapter 1 above148 South Africa is still at an early stage 
in interpreting the fundamental rights of children included in international instruments and 
our Constitution. In the US context Schepard 
rocesses 'cannot facilitate agreement on a plan for family
step in to do so.149  This argument is equally true for South Africa. It is important, 
mple, that there be sufficient access to our courts for interpreting the extent of 
s constitutional right to family, parental or alternative care as c
 
142 Hunt, Macleod & Thomas (1999) op cit note 31 at 115.  See also Firestone (2004) op cit note 138 at 200. 
143 Palmer (1989) op cit note 4 at 21. 
fer family care to her grandchild (removed from an abusing 
rmination_of_parental_rights/index>. 
Weinstein (2004) op cit note 38 at 208. 
144 See Schepard & Bozzomo (2003) op cit note 10 at 342. 
145 See Hallett & Murray (1999) op cit note 4 at 39-41 for procedural failures by Scottish hearing panels. 
146 BG Fines, RE Oliphant & N Ver Steegh 'Termination of Parental Rights: Case Law Development' (2006) 
1 discuss two American examples.  They point out, ibid, that in In re O.S. Ill. App. Lexis 333 (April 17, 
2006) the Illinois Court of Appeals performed valuable corrective action by asserting the rights of a mother 
where a social work agency had forced her to pretend to her child that she was not his mother and provided 
insufficient contact and reunification services during a period of foster care.  They also refer to Matter of 
Guardianship of NS 122 Nev. Adv. Rep.  27, 2006 Nev. Lexis 31 (March 16, 2006) where a Nevada court 
asserted the kinship rights of a grandmother to of
mother) in preference to a stranger. Accessed at  
 <http//www.law professors.typepad.com/family_law/te
147 Firestone & 
148 At part 1.2. 
149 Schepard & Bozzomo (2003) op cit note 10 at 342. 
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Not only children, but also parents and other family members who require binding legal 
determinations about their child-nurturing responsibilities will often be better-served by a 
court than any alternative forum or process.   
 
It is useful to keep in mind the contention of Edwards that: 
'By diverting particular types of c
law in certain disfavoured areas of law
ases away from adjudication, we may stifle the development of 
... The wholesale diversion of cases involving the legal rights 
f the poor may result in the definition of these rights by the powerful in society rather than by the 
150
 
 a South African perspective it also needs to be kept in mind that the ACC is 
more s
va
 
 personnel. As noted in chapter 1 even in first-world countries 
   
o
application of fundamental societal values reflected in the rule of law.'   
This is a danger which cannot be afforded in South Africa at a critical time when we have 
begun to build a democracy based upon constitutional rights.  The danger of the poor being 
disadvantaged looms particularly large in care cases.151  The development of South 
African child care law is already to some degree stifled because of a paucity of legal 
representation and reported cases.152  If all matters were to be entirely consigned to ADR 
development might be halted almost completely. 
 
 From
trongly worded in favour of the use of courts for care inquiries than the CRC. As 
noted in part 1.3.2, above art 19(1) of the ACC prohibits the separation of a child from 
parents unless 'a judicial authority determines in accordance with the appropriate law that 
such separation is in the best interests of the child ' [emphasis added].153 It is thus clear that 
in South Africa the ACC could easily be used to challenge the lidity of any extra-curial 
mechanism that might be introduced in our law unless it was subject to review and 
ratification by a court.   
Another significant contribution which courts can make is that of monitoring the 
work of investigative welfare
with relatively well-developed welfare systems social workers sometimes show poor 
                                              
150 H Edwards 'Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?' (1986) 99 Harvard LR 668 at 679. 
151 As will be remembered, in part 1.2 above it was noted that it is predominantly poor and disadvantaged 
families who tend to be involved. 
152 In relation to the latter problem, see ibid. On our low rates of legal representation see part 5.2, below. 
153 The analogous art 9(1) in the CRC allocates the duty to determine whether a separation is in the best 
interests of the child to 'competent authorities subject to judicial review'. 
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judgment.154 In the most serious cases their failures to act timeously lead to the deaths of 
children who should have been provided with alternative care.155  And even where social 
workers take all possible care they may be misled into trusting plausible and manipulative 
perpetrators of child abuse.156 In other cases they are overzealous in seeking to remove 
children unnecessarily.157 The evaluative criteria of removal as a last resort and keeping a 
roper balance between family care and protection therefore both indicate utilisation of 
ically 
at courts can play a valuable role in directing ADR facilitators. They state that courts are 
the bes
p
courts because of their monitoring capabilities.  This is particularly relevant in South 
Africa where mistakes are more likely to happen because welfare services are 
overburdened.158 
 
 It is not only welfare who may need to be subjected to court monitoring.  It can be 
argued that a greater commitment to alternative methods creates a whole new function for 
courts -that of overseeing these also. Schepard and Bozzomo have suggested specif
th
t placed to ensure 'that these nonjudicial professionals are qualified and accountable, 
do not coerce families into uninformed, involuntary agreements, or supplant the role of the 
judge in making ultimate determinations that affect the parent-child relationship'. 159  
 
Courts are also ideally positioned to ensure that ADR does not drag out care cases 
unnecessarily with the child being left 'in limbo'.160  Not only are  judicial officers well-
                                                 
154 See parts 1.1 & 1.3.1, above. 
15
W
5 See the editorial introduction of Wilson & James (2002) op cit note 58 above,1 at 3; and M Lane & T 
alsh 'Court Proceedings and Court Craft' in Wilson & James ibid, 342.  See also the previous footnote and 
experience in Canada as referred to in part 7.3.1, below. 
156 On the subtlety of strategies sometimes used by abusive caregivers to mislead social workers and gain 
onnell 
ecially in child welfare where statutory 
s, so much so that the national Department of Social 
 South Africa has declared social work a scarce skill'. 
their trust see M Hayes 'Re O and N; Re B -Uncertain Evidence and Risk-Taking in Child Protection Cases'  
(2004) 16 Child and Family LQ 63 at 63-64. See also the findings of Hester as discussed in part 3.3.2, above. 
157 See R J Gelles 'Policy Issues in Child Neglect' in H Dubowitz Neglected Children: Research, Practice 
and Policy (1999) 278 at 291. Examples of unnecessary removals by welfare are noted by H O'D
'What's Wrong with the Picture: the Other Side of Representing Parents in Child Protection Cases' (2005) 4 
Appalachian Journal of Law 73 at 76. See also the Cleveland affair as referred to in part 1.3.1, above. 
158 As noted by V Sewpaul 'The African Union Plan of Action on the Family in Africa' (2006) 49 
International Social Work 129 at 134 intensive recruitment of South African social workers particularly by 
the United Kingdom 'has created visible and felt cracks in services esp
services have suffered some of the worst consequence
Development in
159 Schepard & Bozzomo (2003) op cit note 10 at 343. 
160 Ibid at 348. 
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placed to  monitor the effectiveness of alternative processes  but their legal training renders 
them ideal  for checking the fairness of agreements reached before giving them legal force 
through
3.4.2  isadvantages of Courts  
t is most important is what needs 
to happen to a child in the future.166   It has also been argued that, in a process of defining 
child p
                                                
 ratification.161 It must be concluded that courts can provide a range of unique and 
potentially important advantages in care cases. Given their inherent capabilities it is not 
surprising that, despite perhaps more experience of ADR than in any other country, they 
continue to be utilised as the predominant forum for care cases in the USA.162  
 
D
 
It has been contended generally that 'formal, court-based systems… do not promote 
children's welfare and rehabilitation'.163  It has been argued that one reason for this is that 
courts produce a climate of 'excessive legalism' which is not suitable.164 It has also been 
claimed that they are fundamentally geared to enforcement whereas what most families 
involved in care cases require is assistance.165  
 
Many of the more specific criticisms directed at courts are based on a view that 
their approach in care cases is too narrow. It has been suggested, for example, that they 
focus unduly on what has happened in the past when wha
rotection issues as legal problems, courts frequently fail to take full account of 
complex psychological and social problems.167 It has been claimed that court adjudicators 
and lawyers usually do not have the degree of cross-disciplinary expertise about the needs 
of children and family dynamics required for care cases.168  Mathe has stated that 
inadequate training in the staff of many South African children's courts has encouraged 
some social workers to avoid them in favour of ADR. 169 
 
161 See further Firestone & Weinstein (2004) op cit note 38 at 209. 
note 70 UP. 
p cit note 4 at 30. 
Weinstein (2004) op cit note 38 at 205. 
162 See ibid at 208. 
163 Dale-Risk & Cleland (2002) op cit 
164 Palmer (1989) o
165 See ibid at 23. 
166 Firestone & 
167 Ibid at 203. 
168 Ibid at 206. 
169 Mathe (2002) supra note 65.  
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 Courts have also been criticised for confining themselves to information which is 
too limited. Rather than being permitted a sense of collaboration and allowed to tell their 
stories fully parties are forced to fit their accounts 'into the categorized requirements of the 
law'.170
isproportionate to 
the res  achieved.172 It has been claimed that court processes are extremely expensive 
for stat
e are multiple parties with their own lawyers.176   
  
 In particular, it has been suggested that courts are inherently poorly-geared for 
child participation.   Children frequently do not appear at all -and their views may then 
remain unconsidered or at best be received in a filtered form when conveyed by a legal 
representative or other professional such as a social worker.171 Even where children do 
appear, judges are often not specially trained to appreciate the significance of what they 
say.   
    
  Another criticism is that the resources expended on courts are d
ults
es and thus drain off governmental resources which should be used for other forms 
of service delivery to families.173 Care litigation is also expensive for parties if they need 
to employ private lawyers.174 Costs in time may be high. Courts frequently take long 
periods to resolve care cases and this may be harmful to children left in uncertain situations 
and unable to understand adult timeframes.175 Costs in both time and money are likely to 
be at their highest where ther
  
It has been suggested that courts often have a negative impact even before 
proceedings commence.  Freymond has claimed that judges expect involved persons to 
                                                 
170 Firestone & Weinstein op cit note 38 at 204. 
171 Ibid at 206-07.  Child participation is considered in more detail in part 4.2, below. 
172 Maresca (1995) op cit note 9 at 733 noted that '[t]he litigation of a case requires the expenditure of 
he myriad elements that support the court structure.  
the greatest costs of all are the psychological and emotional costs borne by the parties, and 
 in the 
ion Project 'Policy Forum Discussion Paper -Alternatives to the 
resources: money, court time, staff services, and all of t
Perhaps 
particularly the children'. 
173 Firestone & Weinstein (2004) op cit note 38 at 205. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Maresca (1995) op cit note 9 at 732-33. On delays see also Freymond (2001) op cit note 10 at 15 and the 
South African findings of Denge noted in part 6.2.3, below. 
176 Palmer (1989) op cit note 4 at 29. The problem of expense of care litigation has been a concern
Yukon: see Yukon Children's Act Revis
Court Process' (2004) 2: accessed at <http://www.yukonchildrensact.ca> and hereafter cited as 'Yukon 
Revision Project'. The problem of multiple parties is considered in more detail in part 4.3.2, below. 
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undertake excessive amounts of preliminary preparation.177  Maresca argued that a 
negative consequence of this is the drawing off of 'significant amounts of time and energy 
in preparation of the cases… that could otherwise be spent in dealing with the problems 
that confront the family'.178  
 
A further criticism is that once court processes are interposed interactions between 
vestigative social workers and families are inevitably changed in a negative manner. As 
Maresc
equently, they block communication channels or modify 
rmation.  Even where lawyers are not involved concerns about preserving information 
for evi
tempers helping relationships'.184 
                                                
in
a has put it '[t]he social worker who begins work with the family in the capacity of 
a helping professional is thrust into the position of building a case against the family, and 
bearing witness against his or her client'.179  In response, the family begin to view the 
social worker as an opposing side that must be beaten rather than as someone 
supportive.180 Not only social workers but other expert witnesses may become polarised 
into supporting one side's position.181 
 
As soon as it is clear that a court will be involved communication between 
participants tends to be inhibited. Where lawyers are appointed they often warn family 
members not to communicate with welfare and intimidate social workers from having 
further contact with families.182 Fr
info
dence, avoiding making damaging admissions or breaching rules of confidentiality 
all have the result that communication between families and social workers 'may become 
distorted or shut down completely, thus closing down the possibility of therapeutic 
intervention'.183 As Freymond has argued 'the legal strategies involved in winning a case, 
by their very nature, create an institutionalised antagonism that decreases dialogue and 
 
001) op cit note 10 at 15. 
o the similar view of Cameron & Freymond (2003) and King 
rt 1.3.1, above. 
s problem 
fare in Ontario, Canada in 1989. She cites the Report 
177 Freymond (2
178 Maresca (1995) op cit note 9 at 733. See als
(1997) as cited in the discussion of legalistic systems in pa
179 Ibid at 732. 
180 Ibid; and Palmer (1989) op cit note 4 at 23.  
181 Firestone & Weinstein (2004) op cit note 38 at 205. 
182 Palmer (1989) op cit note 4 at 23. 
183 Maresca (1995) op cit note 9 at 732. See also Firestone & Weinstein (2004) op cit note 38 at 205. 
184 Freymond (2001) op cit note 10 at 14 cites several studies in support and claims that it was thi
which led to the introduction of mediation for child wel
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Some of the strongest criticisms directed at courts relate to their use (in some 
systems) of an adversarial approach. It has been argued that in care cases the adversarial 
approach 'typically fails to serve the interests of children and families and may be more 
harmfu
een particularly true of South African 
childre ourt proceedings.189  Participants at these frequently experience questioning as 
so stre
                                                                                                                                                   
l than beneficial to children relative to other possible methods of dispute 
resolution'.185 It has been said that its use at court destroys opportunities for collaborative 
problem-solving.186  Generally it has been claimed that where parental neglect or abuse is 
alleged it tends to produce bitter litigation which has a 'toxic effect on children caught in 
the middle'.187 
 
In particular, the adversarial system has been condemned for promoting intrusive 
questioning that may traumatise vulnerable children and intimidate or provoke hostility in 
parents.188 As will be shown below this has b
n's c
ssful that they cannot communicate properly.190   A further criticism is that the 
adversary system presupposes an equal contest of opposed interests but in care matters 
contests between caregivers and investigative agencies are often far from equal.191 Also, in 
the complex triangular relationship of welfare services, children and caregivers, interests 
are not necessarily always diametrically opposed. 
     
Another criticism of courts is that they rely upon interactions between social 
workers and lawyers despite the fact that the orientation of these professionals tends to be 
 
s on Child Protection: Protecting Vulnerable Children in Ontario, Canada (1998) 16 
ild protection proceedings as 'adversarial, complex, costly, and time-consuming'.   
serious consideration because it may make it more difficult to gain the cooperation of 
ukon Revision Project (2004) op cit note 176 at 2. 
at parents involved in care cases are often from disadvantaged backgrounds has already been 
rofessionally qualified and used to 
imbalance see further the comments of Wessels and Wriggins in part 
of the Panel of Expert
as describing ch
185 Firestone & Weinstein (2004) op cit note 38 at 203. 
186 Ibid at 206. 
187 Ibid at 204. 
188 The latter is a 
parents needed for post-court rehabilitation and reunification work.  On the adversarial approach as 
inappropriate for care cases see further Y
189 See part 6.2.3. 
190 Ibid. Palmer (1989) op cit note 4 at 29 contrasts courts generally with the less threatening environment at 
alternative processes such as mediation. 
191 The fact th
noted.  On the other hand, investigative agency members are likely to be p
appearing in court. On the resultant 
6.3.1, below. 
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very different.192 Whereas social workers are geared towards healing rifts between family 
members lawyers are expected by courts to provide vigorous representation which often 
entails taking 'extreme and unnecessarily divisive positions'.193 It has been claimed that the 
requirement of zealous advocacy inevitably produces behaviour by lawyers which is 
inimical to the best interests of children and escalates tensions and conflict between 
parties.
 a limited repertoire of remedies and typically do not have 
the
sho
have provided an extrem
arrow scope of these often encourages social workers to choose ADR.199 Another 
criticis
                                                
194  A lawyer may be so articulate in presenting an unrealistically favorable 
impression of a caregiver that a court may leave a child in what is, in reality, a dangerous 
situation.195  And even where children are removed the destruction of family relationships 
produced by the hostile advocacy of lawyers using the adversarial approach may produce 
long-lasting effects which prevent their return.196 
 
A further group of criticisms of courts is based on alleged inadequacies in the 
alternative care solutions they provide. It has been claimed that courts are not geared for 
the provision of 'customised solutions' according to the particular needs of individual 
families because they only 'have
 time or resources to create individualised parenting plans for families'.197 As will be 
wn below it is certainly true that under the 1983 Act South African children's courts 
ely limited range of care solutions.198  Mathe has claimed that the 
n
m is that court solutions are imposed from a position of authority.  In the view of 
Maresca this has the result that: 
'Decisions made by courts and imposed upon parties are often resented by the families they are intended 
to benefit.  Parents and sometimes children may sabotage the interventions and/or placements ordered, 
especially when they have opposed them at trial.  The lack of active input into the formulation of 
solutions to family problems reduces the incentive to ensure that the interventions ordered actually 
work.'200 
 
 
192 On the functions of lawyers see chapter 5 below, especially at part 5.3. 
193 Palmer (1989) op cit note 4 at 24. 
note 38 at 204. 
 op cit note 38 at 204.  On negative consequences sometimes produced by 
his Act at part 8.3.1, below. 
 cit note 9 at 733. See also Palmer (1989) op cit note 4 at 29. 
194 Firestone & Weinstein (2004) op cit 
195 Palmer (1989) op cit note 4 at 24-5. 
196 Firestone & Weinstein (2004)
lawyers see also part 5.2, below. 
197 Firestone & Weinstein ibid at 209. 
198 See the discussion of s 15 of t
199 Mathe (2002) supra note 65. 
200 Maresca (1995) op
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Finally, it has been suggested that the negative consequences of court involvement 
may endure long after proceedings are over. Parents who have been formally found to be 
ysfunctional typically feel stigmatised, dehumanized and disempowered. Palmer has 
t they have 'lost' a court 
battle to retain their children they 'often withdraw from their children's lives, in pain and 
despa
 in South Africa at the 
present time.   Many of the so-called disadvantages of courts discussed in part 3.4.2 are 
method
rmation-gathering, and reduce the extent to which adjudicators are 
required to rely upon a predominantly authoritarian approach.  Specific suggestions in 
relation
                                                
d
noted that there are studies which show that where they believe tha
ir'.201  This may render it impossible for welfare to engage in family rehabilitation 
work where this would otherwise have been feasible.202 Post-hearing fallout may therefore 
in some cases be extremely detrimental. 
 
3.5 Combining Courts and ADR Processes in South Africa 
 
  The review of strengths and weaknesses of ADR methods and courts leads to a 
conclusion that courts should continue to play an important role
ological rather than inherent weaknesses.  They represent the historical legacy of 
traditional processes developed over centuries and not specifically for care cases. It may be 
suggested, for example, that criticisms which relate to the adversarial method can to a large 
degree be met simply by reducing reliance upon it in care cases. This can be achieved by 
making suitable modifications in procedural and evidential rules.   
 
Suitable legislative modifications and new approaches to the training and 
responsibilities of court staff and lawyers could be used generally to reduce the stresses 
imposed upon persons involved in care proceedings, improve opportunities for effective 
participation and info
 to what changes in court functioning are required will be provided in the 
remaining chapters of this thesis.  The criticism that courts tend to provide too narrow a 
range of solutions will to a large extent cease to be valid when the 2005 Children's Act is 
 
201 Palmer ibid at 22. 
202 Ibid.  
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fully implemented.  As will be shown in part 8.3 below a far wider range of outcomes will 
then be provided for. 
 
The case for a continuance of a significant role for courts rests also on the unique 
and in some situations crucial contribution they can make as discussed in part 3.4.1, above.  
Criticisms that courts are too authoritarian cannot be sustained where authoritative 
decision-making is essential to protect children from harm.  It is also important given the 
still lim
nvestigation of foreign 
approaches above shows that the likelihood of achieving the best possible outcome for a 
child m
large extent linked to its use in inappropriate situations. They could usually be avoided or 
minimised if appropriate ADR selection criteria were formulated for use in our system and 
ited development of child care law in South Africa that courts be retained for 
determining the nature and extent of any legal rights which may be placed in issue in a 
particular case.  Local circumstances provide further strong grounds for retaining courts as 
external monitoring forums.  They are needed to ensure that welfare and other 
professionals involved in our overburdened system perform their functions appropriately. 
This accords with the criterion of a system which ensures that proposed alternative care 
measures are subject to scrutiny and open to real challenge. 
 
Although it is put forward as a basic proposition that courts must continue to play a 
significant role in South African care cases it is not suggested that this should happen to 
the exclusion of alternative methods.  The strengths-analysis i
ay sometimes be increased by relying at least partly on ADR. The enhanced 
capabilities for uninhibited communication which exist within alternative processes are a 
positive indicator for their use in terms of another evaluative criterion -that of effective 
methods for hearing the voices of children and caregivers. It is also noteworthy that as will 
be remembered Mathe has indicated that in some South African care cases the advantages 
of relying on ADR are so significant that social workers occasionally already make 
unofficial use of even resource-intensive forms such as FGC’s.203  
 
The disadvantages of ADR that have been identified in part 3.3.2 above are to a 
                                                 
203 Mathe (2002) as cited in part 3.3.1, above. 
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post-ADR monitoring could be imposed in relevant cases.  A second basic proposition, 
therefore, is that our care law can be greatly improved by implementing appropriate 
gislation providing for ADR. As Schepard and Bozzomo have rightly argued the key 
tigation but how they can work 
gether.204  In answering this question it is necessary to consider when ADR should be 
utilised
e 2005 Act is the first South African statute to provide direction on the use of 
ADR in children's cases -including care cases.  In the discussion which follows specific 
section
confirmed (as will be shown below) by a reading of these 
section
 
A pow
l aspects of alternative methods  is included in s 75(1)(d)-(f).  
d) the holding of pre-hearing conferences in terms of section 69, procedures regulating such 
onferences and information that must be submitted to a children's court; 
children;' 
 
le
question is no longer alternative methods versus li
to
 in our law and how it should relate to court processes. These and related issues 
which concern implementation of ADR will be addressed as part of an evaluation of 
relevant provisions of the 2005 Act, below.  
 
3.6  An Evaluation of the Children's Act 38/2005 
 
Th
s of it are discussed and then some general comments are offered. The relevant 
provisions, ss 49, 69-72 and 75(1)(d)-(f), are all to be found in chapter 4, entitled 
'Children's Courts'.  The impression thus conveyed that ADR is to occur under the 
direction of children's courts is 
s. 
 
It should be noted at the outset that the 2005 Act provides merely a starting point. 
er for the minister for justice and constitutional development to provide further 
coverage on certain additiona
This allows for regulations on: 
'(
c
(e) the holding and monitoring of family group conferences or other lay-forums in terms of sections 
70 and 71, procedures regulating such conferences and other lay-forums and information that must 
be submitted to a children's court; 
(f) the qualifications and experience of persons facilitating family group conferences, including 
special requirements that apply to persons facilitating in matters involving the alleged abuse of 
 What will need to be dealt with in regulations is considered below.     
 
                                                 
204 Schepard & Bozzomo (2003) op cit note 10 at 348-49 -referring particularly to FGC’s and mediation. 
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The model relied on in the Act is clearly one which is intended to be court driven.  
Court control will appropriately align our system with the predominant trend in countries 
where there has been extensive experience of ADR in care cases.205  For example, a court 
ower to instigate ADR as proposed in the Act is supported by findings elsewhere which 
ethods where they retain the most power.207    
 
 
follows
 matter or an issue in a matter, order a lay forum hearing 
in an attempt to settle the matter or issue out of court, which may include- 
ard part of their pre-hearing investigative reports to court.  Also, as is further 
otivated in part 7.4.1 below, where courts contemplate instigating ADR they should be 
p
indicate that investigative agencies tend to avoid doing so their own accord206 or else 
choose m
Section 49 of the Act is entitled 'Lay-Forum hearings'.  Sub-section 49(1) reads as 
: 
'A children's court may, before it decides a
(a) mediation by a family advocate, social worker, social service professional or other suitably 
qualified person; 
(b) a family group conference contemplated in section 70; or 
(c) mediation contemplated in section 71.' 
 
The wording 'before it decides a matter or an issue in a matter' implies that a children's 
court could instigate ADR either as a preliminary process or in parallel with its own 
proceedings.208  Procedural rules as envisaged in s 75(1)(e) will certainly be needed if s49 
is to be successfully implemented.  These should require investigative agencies to provide 
an opinion on whether ADR is indicated and, if so, in what form.  They should include this 
as a stand
m
                                                 
205 A different model in which courts lack a dominant status and are merely one of a variety of service 
providers from which participants can choose has been proposed by some commentators: see Firestone & 
Weinstein (2004) op cit note 38 at 207-12. Nevertheless, in developed systems courts have generally 
remained the most authoritative forum involved in care cases -and in fact the introduction of ADR has 
chepard & JW Bozzomo (2003) 
 cit note 58 at 301. 
that '… the court, on the application of the 
s.ca/legislature/legc/statutes/childfam.htm>. 
extended their powers as they are expected to manage and monitor it: see S
op cit note 10 at 341. 
206 Freymond (2001) op cit note 10 at 16; Bell (2002) op
207 Atkin & McLay (2001) op cit note 120 at 298 N58. See also Connelly & McKenzie (1999) op cit note 57 
at 63; and Brophy (2006) op cit note 86 at 54 N117. 
208 This wording may be contrasted with Canadian provisions that provide clearer guidance. In British 
Columbia s 23(1) of the Child, Family and Community Service Act [RSBC1996] supra note 8 expressly 
states that courts may at any stage adjourn care cases for up to three months for the purpose of enabling 'a 
family conference, mediation or other alternative dispute resolution mechanism' to proceed.  In Nova Scotia s 
21(2) of the Children and Family Services Act 1990 provides 
parties, may grant a stay of the proceedings for a period not exceeding three months': accessed at 
<http://www.gov.n
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required to instigate a preliminary hearing to further consider its appropriateness and 
form.209   
 
Future regulations should also expressly provide that children's courts can utilise 
the option of parallel ADR if positive indicators emerge after the proceedings proper have 
ommenced in court. It has been found in some systems that ADR can be most effective 
able 
wording one may note s 21(1) of the Nova Scotia Children and Family Services Act 1990. 
This  s
ian of a child… agree to the appointment of a 
mediat
need o  ADR under s 49(1) of our 2005 
Act is u ation will be developed.   
 
                                                
c
when conducted simultaneously with court litigation.210 Parallel ADR is sometimes more 
successful than pre-litigation ADR because as court hearings progress parties gain new 
insights and may become more open to suitable voluntary solutions. 211 When this occurs it 
will often be appropriate for the court to adjourn and then later consider whether to ratify 
partial or complete resolutions achieved during parallel ADR. 
 
 The phrase 'order a lay forum hearing' in s 49(1) is of some concern.  It has been 
suggested above that ADR should not be forced upon unwilling participants and this 
position has been supported by commentators in other jurisdictions.212  For more suit
tates in relevant part that mediation in child protection cases can only be permitted 
where  '[a]n agency and a parent or guard
or to attempt to resolve matters relating to the child who is or may become a child in 
f protective services'.213  The possibility of forced
nfortunate and it is to be hoped that a suitable clarific
 
209 This would be in line with the approach in many US jurisdictions: see Chandler & Giovannucci (2004) op 
cit note 2 at 217. 
210 See Sheehan (2001) op cit note 34 at 218. In a study of mediation by Savoury, Beals & Parks (1995) op 
cit note 9 at 754 it was found that in as many as a third of child protection cases the appropriate opportunity 
for ADR came only after court proceedings had commenced. 
211 Sheehan, ibid; and Yukon Revision Project (2004) op cit note 176 at 5. 
212 See Savoury, Beals & Parks ibid at 751. Schwarz (2004) op cit note 85 at 307-08 has also argued that 
alternative methods should not be imposed -rather, the role of a court should merely be to decide whether 
ADR is appropriate and, if so, help parties decide whether they wish to utilise it.  Firestone & Weinstein 
(2004) op cit note 38 at 210 propose that families should be given some degree of choice also about which 
form of ADR is to be selected. 
213 Savoury, Beals & Parks ibid at 753 have pointed out that this provision has been interpreted to mean that 
court adjudicators may suggest mediation during the course of care proceedings but must never force it upon 
an unwilling person. 
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Section 49(2) of the 2005 Act lists criteria which children's courts must take into 
account before instigating ADR.  It states: 
'Before ordering a lay forum hearing, the court must take into account all relevant factors, including- 
(a) the vulnerability of the child; 
(b) the ability of the child to participate in the proceedings; 
(c) the power relationships within the family; and 
(d) the nature of any allegations made by parties in the matter.' 
 
Again, a regulation will be required which indicates that investigative agencies must 
rovide recommendations based on these factors in their pre-hearing reports.214 And at the 
ild participation. Canadian 
are mediator Henry has warned that older children who feel shut out of ADR processes 
ew children will frequently be too young, 
nt are: 
nformation concerning parents that they did not previously know about 
will need to be discussed during ADR -for example, criminal behaviour or drug 
p
ADR preliminary hearings which have been proposed above children's courts should be 
required to hear and if necessary derive any further evidence that may be needed. If courts 
are to be placed in a situation where they can 'take into account all relevant factors' before 
deciding on the appropriateness and form of ADR they will need sufficient means to obtain 
pertinent information. 
 
 It is appropriate that s 49(2)(b) requires a children's court to consider whether the 
child involved should participate in ADR.  As has been noted above the less formal 
procedures which characterise ADR may sometimes favour ch
c
sometimes 'vote or decide with their feet' and disappear before a care solution can be 
established.215 She has proposed that guidelines to assist with decisions about child 
participation can be formulated.  In her vi
traumatised or psychologically vulnerable to take part. Where they are not, however, three 
further important negative indicators for their involveme
 
• Negative i
addiction. 
                                                 
214 See ibid at 744 where it is suggested that there should be a requirement that investigative social workers 
take a position in their reports on whether the risk of harm to a child in her current situation is so high or 
 at 7. On the need to involve mature children where possible see also Palmer 
unpredictable that the delays attendant upon instigating ADR would be too dangerous. 
215 Henry (2005) op cit note 12
(1989) op cit note 4 at 27. 
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• The danger that a child may be placed under pressure to make inappropriate 
to a conflict of loyalty.  
 involvement are: 
• More mature children.  
an be constructively resolved by assisting them 
to make admissions to children who are able to understand. 
• 
that if the 
magistrate decides that ADR without direct child participation should be undertaken the 
ADR f
with feedback afterwards.  In this way some children can participate indirectly. 
choices which may lead 
• Cases that have reached a stage where a disputed permanent removal appears 
likely.216  
 
 She has further suggested that four key positive indicators for child
  
• Cases where a significant part of the problem is that parents or social workers are 
not listening to children.  
• Cases where parental guilt issues c
Where children show a strong need to express themselves.217 
 
It may be suggested that, rather than leaving our children's courts without any direction in 
relation to child-participation in ADR, criteria such as these should be made available to 
them in the form of published guidelines. 
 
 In many care cases a discretionary use of the proposed guidelines might lead 
children's courts to a conclusion that it is not appropriate to involve children directly 
because of their vulnerability. The guidelines should therefore further direct 
acilitator must be required to establish whether the child is sufficiently mature to 
express views separately.  If so, the facilitator must discuss beforehand with the child the 
nature of the care plan that should be negotiated by the adults involved in the ADR.218 By 
so doing the facilitator can take the child's views to the alternative process and provide her 
                                                 
216 Henry ibid 7-8; and personal communication at the Conference. 
217 Ibid at 8-9; and personal communication at the Conference. 
218 Section 21(3) of the British Columbia Child, Family and Community Service Act 1996 supra note 8 
requires that with sufficiently mature children ADR facilitators cannot agree to any such plan without first 
 12 years of age is sufficiently mature to be consulted. 
explaining it to the child and taking the child's views into account.  There is a rebuttable presumption that a 
child of at least
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 In relation to specific ADR methods the 2005 Act is broad enough to allow for all 
of the five basic forms already discussed in this chapter.219  For example, in s 72 the 
possibility of negotiated voluntary agreements has been provided for.  In terms of this, any 
agreement reached would have to be 'accepted by all parties involved in the matter' 
(including presumably the child if sufficiently mature) and then submitted to a children's 
court f
r-differences between family members and investigative social workers that 
re likely to negate the benefits of a negotiated voluntary agreement. A deficiency in the 
wordin
mbers of the child'.221 The whole point of FGC’s is that the wider family, 
including persons who may not be parties in the legal sense, may be needed as attendees -
and thi
                                                
or possible ratification.220  Because of the potential drawbacks of voluntary 
agreements as discussed in part 3.3.2 above it will obviously be important for children's 
courts to weigh carefully the four basic criteria in s 49(2) before sanctioning an attempt to 
utilise this process.   
 
Procedural rules should be created to indicate that at a court preliminary hearing 
held to discuss ADR magistrates must consider whether there are deep-rooted disputes or 
extreme powe
a
g of s 72 is that an all-or-nothing approach has been taken. Courts must either ratify 
or reject final agreements in toto.  The possibility of a partial ratification of only those 
clauses in voluntary agreements which courts find to be appropriate should also have been 
allowed for.   
 
Section 70 of the Act is entitled 'Family group conferences' and provides some 
specific provisions on their use.  A criticism of s 70(1) is that it somewhat ambiguously 
designates those who may attend FGC’s as 'parties involved in a matter… including any 
other family me
s should have been made absolutely clear. Furthermore, the limitation to family 
members is inappropriate because, as Holland and O'Neill have pointed out, FGC’s 
 
ilar to the 
s 'including' and 'other' indicate contrary interpretations on who may attend. 
219 It could even as discussed later in this part allow for lay community panels somewhat sim
Scottish ones. 
220 In terms of s 72(2)(b) courts can refer agreements back for reconsideration by the parties. 
221 The word
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sometimes need to involve 'significant non-family members such as godparents and 
neighbours'.222 
 
 It is not suggested that all the FGC provisions in the Act have been inadequately 
worded.  Section 70(2)(a) appropriately requires that a children's court must appoint 'a 
suitably
ny appropriate lay-forum, including a traditional authority, 
in an attempt to settle the matter by way of mediation out of court'. The discretionary 
wordin
child participation in particular is likely to suffer if such persons are placed in positions of 
e child participation 
 qualified person or organisation to facilitate' if it decides that an FGC is 
indicated.223 And s 70(2)(c) usefully requires the provision of a post-FGC report 
(presumably by the facilitator) which a children's court may consider before issuing an 
order. As appears from the quotation above s 75(1)(e)-(f) helpfully provides wide  scope 
for future regulations covering the use of FGC’s. 
 
As appears from the wording quoted above aside from voluntary agreements and 
FGC’s, the Act allows very broadly for what are termed 'other lay-forums'.  Section 71(1) 
states that a children's court 'may, where circumstances permit, refer a matter brought or 
referred to a children's court to a
g 'may, where circumstances permit' appears useful in enabling children's courts to 
refrain from instigating ADR where the necessary resources are not locally available.  
However, the inclusion of the word 'mediation' is unfortunate because it implies the use of 
a particular form of ADR in what is obviously meant to be a general enabling provision 
allowing for various categories. 
 
The reference in s 71(1) to 'a traditional authority' clearly allows for tribal chiefs, 
headmen and elders to be instructed by children's courts to undertake ADR -for example, 
by chairing community panels.  It may be suggested that the difficulties encountered with 
lay hearing panels in even such a relatively well-resourced system as Scotland reveal the 
dangers of utilizing part-time non-professionals.  It has been shown in part 3.3.2 above that 
considerable authority. Connelly and McKenzie have noted that, whil
                                                 
222 Holland & O'Neill (2006) op cit note 25 at 92.  See also Firestone & Weinstein (2004) op cit note 38 at 
205 & 209. 
223 The question of how this could be achieved is discussed later in this part, below. 
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is potentially extremely valuable in child protection decision-making, a practical problem 
is that in many traditional indigenous cultures 'children’s opinions are not privileged, and 
disagreement with adults and elders is not necessarily sanctioned'.224 The latter observation 
would appear to be relevant when considering indigenous cultures in South Africa.225  It 
may th
nferences from the other alternative methods provided for 
in ss 70-72 of the Act.  As has been shown in foreign systems these conferences tend to be 
reserve
urts will need better guidance than this on 
instigation of pre-hearing conferences.  It should have been laid down, for example, that 
erefore be suggested that despite the possible benefits which may arise from 
culturally-based models the decision to involve traditional leaders in care case resolution 
was an unfortunate one. 
 
The 2005 Act expressly provides in s 69 for pre-hearing conferences in any 
contested matter which is to be brought before a children's court.  Section 69(1) states that 
these can be used to mediate or settle disputes 'to the extent possible' and 'define the issues 
to be heard by the court'.  As noted in part 3.3.1 these have been found to be appropriate 
purposes in other systems.  What is missing from s 69, however, is an indication of what 
should distinguish pre-hearing co
d as a final resort prior to the onset of full litigation.  However, there is 
unfortunately no indication in the Act about how pre-hearing conferences should articulate 
with other alternative methods.   
 
A further difficulty with s 69 is that important questions relating to who should 
facilitate, who should attend and what procedure should be followed at pre-hearing 
conferences are insufficiently addressed. It is simply stated in s 69(4)(a) that '[t]he court 
may- prescribe how and by whom the conference should be set up, conducted and by 
whom it should be attended'.  Children's co
                                                 
224 Connelly & McKenzie (1999) op cit note 57 at 69. 
225  Findings by FN Zaal 'Hearing the Voices of Children in Court: A Field Study and Evaluation' in S 
Burman (ed) The Fate of the Child.  Legal Decisions on Children in the New South Africa (2003) 158 at 163 
e had a traditional upbringing sometimes have difficulty 
n taught not to contradict statements made by older 
ommunity panels. 
indicated that black South African children who hav
in refuting the testimony of adults because they have bee
persons. See also DM Chirwa 'Participation Rights: Challenging African Legislation' (2002) 6 Children First 
32. This could also pose a barrier to child participation in other forms of ADR such as FGC's. However, as 
appears from part 3.3.1 above the international experience seems to indicate that children feel less 
intimidated when involved in these than when appearing before c
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magistr
his officer 
do not appear in the 2005 Act.  It would appear that the intention is to do away with 
childre
court support staff to produce a safe and structured 
environment where only the appropriate participants are present.  For example, a 
perpetr
ates must not preside.226 Yet another shortcoming is that, just as with lay 
hearings,227 courts are not directed to consider the views of any party who may be against 
the utilization of a preliminary conference.228 
 
In the spirit of a conference that is indeed 'pre-hearing' and with reference to other 
systems where pre-hearing conferences have been successfully implemented it should have 
been indicated in s 69 that court premises and court support staff must be utilised.  In 
relation to the latter it could have been proposed that children's court assistants as provided 
for in the 1983 Act should facilitate.229  Unfortunately, however, references to t
n's court assistants completely and it may be commented that children's courts are 
unlikely to be able to take on the task of managing a variety of forms of ADR as envisaged 
under the Act if they are in future to be staffed only by clerks and magistrates.  
  
Section 69(2) of the 2005 Act prohibits the holding of pre-hearing conferences in 
any case 'involving the alleged abuse or sexual abuse of a child'.230  Since abuse is at least 
a potential factor in a high proportion of care cases this blanket restriction is likely to 
severely limit the number of matters in which pre-hearing conferences may be utilized.  It 
should not have been included in this form231 given the potential usefulness of such 
conferences and possibilities for using 
ator might be willing to admit abuse at a pre-hearing conference and thus enable a 
children's court to save time and concentrate on finding an appropriate care solution for the 
child at the subsequent court hearing.  
                                                 
226  For the reasons mentioned in part 3.3.2, above. 
7 See the discussion of s 49(1) earlier in this part. 
228 Compare s 2-12(1) of the Juvenile Court Act 1987 as amended, from Illinois. In terms of this, although a 
court can order a preliminary conference, the child’s view must be taken into account. She has the right to 
move her case directly to a full court hearing without one: see chapter 705 of the Illinois Compiled Statutes: 
 the appointment of these officers to 'generally assist' in the performance 
ng appears to exclude actual abuse of a nonsexual kind, although that could hardly have 
ay be a possible indicator for avoiding  a 
22
accessed at <http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs 4.asp>. 
229 Section 7(2) of this Act allows for
of the functions of children's courts. 
230 This clumsy wordi
been the intention. 
231 It is conceded that, as has been noted earlier, abuse of a child m
pre-hearing conference; but the bar should not be an absolute one. 
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 Aside from the need for some amendments relating to core aspects of the Act, a 
detailed set of practice rules on preliminary conferences must be developed.232 As will be 
remembered the Act facilitates the development of such rules because s 75(1)(d) expressly 
provides for the publication of regulations covering pre-hearing conferences. 
 
Aside from difficulties which pertain only to specific methods there are some 
general problems relevant to all of the forms of ADR envisaged in ss 49, 69-72 and 75(1) 
of the Act. Although the foundational s 49 provides children's courts with four basic 
criteria to use when considering whether to instigate ADR at all, the Act does not provide 
guidance on their selection of particular forms. Given that presiding magistrates will 
ainly be trained in law rather than ADR these will urgently be needed. Although 
conside
 for selection guidelines, another area where the Act will 
leave children's courts and participants somewhat in the dark unless suitable regulations 
are dev
                                                
m
rations of space preclude a detailed discussion of selection criteria it may be 
suggested that the analysis of characteristic strengths and weaknesses in part 3.3 above 
shows that a list of positive and negative indicators for the selection of particular types of 
ADR could be developed.  Whilst children's courts should obviously be left with a realm of 
discretion such indicators are essential.  
 
In addition to the need
eloped concerns the degree to which communications made during ADR should 
remain confidential.233  This is an important issue because the basic scheme in the Act is 
that after any form of court-instigated ADR is complete a facilitator’s report and written 
record of any issues agreed between the parties must be submitted to the court to assist it at 
a subsequent care hearing.234   
 
 
232 A useful example of one appears in the New South Wales 'Practice Note 4 of 2002' op cit note 135 at 21. 
233 As can be seen from the quotation above s 75(1)(d) & (e) expressly provide for regulations on 
'information that must be submitted to a children's court'. 
234 See ss 69(4)(b)-(c), 70(2)(b)-(c), 71(3)(a)-(b), & 72(2)(a)-(c).  The latter indicates that it is only with 
negotiated voluntary agreements that a children's court has the option of making a settlement reached by the 
parties an order of court without holding any subsequent hearing at all. 
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The approach taken in the Act is that no uniform standards governing what 
information should be treated as privileged are required.  In relation to different forms of 
ADR, ss 69(4)(b), 70(2)(b) and 71(3)(a) all contain very similar wording.  They direct 
children's courts to decide on a case-by-case basis 'the manner in which' a record is to be 
kept during ADR of any agreement or settlement reached or of any fact that emerges 
'which ought to be brought to the notice of the court'.  The latter phrase begs the question 
and t
utilised in legislation dealing with communications-privileges during ADR processes in 
t esent.  In the latter, this 
annot be done because confidentiality is preserved.236 A compromise model developed 
for chil
e to ensure that the mediator is not used by any 
however, are free to use any information from the 
m
m 7 
  
Maresc out fear of 
prejudi
e
(d) if the disclosure is necessary for a child’s safety or for the safety of a person other than a 
child…'.  (Insertion added) 
                                   
herefore better direction will be needed. 
 
As pointed out by Savoury, Beals and Parks, either open or closed models can be 
care cases. 235 In the former, all records of processes and information which comes to light 
during ADR can freely be made known to persons who were no  pr
c
d protection mediation after considerable experience in Ontario works as follows: 
'Before the commencement of mediation, the parties are asked to agree in writing that they will not ask 
the mediator to testify or provide a report.  This is don
party to advance that party’s case.  The parties, 
ediation process in any subsequent litigation.  It should be noted that this does not relieve the 
ediator from the responsibility to report information that suggests child abuse…' 23
a has claimed that this allows parties to negotiate freely and openly with
cing their case, yet still meets child protection concerns.238  
 
A more closed model which places restrictions on the parties as well as the 
facilitator has been established in s 24(1) of the British Columbia Child, Family and 
Community Service Act, 1996.  This states: 
'A person must not disclose, or be compelled to disclose, information obtained in a family 
conference, mediation or other alternative dispute resolution mechanism, except 
(a) with the consent of everyone who participated in the family conference or mediation, 
(b) to the extent necessary to make or implement an agreement about the child, 
(c) if the information is disclosed in an agre ment filed [at court] under section 23, or 
 
              
 note 9 at 760. 235 Savoury, Beals & Parks (1995) op cit
236 Ibid.  
237 Maresca (1995) op cit note 9 at 735. 
238 Ibid. 
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An advantage of a relatively closed system such as this is that participants are more likely 
to speak freely, make admissions and offer concessions.239  This is obviously most 
portant because facilitation of uninhibited communication is one of the core reasons for 
 are only entitled to utilise three categories of information: firstly, 
proposed solutions which ADR participants have agreed upon (and related implementation 
infor
 set of South African ADR rules would additionally need to cover training242 and 
qualifications for eligibility as a court-appointed ADR facilitator.243 As will be 
remembered from the quotation above s 75(1) rather strangely provides only for 
                                                
im
utilising ADR.  Lande has pointed out that many US states have promulgated very closed 
wording.  They extensively protect disclosures made during ADR as privileged, except 
where they reveal child abuse or neglect.240  Since child protection ADR typically deals 
with these problems even that exception has frequently been narrowly interpreted to apply 
only to 'previously unreported allegations of child abuse or neglect'.241 
 
 In South Africa the 2005 Act certainly needs to be supplemented with some s75(1) 
regulations providing direction on which statements made during ADR should be treated 
as privileged.  The general position ought to be that communications are confidential.  The 
exceptions should be those listed in paragraphs (a)-(d) of the British Columbia provisions 
quoted above, with the rider that only previously unreported allegations of neglect, abuse 
or danger  are not confidential (similarly to the US approach).  This would entail that our 
children's courts
mation), secondly, any other information which participants have all agreed can be 
released, and thirdly anything that the facilitator believes to be new information about 
serious dangers to children or other persons.  This approach could also be used to provide 
guidance concerning what information anyone else (besides a children's court) could utilise 
as unprivileged. 
 
A
 
239 Yukon Revision Project (2004) op cit note 176 at 3. 
2001) op cit note 11 at 4 referring particularly to mediation. 
ng see Maresca (1995) op cit note 9 at 747-50.  On training see also 
 mediators for care cases:  Savoury, 
 cit note 9 at 753; Henry (2005) supra note 12 at 6.   
240 Lande (
241 Ibid. 
242 For some examples of systems of licensing and training see Chandler & Giovannucci (2004) op cit note 2 
at 228.  In relation to scope of traini
Palmer (1989) op cit note 4 at 28-29. 
243 In Nova Scotia and British Columbia there are rosters of approved
Beals & Parks op
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regu
ipation the court regarded as essential (at its proposed ADR 
preliminary hearing) proves to be unable to provide informed consent. The same should 
apply i
perience indicates the need for a standing body of specialists (including some 
ourt adjudicators) to oversee the operation of alternative methods.247 It may be suggested 
al to set up one in South Africa to oversee training and licensing, and 
lso for formulating proposals for ongoing development of ADR regulations and 
                                                
lations on the 'qualifications and experience of persons facilitating family group 
conferences'.244 Obviously, these are needed for facilitators of all alternative methods and 
not merely FGC’s.  
 
Facilitators also need a rules framework covering the processes they should follow 
during ADR.245 Here, s 75(1) has been more appropriately worded because s 75(1)(e) 
provides broadly for regulations on procedures at all forms of 'lay forums'.  When these are 
developed they should, inter alia, direct that a facilitator may not continue with ADR 
where a party whose partic
f it emerges that such a party cannot sufficiently communicate her position and 
interests.  Facilitators must be expressly required to immediately refer a matter back to the 
court in these situations.246  
 
A potential concern is that the introduction of ADR in the 2005 Act should not be 
used to reduce children's courts to merely rubber-stamping agreements reached during 
alternative processes. And this may be a serious danger if, as has been surmised above, 
there is no intention to develop stronger staff complements. A final point is that the 
American ex
c
that it will be essenti
a
guidelines. 
 
 3.7  Conclusion  
 
 The investigation of extra-curial methods for the resolution of care cases in this 
chapter indicates that there are five basic forms of these currently used in well-developed 
 
244 At s 75(1)(f). 
245 For a detailed description of steps found to be effective in Ontario see Maresca (1995) op cit note 9 at 
737. 
246 See ibid at 735. 
247 Lande (2001) op cit note 11 at 4. 
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systems.  It further reveals that four of these -voluntary negotiations between families and 
welfare, mediation, FGC’s and pre-hearing conferences- appear to have considerable 
potential for implementation in South Africa.   Their capacity for encouraging 
ommunication accords with the evaluative criterion of a system which facilitates the 
hearing
g to work constructively with the highly vulnerable children 
nd family members typically involved.  This last conclusion must be seen as tentative, 
tially enable them to play a valuable role.  These include 
eir capacity for authoritative decision-making, evaluating evidence objectively, 
develop
 system is particularly indicated by the 
rimary evaluative criteria requiring fair hearings and a systemic capacity for rigorous 
 
c
 of appropriate voices. And their potential for healing differences amicably and 
sometimes therapeutically aligns them with the criterion of a system which promotes 
successful care by parents and other family members rather than removals of children. 
 
   The fifth ADR form considered in this chapter is one which empowers selected 
lay community volunteers to attempt to settle issues.  This currently appears to be 
problematic from a South African perspective because of the difficulties faced by 
untrained persons in attemptin
a
however, because it is based only on extrapolation from the Scottish hearings panels in a 
very different environment and some limited local research on attitudes towards children's 
views in indigenous cultures. 
 
 It is noteworthy that the predominant approach in developed systems is that in care 
cases courts must not be entirely replaced by ADR.  As has been shown in part 3.4.1 courts 
have unique qualities which poten
th
ment of a children's rights culture, and monitoring of the work of child protection 
personnel.  It has been contended that all of these capabilities are especially relevant in 
South Africa at the present time.  
 
A continuation of the use of courts in our
p
scrutiny and real challenge for the purpose of testing mandatory care intervention 
proposals by welfare. It is clear that our courts, and especially the children's courts, must 
continue to play a predominant role in care cases. 
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 Although the continued involvement of South African children's courts is essential 
it must be conceded that significant changes in the nature of their functioning are required.  
 has been suggested (and will be further substantiated in part 6.2.3, below) that reliance 
ld be utilized, and if so, in what form.  The correctness of another 
asic feature of the Act -that any agreements reached during alternative processes must be 
ubmit
entiality is another failing.  Because a confidence to speak freely is crucial to the 
uccess of all ADR methods a closed model providing only for certain crucial categories of 
form
y for children's 
It
on the adversarial method must be reduced.  And clearly, in view of the advantages to be 
gained it will be appropriate to supplement court involvement with ADR processes. 
 
 On the crucial question of how ADR and court processes should be combined it 
emerges from the comparative research in this chapter that the ideal model is one which 
places courts in control. As shown in part 3.6 a court-managed system is precisely what 
has been established in the 2005 Act.  Appropriately, children's courts will decide in each 
case whether ADR shou
b
s ted to the instigating court for possible ratification- is also supported by experience 
in developed systems.   
 
 Although the 2005 Act is fundamentally correct in its approach to combining courts 
and ADR there are some serious deficiencies in its wording which may undermine its 
effectiveness.  The allowance of both the possibility of forced ADR against the will of 
participants and reliance upon untrained traditional leaders are not appropriate.  The 
decision to leave children's courts to deal on an ad hoc basis with questions of 
confid
s
in ation to be released (as discussed in part 3.6) should have been established in the 
Act.  
 
 Fortunately, many of the other less serious shortcomings in the 2005 Act could be 
addressed simply by issuing regulations as provided for in s 75(1).  In relation to what is 
required in these it is essential to indicate how children's courts should obtain relevant 
information on the appropriateness and timing of ADR in any particular case.  A first step 
would be to direct that investigative social workers’ pre-hearing reports must include 
motivated recommendations.  In addition, it should be rendered mandator
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courts to hold preliminary hearings before ordering ADR.  This would be for deriving any 
further
 
further indicators to assist in deciding what form it should take. It has been shown that it is 
essenti
 
ecisions about either direct or indirect child-participation.  It has been recommended that 
need
e.  It has been recommended that it is especially important to 
clude a direction that a facilitator must immediately refer a matter back to court for 
manage ADR processes this greatly increases the range of their responsibilities. It is of 
 necessary information, establishing what ADR resources are locally available and 
ascertaining the wishes and capabilities of the parties and others involved.  
 
Although s 49(2) of the 2005 Act contains some broad criteria to guide children's 
courts on whether to instigate ADR in a particular case they have not been provided with
al to provide these and that appropriate wording could easily be formulated.  To 
create uniform national standards they should be published as a set of official guidelines.   
 
With reference to the criterion of hearing appropriate voices the 2005 Act quite 
correctly requires children's courts to consider whether the child who is the subject of a 
case should take part in ADR.  It has been shown that experience in developed systems 
indicates that suitable criteria can and should be formulated and published to assist in
d
it s to be made clear that the children's courts must never force an unwilling child or 
any other person to undergo ADR. A clarification to s 49 in this regard is urgently needed. 
 
 There are further important aspects which the regulations need to cover. These 
include requirements for ADR facilitators. Standards governing their training and 
qualifications for eligibility as court appointees must be formulated. The regulations must 
also show in broad outline what steps facilitators must follow with any particular form of 
ADR and in what sequenc
in
further instruction if emerges that a party whose involvement is crucial is not able to 
participate constructively. 
 
 Although the provisions in the 2005 Act which establish ADR under the auspices 
of children's courts are to be applauded the legislature does not appear to have gauged the 
resources required. Experience in other systems indicates that where courts are expected to 
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concern that a middle-ranking staff member in the form of a children's court assistant (as 
provided for under the 1983 Act) appears to have been jettisoned in the 2005 Act. As has 
een shown, valuable ADR-related processes such as facilitation of pre-hearing 
confere
t will be needed.  It is to be hoped that the new legislation will not be 
implem nted with an expectation that children's courts must do considerably more with 
conside
required it will be crucial to provide financial incentives and the degree of professional 
status which their new ADR functions surely deserve.248
                                                
b
nces could have been carried out by these officers.  
 
Removal of the concept of children's court assistant will mean that children's courts 
are to be expected to undertake a considerably wider array of functions with little in the 
way of staff resources.  Although this is certainly not the intention in the Act there is a real 
danger that many children's courts may therefore be reduced to merely rubber-stamping 
written ADR agreements rather than providing the degree of critical monitoring and 
rigorous scrutiny tha
e
rably less.   
 
A final point which emerges from the analysis in this chapter concerns magistrates. 
Quite clearly they will only be able to instigate and manage ADR processes effectively if 
they are provided with appropriate interdisciplinary training.  In particular, they will need 
to be familiarized with the positive indicators for, strengths and limitations of the different 
forms of ADR. And once they become familiar with the unique form of skilled work now 
 
248 In the USA has been found that failure to do this discourages court adjudicators from remaining with care 
work and developing the degree of ADR-related specialisation which is crucial: see Schepard & Bozzomo 
(2003) op cit note 10 at 343-44. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PARTY-STATUS AND DIRECT PARTICIPATION AT CHILDREN'S COURT 
PROCEEDINGS 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
As noted in the previous chapter although there will be new scope for ADR under the 
2005 Act children's courts will continue to be the primary forums for deciding care 
cases.  They will thus still issue orders imposing mandatory alternative care measures.1 
In contrast to the extra-curial methods considered in chapter 3, this chapter begins a 
discussion of means for optimising communication by children and other persons at 
children’s court proceedings themselves.  The focus is on the basic aspects of party 
status and direct participation. 2  
 
Party status at care proceedings is clearly important because it confers significant 
participatory advantages.3 These include being able to obtain legal representation, call 
witnesses or challenge decisions in higher courts.4 Direct participation where persons 
speak for themselves at court avoids difficulties associated with hearsay. But as will be 
shown it is problematic in several respects.  Reference to the criterion of optimum means 
for hearing appropriate voices indicates that a critical evaluation of our law on party status 
and direct participation is essential. The evaluation is divided into two main parts. In these, 
                                                 
1 In s 45(1)(h) of the 2005 Act it is expressly stated that matters involving 'alternative care of a child' fall 
under the jurisdiction of children's courts. 
2 Chapters 5 and 6 follow through with a discussion of how lawyers and presiding officers, respectively, can 
assist communication. 
3 As noted in part 1.3.2 above art 9(2) of the 1989 CRC specifically recognises the importance of 
participation by interested parties in care proceedings. 
4 B Van Heerden 'Judicial Interference with the Parental Power: The Protection of Children' in B Van 
Heerden, A Cockrell & R Keightly et al, Boberg’s Law of Persons and the Family (1999) 497 at 622.  In 
more detail, GC Bohr 'Children's Access to Justice' (2001) 28 William Mitchell LR 229 at 235 described the 
essential rights of parties in care cases as those to notice, to have legal representation, to be present at all 
hearings, to conduct discovery, to bring motions before the court, and to participate in all parts of the action 
including settlement agreements. See also M Sobie 'The Child Client: Representing Children in Child 
Protective Proceedings' (2006) 22 Touro LR 745. As Sobie states ibid at 765 '[a]n essential feature of party 
status is the automatic applicability of a large "bundle" of procedural and substantive rights'.  
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aspects relating to children who are the subject of care proceedings and other persons are 
separately considered.  
 
Part 4.2 deals with whether children should be involved at court.  This has been 
treated as a primary aspect which requires detailed analysis. The presence or absence of the 
child who is the subject of a care case is clearly a significant contextual factor.  
Accordingly, it should influence how court hearings are conducted. For example, if verbal 
participation or even just physical presence of children at court is to be promoted this will 
have implications for procedures that need to be employed.   
 
 Research findings and arguments for and against children being at court are noted in 
parts 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.  In part 4.2.3 degrees and kinds of child-involvement are 
considered and then in part 4.2.4 a position is taken on child participation. Party status 
for children and an approach which facilitates direct involvement in accordance with 
their capabilities and interests are proposed. In part 4.2.5 our present law is critically 
evaluated with reference to this recommendation. 
 
The second fundamental question addressed in this chapter is which persons 
besides the child who is the subject of proceedings should have party-status or be 
otherwise entitled to participate directly at court.  Prior to the 2005 Act our law did not 
allocate party status to welfare despite the fact that social workers instigated nearly all care 
litigation and presented evidence for the state.  With the 2005 Act having now designated 
investigative agencies as parties5 the question of whether this is appropriate is considered 
in part 4.3.1. It is concluded that, despite some foreseeable difficulties, it will enable 
agencies to provide better services. 
 
 In part 4.3.2 the issue of which private individuals should receive party status is 
discussed.   In subpart 4.3.2.1 the preliminary question of whether to limit the numbers of 
                                                 
5 Section 1 provides automatic party status to 'the department or the designated child protection organisation 
managing the case of the child'. 
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private parties is considered. It is contended that a child-participatory model as 
recommended in part 4.2 and the need to facilitate communication by primary caregivers 
entail that a selective rather than accommodating approach must be taken. In light of this, 
in subpart 4.3.2.2 private-party eligibility criteria are discussed. Particular attention is 
given to unmarried fathers and prospective caregivers. It is concluded that provisions in the 
2005 Act providing them with automatic party status are overly broad.   
 
In subpart 4.3.2.3 the 2005 Act’s introduction of a merely 'participant' as opposed 
to full party status for certain persons is analysed.  It is suggested that this facilitates a 
child participatory model and assists existing primary caregivers.  It is shown that it is a 
potentially useful mechanism for presiding officers. It could enable them to reduce the 
number of lay adults and legal representatives who are able to maintain an adversarial 
presence throughout proceedings.  Participant status is thus supported in this chapter as 
capable of rendering children's courts more child- and caregiver-friendly by reducing 
overcrowding and intimidation. However, it is contended that the Act provides inadequate 
wording because it does not distinguish clearly enough between participants and full 
parties.  Recommendations for a better differentiation are put forward. 
 
4.2 Party-participation by Children Who Are the Subject of Care Proceedings 
 
The appropriate extent and nature of direct involvement of children at court 
requires careful consideration. From a child empowerment perspective it may be argued 
that it is important to hear them at first hand because crucial decisions about their futures 
are to be made. However, from a child protection perspective concerns about secondary, 
systemic abuse of children arise.  Can they really be expected to participate in hearings 
where adults dispute sensitive issues? Given these seemingly contradictory considerations 
it is not surprising that different solutions to the dilemma of child involvement have been 
adopted in developed systems. In legalistic systems6 responses range between 
                                                 
6 On the concept of legalistic systems as utilised in this thesis see part 1.3.1, above.  
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discouraging7 and (less frequently) actively supporting8 such involvement, with shades in 
between.9   In anti-legalistic systems10 child involvement is more likely to be 
encouraged.11 
                                                 
7 There have been criticisms that many legalistic systems have failed to accommodate direct child 
participation: see J Cashmore 'Children's Participation in Family Law Matters' in C Hallett & A Prout 
Hearing the Voices of Children: Social Policy for a New Century (2003) 158. In England and Wales 
representation by adults tends to be regarded as a preferable substitute. This is facilitated by s 95 of the 
Children Act 1989 which provides courts with a discretion to decide whether the child should attend. Family 
Proceedings Rules 1991 (SI 1991/1247) r 4.16 indicates that proceedings can take place in the absence of a 
child if the court considers this to be in her best interests. Under r 4.11(4)(b) a court may receive information 
about the child's wishes in regard to attending. These provisions tend to be implemented in a way which 
avoids the presence of children: J Hunt, A Macleod & C Thomas The Last Resort. Child Protection, the 
Courts and the 1989 Children Act (1999) 170 noted that the few children who seek direct involvement in 
proceedings are sometimes 'dissuaded or denied attendance'. See also J Masson 'Representation of Children 
in England: Protecting Children in Child Protection Proceedings' (2000) 34 Family LQ 467 at 469 & 491;  B 
Mitchels & H James Child Care Protection Law and Practice (2001) 63; and J Brophy Research Review: 
Child Care Proceedings Under the Children Act 1989 (2006) at 69.  In some parts of Australia there has also 
been little facilitation of child participation: L Akenson & L Buchanan Guidelines for Lawyers Acting for 
Children and Young People in the Children's Court (1999) at 24; P Parkinson 'The Child Participation 
Principle in Child Protection Law in New South Wales' (2001) 9 International Journal of Children's Rights 
259; and R Sheehan 'The Marginalisation of Children by the Legal Process' (2003) 56 Australian Social 
o to court. See also R Sheehan Magistrate’s Decision-making in Child Protection 
 only limited involvement by the child is usually possible: see note 14 and the accompanying 
Work 28 at 29. 
8 New South Wales appears not to follow the trend in other Australian jurisdictions because child 
participation has been strongly encouraged there: see note 65, below. Scotland also places strong emphasis 
upon hearing children through direct engagement. This is not merely as noted in part 3.3.1 above at lay 
hearings panels; as can be seen from K McK Norrie Children's Hearings in Scotland (2005) 98-100 it also 
applies when care matters g
Cases (2001) at 211. 
9 In the USA
text, below.  
10 In relation to the meaning applied to these see part 1.3.1, above. 
11 As appears from A Moylan 'Children's Participation in Proceedings -the View from Europe' in Thorpe LJ 
& J Cadbury (eds) Hearing the Children (2004) 171 at 172 in anti-legalistic systems in continental Europe 
there is much more emphasis on judges seeing children if they have significant interests at stake.  This is to 
directly ascertain their wishes and feelings. For the example of France see Sheehan (2001) op cit note 5 
above at 214; and M-C Celeyron-Bouillot 'The Voice of the Child in Hague Proceedings: a French 
Perspective' (Autumn 2003) VI The Judges’ Newsletter/La letter des juges 18.  On Germany see H-C 
Prestien J 'The German Child Law Reform of 1998 As Seen by a Practitioner: Does It Go Far Enough in 
Making the Child's Voice Heard?' (Autumn 2003) VI The Judges’ Newsletter/La letter des juges 44; and M 
Stötzel & JM Fegert 'The Representation of the Legal Interests of Children and Adolescents in Germany: A 
Study of the Children's Guardian from a Child's Perspective' (2006) 20 International Journal of Law, Policy 
and the Family 201 at 206-07. Hearing children has been encouraged by art 6b. of the European Convention 
on the Exercise of Children's Rights 1996 which came into force in July 2000: accessed at 
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/160.htm>. It places an onus on every court adjudicator in 
proceedings affecting a child to 'consult the child in person in appropriate cases, if necessary privately' either 
directly or through other persons or bodies 'in a manner appropriate to the child's understanding, unless this 
would be manifestly contrary to the best interests of the child'.  In Kutzner v Germany (Application No 
46544/99, 26 Feb 2002) <http://cmiskap.echr.coe.int/tkp197/portal.asp?sessionId=8553112&skin=hudoc-en> 
the chamber court of the European court of human rights reviewed a removal of two sisters into alternative 
care. One of its concerns which led to a finding of unlawfulness was that they had at no stage been heard by a 
court adjudicator: see ibid at p15 para 77.  On the approach in anti-legal systems see also part 1.3.1, above. 
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The question of attendance of children at care proceedings is multidimensional.12  
Aside from possible different forms of participation, other important variables are different 
purposes (for example, the child observing, being seen and/or being heard), differences in 
children,13 and voluntary or compelled participation. In considering the best approach for 
South Africa it is necessary to keep these variables in mind. They allow for a more 
nuanced appreciation of the arguments for and against child-involvement.  These 
arguments, an appropriate model for accommodating different degrees of involvement, and 
our current law, are considered in the next four sub-parts below.  
   
As a preliminary consideration it may be asserted that the position taken on 
involvement of children must depend on whether it is concluded that care proceedings 
must inevitably represent a travail or whether it is regarded as possible to develop 
procedures that will produce a positive, self-affirming experience for a significant 
proportion of children.  Although negative considerations will be noted first it will be 
shown that there are research findings which indicate that involvement at court can serve at 
least some children's needs and be experienced by them as constructive. 
 
4.2.1  Arguments against Involvement of Children 
 
   A technical argument which can be raised against significant participatory rights 
for children is that care cases arise because of disputes between the state and a child’s 
caregivers and not between the state and the child.  Under this characterisation the child 
can be left, in terms of her involvement, on the sidelines. This sidelining approach has 
been applied to deny or limit participatory rights for children in many US jurisdictions.14 
                                                 
12 Brophy (2006) op cit note 7 at 69. 
13 Ibid at 69-70.  In relation to differences in children, under s 64(3) of the Children and Young Persons (Care 
and Protection) Act 1998 of New South Wales, Australia, notification of proceedings 'is to be made in 
language and in a manner that the child or young person can understand having regard to his or her 
development and the circumstances' -accessed at <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw>. 
14 Bohr (2001) op cit note 4 especially at 236-38.  At 232 ibid she cites the Minnesota Juvenile Protection 
Rules 2000 r 58.01 as an extreme example of this approach because it removed party status for children. 
Sobie (2006) op cit note 4 at 769 points out that only a minority of US states have explicitly given party 
status.  As she comments, ibid, in most states the child is merely a virtual party with limited participation 
rights which 'vary from state to state'. See also S Gerwig-Moore & LS Schrope 'Hush, Little Baby, Don't Say 
a Word: How Seeking the Best Interests of the Child Fostered a Lack of Accountability in Georgia’s Juvenile 
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 The main substantive argument against child participation in care proceedings is 
protectionist and can be simply stated. It is based upon the contention that there is a 
significant likelihood that children will be confused and severely stressed by such 
proceedings.15  In appreciating this assertion fully it must be accepted that a high 
proportion of children who need to be the subject of care hearings are psychologically 
fragile because they have inadequate parents and dysfunctional families.16 It has been 
claimed, for example, that negative effects of involving such children in court proceedings 
have been revealed in England. A pre-1989 English practice of requiring children over five 
years of age to attend care proceedings at magistrates’ courts was, in the words of Masson 
'severely criticised because of its damaging and disruptive effect on children who were 
brought from distant placements to courts which completely lacked facilities for them'.17 It 
was found to be particularly oppressive and harmful where children did not want to 
attend.18 
 
A related argument against direct participation of children is that it may place them 
under pressure to make inappropriate choices about forms of care or caregivers.19 A fourth 
argument is that the presence of children may lengthen proceedings and make other 
participants uncomfortable about speaking freely.20  It is unnecessary and a waste of court 
time because adults can more efficiently present their views and protect their interests at 
                                                                                                                                                    
Courts' (2007) 58 Mercer LR 531 at 540-41. There are, however, a few states in which party status has been 
accorded to the child by legislation or authoritative case precedent.  For example: Indiana Code Annotated 
§3103409-7; In re Nikolas E 720 A. 3d 562 (supreme judicial court of Maine, 1998); and In re 
Adoption/Guardianship No. T97036005 746A. 2d 379 Md. 1 (court of appeals, Maryland, 2000). 
15 Parkinson (2001) op cit note 7 at 259 noted that in many systems concerns about promoting the safety of 
children have traditionally prevailed over considerations relating to their autonomy and participation.  He 
also stated ibid '[t]his has been buttressed by the idea that what will happen to them in alternative care is 
outside their experience and thus they cannot be expected to make a meaningful contribution'.  See generally 
also L Davis 'Children in Court -a Postcript' (2007) 37 Family Law 454.  
16J Masson (2000) op cit note 7 at 467-68 noted English statistics showing that approximately half of all care 
proceedings are provoked by a serious crisis such as a physical injury to the child.    
17 Ibid at 489. 
18 J Masson & MW Oakley Out Of Hearing: Representing Children in Care Proceedings (1999) 145. 
19 As noted by Davis (2007) op cit note 15 at 435 this may have the effect of the 'drawing the child into direct 
conflict with close family members'. 
20 M Ells, RB O'Neill, V Weise et al 'Unravelling the Labyrinth: a Proposed Revision of the Nebraska 
Juvenile Code' (2004) 82 Nebraska LR 1126 at 1161. 
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court.21 In support of the substitute-adult representation approach it has been suggested 
that where a child's views are presented for her by other persons she is spared the trauma of 
appearing in court but nevertheless can participate in the sense of 'knowing that one's 
actions are taken note of and may be acted upon'.22  
 
It is also arguable that ADR removes or at least reduces the need for children to 
appear at court.  As noted in the previous chapter s 4(2) of our 2005 Act requires 
consideration to be given to the child's capabilities for participation in ADR. It could be 
suggested that there is no longer a need for children to come to court since they can if 
capable participate at less stressful forums.  Where this has already occurred it can be 
argued further that they have had an opportunity to communicate directly and might now 
find it unduly stressful to have to hear and recount similar information again in a more 
formal environment at court. 
 
4.2.2  Arguments in Favour of Involvement of Children 
 
  The technical argument that care proceedings arise purely between the state and 
caregivers discounts the reality that it is the child who has the greatest stake in the 
outcome.23 Bohr has contended that its application in the USA has produced 'significant 
barriers' to just outcomes in care cases.24  Against this sidelining approach is a growing 
body of international literature, partly analytical and partly based on research findings, 
                                                 
21 On the substitute adult approach see note 7, above. As an example of legislative facilitation of this 
approach s 328 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, California requires expressly that in a care investigation 
'[t]he social worker shall interview any child four years of age or older who is a subject of an investigation… 
to ascertain the child's view of the home environment…'. The social worker must include 'the substance of 
the interview' in her investigatory report for court: accessed at <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-
bin/displaycode?section=wic &group=00001-01000 &file=>. 
22 J Boyden & J Ennew Children in Focus-a Manual for Participatory Research with Children (1997) 33.  
23 Bohr (2001) op cit note 4 at 236. As has been noted in part 1.3.2 above the most drastic outcomes in care 
cases tend to be forms of institutional confinement which restrict a child's liberty. In South Africa s 35(2)(d) 
of the Constitution creates a right for any person who has been detained 'to challenge the lawfulness of the 
detention in person before a court and, if the detention is unlawful, to be released' [emphasis added].  It can 
be argued that this strengthens the right of a sufficiently mature child to participate directly. PJ  Schwikkard 
'Arrested, Detained and Accused Persons' in I Currie & J De Waal et al  Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 733, 
at 741-42 refers to Canadian approaches and supports a broad interpretation of detention in s 35(2)(d).   
24 Bohr ibid at 239. In criticising the failure to allocate party status to the child in many US jurisdictions 
Sobie (2006) op cit note 4 at 769-770 stated 'recognition of the child as a formal party in child protective 
cases would resolve many of the problems and dilemmas which continue to plague the field'. 
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which asserts the case for court adjudicators paying more attention to children's views 
about domestic problems generally and involving them in consequential decisions that 
affect them.25 Three important arguments which emerge from the literature can be briefly 
stated. Firstly, participation means that children are more likely to comply with 
decisions.26  Secondly, participation can enable some children to better understand their 
present circumstances and result in more appropriate decision-making about their 
futures.27 Thirdly, it supports a modern view of children as individuals who deserve 
respect and are capable of exercising rights for themselves.28   
 courtroom.31 
                                                
 
  The counterargument that children's views can be adequately presented in their 
absence by other persons has been weakened by research findings.  These suggest that 
even expert witnesses sometimes make inappropriate recommendations because they fail 
to identify children's deepest concerns.29 They have also been found to differ widely on 
such basic issues as whether children should be removed from parents.30 Clearly, 
children's views will often be more easily and accurately communicated to the judge if 
they are in the
 
The approach in some legalistic systems of relying mainly on adults as substitutes 
to present the views of children at court has understandably therefore been criticised both 
for denying children a voice32 and for being inefficient.33 It is not surprising that in 1997 
 
25 See Cashmore (2003) op cit note 7 at 159-60. 
26 Ibid 159. As has been noted in relation to ADR in part 3.6 above, children who are not involved may 'vote 
with their feet'. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. See also J McCausland & A Bourton Guarding Children's Interests: The Contribution of Guardians 
Ad Litem in Court Proceedings (2000) 9. G Van Bueren 'The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child: An Evolutionary Revolution' in CJ Davel (ed) Introduction to Child Law in South Africa (2000) 202 at 
205 has argued that the CRC has promoted a 'new culture of listening' which requires recognition of children 
'as evolving autonomous individuals'.   
29 See V Morrow ' "We are people too": Children's and Young People's Perspectives on Children's Rights and 
Decision-Making in England' (1999) 7 International Journal of Children's Rights 149 at 151; and Masson & 
Oakley (1999) op cit note 18 at 12. 
30 See N Thomas & C O'Kane 'When Children's Wishes and Feelings Clash with Their "Best Interests" ' 
(1998) 6 International Journal of Children's Rights 137 at 138. 
31 Ells, O'Neill & Weise et al (2004) op cit note 20 at 1161. 
32See Masson (2000) op cit note 7 at 490.  See also note 7, above. 
33 J Fortin Children's Rights and the Developing Law (2003) 211 described it as a 'fragmented and arbitrary' 
method for conveying children's wishes to courts. See also Masson & Oakley (1999) op cit note 18 at 15. 
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the English Magistrates’ Association supported a view that attendance at cases could be in 
the interests of children -and particularly more mature children.34  And even the English 
court of appeals has recently slightly softened its position against attendance.35 
A number of specific advantages may be said to result from child-participation at 
care hearings. If the child is permitted to give testimony and her input is given serious 
consideration this will maximise her chances of influencing the proceedings.  This is 
particularly important in care cases because of the grave significance for the child of the 
decisions that will have to be made.36 Where a child wishes to participate at court closing 
her out may reduce her future cooperation by causing her to disengage from what is seen 
as an alien manipulation of her life.37  
 
It is particularly where the child's wishes differ from those of persons who purport 
to represent her that her views are unlikely to be sufficiently heard by a court if she is not 
permitted to speak directly. And where an adult (such as a lawyer) is genuinely attempting 
to represent the child's views he will be able to consult with a child who is present if new 
evidence comes to light during the hearing.  Where a child of sufficient understanding 
remains present she may not only gain a useful understanding of the social dynamics 
affecting her case but may also be able to counter incorrect evidence.38  This she may do 
either by passing on instructions to her legal representative (if any) as the evidence unfolds 
or by directly correcting impressions herself.39   
 
A further argument in favour of involvement of the child at court is that seeing and 
interacting with her will make her 'real' for the presiding officer.40  This will enable the 
establishment of a relationship that may be important in soliciting information from the 
                                                 
34 Masson (2000) op cit note 7 at 490 N131. 
35 See the judgments discussed by Davis (2007) op cit note 15 at 434-36. 
36 See note 23, above.  As Gallinetti has put it 'the more serious the consequences of the decision are, the 
more the child's opinion needs to be considered': see J Gallinetti 'Child Participation in South African Family 
Law and Child Welfare Proceedings' (UP, Paper: 11th World Conference of the International Society of 
Family Law: Copenhagen and Oslo 2-7 August, 2002: <http://www.jus.uio.no/ifp/isfl>). 
37 On the problem of disengagement see further Masson & Oakley (1999) op cit note 18 at 116. 
38 This point was made many years ago by Tredgold CJ in the Rhodesian care case In re R 1951 (2) SA 18 
(R).                       
39 Sheehan (2003) op cit note 7 at 37 after observing children's court cases in Melbourne concluded that these 
two important capabilities could be impeded if children were seated too near opposing adult parties. 
40 Ells, O'Neill & Weise et al (2004) op cit note 20 at 1137. 
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child and affirming her self-worth.  Also, actual contact encourages adjudicators to work 
more rapidly towards suitable solutions.41   If the child is present at the end of the 
proceedings the presiding officer will have the opportunity to explain the effect of the 
court order and the reasons for it.  This may be better than the child having to rely on other 
persons to inform her at second-hand. 
 
Perhaps the most important argument supporting a system designed to encourage 
children to appear at care proceedings is that it may represent a positive and useful 
experience.42 Some findings indicate that it may empower them by providing greater 
'feelings of self-efficacy or perceived control' at a stressful time in their lives.43 There is 
also research which suggests that the problem of other parties’ evidence being stressful for 
children to hear is less serious than previously thought.44  
 
On the views of children themselves about whether they should be at court, Clark 
and Sinclair found that those who participated directly at care proceedings particularly 
appreciated being listened to and given a part in decision-making.45  In two larger and 
more general studies involving, respectively, 73 and 184 children Morrow established as a 
significant finding that a high proportion of children wish to be involved in decision-
making processes where outcomes are likely to affect them.46 Recent surveys of children 
                                                 
41 Ibid and at 1161. 
42 G Schofield 'The Voice of the Child in Public Law Proceedings: a Developmental Model' in Thorpe & 
Cadbury  (2004) op cit note 11, 33 at 34 concluded that current knowledge on care cases shows '[i]f it is 
appropriately and sensitively handled, enabling the child to participate in the process of decision-making can 
also be developmentally beneficial'.  
43 Ells, O'Neill & Weise et al (2004) op cit note 20 at 1158; BA Green & AR Appell 'Representing Children 
in Families -Foreword' (2006) 6 Nevada LJ 571 at 579.   
44 Brophy (2006) op cit note 7 at 71 notes that courts sometimes direct that children should not attend 'on the 
expectation of intense adversarialism which does not actually materialise particularly by the later stages. The 
feared scenario of highly distressed parents rehearsing horrendous verbal evidence in court' has been found 
not to happen in most cases and thus is overrated as a negative consideration.  
45 McCausland & Bourton (2000) op cit note 28 at 8.   
46 Morrow (1999) op cit note 29 at 166. See also Masson (2000) op cit note 7 at 490; and S Walker 
'Consulting with Children and Young People' (2001) 9 International Journal of Children's Rights 45 
especially at 47 & 54. 
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in alternative care in the US have shown that the majority of them wish that they had been 
allowed to participate directly at care proceedings.47 
 
In rejecting the commonly-held belief that appearances in court are always 
experienced as negative by children Lipovsky cited a 1992 American study of 218 children 
who gave evidence in sexual abuse cases.48  A significant proportion of them found the 
experience to be positive.49 Lipovsky and Stern have suggested that '[c]hildren can and do 
testify without suffering significant emotional trauma'.50 Even relatively young children 
have gone to great lengths to assert their right to be heard in care proceedings.51   
 
In challenging the core argument that testifying is too stressful for most children 
one may also note the findings of Grover.52  After reviewing recent research in several 
countries she concluded that it shows that many at-risk children (including those in need of 
alternative care)53 tend to have strong and resilient rather than diminished self advocacy 
skills.54  They develop these as a survival mechanism.55  She contends that it is therefore 
gravely unfair, disempowering and can even be dangerous (because important evidence 
may be missed) to deny such children the opportunity to participate directly where 
important decisions about their futures are to be made.56 
                                                 
47 Ells, O'Neill & Weise et al (2004) op cit note 20 at 1158; BA Green & AR Appell 'Representing Children 
in Families -Foreword' (2006) 6 Nevada LJ  571 at 579. 
48 JA Lipovsky 'The Impact of Court on Children: Research Findings and Practical Recommendations' (1994) 
9 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 238, at 241-42 & 254. 
49 Ibid at 241-42 citing research by GS Goodman, EP Taub and EP Jones et al. 
50 J Lipovsky & P Stern 'Preparing Children for Court: An Interdisciplinary View' (1997) 2 Child 
Maltreatment 150 at 161. 
51 An American example is 10-year-old Samantha Frazer in In the Matter of the Petition of Samantha Nicole 
Frazer, 721A. 2d 920 (Del. 1998).  For a discussion of this case see TM Culley 'What Does It Mean to 
Represent Delaware's Abused, Neglected and Dependent Children?' (2001) 4 Delaware LR 77 at 80-81. 
52 S Grover 'Advocacy by Children as a Causal Factor in Promoting Resilience' (2005) 12 Childhood: a 
Global Journal of Child Research 527. 
53 Ibid at 536. 
54 Ibid at 531-32 & 536. 
55 Ibid at 531. In an analysis of current child developmental research findings Schofield (2004) op cit note 42 
at 38 explained that this occurs because some children with inadequate parents learn to 'use displays of 
feelings to gain the attention of and control unpredictably available caregivers'. She further points out at 40 
ibid that '[f]or children whose early caregiving experiences are characterised by insensitive, neglectful or 
abusive care' one response is a 'striving for personal power and efficacy'.  She also concludes, however, that 
the current knowledge indicates a second group of more closed, uncommunicative children who also 
commonly become involved in care proceedings: see ibid at 38. 
56 Grover (2005) ibid at 531 & 536. 
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 It may be concluded that although there are arguments both for and against direct 
child involvement many of the latter predate more recent findings about the needs and 
resilience of children.  And they would lose much of their force if appropriate changes in 
court environments could be produced.  In the next part below the additional factor of 
different forms of child involvement is considered and a proposed model for the South 
African children's courts is then put forward. 
 
4.2.3  Different Forms of Participation 
 
Before reaching a conclusion on the position which ought to be taken in South 
Africa it is necessary to focus more closely on what permutations in direct child 
participation are possible.  In a purely technical sense it could be asserted that any child 
who is the subject of proceedings becomes a participant in law merely by being granted 
party status.  It will be recalled that it has been argued above that allocation of such status 
is certainly an important threshold requirement for effective participation.57 However, 
English researchers Masson and Oakley found that the mere designation of party status for 
children in care cases did not necessarily result in opportunities equal to those of other 
parties -and in particular it often did not produce scope for children to participate at 
court.58 They concluded that it did not even guarantee that courts would focus sufficiently 
on children’s concerns rather than those of the adults involved.59   
 
In terms of involvement going beyond mere receipt of party status it would appear 
that it is necessary to distinguish between at least five possibilities along a spectrum of a 
child's engagement. Firstly, a child might have her views conveyed without being 
                                                 
57 In further support Bohr (2001) op cit note 4 at 236 contends that US experience shows that failure to 
provide party status weakens children’s rights to be heard, to present evidence, and to cross-examine 
witnesses.  They and their legal representatives are also sometimes denied access to crucial documents. In 
England, the National Association of Guardians ad Litem and Reporting Officers Support Services in Family 
Proceedings -Future Organisation of Court Welfare Services ND 
<http://www.nagalro.com/docs/documents_page.htm>  chapter 4, para 2 has argued that a full and entirely 
separate party status for children is essential because they have so much at stake. 
58 Masson & Oakley (1999) op cit note 18 at 144-45. 
59 Ibid at 145. 
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physically present at court or directly involved in hearings at all. This could be done for 
her by representatives. Secondly, a child might be physically present but merely appear at 
court for a short period of time so that the adjudicator could have sight of her and perhaps 
converse with her at the start of proceedings.60 Thirdly, a child might remain present 
during all or part of the proceedings -but just as a silent observer.61  One variation here 
would be to have the child present only when the presiding officer is ready to give 
judgment.  
 
A fourth possibility would entail a child becoming more actively involved in 
proceedings but taking only an indirect role. She could give evidence, but only from a 
sheltered situation where she is protected from direct confrontations with other parties.62  
Simple methods for providing shelter could involve a child being placed behind a screen or 
having questions directed through the medium of the presiding officer.63 Other methods 
could involve a child giving evidence via a prerecorded statement, remote television 
linkage and/or trained intermediary who rephrases information in child-appropriate 
language (hereafter, these are collectively referred to as 'sheltered' participation methods).  
A fifth approach would be to provide for full involvement of the child in giving viva voce 
evidence directly in the presence of the other parties -and this might even include 
conducting and being subjected to cross-examination. Under this last approach, the child 
                                                 
60 A variation is for the adjudicator to see the child in chambers rather than in court.  Under title 13, § 724(a) 
of the Delaware Code Annotated <http://www.delcode.state.de.us/title 13/> appear detailed provisions 
allowing for a presiding officer to interview a child in chambers to ascertain her wishes.  There is a discretion 
to permit counsel to be present.  It is further provided that '[t]he court shall, at the request of a party, cause a 
record of the interview with the child to be made part of the record in the case'.  This provision is worded as 
applying to custody cases.  However, it is also used for termination of parental rights cases: see Culley 
(2001) op cit note 51 at 91. Fortin (2003) op cit note 33 at 240-41 contends that where chambers contact is 
employed confidentiality rules must be developed and it must be kept in mind that if other parties are not 
present they will not have had the opportunity to test evidence privately presented by the child. JEB Myers 
'Session 3: Children's Rights in the Context of Welfare, Dependency and the Juvenile Court' (2004) 8 U.C. 
Davis Journal of Juvenile Law and Policy 267 at 285-86 suggested that confidential chambers meetings 
should be an option not merely with children but also other vulnerable family members. 
61 Under title 22, § 4005-D of the Maine Child and Family Services and Child Protection Act (2001 
Amendment) <http://janus.state.me.us/legis/statutes/22/title 22 sec 4005-D. html> at subpart 3 there is 
express provision for a court to grant observation status to a person. It is further stated that '[t]he opportunity 
to attend court proceedings does not include the right to be heard or the right to present or cross-examine 
witnesses, present evidence or have access to pleadings or records'. 
62  Research in the US has shown that what tends to cause most stress for child-witnesses is 'face-to-face 
contact' with an opposing party: Lipovsky (1994) op cit note 48 at 255.   
63 The latter has been provided for in domestic violence cases under s 7(3) of the South African Domestic 
Violence Act 116/1998. 
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might, or might not, also remain present during the rest of the proceedings when she is not 
participating. 
 
 
 
4.2.4  An Appropriate Model 
 
A properly-developed system of care law must take a clear position and provide 
sufficient guidance for presiding officers on degrees and forms of participation by children 
who are the subject of proceedings.64  To protect their rights such children should certainly 
as a threshold requirement automatically receive full party status. However, as noted above 
research findings indicate that more will be required to ensure meaningful involvement.  
The proposed guidance should therefore deal distinctly with the two alternatives of child-
participation sought by the child herself or by other persons.   More detailed 
recommendations are made below.  
 
  Direct involvement desired by the child is supported by both the analysis above and 
the criterion of optimum capacity for hearing the voices of vulnerable participants.  A child 
participatory model is the ideal because courts should be accessible and supportive where 
children wish to communicate directly.65 A response to the counterargument that this is too 
                                                 
64 TG Kleinman 'Strategies and Pretrial Hearings for Child Protection' 2004 (1) Journal of Child Custody 
<http://www.leadershipcouncil.org/doc/kleinman-strategies-2004.pdf> 105 at 110 states that in some US 
jurisdictions special hearings (referred to as competency hearings) may be held by courts to determine 
whether the child ought to give testimony.  If it is found that the child should, a second question is whether 
this should be in open court or by means of one of the sheltered participation methods.  Very similarly, under 
r 69.07 (7) of the Civil Procedure Rules -Nova Scotia: Proceedings under the Children and Family Services 
Act courts are directed 'as soon as is practicable in the circumstances' to hold 'interim protection hearings'.  
At these they are required, inter alia, to 'make such directions respecting the child's party status, 
representation, presence at hearings, participation, disclosure to the child, and service of documents upon the 
child as are just and necessary in the circumstances, having regard to the child's best interests'.  On special 
hearings for establishing party and participation status see further part 7.3.1, below. 
65 This view is gaining acceptance in the US and a few states have begun to promulgate legislation 
encouraging direct participation: see Ells, O'Neill & Weise et al (2004) op cit note 20 at 1158. On growing 
support in the US for the presence of children at care proceedings see also Green & Appell (2006) op cit note 
43 at 588. An Australian example is s 10 of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 
of New South Wales.  This not only establishes the child's right to express herself freely but also requires that 
she should receive any support necessary to do so in children's court proceedings. Parkinson (2001) op cit 
note 7 at 260 asserted that a strong point of the 1998 legislation is its support for child participation in care 
matters.  He states ibid '[t]his principle runs like a golden thread throughout the Act'. 
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stressful is that at care hearings there is not generally a punitive purpose.66  Therefore, 
pressures on children need not be as intense as at criminal trials.  In answer to the related 
counterargument that children from dysfunctional families are too vulnerable to go to court 
it is necessary to bear in mind the research cited above which shows that upsetting  
revelations by other parties are not pervasive and that children from difficult circumstances 
often have well-developed self advocacy skills. It is thus recommended that the child 
should have a right to apply to give relevant evidence if she wishes and is able to.67  As 
suggested by  Ells, O'Neill & Weise et al suitable criteria for adjudicators are the child's 
level of development, the potential for trauma to the child, and how essential the child's 
direct participation is 'to a just and fair outcome'.68 
 
It must be conceded that psychological fragility may be a reason to limit the degree 
of involvement by some children; but it should not be a consideration which results in 
court inaccessibility becoming a standard norm.  None of the reasons against participation 
that have been considered in part 4.2.1 above justifies a general ban on child participation 
in the South African children's courts.  What these reasons admittedly do indicate, 
however, is that because children generally are vulnerable procedural methods and rules of 
evidence will need to be carefully fashioned and implemented to provide sufficient 
shielding and encouragement.69  
 
On the alternative right of children to remain present as merely silent observers it 
may be concluded that the basic approach should again be that this is a standard but not 
absolute entitlement. Whenever other participants are inhibited from communicating freely 
or a child may find their testimony too upsetting courts must have a discretion to order her 
temporary removal.70  But this should not be overutilised.  As a means to promote 
involvement of children it should be stated in future regulations that failure to facilitate the 
                                                 
66 However, in part 8.4.4 below it is suggested that courts dealing with care cases occasionally need to 
enforce compliance with their orders by imposing criminal sentences. 
67 The question of the extent of active participation -and specifically the issue of cross-examination- is further 
considered in the next part, below. 
68 (2004) op cit note 20 at 1157. 
69 For some specific proposals see part 6.3.2, below. 
70 Ells, O'Neill & Weise et al (2004) op cit note 20 at 1160.  
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continued presence of the child during phases of proceedings where she wishes to remain 
constitutes a reviewable irregularity unless a children's court has noted reasons against.   
 
Turning to the second fundamental question of child-involvement desired not by 
the child but by other persons, in view of the problem of child-vulnerability only very 
limited scope should be allowed.71  Only court adjudicators acting in terms of 
circumscribed powers should be able to compel the presence and especially actual 
participation of a child.  As will be further motivated below they should have a right to see 
and/or question the child concerned at any stage of care proceedings if this reasonably 
appears to be necessary in the interests of the child.   
 
Future South African procedural rules should provide that the presiding magistrate 
will normally have contact with the child at least once and as soon as possible in the course 
of proceedings. This should apply unless there is a reason (such as infancy or ill-health) 
which renders it inappropriate.  A motivation for this is that it will often be easier to decide 
on the best care outcome if the magistrate has seen the child. If it is necessary to decide 
whether she has been physically or psychologically harmed, seeing her will often be 
useful.72 Ells, O'Neill and Weise et al have noted that in systems where judges regularly 
see children this provides indirect protection.  The likelihood of such monitoring 
'galvanizes' welfare to take better care of children in their charge.73 
 
Contact between presiding officers and children would not only help make children 
'real' for adjudicators as noted above; it would also create opportunities for older children 
to decide whether they would like to communicate directly.  They might discover a 
                                                 
71 As will be remembered from the discussion in part 4.2.1 Masson & Oakley (1999) concluded that pre-1989 
English practice revealed that forcing children to attend is inappropriate in many cases. 
72 This is proposed as a supplement to the possibility of expert evidence. The 1983 Act at s 54(1) currently 
enables a commissioner to estimate the age of a person when necessary 'by his or her appearance or and from 
any information which is available'.  The latter will usually include a report from a district surgeon. 
73 Ells, O'Neill & Weise et al (2004) op cit note 20 at 1161. 
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supportive adjudicator and then wish to give evidence.74 Future South African rules of 
court should require presiding magistrates to be encouraging in this regard.75  
 
 Whether presiding officers should have a right to question as opposed to merely 
see the child may be seen as more controversial.  It raises the extent of a child’s right not to 
participate. From a children's rights perspective it might be asserted that a child should 
never be subjected to questioning if she is unwilling. What, however, of a case where the 
child's evidence is essential and her reasons for refusing to testify are suspect?  For 
example, an immature child might refuse because an unfit parent has bribed her by 
promising her a computer game if she avoids court.76  
 
It might be contended that the answer to the problem of children manipulated into 
silence is alternative evidence from other sources such as investigative social workers.  
This avoids the hard truth that cases occur where a court needs to make a direct assessment 
of the child's version of important events.77  For example, what if welfare can convey only 
hearsay that a child has been abused and the alleged perpetrator insists that social workers 
were influenced by someone whom he proves has a grudge against him? By seeing and 
questioning the child the court may be able to establish the truth.  
     
Yet another reason for courts being able to see or question children is that this will 
help counter child-grant fraud.  A problem in South Africa is that of non-existent 'ghost-
children' against whose names alternative care cases are brought to court.78  This is done so 
that fraudulent persons can receive foster care or institutional care grants from the state.79 
                                                 
74 Brophy (2006) op cit note 7 at 71 cited English research showing that in some care cases children wanted 
to speak directly to the judge to ensure that their views were understood. 
75 Grover (2005) op cit note 52 at 531 reported positively on findings which she concluded show that 
professionals can provide the support necessary 'to foster self-advocacy efforts' even by highly marginalised 
children. 
76 Children being manipulated by parents has been recognised in England as a danger that courts must remain 
alert for: see D Burrows 'A Child's Understanding' (October 1994) Family Law 579 at 579-80; and Fortin 
(2003) op cit note 33 at 260-61. See also part 6.3.2.4, below. 
77 This is clearly proved by recent case examples in England: for a discussion see Davis (2007) op cit note 15 
at 434-36. 
78 The terminology 'ghost-children' in this context is that of commissioner DS Rothman: personal 
communication 2 Sept 2002. 
79 Ibid; and commissioner P Booysen: personal communication 12 Sept 2006. 
 145
Another form of fraudulent court case is one in which it is pretended that parents have died 
so that other relatives can claim foster care grants.80 In these situations ordering the 
presence of the child and then questioning any child who is presented should uncover the 
deception.81  
 
It must be concluded that cases do occur where it will be necessary for a presiding 
officer -and obviously within bounds appropriate to the child's capabilities- to question the 
child even where she has not agreed to this. If it is accepted that children's courts should 
have a right to seek evidence from children, they will need procedural guidance.    
Procedural rules should require magistrates to weigh the extent to which the child’s best 
interests will be served by her being encouraged to participate.  They should also be 
required take into account any possible adverse effect upon any other party if the child 
does not provide testimony.  
 
Against these factors must be balanced possible psychological damage resulting 
from the child being pressured to give evidence.82  Specifically, where the child is 
apparently unwilling (as opposed to incapable) the court should be required to determine 
whether there is reason to believe that her evidence will be essential.83  In so doing 
adjudicators must be empowered to at least see and may sometimes also decide to question 
the child.84  
 
 Although a child participatory model is proposed for our children's courts there 
should be some limitations.  In many cases it will clearly not be in the best interests of, for 
example, a very young, ill or traumatised child to even appear at court. Generally on good 
                                                 
80 On the problem of fictional care cases see further FN Zaal 'When Should Children Be Legally Represented 
in Care Proceedings?  An Application of Section 28(1)(h) of the 1996 Constitution' (1997) 114 SALJ 334 at 
342.  
81 Because children tend to be more honest than adults, this has often proven to be a successful means for 
discovering dishonest applications in the children's courts: Rothman (2002) supra note 78. 
82 A test recently developed in England is whether the child will find it 'oppressive' as opposed to merely 
unpleasant or difficult if compelled: Davis (2007) op cit note 15 at 436. 
83 This is the key test in the recent English approach: ibid at 435-36. 
84 This is supported by a finding of Walker (2001) op cit note 46 at 46.  He argued that international research 
increasingly 'demonstrates the value of consulting children and seeing how much they can achieve with a 
little help which is appropriate and acceptable'.   
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cause shown a court should dispense with having sight of the child at some or all stages of 
proceedings. And where courts order an attendance or participation which the child does 
not desire they should be required to limit its extent to the minimum necessary for an 
appropriate outcome in the case.85 
 
Regardless of whether participation is initiated by the child herself or another 
person, sheltered means for testifying must be considered.  Magistrates must be required to 
make an informed choice from amongst all of the degrees and methods of child-
involvement discussed earlier. They must also be directed to keep in mind the distinction 
between the child providing factual evidence, generally expressing feelings, or expressing 
specific preferences between caregivers or forms of care.86  The latter should be 
discouraged unless the child is exceptionally mature and resilient.  This is both because a 
commitment to choices may be harmful for a child87 and it is the adjudicator’s 
responsibility to decide upon outcomes. 
  
It is obviously particularly where a child feels seriously intimidated that she ought 
not to be present -and especially in open court. It should be the duty of a child's legal 
representative, if any, and welfare to indicate in pre-hearing reports how well the child 
would be likely to manage in giving evidence or merely observing.  If the prognosis is that 
the child can testify the prehearing advice should indicate whether she should be a 
sheltered-method participant.  Sometimes it will only be apparent that the child cannot 
cope when she appears at court.  This may be because of causes not foreseen by the 
persons who prepared her. An example might be an unexpected reaction in the presence of 
an adult whom the child is afraid of.   
 
                                                 
85 Brophy (2006) op cit note 7 at 70 suggests that it is important to protect children from 'long and 
acrimonious hearings'.  She also noted findings which indicate that adversarialism diminishes as care cases 
proceed towards the outcomes decision-making stage; so appropriate attendance of the child 'can be a 
question of timing'.   
86 On the importance of these distinctions for appropriate child participation in domestic litigation generally 
see Cashmore (2003) op cit note 7 at 159. 
87 On the dangers of children taking on the burden of inappropriate choices see RE Emory 'Hearing 
Children's Voices: Listening and Deciding is an Adult Responsibility' (2003) 45 Arizona LR 621 at 622.  See 
also Davis (2007) as cited in part 4.2.1, above. 
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Future South African rules for children's courts should require presiding officers to 
give attention to the degree of fear encountered or likely to be encountered 88 by any child 
party or witness.  They should do so after reading pre-hearing documentation and then 
continuously, on a monitoring basis, if the child is present at proceedings.  Should the 
magistrate observe that the child is becoming seriously stressed or is for any other reason 
unable to cope the cause should be dealt with. The proposed rules should indicate that this 
can be done by removing a person who is the source of the child's discomfort, by ordering 
sheltered participation or by removal of the child from the proceedings.  
 
The proposed discretionary power to remove the child where it appears that this is 
in her best interests means that   presiding officers will sometimes have to make on-the-
spot rulings about child-protection versus a child's right to understanding about her 
circumstances.89 As noted earlier a witness may intend to reveal sensitive information that 
could upset the child.  An example might be that a man whom a child always thought was 
his father is not in fact his father, or that the child's mother is a prostitute.90  Rules of court 
should therefore indicate that presiding officers, legal representatives, welfare and other 
expert witnesses are all obliged to give consideration to whether the child will be harmed 
by information that is likely to be revealed in testimony. 
 
In light of the proposals for a best practice model for child participation as put 
forward above relevant aspects of our current law can now be critically evaluated. This 
will be done, below. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
88 CD Schwarz 'Unified Family Courts: A Saving Grace for Victims of Domestic Violence Living in Nations 
with Fragmented Court Systems' (2004) 42 Family Court Review 304 at 307 has argued that generally 
children should not be present in court 'when domestic violence is involved'. 
89 Brophy (2006) op cit note 7 at 73 notes English data suggesting that courts need to respond flexibly 
according to the participation requirements of individual children. 
90  See further A Griffiths and RF Kandel 'Hearing Children in Children's Hearings' (2000) 12 Child and 
Family LQ 283 at 293. 
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4.2.5  An Evaluation of Our Current Law 
 
Limited available data suggests that under the 1983 Act children have tended not to 
be encouraged to participate in care proceedings.91 In a study by the Community Law 
Centre of the University of the Western Cape in 2001 a group of child-respondents who 
had appeared in both children's courts and juvenile courts indicated that they preferred the 
latter because 'although the criminal courts were impersonal, a child could at least express 
his or her opinion in the criminal court as opposed to the children's court'.92 In the same 
year non-participation by children in children's courts was noted by the South African law 
commission as a matter for concern and it recommended legislative amendments.93  
 
Although child participation in children's courts is currently governed by the 1983 
Act more detailed provisions have been promulgated in the 2005 Act.  In the discussion 
below attention is devoted mainly to the wording of the new legislation.  General 
orientation on child participation, party status, court accessibility, attendance at court, 
voluntary and involuntary participation, and protective limitations are in turn considered. 
 
At the foundational level of general precepts, the 2005 Act strongly asserts a child 
participatory approach.  Section 10 is entitled '[c]hild participation' and it states '[e]very 
child that is of such an age, maturity and stage of development as to be able to participate 
                                                 
91 Interviews with commissioners at 43 children's courts indicated that children were less likely to be 
encouraged to participate in rural jurisdictions. Findings in the same study showed that in at least 19% of all 
jurisdictions commissioners routinely conducted care cases without the child coming to court at any stage: 
see C Matthias Removal of Children and the Right to Family Life: South African Law and Practice (1997) 
48-49. Attorney V Groenewald 'Representing Children in the Children's Courts' (Unpublished Paper: Law 
Teacher's Conference, Durban, 6 July 2000) found in her practice that Cape province commissioners 
frequently excluded children from proceedings. In her view many of them did not regard it as important to 
hear the child.  B Khumalo (children's court commissioner at Pietermaritzburg) stated that low levels of child 
participation were prevalent in KwaZulu-Natal (personal communication 24 Oct 2002).  A similar view was 
expressed about Mpumalanga province by a legal aid board attorney specialising in children's court work in 
rural jurisdictions near Middleburg (personal communication: R Govender, 1 June 2005). See also the 
findings of Bacharam noted in part 6.2.3, below.  
92 Community Law Centre Report on Children's Rights "They should listen to our side of the story" (2001) 
13. 
93 Review of the Child Care Act (Discussion Paper 103: Project 110, December 2001) vol 5, at 1141. It was 
therefore proposed by the commission (ibid, at 1176) 'that it be expressly stated, as part of the procedures… 
that a child-party has the right to be present and to participate at a court hearing (or to convey her views in 
chambers to the adjudicating officer), if she so wishes and is able'. 
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in any matter concerning that child has the right to participate in an appropriate way and 
views expressed by the child must be given due consideration'. This wording appears as 
part of a listing of general principles in chapter 2 of the Act.  Although it is therefore not 
confined only to children's court proceedings it is certainly applicable to them. As will be 
seen more specific provisions which pertain only to children's courts have also been 
included. 
 
Section 1 of the 2005 Act includes 'a child involved in the matter' in a list of 
persons who have automatic party status in children's court cases.  As has been noted this 
is certainly an important threshold requirement.  The express affirmation of it in s 1 
compares favourably to the 1983 Act.94 It triggers further core rights to adduce evidence,95 
have legal representation and appeal.96  
 
Section 14 of the 2005 Act provides a second important threshold right for children 
-that of access.  It is entitled '[a]ccess to court'.  It establishes that '[e]very child has the 
right to bring, and to be assisted in bringing, a matter to court, provided that matter falls 
within the jurisdiction of that court'.97    This is reinforced by s 53.  The latter includes '[a] 
child who is affected by or involved in the matter' amongst persons who may bring 
relevant cases to children's courts for placement on their rolls. This again compares 
favourably with the 1983 Act.  Under the latter a child in need of alternative care is 
entirely reliant upon welfare to initiate proceedings on her behalf. 98 
                                                 
94 The 1983 Act unfortunately does not expressly state that the child who is the subject of care proceedings is 
a party.  However reg 4(1) subsequently published in terms of this Act stated that the child 'shall have the 
same rights and powers as a party to a civil action in a magistrates’ court in respect of examining witnesses, 
adducing evidence and addressing the court'. This regulation was inserted by Government Notice R416 in 
Government Gazette 18770 of 31 March 1998. 
95 As will be further discussed below, the 2005 Act at s 58 expressly states that the child has a right to adduce 
evidence.  In s 59(1) the child is given the right to require a children's court clerk to summons a person to 
appear as a witness or produce other forms of evidence. 
96 Section 51 provides all parties with the right to appeal and ss 54 and 55, respectively, allow child parties to 
have private legal representation or be considered for state-funded representation. 
97 On the importance of children being able to instigate care cases themselves see P Day 'Should Children Be 
Able to Divorce their Parents?' (2000) 11 Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 652 at 653. 
98 J Sloth-Nielsen 'Children's Rights and the South African Courts: an Overview since Ratification of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child' (2002) 10 International Journal of Children's Rights 137 at 149-50 
argued that there is generally a need for mechanisms to enable South African children to bring court actions 
on their own behalf. 
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The analysis earlier in this chapter indicates that a fundamentally correct approach 
has been taken in grounding the 2005 Act generally on child participation principles. In 
regard specifically to proceedings in the children's courts its attention to the threshold 
requirements of party status and access to court is also appropriate.   
 
On a physical presence at children's court hearings s 56(b) of the 2005 Act creates a 
basic right for 'the child involved in the matter before the court' to attend. As regards 
mandatory attendance s 57(1) states that children's court clerks may 'request' any party to 
attend -and this would obviously include the child.  Whilst the word 'request' suggests a 
right to refuse, s 57 is entitled '[c]ompulsory attendance of persons involved in 
proceedings'.  The tension in meaning thus created is to some extent clarified by s 57(2).  
This states that '[t]he person in whose physical control the child is must ensure that the 
child attends those proceedings except if the clerk of the children's court or the court 
directs otherwise'. It would thus appear that the Act creates both a right and duty of 
attendance for child-parties.    
 
Although the 2005 Act appears to provide magistrates with a right to compel 
children's attendance it does not indicate how they should implement this.  For example, 
they are not informed whether they must normally at least have sight of the child. Here the 
2005 Act compares unfavourably with the 1983 Act.99 As has been argued, a standard 
attendance requirement is essential.   
 
Active participation as opposed to mere attendance by child-parties is covered in ss 
58, 60 and 61 of the 2005 Act. Some boundaries for voluntary participation are set out in 
these provisions.  The former accords a child 'the right to adduce evidence… and, with the 
permission of the presiding officer of the children’s court, to question or cross-examine a 
witness or to address the court in argument'. This needs to be read with s 60(1)(c).  The 
latter empowers the presiding officer to allow any person 'to be questioned or cross-
                                                 
99 Section 13 of the latter is entitled 'Bringing Children before Children's Court'.  It provides that in cases of 
emergency removals or referrals from other courts the child must be seen (s 13(1)).  In other care cases the 
children's court assistant must decide whether the child ought to be seen (s 13(2)). For further discussion see 
HM Bosman-Swanepoel & PJ Wessels A Practical Approach to the Child Care Act (1995) 35. 
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examined' by the child 'to the extent necessary to resolve any factual dispute which is 
directly relevant'.   
 
By way of commentary on these provisions, the basic right in s 58 to provide 
evidence is clearly a sine qua non for meaningful child involvement. Appropriately, this is 
subject only to the threshold requirements in s 10.  As will be remembered these merely 
compel sufficient maturity and an appropriate method for participation. However, the s 58 
requirement for children to seek permission from adjudicators before addressing them 'in 
argument' appears unduly restrictive and adversarial.  Subject to some reservations noted in 
the next paragraph below, the need to obtain similar permission before a child may 
question other participants does appear to be appropriate because it could be used to 
protect children from stressful verbal confrontations. 
 
Section 61 of the Act is entitled '[p]articipation of children'. It begins as follows: 
'61. (1) The presiding officer in a matter before a children's court must- 
(a) allow a child involved in the matter to express a view and preference in the matter if the court 
finds that the child, given the child's age, maturity and stage of development and any special needs 
that the child may have, is able to participate in the proceedings and the child chooses to do so; 
(b) record the reasons if the court finds that the child is unable to participate in the proceedings or is 
unwilling to express a view or preference in the matter;…' 
 
It is noteworthy that a different form of children's voluntary evidence -that of expressing a 
view and preference- is designated here.  Given the dangers of allowing children to make 
inappropriate choices as referred to above the restrictive criteria in s 61(1)(a) based on 
maturity and special needs are entirely appropriate.  What is inappropriate, however, is that 
they are to be applied merely to discern whether the child generally 'is able to participate in 
the proceedings'.  They should have been made more specifically applicable to whether the 
child is sufficiently mature and psychologically resilient to express preferences about 
caregivers or care -and it should further have been made clear that the expression of such 
preferences should be facilitated in only the most exceptional cases. Another comment 
about the maturity and special needs criteria in s 61(1)(a) is that they should also have been 
made applicable to decisions by magistrates about a child's right to question other 
witnesses as referred to in the previous paragraph.   
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In relation to mandatory as opposed to voluntary participation by child-parties a 
foundational provision is s 60(1) of the Act.  This opens with an affirmation that presiding 
officers control proceedings. It further provides them with a range of capabilities in this 
regard.  These include calling 'any person' -which must presumably include the child- and 
subjecting him or her to 'questioning or cross-examination'.100 Presiding officers may also 
require persons so called to be subjected to questioning or cross-examination by other 
participants or their legal representatives 'to the extent necessary to resolve any factual 
dispute which is directly relevant'.101  Whilst s 60(1) thus provides very wide powers for 
magistrates to compel children to submit to even intensively adversarial forms of 
participation, it needs to be read with other provisions in the Act. 
 
In relation to controls upon the power of adjudicators to compel children to 
participate inappropriately a question which arises is whether the maturity and special 
needs limitations in s 61(1)(a) as discussed above in relation to voluntary participation can 
be interpreted as also curbing the broad compulsion powers of presiding officers.  Against 
this view is the fact that the limitations do seem to be worded as applicable only where a 
child is the instigator of participation -she is being 'allowed' rather than called upon by the 
presiding officer.  Also, as noted above s 61(1)(a) refers to a child expressing 'a view or 
preference' rather than being 'questioned or cross-examined' as contemplated in s 60(1).  It 
would therefore seem that unfortunately a child's immaturity or special needs as referred to 
in s 61(1)(a) have not been expressly set as limiting the extremely wide compulsion 
powers available to magistrates in terms of s 60(1). 
 
There are, however, other limitations in the 2005 Act which are clearly intended to 
protect children in both situations of voluntary and court instigated participation.  For 
example, s 60(2) states '[i]f a child is present at the proceedings, the court may order any 
person present in the room where the proceedings take place to leave the room if such 
order would be in the best interests of that child'.  An obverse provision, s 61(3), states that 
a children's court: 
                                                 
100 Section 60(1)(b).  
101 Section 60(1)(c). As has been noted above this provision is also relevant when children seek to participate 
voluntarily. 
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'(a) may, at the outset or at any time during the proceedings, order that the matter, or any issue in the 
matter, be disposed of separately and in the absence of the child, if it is in the best interests of the 
child; and 
(b) must record the reasons for any order in terms of paragraph (a).'102 
 
Under s 48(1)(e) it is further indicated that the reasons for removing any person must be 
recorded on the court roll prior to the removal actually taking place. That there is indeed a 
need for a removal power has been shown in the discussion of an ideal model, above.  That 
it is particularly appropriate for South Africa appears from findings which indicate that 
commissioners sometimes keep children present whilst disturbing evidence is presented.103    
However, the best interest criterion is rather broad as a ground and Masson and Oakley 
have rightly suggested that more specific guidelines such as the maturity of the child and 
whether testimony will be lengthy can be utilized.104 
 
Section 58 of the 2005 Act usefully accords considerable protective powers to 
presiding magistrates by enabling them to decide whether to allow any participant to 
question a particular witness.  Unfortunately, however, it does not give them the same 
power where a participant wishes to question a party.  Nevertheless s 61(1)(c) provides 
some protection by compelling presiding officers to 'intervene in the questioning or cross-
examination of the child if the court finds that this would be in the best interests of the 
child'. 
 On sheltered methods, s 61(2) allows for a child who is a party or witness to 'be 
questioned through an intermediary as provided for in section 170A of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, 1977 (Act No 51 of 1977) if the court finds that this would be in the best 
interests of the child'.  The ground of 'undue mental stress or suffering' is included in 
                                                 
102  This wording is very similar to clause 84(3)(a) of the South African law commission's 2002 Draft 
Children's Bill. In this it was recommended that a court 'may, at the outset or it any time during the 
proceedings, order that the matter, or any issue in the matter, be disposed of separately and in the absence of 
the child, if it is in the best interest of the child'.  In clause 84(3)(b) of the Bill it was further recommended 
that the court 'must record the reasons for any order' directing a removal. Under s 19(2)(b) of the Children 
and Young Persons Act 56/1989 <http//www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic> as currently in force in Victoria, 
Australia, a court can of its own accord or 'on the application of a party or of any other person who has a 
direct interest… order that only persons or classes of persons specified by it may be present during the whole 
or any part of a proceeding'.  It is further provided usefully in s 19(3) that either a party or any other 
interested person has standing to support or oppose such an application.  Similar wording should be included 
in our law.  
103 Matthias (1997) op cit note 91 at 49.  Govender (2005) supra note 91 described the practice as widespread 
in rural children's court jurisdictions.   
104 Masson & Oakley (1999) op cit note 18 at 116. 
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s170A as the requirement for its use on behalf of child witnesses in criminal cases.105  This 
seems unduly restrictive for care cases.  An accommodating approach in which an 
intermediary could be considered in any matter where this would help the child participate 
effectively would have been more appropriate.106  In criminal cases it is prosecutors who 
must make an application for the child to interact with an intermediary (trained to convert 
communications into child-appropriate language) at a location viewable from the 
courtroom.107   However, it is to be hoped that s 61(1)(c) will be interpreted as enabling 
magistrates to require intermediaries mero motu. It is most unfortunate that the 2005 Act 
does not additionally make specific reference to other sheltered participation methods. 
 
It may be concluded that a fundamentally correct approach has been taken in 
establishing a child participatory model as a basis for the Act.  The concept of providing 
some detailed guidance in relation to how that participation should occur is also sound108 
but there are some weaknesses in its enunciation. As has been shown these include failures 
to indicate that magistrates should only in exceptional cases allow children to make critical 
choices or compel them to participate.  The wording on access to sheltered methods is too 
limited. These shortcomings do not appear to be fatal deficiencies, however, since they 
could easily be corrected by the publication of additional regulations.  In this regard, 
s52(2) of the Act expressly allows for the publication of rules governing appropriate 
questioning techniques for children.  
 
Just as with the ADR requirements,109 so too with the child participation provisions 
in the 2005 Act presiding magistrates will need to acquire important new skills.  They will 
have to be able to make correct decisions, sometimes during the course of proceedings, 
about whether to allow, order, alter or terminate a child’s involvement at court.  They will 
                                                 
105 For a discussion of its applicability in such cases see J Le Roux & J Engelbrecht 'The Sexually Abused 
Child as a Witness' in Davel (2000) op cit note 28, 343 at 347-50.   
106 In s 10(1)(c)  of the New South Wales Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 supra 
note 13, for example, a there is a general duty to provide 'any assistance that is necessary for the child or 
young person' to participate.  
107 See further Le Roux & J Engelbrecht (2000) op cit note 105 at 348. 
108 Parkinson (2001) op cit note 7 at 260 mentioned that experience in Australia shows that obligations to 
ensure child participation in care cases need to be legislatively 'spelt out in great detail'. 
109 See part 3.7, above. 
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need to become knowledgeable about a variety of participation methods for children 
including not only sheltered methods but also the distinctions between recounting factual 
evidence, conveying feelings and 'expressing a view or preference'. 
 
4.3  Party-Participation by Persons Who Are Not the Subject of Proceedings 
 
In the discussion which follows party-status and participatory rights for persons 
other than the child who is the subject of care proceedings are considered.  In part 4.3.1 the 
introduction of party status for investigative welfare agencies in children's court cases in 
terms of s 1 of the 2005 Act is critically evaluated. Arguments for and against this 
significant change are weighed up.  It is suggested that on balance it represents an 
important advance in the development of our care law. 
 
Just as in the case of children, so too with other private persons, children's court 
magistrates need to judge capabilities and interact appropriately if effective participation is 
to be achieved.110 In part 4.3.2 the question of appropriate criteria for allocating party 
status to private individuals is considered. It is contended that an effective child 
participatory model entails a selective approach to applications by adults for private party 
status.  It is further proposed that achieving a balance between hearing the voices of 
caregivers who have substantial nurturing links and avoiding intimidation which may 
result from the presence of too many persons is feasible.  It is argued that this can be 
facilitated with restrictive grounds for full party status combined with an alternative status 
which permits less participation.  It is shown that the 2005 Act achieves the compromise 
required, but unfortunately confuses between full parties and mere participants because of 
inappropriate wording. 
  
 
 
                                                 
110 In a review of research Brophy (2006) op cit note 7 at 62-63 noted English findings that a critical factor 
for encouraging effective parental participation was presiding officers 'showing some patience, sympathy, 
respect and warmth and addressing parents directly'.  Parents felt discouraged from participating where 
adjudicators did not welcome and acknowledge them in court or showed little understanding of their cultural 
backgrounds.  
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4.3.1 Party Status for the Investigative Agency 
 
In some developed systems investigative social workers are parties in care 
proceedings, but only on behalf of the state in a representative capacity.111  This has not 
been the approach in South Africa.  In 1970 under the Children's Act 33/1960 De Vos 
Hugo JP held in the high court decision of Ex parte Kommissaris van Kindersorg: In re 
Steyn Kinders that probation officers could not acquire party status in care proceedings 
heard by children's courts.112 In line with this when social workers took over the care 
functions of probation officers they were not provided with party status. Under the 1983 
Act this position continues.  
 
It could be argued that it is anomalous that welfare have been denied party status 
given the crucial role they play. They conduct pre-hearing investigations into the domestic 
circumstances of all children who require alternative care and then prepare evidence. A 
social worker must present a written investigative report to the children's court in every 
case.113 She must subsequently be available to give viva voce evidence if the contents of 
the report are challenged or the court requires clarification.114  The fact that she may 
merely be questioned at proceedings as an expert witness and has no right in turn to 
question other participants or address the court are serious limitations. 
 
 
                                                 
111 For example, under s 39(1)(b) of the Child, Family and Community Service Act (RSBC 1996) of British 
Columbia, Canada, and s 98(1)(b)-(c) of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 of 
New South Wales, Australia, party status is allocated to the ministry of welfare. Investigative social workers 
appear merely as representatives. 
112 1970 (2) SA 27 (NC) at 33B-D. He interpreted unclear wording in reg 8(2) published in terms of the 1960 
Act. At 33A ibid he stated 'Volgens reg 8(2) kan enigiemand wat die voorsittende Komissaris by 'n 
ondersoek oortuig dat hy 'n wesenlike belang, direk of indirek, by die verrigtinge van die ondersoek het  van 
die Kommissaris verlof kry om tussenbei te tree en so iemand word dan beskou as 'n party by die 
verrigtinge…'. 
113 In terms of s 14(2) of the 1983 Act '[t]he commissioner presiding over a children's court holding such 
inquiry shall during that inquiry request any social worker to furnish a report on the circumstances of the 
child concerned and his or her parent or guardian or the person having custody of the child' [emphasis 
added].  It can be seen from this wording that the commissioner has no choice and must receive a report in 
order to complete a care inquiry. Under ss 62, 63 and 155(2) & (9) of the 2005 Act these responsibilities will 
continue. 
114 Regulation 5(3) under the 1983 Act.  In s 63(3)(b) of the 2005 Act the liability to defend the report has 
been continued. 
 157
In a 2001 report it was proposed somewhat ambiguously by the department of 
social development that '[i]nvestigating social workers could be treated as witnesses or 
could become a party to the matter.  It depends on the case and the functions of the social 
worker'.115  Rather than allowing an election, in s 1 of the 2005 Act a simpler solution was 
adopted.  In a significant change to our law automatic and mandatory party status has been 
accorded to 'the department or the designated child protection organisation managing the 
case of the child'.116 The department here referred to is the department of social 
development.  This either utilises its own social workers or delegates care cases to non-
governmental child protection agencies.117 Once s 1 comes into force both government and 
delegated social workers will appear as parties.  
  
An important question is whether the new status is appropriate.  In some respects 
the department of social development and nongovernmental agencies may find that it is 
disadvantageous. As parties they may incur forms of liability -for example, for the 
payment of damages or legal costs- that did not apply when they were merely expert 
witnesses.118 It could also be asserted that party status entails that the relationship of 
investigative social workers with family members and other professionals will change in 
ways that are negative.119  Because there is more scope for welfare incurring legal liability 
and also a need to ensure that they are a successful party at court they may become reticent 
about providing information to other participants before and during proceedings.  
 
 It can certainly be predicted that once it is clear that a matter will go to court an 
investigative agency is likely to be concerned about making statements that may prejudice 
their case.  This could result in investigative social workers becoming extremely inhibited 
in their interactions with other parties and anyone who might potentially appear in court as 
                                                 
115 Department of Social Development Comment on Critical Issues to Enable the Law Commission to 
Finalise its Investigation Into the Review of the Child Care Act (2002) 3. 
116 See the definition of 'party' at (e). 
117 See the definition of 'Department' in s 1 of the 2005 Act. 
118 In relation to damages, in s 45(1)(f) of the 2005 Act children's courts receive a new power to adjudicate 
any claim arising from abuse or neglect of a child other than a criminal charge.  With costs, in s 48(1)(d) of 
the 2005 Act it is expressly stated that children's courts may make costs orders.  For a discussion of these 
provisions see part 8.4.4, below 
119 On the danger of negative role changes affecting social work services see also part 3.4.2, above. 
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an opposing witness or opposing legal representative.  This in turn could reduce chances 
for extracurial resolution of issues and thus run counter to the effort to encourage ADR 
which (as seen in the previous chapter) is an important feature of the 2005 Act. 
 
It could be argued that a further negative consequence of party status for welfare is 
that dependence on lawyers (who would now be more frequently needed both to advise 
and act in children's courts as their representatives) is likely to increase. This raises two 
concerns. For South African investigative agencies -and particularly nongovernmental 
ones which tend to be cash-strapped-  this could result in precious financial resources 
being drawn off to pay the bills of law firms.  Also, since lawyers are trained to work in an 
adversarial manner their inclusion as representatives could by association generate a less 
positive image of social workers. Resulting alienation of caregivers might reduce their 
willingness to cooperate in family reunification work during the post-court phase.120 
 
Closer interaction with their own lawyers may encourage agencies to work in a 
more legalistic manner. Greater formality and an emphasis on technically correct 
procedures may subvert immediate and unconstrained help for families.  And as has been 
noted in chapter 1 above, factors which encourage a predominantly legalistic approach in 
work with families with care problems have been viewed as problematic in some 
systems.121 It could also be suggested that it is something of a fiction to characterise 
welfare as merely one of the parties.  In practice their reports tend to carry considerable 
weight; and this has been increasingly recognised in our legislation to an extent which 
could be seen as giving them an unfair advantage if they are also to receive party 
capabilities.122   
 
As against the negative arguments, some important counterarguments in favour of 
the new status can be put forward. It has already been suggested that the extensive 
                                                 
120 See ibid. 
121 See part 1.3.1. 
122 Under reg 5(1) of the 1983 Act 'the mere submission' of the investigative agency’s report constitutes 
'prima facie proof of the facts stated in that report'.  Following a recommendation in clause 86(2) of the South 
African law commission's 2002 Draft Children's Bill, in s 63(1) of the 2005 Act submission constitutes 
'evidence' which is no longer merely prima facie.  It should be noted, however, that the same is true of reports 
submitted by other experts. 
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responsibilities of investigative agencies require that they should have greater powers. In 
relation specifically to legal representation Loffell, having had many years of experience in 
children's court work as a social worker in South Africa, has argued that the right to have a 
lawyer would be a positive rather than negative consequence.123  She pointed out that 
social workers are sometimes prevented from presenting evidence effectively because of 
high levels of intimidation by opposing lawyers. This is especially likely where lawyers 
represent parents who wish to retain custody of children at any cost.124  She considers that 
the solution is for the social worker to have her own lawyer to shield her against such 
intimidation and assist her in conveying evidence. 125  
 
As Loffell has also suggested a further significant advantage which flows from 
party status is that if an incorrect decision is reached by a children's court the investigative 
agency can take the matter to higher courts on appeal or review. She cited personal 
experience under the present dispensation of being powerless to challenge occasional 
children's court rulings which resulted in children being left with dangerously-abusive 
caregivers.126  It is quite true that if welfare is not permitted to challenge such decisions 
there may be no one else with the motivation and resources to do so.   
 
A practical problem is that taking a matter on appeal or review raises the stakes 
considerably in terms of legal costs. One solution would be to create procedures for state 
representational entities such as the legal aid board or family advocate to serve as lawyers 
for investigative agencies at state expense.  This could be done with regulations published 
in terms of the 2005 Act.  A significant side benefit might be more opportunities for higher 
courts to assist in the development of South African care law.  As has been noted the 
inability of nearly all current parties to afford appeals or reviews has resulted in very few 
reported cases and a consequent stultification in this field in recent decades.127 
 
                                                 
123 Dr J Loffell (social worker, Johannesburg Child and Family Welfare Society) personal communication 12 
Aug 2001. 
124 Ibid. On intimidation and other inappropriate behavior by lawyers see also parts 3.4.2, above & 5.2, 
below. 
125 Loffell ibid. 
126 Ibid. 
127 See parts 1.2 & 2.3, above. 
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It may be concluded that the advantages of party status for welfare are so important 
that they outweigh the disadvantages.  In view of the importance of their functions it is 
surely essential that investigative social workers no longer be confined to a role in which 
they can merely be questioned at hearings. Also, a right to take matters to higher courts 
will not only improve the quality of services which agencies can provide but may also 
improve the services of children's courts as they recognise that  monitoring of their 
decisions by higher forums is a more likely possibility. The problem of legal fees can to 
some extent be addressed as has been suggested in the previous paragraph.  The greater 
exposure of nongovernmental agencies and the department of social development to legal 
liability will serve usefully as an ongoing pressure to improve standards of care services.  
In relation to nongovernmental agencies, s 1 of the 2005 Act should, however, be amended 
to enable party functions to be exercised in a purely representative capacity on behalf of 
the state.128  The state would then incur liability and could use its agency-licensing powers 
to indirectly maintain standards. 
 
It must be conceded that the likelihood of inhibited communication and a more 
legalistic approach by agencies is a matter for concern.  This could best be countered by 
developing regulations covering appropriate communication between agencies and 
families. In these it should be indicated that pending or current court proceedings cannot be 
used as a reason to reduce normal levels of care services to and communication with client 
families. Overall, the decision to allocate mandatory party status in the 2005 Act was a 
fundamentally correct one which will conduce to better development of our law and 
provide direct advantages to children and families. 
 
 
 
4.3.2  Party Status for Private Individuals 
 
The question of which private individuals besides the child should receive party 
status in care proceedings is clearly an important one. In part 4.3.2.1 below the preliminary 
                                                 
128 See note 111, above. 
 161
aspect of whether applications for such status should be facilitated regardless of numbers 
or else restricted is considered.  It is concluded that children's courts in South Africa 
should be supplied with criteria that will enable them to control numbers. In light of this it 
is further explored in part 4.3.2.2 what these should be.  Finally, in part 4.3.2.3 the concept 
of an alternative to private party status is examined with particular reference to the 2005 
Act.  It is suggested that this concept is fundamentally in harmony with a child 
participatory model, but that the wording of the Act requires refinement. 
 
4.3.2.1 Accommodating and Restrictive Approaches 
 
In an effective system at least some legislative direction is required on criteria for 
eligibility as a private party. If care- or kinship-related links to the child were applied as 
such criteria possible candidates for party status might include the following: 
 
• Biological parents, with possible extensions to other actual or potential caregivers 
closely related to the child who is the subject of care proceedings. 
• Distant relatives, with a possible limitation to those who are current or potential 
caregivers. 
• Current or previous de facto caregivers with service as substitute parents, although they 
are unrelated to the child biologically. 
• Potential future caregivers who are unrelated -such as prospective foster or adoptive 
parents. 
 
It can be seen that even where care- or kinship-related links are required the pool of 
persons who might merit consideration remains potentially large.  
 
 
A fundamental distinction is between what has been called in England the 'open-
door'129 or else what might perhaps be termed the 'controlled gate-keeping' approaches.  
Under the former, in care proceedings courts will generally accommodate persons in the 
                                                 
129 See Hunt, Macleod & Thomas (1999) op cit note 7 at 167. 
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categories listed above130 and there may even be no limit on who else may apply.131 In 
contrast, where courts are expected to act as gatekeepers their own discretion or legislative 
criteria are restrictively applied to ensure that the number of parties is kept to a 
minimum.132  South African commissioner Rothman, having had personal experience of 
both large and small numbers of parties, has expressed a view that the latter is generally 
preferable.133  
 
Rothman bases his support for a gatekeeping approach on two arguments.  Firstly, 
everyone with a right to party-status must be given reasonable notice of proceedings. 
Where there are many such persons long delays occur while the notices are served. 
Furthermore, children's court decisions become vulnerable to being unseated by 
subsequent reviews. The larger the number of notices required, the easier it will be to raise 
a technical argument that there is not sufficient proof on record that they were all properly 
served.  
 
 Rothman’s second argument is that it will not be to the advantage of the child 
concerned to crowd children's court hearings with numerous private parties who may be 
vociferously in opposition to each other.  This may be intimidating if she is present and 
will mean that many persons will be able to cross-examine her if she chooses or is required 
to give evidence.134  Furthermore, anyone who has party status will be entitled to bring a 
                                                 
130 Ibid. In England, courts even have a discretion to grant a request for party status without a hearing: see C 
Lyon Child Abuse (2003) 293 para 7.28.  Under the Delaware Code Annotated title 13, § 1104 a wide range 
of persons have locus standi to bring termination of parental rights cases to court.  These include parents, a 
presumed father, any blood relative of the child, the department of welfare or any licensed agency. 
131 In England under the Family Proceedings Courts (Children Act 1989) Rules 1991 (SI 1991/1395) r 7(2) 
any person can file a request to be joined as a party or to have another person joined.   
132 For example, under s 98(1) of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 of New 
South Wales, automatic party status is restricted to the child, other private persons with legally allocated 
parental responsibilites, and investigative agency personnel as 'agents' of the state. Even more restrictive is 
s39(1) of the Child, Family and Community Service Act (RSBC 1996) of British Columbia, Canada. Under 
this automatic party status is limited to parents of the child, the investigative agency (in a representative 
capacity on behalf of the state) and certain persons who have been granted interim custody of the child by a 
court.  However, in each of these three cases automatic party status is lost upon failure to appear 'at the 
commencement of the protection hearing'. 
133 Rothman (2002) supra note 78. 
134 Rothman’s view that large numbers of contesting private parties produce a difficult children's court 
environment has been supported by other experienced commissioners: see Zaal (1997) op cit note 80 at 341. 
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lawyer. And large numbers of lawyers with different agendas tend to produce a more 
formal and adversarial children's court environment.135  
 
In contrast to the approach supported by Rothman, in England under the 1989 
Children Act utilisation of the 'open door' approach to persons who wish to be private 
parties in care proceedings has been described by some commentators as successful in 
encouraging potential alternative caregivers to come forward and offer  placements for 
children.136 An accommodating approach has also been favoured by the South African law 
commission.137 However, a sample of care cases drawn by English researchers Hunt, 
Macleod and Thomas in 1999 uncovered unwieldy matters where there were as many as 
nine and even fifteen different parties.138  Since (as has been shown above) in England the 
participation of children at court is rare, intimidation of them by large numbers of adult 
parties is hardly an issue.  From a South African perspective, however, a very different 
model which emphasises facilitation of child-participation has been proposed above. 
Accordingly, it is recommended that in South Africa there should be a court capacity to 
control the number of parties rather than an open door approach.139 
 
                                                 
135 Rothman 2002 supra note 78.  On the influence of lawyers see also part 5.2, below. 
136  Hunt, Macleod & Thomas (1999) op cit note 7 at 167 found that an open-door policy led to nonparent 
adults becoming involved in 45% of cases. They concluded '[p]ractitioner reports that this has encouraged 
wider participation are confirmed by our sample cases'. 
137 In 2001 the commission was concerned that, generally in matters involving children, accessibility to the 
courts is 'a major failing at the moment': see Review of the Child Care of Act op cit note 93 at vol 5, 1185.  It 
therefore recommended that legislation replacing the 1983 Act should contain provisions for discouraging 
courts from 'adopting a technically-restrictive procedural approach in order to deny someone who has a 
substantial interest in the proceedings from presenting his or her case and, where appropriate, from being 
regarded as a party' -ibid, at 1184. In clause 81(e) of the commission’s Draft Children's Bill of 2002 it 
recommended broadly that automatic party-status be granted to any 'person whose rights may be affected by 
an order that may be made by the court in those proceedings'. 
138 Hunt, Macleod & Thomas (1999) op cit note 7 at 167-68.  
139 In the New South Wales case In the Matter of 'Pamela' as reported in Children's Law News March 2003 
<http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/children's_court/II_cc.nsf> 1 the issue of a court's discretion to add 
a fifth party where are there were already four arose. Schurr CM of the Campbelltown children's court found 
it appropriate to hear argument against such addition from the prior parties. It was contended (at 6 ibid) on 
behalf of the department of community services that 'a multiplicity of parties would impede the court in its 
duty to deal with cases with informality and expedition'. Schurr CM (at 9, ibid) conceded:   'It is likely, with 
so many parties, that elements of adversarial approaches, legal technicalities and lack of expedition will 
threaten the timely disposition of the case'. After observing 92 children's court cases in Melbourne, Australia, 
Sheehan (2003) op cit note 7 at 32 noted that the presence of large numbers of persons adversely affected 
children's capacity to participate. Children tended to feel confused and alienated. 
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If control over the number of private parties is appropriate the question which 
arises is how this should be achieved.  Holding special hearings to decide whether to grant 
party status to all private individuals who seek this could be time-consuming.  A 
compromise approach which has much to recommend it, therefore, distinguishes between 
persons who have automatic party status and those who must obtain court permission.140  
The question of what criteria should be employed to distinguish between the two groups is 
pursued below. 
 
4.3.2.2 Criteria for Eligibility  
 
Section 1 of the 2005 Act includes a definition as follows: 
' "party", in relation to a matter before a children's court, means- 
(a) a child involved in the matter; 
(b) a parent; 
(c) a person who has parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the child; 
(d) a prospective adoptive or foster parent of the child; 
(e) the Department or the designated child protection organisation managing the case of the child; or 
(f) any other person admitted or recognised by the court as a party;'. [Emphasis in the original.] 
 
 Similarly to the list of possible private parties in part 4.3.2.1 above this provision utilizes 
biological parenthood, prior legally-allocated parental responsibilities and a willingness to 
adopt or foster as criteria for automatic private-party status.  But additionally under s 1(f) a 
broad and entirely unguided discretion to apply either open door or gatekeeping 
approaches in respect of any other private party applicants is accorded. 
 
 In relation to the automatic status criterion in s 1(b) mere biological parenthood is 
questionable.141  A much more restrictive approach providing automatic party-participation 
                                                 
140 Under s 98(3) of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 of New South Wales, 
besides persons who have automatic party status, 'any other person who, in the opinion of the Children's 
Court, has a genuine concern for the safety, welfare and well-being of the child or young person may, by 
leave of the Children's Court' obtain exactly the same rights as a private person who has automatic party 
status by virtue of exercising legally allocated parental responsibilities. 
141 In interpretations of the rights to family life and nondiscrimination in arts 8 and 14, respectively, of the 
ECHR the European court of human rights has tended to protect the interest of all parents to participate 
effectively in judicial processes involving their children: see Moylan (2004) op cit note 11 at 180. However, 
it also held in B v UK ECRH [2000] 1 FLR 1 (14 Sep 1999) that there are objective and reasonable 
justifications for treating married and unmarried fathers and caring and uncaring parents differently. On the 
approach of the court see further G Douglas 'Case Reports: Human Rights' 2000 (30) Family Law 88 at 88-
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rights only to parents with custody or guardianship over legitimate children became 
established in our law many years ago under the Children's Act 33/1960.142  This Act did 
not, however, extend automatic party-status to either of the parents of extramarital 
children.143 Under the 1983 Act until the late 1990s the practice was to grant automatic 
party status only to custodian parents of such children.144 This favoured mothers because 
they and not fathers automatically received custody in terms of our common law.145 
Unmarried fathers were therefore required to approach children's courts and make out a 
case for receiving party status.146  
  
The practice of denying automatic party status to non-custodian fathers of 
extramarital children ended in the late 1990s. In 1997 the constitutional court decided 
Fraser v Children's Court, Pretoria North and Others.147 In this matter an unmarried 
father successfully asserted his right to be heard in children's court proceedings prior to the 
adoption of his child. It was held that s 18(4)(d) of the 1983 Act was inconsistent with the 
interim constitution148 to the extent that it denied an unmarried father a right to consent to 
the adoption of his child 'in all circumstances'.149  
 
At the time Fraser was heard the wording of s 18(4)(d) prevented all unmarried 
fathers from resisting adoption of their children by other persons. Just as with care cases, 
they were not even entitled to notice of pending adoption proceedings. The constitutional 
                                                                                                                                                    
89; and S Bellamy QC 'Fathers: Who They Are -Their Parental Responsibility and Rights in Public Law 
Proceedings' (2004) <http://www.nagalro.com/docks/Stephen%20 Bellamy> at 6. 
142 In Snyder en Andere v Steenkamp en Andere 1974 (4) SA 82(N) at 87H-88B it was held that that even a 
divorced, non-custodian guardian who had taken little interest in his child had the right to have his reasons 
for not testifying recorded like any other person with automatic party-status: see also ibid at 83E-G. G Van 
Wyk ‘Kinderhofondersoeke: Partye tot die Ondersoek’ (1988) 23 Die Magistraat/The Magistrate 168 
supported the view that a noncustodial divorced parent should have automatic party-status.  See also 
Weepner v Warren en Van Niekerk 1948 (1) SA 898 (C). 
143 It referred at s 1 to 'parents' as including a father or mother of a child born out of or legitimated by a 
lawful marriage.  For an interpretation of this section, see the Snyder case ibid at 88A. 
144 See Bosman-Swanepoel & Wessels (1995) op cit note 99 at 24. This was encouraged by wording in 
s13(5)(a) which created a right to notice of care proceedings only for custodian parents. 
145 See further B Van Heerden 'How the Parental Power Is Acquired and Lost' in Van Heerden (1999) op cit 
note 2, 313, at 405 (hereafter referred to as Van Heerden (1999A)); and T Davel 'The Status of Children in 
South African Law' in  Davel (2000) op cit note 28, 1 at 35. 
146 See Bosman-Swanepoel & Wessels (1995) op cit note 99 at 24. 
147 1997 (2) BCLR 153 (CC). 
148 As contained in Act 200/1993. 
149  Op cit note 147 at 173J-174A. 
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court held in Fraser that s 18(4)(d) was unconstitutional because it discriminated unfairly 
against unmarried fathers on the basis of their gender and marital status.150 The court gave 
parliament two years to amend the 1983 Act.  This was done with the Adoption Matters 
Amendment Act 56 of 1998 which altered s 18(4)(d) so as to require the consent of 
unmarried fathers to adoptions in certain situations. 
 
Not only the 1983 Act but also its regulations were amended as part of the post-
Fraser response in 1998.  A new reg 4(1) conferred 'the same rights and powers as a party 
to a civil action in a magistrate’s court in respect of examining witnesses, and adducing 
evidence and addressing the court' on the 'parent or parents' of any child subject to a 
children's court care inquiry.151  A new reg 9(3) compelled commissioners to ensure that 
notice of any pending inquiry was sent to 'a parent or guardian of a child or to the person in 
whose custody the child is'.152 These regulations have been interpreted as requiring that all 
parents and not merely custodian parents have a right to party status in care cases.153 As 
noted above the requirement that biological parents must receive automatic party status is 
set to continue when s 1 of the 2005 Act is implemented.154 
  
It may be suggested that it is not in fact appropriate for all non-custodian parents of 
extramarital children to receive automatic party status.155 For some parents party status is 
only of importance for opportunities it provides to be obstructive by delaying 
                                                 
150 Mohammed DP J, expressing the unanimous judgement of the constitutional court, found that s18(4)(d) of 
the 1983 Act was contrary to the right not to be unfairly discriminated against in s 8(2) of the interim 
constitution as contained in Act 200/1993.  See the judgment ibid at 162 D-E. 
151 1986 Regulations of the 1983 Act as amended by Government Notice R416, Government Gazette 18770 
of 31 March 1998. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Van Heerden (1999) op cit note 4 at 617 noted that the new wording was interpreted as creating not 
merely a right but also a duty for parents to attend.  Commissioner Booysen (2006) supra note 79 stated that 
the regulations brought about a new procedure. In terms of this commissioners can only commence care 
proceedings without an unmarried father if it is confirmed on affidavit that his identity or present 
whereabouts remain unknown.  And this must be despite reasonable search efforts by welfare. 
154 See, however, the limited exceptions referred to in note 164, below. 
155 In the English case of Re X [1996] FLR 186 it was decided that notice about pending care proceedings 
need not be served on a putative father who had not exercised any parental responsibility. However, in Re AB 
(Care Proceedings: Service on Husband Ignorant of Child's Existence) [2004] 1 FLR 527 a mother's 
application to prevent the father receiving notice failed.  The court held that all categories of fathers were 
entitled to notice except in extreme circumstances. On English law see further note 159, below.  
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proceedings156 or to continue abusive contact with the child or other parent.157 Rothman 
has expressed the view that the difficulties encountered in post-1998 children's court 
practice reveal a need for reinstituting the previous onus on unmarried fathers to apply for 
permission to be joined as parties rather than granting them automatic status.158   
 
A modification of Rothman's proposal would be to distinguish between categories 
of fathers of extramarital children. This is not without precedent elsewhere.159  In terms of 
our own post-Fraser law, under s 19A(2)160 of the 1983 Act in order to have a right to 
withhold consent to the adoption of his child an extramarital father must have 
acknowledged his paternity in writing and made his identity and whereabouts known.161 
And even where he has done so he loses this right under certain circumstances specified in 
s 19 of the Act. These include his having abused the mother or child, or failed to discharge 
parental duties without good cause.162     
 
                                                 
156 Rothman (2002) supra note 78; Booysen (2006) supra note 79. Despite the open door approach in 
England, in Re P (Care Proceedings: Father's Application to be Joined as  Party) [2001] 1 FLR 781 Connell 
J upheld a lower court's rejection of party status for a father who had on several occasions delayed care 
proceedings.  Generally, however, English courts have been reluctant to deny party status to unmarried, 
noncustodial fathers purely on the ground that it would delay completion of cases: see Lyon (2003) op cit 
note 121 at 294-95 para 7.32. 
157 Instructive in this regard is the Australian case In the Matter of 'Trent' (Children's Court of New South 
Wales at St James, Case 36/2004, 30 Jan 2004) reported in Children's Law News March 2004 
<http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/children'scourt/IIcc.nsf> at 23. Mulroney CM (at 26 ibid) found it 
regrettable that, in terms of the mandatory party entitlement in s 64 of the Children and Young Persons (Care 
and Protection) Act 1998, he was compelled to allow the presence of a father who had an extensive history of 
criminal violence. He was satisfied on the evidence that the father’s presence would jeopardise the safety of 
the mother and possibly also the child.  But he was forced to dismiss an application to prevent attendance by 
the father. In his judgment, ibid, he noted that 'circumstances where a parent has no genuine interest in the 
welfare of the child and where that parent may take advantage of the opportunity to attend court to do 
something that would harm the best interests of the child' were not unusual in care cases. He compared the 
New South Wales provision unfavourably with the discretion available to courts in England. Sheehan (2003) 
op cit note 7 at 34 observed several cases of abusive parents who posed a danger to other participants at the 
Melbourne children's court in Australia. 
158 Rothman (2002) supra note 78. 
159 Bellamy (2004) op cit note 141 at 6-7 pointed out that in English care proceedings it is only fathers with 
legally allocated parental responsibilities who automatically receive party status.  Other fathers must submit a 
motivated application to court. 
160 Inserted by the Adoption Matters Amendment Act 56/1998. 
161 For further discussion see Davel (2000) op cit note 145 at 35. 
162 See s 19(b)(vii)-(x). 
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Appropriately, the limitation on automatic participation rights of abusive or 
uncaring fathers which developed in our pre-existing law has been carried over into the 
2005 Act for adoption matters.163 However, it is anomalous that there is only a slight 
extension of it to care proceedings.164  The drafters of the Act need surely not have feared 
constitutional challenge. A body of constitutional jurisprudence indicating that not all 
forms of discrimination are unfair has begun to develop.165 There are even authoritative 
precedents which indicate that fathers not exercising parental responsibilities may in some 
situations be lawfully discriminated against if important societal goals, such as protecting 
the interests of vulnerable single mothers or children, will be advanced.166  Under the 2005 
Act there is greatly increased scope for caring extramarital fathers to gain parental 
responsibilities167 -and so it would mainly be those who have shown little interest in their 
children who would be denied automatic party status with the approach proposed. 
 
It is recommended that the blanket allocation of automatic party status to nearly all 
parents in the 2005 Act needs to be modified. It should be limited in care cases only to 
                                                 
163 See ss 233(1)-(2) & 236(1) of the 2005 Act. 
164 In care proceedings (as in other children's court matters) a father who conceived the child through rape or 
incest will be denied party status: see ibid at s 1: definition of 'party' read with that of 'parent'. Also, in terms 
of the definition of 'parent' in s 1 of the Act 'a parent whose parental responsibilities and rights in respect of 
the child have been terminated' loses a right to automatic party status. 
165 See Currie & De Waal (2005) op cit note 23 at 245-46. 
166 In Fraser v Children's Court, Pretoria North and Others 1997 (2) BCLR 153 (CC) at 173A-B 
Mohammed DP J accepted the validity of a distinction between caring and uncaring fathers.  In President of 
the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) Goldstone J, expressing the view of the majority of 
the constitutional court, found that a decision by President Mandela to release female but not male prisoners 
with children younger than 12 was not unconstitutional: see especially at paras 37, 39 & 40. In a separate 
concurring judgment in Hugo O 'Regan J expressed the view that the disproportionately heavy child-rearing 
burden carried by many women justified some discrimination against fathers at the present stage of 
development of South African society: see ibid at para 113.  See also Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 
(CC) at paras 52-53. In Jooste v Botha 2000 (2) SA 199 (T) it was held that it was not unconstitutional for 
unmarried noncustodial fathers to have fewer parental responsibilities than other fathers. E Bonthuys 
(revising author) 'Children' in Currie & De Waal (2005) op cit note 23, 599 at 607-08 has commented that 
awarding unmarried fathers equal parenting rights may theoretically advance gender equality but without 
children necessarily benefiting from additional care. In practice, it may even produce disadvantages resulting 
from increased opportunities for interference by such fathers. 
167  For example, under s 21 fathers who have on a long-term basis lived with the mother, attempted to 
provide maintenance or agreed to have their paternity legally recorded automatically acquire parental 
responsibilities.  Under s 22 they may acquire responsibilities by entering an agreement with a person who 
already has them.  Under ss 30 & 33 they may become co-holders of parental responsibilities in terms of an 
agreed parenting plan. 
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parents who currently have lawful custody168 or contact169 entitlements and have not been 
found by a court to have abused the child or other parent. It should be noted that these 
criteria are gender neutral and that other parents would still have a right to apply to court 
for party status. On procedures required, a first step would be to differentiate between 
rights to notice of proceedings and party status as in English law.  A second step would be 
to follow our adoption law170 in placing an onus on parents to see that they identify 
themselves on their children's birth registers.  
 
In England, fathers without parental responsibilities have a right to notice if they 
can be identified and traced; but then they have to apply to court for permission to receive 
party status.171   A similar approach should be adopted for parents of either gender in 
South Africa. This would reduce the problem of delays resulting from requirements to 
provide notice to unknown parents. As long as courts take reasonable steps to try to trace 
all parents there should be no danger of a court decision being overturned because of an 
absence of notice.   
 
The detailed wording of §11,007A in title 13 of the Delaware Code Annotated 
provides an example of the kinds of notice procedures that could be utilised in South 
Africa.  Courts in Delaware are required to establish whether a child's father has received 
notice of pending care proceedings.172 If not, they are obliged to pursue an inquiry.  The 
purpose of this is to attempt to identify the father and his whereabouts.  Privacy rights of 
the mother are respected to the extent that she cannot be forced to give evidence on these 
aspects.173 And if welfare services and the court are also not able to establish the latter 
independently, notice may be sent to the last known address or, failing any such, published 
                                                 
168  In a listing of parental responsibilities in s 18(2) the 2005 Act appears to substitute the term 'care' for 
'custody'.  The latter has become well-established in our common law and is used in its traditional sense in 
this chapter to prevent confusion with notions of alternative care. 
169 The term 'contact' has clearly been substituted ibid for our common law term 'access'. 
170 See s 19A(2)(a) of the 1983 Act as discussed in the main text above; and also ss 236(3)(a) & 236(4) of the 
2005 Act. 
171 For a detailed discussion see Lyon (2003) op cit note 130 at 293-96. 
172 § 1107A(c). 
173 § 1107A(e) read with §1105(5)a. 
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for three weeks in a local newspaper.174  Hearings may then validly commence 
immediately.175 In South Africa a similarly manageable tracing rules would be very useful.  
 
In 2001 it was recommended by the South African law commission that a 
legislative provision was required to enable children's courts (or their future equivalent) to 
conduct a different form of separate hearing -one not for tracing but for dealing with 
applications to receive discretionary party-status.176 Such a provision is certainly still 
needed. It could be utilised, inter alia, to consider applications by known parents without 
responsibilities if the 2005 Act were to be amended as proposed above.177   
 
Even if the Act is not amended, a party status application procedure as suggested 
by the law commission will still be needed for persons who are not automatic parties in 
terms of the current wording.  As will be remembered, the final category referred to in the 
definition of a party in s 1 is very broadly 'any other person admitted or recognised by the 
court as a party'.  The law commission recommended a capability for party status hearings 
in cases either 'pending or currently underway'178 and it is indeed essential that express 
jurisdiction to hear both new or late applications after proceedings have already begun be 
created for the  children's courts.179 This could perhaps now best be achieved with a 
suitable regulation published in terms of the 2005 Act. 
                                                 
174 §1107A(f). If there is evidence of a presence in a different locality notice in the press may also be ordered 
there. 
175 §1107A(i). 
176 The commission proposed '[a] provision needs to be enacted in the proposed new children's legislation 
which is to the effect that any person who wishes to assert the right to be a party in a case pending or 
currently underway in the Child and Family Court should be permitted to appear and/or place documentation 
before the Child and Family Protector of the Court in order to try to make out a case that she or he has an 
interest in the proceedings sufficiently substantial that she [sic] should receive the status of being a party.  
Should the person establish a prima facie case, the Child and Family Protector should immediately refer the 
matter to the Court for a decision which might involve a special hearing': see Review of the Child Care Act 
(2001) op cit note 93 at vol 5 p1184. 
177 It could take the form of a rule of court which states that unless the court directs otherwise a party status 
hearing may be ex parte.  On the use of preliminary hearings for establishing party status see further part 
7.4.1, below.  
178 See Review of the Child Care Act (2001) as quoted in note 176, above. 
179 Although no South African statistics are available researchers Hunt, Macleod and Thomas (1999) op cit 
note 7 at 239 found that in a significant proportion of English care cases (35 out of a sample of 83) 
applications for late party status needed to be considered.  A South African example is the unreported Durban 
high court case of Womack v Womack and Four Others (Case No 1766/2000, of 5 June 2000). In this matter 
two applicants for late party status in children's court care proceedings were denied that status despite the fact 
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 Aside from the fact that s 1 of the 2005 Act is problematic because it provides 
automatic party status indiscriminately for nearly all parents, regardless of their links with 
children, it is also unfortunate that it does so for 'a prospective adoptive or foster parent of 
the child'.  'Prospective' is not defined in the Act and so any claim of willingness to foster 
or adopt could become a ticket for automatic party status.  It is hard to see why this 
approach was adopted.  Prospective adoptive or foster parents who wish to participate as 
full parties would usually be seeking to gain custody of the child.180  Their main motive 
will therefore often be the negative one of discrediting current or potential rival caregivers.   
 
By providing 'prospective adoptive and foster parents' with automatic and extensive 
participatory powers  as parties (including, for example, the right to utilise lawyers) the 
drafters of the Act have greatly increased the scope for adversarial interactions that will not 
favour child participation, poor  unrepresented biological parents or even the achievement 
of the best possible outcomes.181  Prospective caregivers, like parents without lawful 
custody or contact entitlements, should surely have been required to make out a case for a 
grant of party status. 
 
Aside from being too accommodating on private persons entitled to automatic party 
status the 2005 Act also does not indicate what criteria children's courts should apply when 
exercising a discretion to grant party status to other private persons.182  English courts have 
been provided with the broad legislative criterion of 'the applicant’s connection with the 
                                                                                                                                                    
that they were closely related to a bereaved child and she was more strongly bonded to them than anyone 
else.  Although children's court proceedings by other family members who wished to gain care of the child 
had been started without their knowledge they could not be granted late party status because there was no 
provision for this in the 1983 Act. In his judgment in the high court Moerane AJ described this as rendering 
the Act 'fatally-flawed': see the judgment ibid, at p 5, lines 12-13.  On late party status hearings see further 
part 7.4.2, below. 
180 Prospective adoptive parents will also be seeking guardianship. 
181 In Re G [1993] 2 FLR 839 the English court of appeal decided that in the absence of special 
circumstances foster parents should not normally receive party status.  See also Lyon (2003) op cit note 121 
at 297 para 7.35. 
182 There is very little South African case precedent. In Ex parte Kommissaris van Kindersorg: In re Steyn 
Kinders 1970 (2) SA 27 (NC) at 33 B-D, in an interpretation of reg 8(2) the Children's Act 33/1960, it was 
held that a priest's interest in a child as merely a member of his congregation was insufficient to justify party-
status. 
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child'.183 Thus any previous ties with the child can be utilised in support of a claim for 
discretionary party status.184 Under a more restrictive gatekeeping approach which is 
needed in our system the primary criterion which ought to be applied is whether an 
applicant has at any stage made reasonable efforts to provide significant care (including 
indirectly in the form of maintenance) for the child.185 
 
The proposed discretionary party status criterion of efforts to feature significantly 
in the child's life as a parent figure has the advantage of being grounded in facts that can be 
proved. For example, where it can be shown that a separated father or mother has 
maintained a positive relationship with a child for a significant period of time this should 
count in favour of an application.  In contrast, a parent who has ignored a child until the 
time of the proceedings should not be allocated party-status.186 In relation specifically to 
unmarried fathers a substantial care criterion for allocating rights would certainly not be 
out of line with our existing law.187  Even a substitute-parent figure not related to the child 
might be able to meet the significant care test.  It is thus realistically based on who has 
actually nurtured and bonded with the child.188 Also in favour of the actual service ground 
is that it is gender-neutral.189 
 
                                                 
183 Children Act 1989 s 10(9)(b). 
184 See further Lyon (2003) op cit note 130 at 296 para 7.34. 
185 In the New South Wales children's court case In the Matter of 'Pamela' (2003) op cit note 139 at 5 it was 
found that foster parents had correctly been granted party status because they had previously through their 
care demonstrated 'a genuine concern for the safety, welfare and well-being of the child'. 
186 After observing at children's courts in Melbourne Sheehan (2003) op cit note 7 at 34 recommended 
legislation to keep away parents who had played little part in their children's lives yet attended at court to 
interfere vexatiously with proceedings or behave abusively. 
187 In T v C 2003 (2) SA 298 (W), also reported as Talbot v Cleverly [2003] 1 All SA 640 (W), at para 19 the 
fact that an unmarried father had had little contact since birth counted against his application to challenge the 
adoption of his child by another person. Under s 21(1)(b)(ii) of the 2005 Act contributing or attempting to 
contribute in good faith 'to the child's upbringing for a reasonable period' is enough to automatically confer 
full parental responsibilities and rights on a biological father. As mentioned by Bonthuys (2005) op cit note 
166 at 607 N35 with reference to the previous Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act 86/1997 
an important consideration with unmarried fathers should be whether they have developed a bond with their 
children. 
188 In C v Commissioner of Child Welfare, Durban 1978 (2) SA 300 (N) at 304 James JP found that the 
person who most deserved party status in children's court care proceedings was an unrelated friend of the 
child's mother. 
189 Bonthuys (2005) op cit note 166 at 608 has suggested that prior 'actual child care work' with a child may 
be a suitably gender neutral criterion for the allocation of parental responsibilities.  
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In further support of a significant care criterion for discretionary party status it may 
be noted that under the Maine Child and Family Services and Child Protection Act the 
ground for a person to be added to care proceedings is 'having a substantial relationship 
with the child or a substantial interest in the child's well-being, based on the time, strength 
and duration of the relationship or interest'.190 Under a somewhat similar approach in 
Victoria, Australia, s 3 of the Children and Young Persons Act 56/1989 was amended to 
enable a same-sex partner with whom a parent or current custodian 'is living as a couple on 
a genuine domestic basis (irrespective of gender)' to obtain party-status in the children's 
courts.191 The concept of 'genuine domestic' links with the child, and even genuine efforts 
to provide substantial indirect care over time by way of contact or maintenance, are surely 
better indicators of a would-be applicant having the best interests of a child at heart  
sufficiently to utilise party status appropriately than the mere happenstance of biological 
parenthood.  
 
Even where the proposed requirement of sustained efforts to provide significant 
previous care is successfully established by an applicant for discretionary party status our 
children's courts should be obliged to consider two further exclusionary criteria.  Firstly, it 
should still be necessary to assess whether a grant of party status is reasonably likely to 
result in harm to the child or another vulnerable person who already has party status -this 
would apply where there is evidence that the applicant’s previous behaviour suggests that 
he   will use opportunities at court to behave in an abusive or seriously intimidating 
manner.192  This exclusion should only apply where inappropriate behaviour is anticipated 
                                                 
190 Title 22  § 4005-D at subparts 1C & E of the Maine Child and Family Services and Child Protection Act 
supra note 61. 
191 The amendment was in terms of the Children and Young Persons Amendment Act 72/2001. In South 
Africa, in Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population Development 2001 (12) BCLR 1225 the 
constitutional court held that a partner in an established same-sex relationship could be a party in a children's 
court adoption application.  It is likely that by analogy the same approach would be taken in care 
proceedings, but the criterion proposed in the main text would only permit party status for partners who had 
built up a prior relationship with the child by providing substantial care.  Generally on increasing support for 
the parenting role of same-sex couples in our law see A Pantazis & T Mosikatsana 'Children's Rights' in M 
Chaskalson, M Kentridge & J Klaren et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2005) 33-i at 33-14. 
192  As has been mentioned, at the Melbourne children's court Sheehan (2003) op cit note 7 at 34 noted 
instances where vexatious and angry parents were a danger to children and other participants.  Without 
legislation enabling them to control participation rights of parents there was 'little the court could do' to 
ensure sufficient control inside and personal safety outside the courtroom during proceedings. 
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to an extent that available sheltered participation methods cannot sufficiently prevent.193 It 
should thus generally be limited to extreme cases.  There should even be a power for 
children's courts to apply the criterion of abusive or intimidating behaviour to remove party 
status from someone who already has it.194 
 
The second exclusionary criterion   required entails a power to deny an applicant 
who will be taking substantially the same position and thus mainly duplicating views that 
will be put forward by an existing party. As has been established in some other systems, 
accommodating such a later applicant would encourage repetitive evidence and thus 
lengthen proceedings unnecessarily.195    
 
In answer to a possible criticism that a significant care criterion with the two 
further limitations proposed would unduly restrict discretionary party status applications it 
can be asserted that effective gatekeeping powers for children's courts to control the 
numbers of private parties are essential. Children and vulnerable custodian parents such as 
single mothers should not have to appear amongst crowds of satellite role players.196  The 
proposed approach accords with the criterion of hearing the most appropriate voices. Also, 
as will be shown below an alternative status for less centrally involved participants has 
been created under the 2005 Act -and this greatly reduces the need for children's courts to 
be accommodating in respect of all party status applications. 
 
                                                 
193  There is a similar approach in England.  Under s 10(9) of the English Children Act 1989 courts must 
consider whether an applicant for discretionary party status will disrupt the child's life to an extent which is 
harmful. For an illustration of the serious difficulties which can result where the risk criterion is not 
available, see note 157, above.  
194 In the English case Re W (Discharge of Party to Proceedings) [1997] 1 FLR 128 a court removed the 
party status of a natural father who had had very little contact with his children and had been convicted of 
murdering their half-sister. As commented by J Black, J Bridge & T Bond A Practical Approach to Family 
Law (2000) at 498 although it is a serious matter to remove existing party status it is occasionally justifiable 
in care proceedings. 
195 In the English case Re M (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Evidence) [1993] 1 FLR 822 grandparents were denied 
party status where they were taking precisely the same position as the mother of the child.  For a discussion 
of the application of the principle in English law see Lyon (2003) op cit note 130 at 296-97 para 7.35. In 
New South Wales children's courts apply a similar rule that if a later applicant’s interests and aims are 
identical or nearly in accordance with those of someone who already has party status this weighs against the 
application: see In the Matter of 'Pamela' (2003) op cit note 139 at 8. 
196 Sheehan (2003) op cit note 7 above at 32 noted from her observation in the Melbourne children's court 
that allowing large numbers of persons to be present not only intimidated children but also custodian parents. 
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4.3.2.3 An Alternative to Party Status 
  
It appears from the wording of s 58 of the 2005 Act that another way to gain 
participatory rights besides the receipt of party status has been created. This provision 
reads: 
'Rights of persons to adduce evidence, question witnesses and produce argument 
The following persons have the right to adduce evidence in a matter before a children's court and, 
with the permission of the presiding officer of the children's court, to question or cross-examine a 
witness or to address the court in argument: 
(a) A child involved in the matter; 
(b) a parent of the child; 
(c) a person who has parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the child; 
(d) a care-giver of the child; 
(e) a person whose rights may be affected by an order that may be made by the court in those 
proceedings; and 
(f) a person who the court decides has a sufficient interest in the matter.' 
 
A comparison between the persons listed here and those included in the definition of a 
party in s 1 reveals some significant differences.  Of particular note is that categories (e) 
and (f) in s 58 are not listed in s 1 as either automatic or discretionary parties.   Category 
(d) in s 58 must be read with the definition of 'care-giver' included in s 1.197  Such reading 
indicates that only one of the listed kinds of caregiver -a foster parent- would receive 
automatic party status.  The inescapable conclusion is that the intention with s 58 was to 
create a much wider set of persons to whom children's courts can provide lesser 
participatory rights than those which go with full party status. 
 
 The creation of two categories of what may conveniently perhaps be referred to 
respectively as full parties and participants in the 2005 Act is not without precedent 
elsewhere.198  Whilst it might be criticised as bringing complexity to the legislation199 it 
                                                 
197 The definition includes foster parents, persons who care for a child with permission from a parent or 
guardian or who do so in their capacity as a care worker or head of a child-headed household. 
198 Section 87(1) of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 of New South Wales 
supra note 13 reads as follows:   
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supports a child participatory model.  In cases where so many private persons wish to be 
involved that the child and/or existing caregiver involved would be overwhelmed and 
intimidated it potentially increases the powers of a court to limit the extent of participation.   
 
The aim of enabling children's court magistrates to modulate the degree of 
participation by private persons has not been perfectly realised in s 58.  The new category 
of persons to be allocated lesser participation rights should not have been confusingly 
overlapped with parties as defined in s 1.200 This is a recipe for confusion.  However, 
unlike the 1983 Act where the only choice is between the opposite extremes of either party 
or merely witness status, s 58 creates a via media which allows for an in-between category 
who may provide evidence, seek permission to question other persons and address the 
court.  It could be used to allow persons such as extended family members something more 
than a purely passive involvement. It could also limit them to brief appearances and thus 
reduce overcrowding. 
 
Precisely how the rights of mere participants are reduced as compared to those of 
parties in the 2005 Act will need to be delineated further in regulations. Under r58.02 
subdivision 1 of the Minnesota Juvenile Protection Rules 2000 the rights of participants are 
merely to receive notice, attend hearings, and offer information at the discretion of the 
court.201 Under title 22, § 4005-D of the Maine Child and Family Services and Child 
                                                                                                                                                    
'The Children's Court must not make an order that has a significant impact on a person who is not a party to 
proceedings before the Children's Court unless the person has been given an opportunity to be heard on the 
matter of significant impact. 
(2) If the impact of the order is on a group of persons, such as a family, not all members of the group are to 
be given an opportunity to be heard but only a representative of the group approved by the Children's Court. 
(3) The opportunity to be heard afforded by the section does not give the person who is heard the status or 
rights of a party to the proceedings'. 
Sub-rules 58.01-02 of the Minnesota Juvenile Protection Rules 2000 very similarly created a new class of 
persons who were mere participants as opposed to full parties in care cases. Bohr (2001) op cit note 4 at 236 
described the rationale for the rules as follows: '[t]here may be many individuals concerned about the best 
interests of a child who do not have the immediate connection to the child that justifies treating them as 
parties'. 
199 Bohr ibid at 238 has argued that in US care cases distinguishing between full parties and mere participants 
has sometimes resulted 'in a wasting of court time which should be spent developing an alternative care plan 
as applicants and their lawyers argue about whether a person is entitled to full party status'.   
200 The overlapped categories are: the child who is the subject of the proceedings, a parent, and a person who 
has legally-allocated parental responsibilities. 
201This clearly goes only slightly beyond the rights of witnesses. For a discussion and comparison of 
participant and full party rights under these rules see Bohr (2001) op cit note 4 at 235.  
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Protection Act  as amended in 2001  it is expressly indicated in subpart 4 that a person who 
merely has participant status 'has the right to be heard in any court proceeding under this 
chapter.  The right to be heard does not include the right to present or cross-examine 
witnesses, present evidence or have access to pleadings or records'.  In subpart 5 it is stated 
that none of these exclusions applies to persons with full party status.202  
 
In the South African 2005 Act s 58 ought to have distinguished between the rights 
of full parties and mere participants.  The point of the distinction is surely that participants 
should be expressly shown to have lesser rights so that children's courts can use participant 
status to reduce overcrowding and adversarialism in ways that will encourage 
communication by vulnerable core role players and smooth the path to an amicable 
outcome.  It could usefully have been stated, for example, that participants may not bring 
legal representatives and can remain for only limited parts of the proceedings specified by 
the court.  To distinguish them more from mere witnesses they should not have needed a 
children’s court’s permission to address it in argument. 
 
Aside from inadequate wording on the communication rights of participants s 58 is 
also vague on the criteria for granting persons participant status. The designation in para (f) 
of 'a person who the court decides has a sufficient interest in the matter' is so broad as to 
provide no real guidance. In para (e) 'a person whose rights may be affected by an order 
that may be made by the court in those proceedings' is also open-ended.  In England a 
person who needs to defend himself against allegations that he maltreated the child may 
intervene in care proceedings without receiving full party status.203  However, this has 
been circumscribed to include only cases where clarification about the truth of the 
allegations will assist in deciding whether the child is in need of alternative care or what 
form that care should take.204  This is appropriate since it should not be possible for 
persons who have links to the proceedings to use them for their own ends and thus draw 
courts away from the primary task of deciding on the best care outcome for the child. 
                                                 
202 In subpart 7 it is usefully indicated that participants are subject to confidentiality and disclosure 
limitations. Such a rule should be applied to participants in our law. 
203 Re S (Care: Residence: Intervener) [1997] 1 FLR 497.  
204 Re H (Care Proceedings: Intervener) [2000] 1 FLR 775. For a general discussion see Lyon (2003) op cit 
note 130 at 297-98 para 7.36.  
 178
 By indicating that the only automatic right for participants is that of presenting their 
personal evidence s 58 of the 2005 Act confuses between the concepts of witness and 
participant. The primary and automatic right of a participant ought instead to be that of 
addressing the court -further attendance and evidence related rights should be subject to 
court permission on a monitoring basis.  If this approach were taken, children's courts 
would be better able to distinguish between mere witnesses and participants. The latter 
should be designated as persons who can make out a prima facie case that if they were 
permitted to do more than merely present their own personal evidence the relevant interests 
of the child in the case would be served.  
 
Discretionary party status and participant status are inherently useful concepts.  The 
extensive powers that go with automatic party status mark it as a blunt instrument of 
traditional adversarial litigation.  In an era when alternatives such as ADR are becoming 
increasingly available and adversarialism needs to be controlled it will often be appropriate 
only for core attendees at care proceedings. It should of course be indicated in regulations 
that persons who lack automatic party status may apply for discretionary party status or, in 
the alternative, mere participant status.  
 
4.4  Conclusion 
 
It emerges in this chapter that it is crucially important for the children's courts to 
facilitate the presence of children who are able to directly participate meaningfully. The 
current widespread disregard of the importance of direct involvement and denial of 
sufficient access indicated by local data are a matter for concern. The children's courts fail 
significantly when measured against the criterion of hearing of the voices of children. As 
has been shown, the traditional protectionist argument against children's involvement at 
court does not take sufficient account of international research findings on the needs and 
capabilities of even vulnerable children.  
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  South Africa’s international convention responsibilities to hear children properly 
when significant decisions are to be made and include them fully in a rights culture also 
strengthen the case for a child participatory model as the ideal for our children's courts. 
Advances in technology which have increased the scope for sheltered participation 
methods have further eroded the protectionist position. Thus the assertion and 
strengthening of children's participatory rights in the 2005 Act is entirely appropriate.  
 
Concerning how children should participate it has been shown that the 2005 Act 
takes our law forward in regard to the threshold aspects of instigating proceedings, party 
status and the right to attend at court. However, on substantive aspects which require 
detailed explication the Act emerges as less well formulated.  The requirement in s 58 that 
children must seek permission from adjudicators before addressing them 'in argument' is an 
unnecessary technicality which clumsily inserts adversarial elements into what should be 
an entirely supportive relationship between adjudicators and children.  
 
On children's interactions with other parties at hearings it has been shown that ss58, 
60(2) and 61(1) of the 2005 Act all offer some protection by providing magistrates with 
wide powers to control questioning and remove persons from proceedings.  However, the 
specified criteria of maturity and special needs are unfortunately not linked to one 
particularly sensitive form of evidence - that of expressing a preference about a future 
caregiver or form of care.  The criterion of a child's willingness in s 61(1)(b) is 
inappropriate for this because of the general undesirability of children giving such 
evidence. 
 
A serious weakness in the 2005 Act is insufficient reference to sheltered 
participation methods.  Unfortunately, it refers expressly only to the use of intermediaries. 
Even here, the Act is too narrow because it provides merely a cross-reference to a criminal 
law provision designed to deal with very different situations. Appropriate grounds and a 
power for magistrates to order intermediary use mero motu have not been included. Given 
the vulnerability of many family members involved in care proceedings the sparse 
provision for sheltered methods is a major shortcoming. 
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 On the difficult question of compelled as opposed to voluntary involvement of 
children it has been shown that mandatory attendance at court is occasionally necessary for 
care cases. Although an unfortunate inclusion of the word 'request' in s 57(1) of the 2005 
Act causes some confusion a power for a magistrate to call and/or subject to cross-
examination 'any person' in s 60(1) seems to include the child.  This being so, it is 
unfortunate that although the factors of immaturity or special needs of children have 
appropriately been included as criteria for limiting voluntary participation, magistrates are 
not obliged to take them into account when deciding on the extent of compulsory 
participation. 
 
It is apposite that s 10 of the 2005 Act expresses as a general principle that children 
in all situations affecting them have 'the right to participate in an appropriate way'. 
However, the failure in the more specific provisions which relate to children's court 
hearings to guard against the danger of children expressing outcomes preferences (and thus 
taking on a heavy responsibility), the inadequate attention to sheltered participation 
methods and the insufficiency of criteria for controlling the compulsion powers of 
adjudicators cumulatively raise a concern that children may in practice and despite s 10 be 
expected to participate inappropriately. This danger is likely to be great where specialist 
and well-trained presiding officers are not available. 
 
Aside from the new provisions on child participation a second important change 
brought about by the 2005 Act is the creation of automatic party status in children's court 
cases for investigative welfare agencies.  This is likely to result in greater liability for legal 
costs and damages. Reference to experience in other systems suggests that there may be a 
consequential shift towards a more constrained, legalistic approach in agency work.  It has 
been suggested, however, that this problem is not insurmountable.  Non-governmental 
agencies could be given an amended party status so that they appear merely as 
representatives of the state.  Regulations are required both to counter legalistic reductions 
in services where children's court proceedings are in train and to ensure that state entities 
provide agencies with free legal representation.  If these solutions are adopted party status 
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for welfare should enable it to be much more effective.  Also, it might be possible to 
generate more higher court oversight because welfare would have not just the theoretical 
entitlement but also the actual resources to take matters on appeal or review.  As has been 
suggested the advent of even limited higher court monitoring could be of great value in 
improving the quality of children's court work generally. 
 
The proposal in this chapter that a child-participatory model is the ideal has 
important implications for rules governing allocation of party status to other private 
individuals.  It is essential that a selective approach to some categories of applications by 
the latter be established. This would help to avoid overcrowded care hearings in which 
children feel intimidated and the concerns of adults at the periphery receive undue 
attention. The extreme vulnerability of many caregivers also indicates a need to limit 
involvement of satellite role-players.  The criteria of effectively hearing of the voices of 
children and supporting caregivers thus indicate a gatekeeping approach.  On the basis of 
this conclusion it has been argued that the 2005 Act is too accommodating of nonessential 
parties.   
 
In relation to biological parents it has been shown with reference to approaches in 
other systems and our own constitutional jurisprudence that it is practicable to distinguish 
between different categories.  It has been suggested that parents not currently entitled to 
either custody or contact should have to apply for party status.  The same has been 
recommended for prospective foster or adoptive parents -and it has further been suggested 
that this category should be approached with caution since their motivation will often 
simply be to discredit rival caregivers. 
 
A gap which currently exists in the 2005 Act is an absence of grounds for 
discretionary as opposed to automatic private party status.  With reference to approaches in 
other systems it has been recommended that the primary ground should be substantial 
previous care for the child. This ought to be coupled with two further potentially 
exclusionary, secondary criteria.  These should be a likelihood that abusive tendencies in 
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the applicant will not be shielded by available shelter participation resources or that the 
applicant will duplicate the position of a pre-existing party. 
 
In the final part of this chapter the viability of distinguishing between full party and 
a lesser 'participant' status has been investigated.  It has been noted that these categories are 
utilised in some foreign systems.  It has been proposed that the distinction is potentially 
very useful.  In care proceedings it allows for a compromise status between the extremes of 
full party and mere witness.  It is therefore a valuable concept which can allow, for 
example, extended family members or prospective substitute carers to have a brief say in 
court rather than an ongoing presence that may crowd the proceedings.   
 
Although the concept of participant has been included in s 58 of the 2005 Act, there 
are two deficiencies in its formulation.  The core distinguishing right should not have been 
that of adducing evidence because this confuses with mere witnesses.  Instead, it should 
have been that of addressing the court. Secondly, it is most unfortunate that in the Act 
there is a confusing overlap between parties and participants.  Amendments to improve the 
blurred wording are thus urgently required. 
 
It emerges from this chapter as a whole that the attempt in the 2005 Act to broaden 
and create different forms of direct participation will make significant new demands on 
children's court magistrates.  And these demands are increased by the inadequacy of many 
of the relevant provisions.  As has been shown some of the shortcomings require actual 
amendments rather than merely supplementary regulations.  And just as noted with ADR 
in the previous chapter, for effectively managing communication at court magistrates will 
need appropriate training and the opportunity to specialise.205 In the next chapter one 
possible means for their assistance -that of effective representation for parties- is 
considered. 
                                                 
205 On the complexity of decision-making about participation in children's cases and knowledge consequently 
required of decision-makers see further Thomas & O’ Kane (1998) op cit note 30 at 150; and Schofield 
(2004) op cit note 42 at 34. 
 183
CHAPTER 5 
LEGAL REPRESENTATION: TOWARDS A RESOLUTION OF TWO 
FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 In chapters 3 and 4 the role of legal representatives in care proceedings has been 
briefly referred to.1  These references suggest that involvement of lawyers may be either 
disadvantageous or beneficial, depending on the nature of their functioning2 and this is 
supported by some local findings and observations.3 The challenge, then, is how to ensure 
that the positive potential of lawyers is maximised so that they effectively assist parties, 
help to transmit knowledge of care law and in other ways contribute positively to a better 
functioning of our under-resourced system. 
 
 In this chapter an attempt is made to resolve two core problems which relate to 
effective utilisation of legal representatives in children's court care cases in South Africa. 
The first of these is the extent to which they should focus upon an assertion their clients’ 
views and wishes or, alternatively, be able to disregard these in directly assisting courts to 
establish what is in the best interests of children who are the subject of proceedings.  The 
second problem is how to make optimal use of state-appointed legal representatives. 
 
 These are clearly important issues in a system where available skills and finances 
are by no means abundant.  In part 5.2 below our relevant law and also the limited South 
African data on the impact of lawyers are briefly considered.  This discussion provides a 
context for the analysis which follows in parts 5.3 and 5.4.  This analysis concerns, 
respectively, what should be the primary role of legal representatives and when and how 
they should be appointed at state cost. 
                                                 
1 See parts 3.4.2 & 4.3.1. 
2 See also R Sheehan Magistrates’ Decisionmaking in Child Protection Cases (2001) at 189-90. 
3 For examples of valuable contributions made by lawyers in children's court cases see FN Zaal Do Children 
Need Lawyers in the Children's Courts? (1996) 47 & 53-57; and C Matthias Removal of Children and the 
Right to Family Life: South African Law and Practice (1997) 54-55. For lawyers having a negative effect see 
part 5.2, below. 
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 In part 5.3 it will be argued that in our system a mainly client-directed model is 
needed for lawyers.  Their primary function should be to assist with communication in 
court. It will be contended that this is compatible with an overall paramountcy of the best 
interests of children.  It is further proposed that it is only where a lawyer appears on behalf 
of a child who is not able to communicate relevant evidence that he should work in 
accordance with his own informed views concerning the best interests of the child. It will 
be suggested that the functions of legal representatives should be set out in a practice code 
for lawyers who appear in children's courts. 
 
 In part 5.4 a process for appointing legal representatives at state expense for 
indigent parties is proposed.  It is recommended that discretionary guidelines rather than 
absolutely binding legislative grounds are required. It will be shown that an appropriate list 
of such guidelines can be formulated by drawing upon previous South African attempts 
and available local and international literature.  
 
 It will further be proposed that not only children but also other parties should be 
eligible to receive state funded legal representation in certain care cases.  It will be 
suggested that in the absence of specialist screening officers at children's courts our family 
advocates are currently the best placed for making final decisions on who should receive 
subsidised representation.  It will be shown that procedural mechanisms for this process 
need to be created. 
 
5.2 An Overview of South African Law and Practice 
 
The South African children's courts have for much of their existence been subject 
to the procedural rules of ordinary civil magistrates’ courts on the appearance of lawyers 
although with an unspecified degree of discretion to make changes.4 In the absence of 
                                                 
4 Section 52(1) of the 2005 Act states in relevant part '[e]xcept as is otherwise provided in this Act, the 
provisions of the Magistrates’ Courts Act, 1944 (Act No. 32 of 1944), and of the rules made in terms thereof 
as well as the rules made under the Rules Board for Courts of Law Act, 1985 (Act No.  107 of 1985), apply, 
with the necessary changes required by the context, to the children's court in so far as these provisions relate 
to-… (b) the appearance in court of advocates and attorneys'. Section 9(1)(a) of the Children's Act 33/1960 
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specific legislation or reported higher court precedent to the contrary, lawyers appearing in 
these courts have often been permitted to function in an unconstrained adversarial manner 
just as they would in other courts.5  Local empirical findings and anecdotal evidence from 
practitioners suggests that the absence of guidance on how their role should be adapted has 
reduced the effectiveness of lawyers in the children's courts. They frequently confuse 
participants and waste time by attempting to import terminology and procedures that are 
relevant to other litigation with which they are more familiar.6  
 
 There is even evidence to suggest that, just as in other systems,7 South African 
lawyers occasionally add to secondary, systemic abuse of children.8 By overly aggressive 
behaviour and intrusive questioning they traumatise participants9 and inflict damage on 
fragile family relationships.10   They sometimes also   make it more difficult for children's 
courts to discover the best alternative care solutions.11  The lack of authoritative directions 
concerning functions of lawyers and more generally an absence of procedural guidelines 
indicating operational differences between children's courts and ordinary civil magistrates’ 
courts have made it difficult for adjudicators to ensure that lawyers have a constructive 
                                                                                                                                                    
and s 9(1) of the Child Care Act 74/1983 similarly applied the rules of civil magistrates courts, including 
those relating to lawyers, to children's courts.   
5 T-LD Wessels 'Representing Children at Court: a Lawyer's Perspective' (Visiting lecture, University of 
Durban-Westville, 20 Aug 2003). This was also the experience of attorney M Essack as he developed a 
specialist children's practice in KwaZulu-Natal: personal communication 6 Sept 2002. 
6 Earlier findings by Zaal (1996) op cit note 3 at 41 and Matthias (1997) op cit note 3 at 54 about the 
inappropriate work methods of some South African lawyers were corroborated by V Groenewald 
'Representing Children in the Children's Courts' (Unpublished paper, Law Teacher' s Conference, Durban, 6 
July 2000); and J Gallinetti 'Child Participation in South African Family Law and Child Welfare Proceedings' 
(Unpublished paper, 11th World Conference of the International Society of Family Law:  Copenhagen and 
Oslo 2-7 August, 2002)UP accessed at <http://www.jus.uio.no/ifp/isfl>.   
7 See part 3.4.2, above. 
8 Zaal (1996) op cit note 3 at 41 and Matthias (1997) op cit note 3 at 54; Groenewald (2000) supra note 6; 
Gallinetti (2002) supra note 6. 
9 See Loffell as cited in part 4.3.1, above. 
10 As noted by BA Green & AR Appell 'Representing Children in Families -Foreword' (2006) 6 Nevada LJ 
571 at 582 it is essential that lawyers appreciate the need for children to maintain connections with their 
families and work to strengthen rather than weaken these. 
11 Zaal (1996) op cit note 3 at 45-46; Matthias (1997) op cit note 3 at 54. DS Rothman 'The Need for Legal 
Representation for Children in Children's Court Proceedings -Fact or Phobia?' (2001) 4 The Judicial Officer 
4 at 8 has gone so far as to state that it 'has been the personal experience of many commissioners' that where 
lawyers appear in children's court proceedings they sometimes 'impact negatively on the interests of the child 
concerned'. 
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influence.12  And instances even appear to have occurred where lawyers encouraged 
adjudicators to make inappropriate procedural rulings.13 
  
The ineffectiveness of some commissioners in interacting with lawyers -and 
particularly in failing to curb extreme manifestations of win-at-all-costs tactics- may also 
in part be due to unfamiliarity. Having a lawyer appear in a children's court case is 
something of a rarity in South Africa. Although only limited data is available, there are 
findings which suggest that relatively few litigants have had legal representation at 
children's court hearings14 -and this is of course consistent with worldwide trends 
indicating that most families involved in care cases are too impoverished to afford 
lawyers.15  
 
For child parties specifically, prior to the promulgation of the final Constitution in 
Act 108 of 1996 there was no provision for state funding of the costs of lawyers.16  
However, in s 28(1)(h) of the Constitution it  is stated that every child has the right 'to have 
a legal practitioner assigned to the child by the state, and at state expense, in civil 
proceedings affecting the child, if substantial injustice would otherwise result'.17  This is 
clearly wide enough to include children's court proceedings and it rendered South African 
                                                 
12 Matthias ibid cited social worker-respondents who observed commissioners allowing lawyers to behave 
inappropriately at children's court hearings. See also the findings of Zaal ibid at 46. 
13 Dr J Loffell (of the Johannesburg Child Welfare Society) stated that she had on many occasions served as 
the investigative social worker in cases where commissioners deferred unduly to aggressive lawyers: 
personal communication, 1 Aug 2002. L Dhabicharan (assistant-director of Childline, Durban) described 
involvement in a case where, at the insistence of a lawyer who complained about overcrowding, the 
commissioner ordered the departure of an experienced investigative agency social worker, leaving only her 
colleague who was doing her first case in court: personal communication 20 Sept 2002.  
14 Zaal (1996) op cit note 3 at 37-38 found that lawyers only appeared in approximately 0.4% of all cases in 
rural jurisdictions and in about 5% of cases in urban jurisdictions.  Findings by Matthias (1997) op cit note 3 
at 53 also indicated that lawyers rarely appeared in children's courts, especially where black families were 
involved. In 2003 a legal aid justice centre director noted that hardly any lawyers were appearing in the 
Verulam, Phoenix, Kwa-mashu and Ndwedwe jurisdictions in KwaZulu-Natal: F Bacus, personal 
communication 4 April 2003. Legal aid justice centre attorney R Govender, based on her experience in 13 
rural children's court jurisdictions in Mpumalanga province, stated that legal representatives almost never 
appear in these: personal communication 1 Jun 2005. 
15 On poverty see part 1.2, above. 
16 General legal aid provisions were contained the Legal Aid Act 22/1969, but they afforded no particular 
priority to children or children's court matters. 
17 For a general analysis of the wording of s 28(1)(h) with reference to all types of civil proceedings and in 
the light of international instruments to which South Africa is a signatory see J Sloth-Nielsen 'Children' in  
MH Cheadle, DM Davis & NRL Haysom (eds) South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2005) 
507 at 535. 
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research data suggesting that children were rarely represented in these a matter for concern 
amongst the legislature.  An amendment of the 1983 Act was promulgated in 1996.  A new 
s 8A was worded to provide expressly for the possibility of either private or state-
appointed legal representatives appearing on behalf of children in children's court 
hearings.18 Relevant aspects of this provision will be discussed below. 
 
 In relation to private legal representatives paid for by parents, s 8A(3) allowed 
rather broadly for a children's court to approve the appointment of a child’s legal 
representative by a parent 'should the children's court consider it to be in the best interests 
of such child'.  Van Heerden noted that '[t]his provision flies in the face of expressed 
concerns about the potential for a conflict of interest, where parents (who may be in a 
position akin to that of defendants in a removal inquiry) are empowered to appoint a legal 
representative for the child'.19    
 
The wording on appointment of lawyers for children by the state was equally 
unsatisfactory.20  Section 8A(4) determined that '[a] children's court may, at the 
commencement of a proceeding or at any stage of a proceeding, order that legal 
representation be provided for a child at the expense of the state, should the children's 
court consider it to be in the best interest of such child'.  It was subsequently recognised 
that the best interest criterion was too vague. Section 8A(4) was supplemented in 1998 by 
a much more detailed set of sub-grounds.  These were provided in a new reg 4A(1) 
published in terms of the 1983 Act.21 It reads as follows: 
 
                                                 
18 Section 8A was inserted by s 2 of the Child Care Amendment Act 96/1996.   
19 B Van Heerden 'Judicial Interference with the Parental Power: The Protection of Children' in B Van 
Heerden, A Cockrell & R Keightly et al  Boberg’s Law of Persons and the Family (1999) 497 at 619 N408. 
Groenewald (2000) supra note 6 cited an unreported case where a lawyer appointed to represent a child by 
his father advised the child not to speak to the investigative social worker and encouraged the child to say at 
court that he wanted to remain with his father when in fact he was uncertain about this.  
20 For criticisms of s 8A see further J Sloth-Nielsen & B Van Heerden 'The Child Care Amendment Act 
1996:  Does It Improve Children's Rights in South Africa?' (1996) 12 SAJHR 649 at 650; FN Zaal 'When 
Should Children Be Legally Represented in Care Proceedings? An Application of Section 28(1)(h) of the 
1996 Constitution' (1997) 114 SALJ 334 at 335-36; and the South African Law Commission Review of the 
Child Care Act (Discussion Paper 103, Project 110, 2001) vol 1, pp 96-98.  
21 Child Care Act 74/1983 Amended Regulations (Government Notice R 416, Government Gazette 18,770 of 
31 March 1998). 
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 'Legal representation 
(1) Legal representation at the expense of the state shall be provided for a child who is involved in 
any proceedings under the Act, in terms of section 8A(5) of the Act, in the following 
circumstances: 
(a) Where it is requested by the child who is capable of understanding; 
(b) where it is recommended in a report by a social worker or an accredited social worker; 
(c) where any other party besides the child will be legally represented in the proceedings; 
(d) where it appears or is alleged that the child has been physically, emotionally or sexually 
assaulted, ill treated or abused; 
(e) where the child, a parent or guardian, a person in whose custody the child was immediately 
before the commencement of the proceedings, a foster parent or proposed foster parent, or an 
adoptive or proposed adoptive parent contests the placement recommendation of a social worker or 
of an accredited social worker who has furnished a report contemplated in section 14(2) of the Act 
or regulation 8(2), as the case may be; 
(f) where two or more persons are each contesting in separate proceedings for the placement of the 
child in their custody; 
(g)where the child is capable of understanding the nature and content of the proceedings, but 
differences in language used by the court and the child prevent direct communication between the 
court and the child, a legal representative who speaks both the languages must, subject to paragraph 
(h), be provided; 
(h) where a legal representative contemplated in paragraph (g) can not be provided, an alternative 
arrangement should be made, including the provision of an interpreter for the child; 
(i) where there is reason to believe that any party to the proceedings or any witness intends to give 
false evidence or to withhold the truth from the court; and 
(j) in any other situation where it appears that the child will benefit substantially from legal 
representation either as regards the proceedings themselves or as regards achieving in the 
proceedings the best possible outcome for the child.' 
 
As can be seen reg 4A(1) provides a relatively detailed set of grounds. It is clearly based 
on a view that legal representation should be available at state expense in a wide variety of 
children's court proceedings. However, its breadth and mandatory wording raised concerns 
that it might prove to be costly to implement.22 Rothman criticised the degree of detail as 
'draconian' and as indicative of 'an unrealistic and almost phobic approach'.23  
 
However, other commentators expressed the contrary view that the regulations 
should be broadened further to assist as many children as possible.24 In line with this, 
clause 78(5) of the South African law commission's 2002 draft Children's Bill proposed 
that the grounds be widened to allow any child to obtain legal representation simply by 
making a request for this.  A power for a court to terminate the services of a child's 
                                                 
22 Rothman (2001) op cit note 11 at 4 & 8 argued that if the grounds contained in s 8A and reg 4A(1) were 
implemented this would lead to lawyers being employed in cases where they were not needed.  
23 Ibid at 4.     
24 J Sloth-Nielsen 'Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Some 
Implications for South African Law' (1995) 11 SAJHR 401 at 410-11; Van Heerden (1999) op cit note 19 at 
618.   
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privately appointed legal representative who 'does not serve the interests of the child in the 
matter or serves the interests of any other party' was recommended in clause 78(2)(b).25  
 
Additional proposals were contained in clause 77 of the 2002 draft Bill.  This 
recommended that not merely a child but any impoverished party should be entitled to 
apply for state funded legal representation.26  And with a view to ensuring representation 
of sufficient quality it was suggested that it should be provided either by a family advocate 
or a lawyer drawn from a select list of names on a 'Family Law Roster'.27 
 
In a climate of financial restraint and conflicting opinions by commentators it is 
perhaps not surprising that neither s 8A nor reg 4A were ever implemented. Legal aid 
justice centres nevertheless began to provide free legal representation for children in some 
children's court care cases.  A survey by Gallinetti revealed that, since there were no rules 
to guide their services, they achieved only a 'disjointed and inconsistent application' of 
their child representation goals.28   According to Rothman the lack of guidance has also 
caused commissioners to refer cases for state representation haphazardly. They have used 
such criteria as whether court time might be saved and to obtain the benefit of legal 
argument.29    
 
Since justice centres employ their own full-time lawyers these have often been used 
to replace the private lawyers who were previously occasionally appointed for legal aid 
cases. The quality of services provided for children by justice centre lawyers has 
sometimes been less than ideal.30   It appears that one reason for this is that many centres 
undertake mainly criminal law work.31  Many of their lawyers   therefore remain 
                                                 
25 A state funded lawyer would then have to be appointed as a substitute -see clause 78(5)(g). 
26 Clause 77(2). 
27 Subclauses 77(2)(a)-(b). 
28Gallinetti (2002) supra note 6.  Similar observations were made by Groenewald (2000) supra note 6, Bacus 
(2003) supra note 14; and Govender (2005) supra note 14. 
29 Rothman (2001) op cit note 11 at 7-8. 
30 This view as expressed by Wessels (2003) supra note 5 was unanimously endorsed by a group of eight 
practitioners who attended her seminar. These included an attorney, two children's court commissioners, two 
prosecutors and three social workers who all had experience in the children's courts. 
31 Gallinetti (2002) supra note 6; and K Mehta (director of the Pinetown justice centre) -personal 
communication 7 Aug 2003. 
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inexperienced in children's court representation.32  It has been alleged that in some cases 
this is exacerbated because centres change representatives partway through cases.33  It has 
even been have claimed that the standard of services provided by some justice centres has 
been so poor that children's court commissioners who previously referred matters for legal 
aid ceased to do so.34 
 
Despite the ongoing need for direction, in the 2005 Act there is little reference to 
legal representation.  The use of ordinary civil magistrates’ court rules as a primary guide 
for children's court appearances has been continued in s 52(1)(b).35 In s 54 appears a 
simple restatement of the common law as follows: '[a] person who is a party in a matter 
before a children's court is entitled to appoint a legal practitioner of his or her own choice 
at his or her own expense'. This is supplemented by s 55 which reads as follows: 
 
'(1) Where a child involved in a matter before the children's court is not represented by a legal 
representative, and the court is of the opinion that it would be in the best interests of the child to 
have legal representation, the court must refer the matter to the Legal Aid Board referred to in s 2 of 
the Legal Aid Act, 1969 (Act No. 22 of 1969). 
(2)The Board must deal with a matter referred to in subsection (1) in accordance with section 3B of 
that Act, read with the changes required by the context.' 
 
Although this wording expressly allows for legal aid lawyers to appear on behalf of 
children, just as in s 8A of the 1983 Act insufficient guidance is provided on when this 
should occur.  This is because of the utilization, once again, of the vague best interests 
ground.36 As can be seen, despite the proposal in clause 22 of the law commission Bill 
there is also no provision for parties who are not children to receive representation.  
 
  It is clear that the 2005 Act will need supplementing.  Firstly, given the rather 
mixed track record of the few lawyers who have appeared in recent years, s 52 requires 
additional wording indicative of the main orientation and functions of legal representatives 
in the children's courts. And in relation to ss 54-55 more clarity is needed on when children 
                                                 
32 Wessels (2003) supra note 5. 
33 Ibid.   
34 Commissioner A Vermooten: personal communication 20 Aug 2003.    
35 See note 4, above. 
36 As will be remembered it was noted in part 1.3.2 above that where the best interests ground stands alone it 
may invite dangerously simplistic interpretations. 
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have a right to representation at state expense.   Because of the vulnerability of many 
caregivers it is also essential that criteria be created to enable other parties besides children 
to receive such representation.  The absence of any reference in the 2005 Act to selection, 
training and accreditation of South African lawyers for children's court work leaves further 
gaps. 
 
As a first step towards developing the more detailed guidance which is needed it is 
necessary to ascertain what kind of assistance lawyers ought to provide.  This requires an 
analysis of what their primary roles should be.  Such an analysis is provided, below. 
 
5.3 A Determination of the Primary Functions of Legal Representatives 
 
 In relation to lawyers appointed to represent children who are involved in domestic 
litigation generally, a fundamental question which has been debated in the last decade -and 
particularly in North American systems- is whether they should assert what is in the best 
interests of their clients or else only what their clients want conveyed.37 This distinction is 
of importance in care cases.38  What a lawyer comes to believe is in the best interests of a 
child-client who is under consideration for alternative care may be very different from 
what that child wishes to have communicated or even achieved in the court proceedings.  
A key question in this situation is whether the lawyer should assert best interests according 
to her own subjectively informed views, or else remain within a client-directed brief. 
 
 One solution to this dilemma is a combined approach with children's lawyers 
expected both to see that their clients’ voices are properly heard and that what is in their 
                                                 
37 BJ Berenberg 'Attorneys for Children in Abuse and Neglect Proceedings: Implications for Professional 
Ethics and Pending Cases' (2006) 36 New Mexico LR 533; M Sobie 'The Child Client: Representing Children 
in Child Protective Proceedings' (2006) 22 Touro LR 745. For a review of the literature up to 2005 see BA 
Atwood 'Representing Children: the Ongoing Search for Clear and Workable Standards' (2005) 19 Journal of 
the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 183, at 184 N2-N3.  Some subsequent commentaries are 
included in (2006) 6 Nevada LJ -'Special Issue on Legal Representation of Children'.  This contains 
contributions and conclusions from an important conference of academics and practitioners on representation 
of children.  It was held in January 2006 at the University of Nevada and is hereafter referred to as the 
'Nevada Conference'. 
38 See generally DN Duquette 'Legal Representation for Children in Protection Proceedings: Two Distinct 
Lawyer Roles Are Required' (2000) 34 Family LQ 441. 
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best interests is fully asserted in court.39  As Atwood has noted, however, experience has 
begun to indicate that this hybrid approach is impracticable because it requires lawyers to 
undertake what are often contradictory functions.40 
 
In South Africa the significance of the distinction between the best interests and 
client-directed approaches to representation and the potential for conflict between these 
appears to have been recognised by only a few practitioners.41  This is understandable 
given that legal representatives appear on behalf of children so rarely. In divorce cases, the 
high court has in some instances concluded that a child may need a separate lawyer to help 
her express her views even when there is a lawyer available to assist in establishing what is 
in the best interests of the child.42  Although it is to be hoped that the children's courts will 
also benefit from direction from the high court, this would not obviate the need for 
comprehensive practice regulations.43 
 
A strong case can be made for the proposed regulations to direct that lawyers must 
primarily assert the wishes of young clients who are able to express these.  Since s 28(2) of 
our Constitution states that the best interests of children must be paramount in any 
situation affecting them, conveying a child's position and version of events should be seen 
as her own lawyer’s contribution to what is in her best interests.  By doing this, such a 
lawyer certainly contributes to the child’s sense of empowerment as a human being with 
                                                 
39 For further explication see Atwood (2005) op cit note 37 at 205, 207 & 214-15. 
40 Ibid, at 221-22. 
41 An exception is the University of Cape Town legal aid clinic.  Lawyers in this clinic who specialised in 
children's court work experimented with both best interests and client directed approaches in the late 1990s.  
They concluded that the latter was better for children who could communicate because of the importance of 
ensuring that the voices of even the very young were properly heard in court: Groenewald (2000) supra note 
6.  In its review of the 1983 Act the South African law commission similarly concluded that lawyers who 
represent children should 'come to court prepared and able to present the hopes and wishes of the child-client 
(genuine child advocacy) as opposed to merely conveying… what certain adult persons feel is best for the 
child': see Review of the Child Care Act (2001) op cit note 20 at vol 5, p1196. 
42 Soller NO v G and Another 2003 (5) SA 430 (W); Van Niekerk v Van Niekerk Case No 20880/2002, 22 
June 2004 (TPD, unreported); and Reardon v M Case No 5493/02, 27 February 2004 (DCLD, unreported). 
43 It has been recognised in the USA that lawyers need more than ad hoc court guidance on their functions.  
A number of professional bodies have produced draft versions of practice codes which differ somewhat and 
are being debated in the USA. For evaluations of these see Duquette (2000) op cit note 38 at 450-51; and 
Atwood (2005) op cit note 37 at 209-19. 
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important participatory rights.44  He also helps to ensure that the court has sufficiently 
complete information.  
 
Blinn, in arguing strongly that an especially important function of children's 
lawyers is 'giving their stories a voice in proceedings,'45 has given examples of cases in 
which gravely wrong solutions were adopted simply because the child's version of events 
was not strongly enough asserted.46  She argues that it is now obvious that in many cases 
'the child's own perspective' must be effectively conveyed to courts and that in some 
instances children need their own personal legal representatives to assist with this.47        
 
There is merit in the argument that lawyers generally do not have the capability to 
independently assess a child's welfare needs sufficiently to assert her best interests 
accurately and without any subjective bias.48 Conveying the evidence and views of their 
clients is far more in accordance with their training.   Where courts are clearly aware that 
this is their function there will surely be little danger of adjudicators being misled rather 
than assisted by child advocates.49   
 
The task of providing an objective assertion of what is in the best interests of the 
child should be that of welfare.  With the 2005 Act having now provided party status to 
agencies they will have the power to appoint their own lawyer if one is needed to assist 
them in doing so.50 The constitutional court has recognised that best interests 
representatives can play an important role. In Du Toit and Another v Minister of Welfare 
and Population Development and Others in the context of adoption and with reference to 
s28(1)(h) of the Constitution Skweyiya AJ stated obiter '[i]n matters where the interests of 
                                                 
44 KH Federle 'The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling 
the Child Client' (1996) 64 Fordham LR 1655 at 1695-96. 
45 BA Blinn 'Focusing on Children: Providing Counsel to Children in Expedited Proceedings to Terminate 
Parental Rights' (2004) 61 Washington and Lee LR 789 at 794. 
46 Ibid at 790-94. 
47 Ibid at 822. 
48 Duquette (2000) op cit note 38 at 458 warned that lawyers may simply substitute their own personal 
prejudices as a criterion of what is in the best interests of the child. See further Atwood (2005) op cit note 37 
at 209. 
49 On this danger otherwise see the problem of commissioners being misled noted in part 5.2, above.  See 
also part 3.4.2, above. 
50 See part 4.3.1, above. 
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children are at stake, it is important that their interests are fully aired before the court so as 
to avoid substantial injustice to them and possibly others'.51  Also, as will be further 
discussed in the next chapter,52 if the role of children's court adjudicators is defined as 
inquisitorial rather than accusatorial they themselves will be able to elicit evidence to 
establish what is in the child's best interests.53    
 
In accordance with the criterion of hearing the voices of children it may be 
recommended that a South African practice code is required.  It should direct that, if a 
child is willing and mature enough, facilitating her communication of relevant information 
is the task of any lawyer appointed to represent her.54 In support of this it may be noted 
that the majority view at the Nevada Conference was that children's lawyers should 
wherever possible be client- rather than best interests-directed.55 
 
 It has been noted in the previous chapter that one of the most important reasons for 
facilitating children's participation is to provide them with a sense of empowerment.56  
Another finding at the Nevada Conference was that when children's lawyers function 
appropriately they can contribute to this.57  In line with the conclusions reached at the 
Conference it would be useful to indicate in the proposed code that support by their 
lawyers for children's participation should not only be through the three traditional means 
of leading evidence, challenging opposing versions of other parties and advocacy. It should 
                                                 
51 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) at 201 paras F-G. 
52 See generally part 6.3. 
53 P Parkinson 'The Child Participation Principle in Child Protection Law in New South Wales' (2001) 9  
International Journal of Children's Rights 259 at 268 argued that the best approach is one in which welfare 
supplemented by 'the independent scrutiny of the Court' establish what is in the child's best interests.  
54 See r 1.14(a) of the American Bar Association (hereafter, 'ABA') Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
(2006 ed) <http:// www. abanet.org/ cpr/ mrpc/rule_1_14.html>. See also the ABA comment 1 to this rule at 
<http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule_1_14_comm.html>; and standard B-4 of the ABA Standards of 
Practice for Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases (1996) 
<http://www.abanet.org/child/repstandwhole.pdf>. 
55 Green & Appell (2006) op cit note 10 at 583-84. 
56 See part 4.2.2, above. 
57 Green & Appell (2006) op cit note 10 at 578 recorded that '[c]hildren need lawyers not simply to promote 
fair processes and outcomes, but to promote children's autonomy -their right and need to have a say in what 
happens to them and in legal proceedings'. 
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be stressed that a crucial function is first to establish whether the child wishes to 
participate.58  
 
Discovering a child's participation needs requires a relationship of trust.59 Except in 
emergencies where there is no time a child’s lawyer should be expressly directed to 
establish such a relationship prior to proceedings.60  During this pre-hearing stage the 
lawyer must ascertain whether the child would prefer not to attend court at all or needs to 
use a specific sheltered participation method at proceedings. It would be useful for drafters 
of the proposed code to consult the ABA's detailed recommendations on how precisely 
legal representatives should strike a balance between advising and listening to child clients 
when preparing for court. 61 
 
However, there should be two ethical limitations on the principle of client 
direction. Firstly, despite being open to the child's expression of views and fully available 
to assist in her provision of evidence, her representative must be careful not to pressure her 
into feeling that she must take responsibility for making choices about the outcome.  As 
noted in the previous chapter this will often be inappropriate in care cases62 -and the 
lawyer must therefore consistently remind the child that it is the burden of the court to 
decide. Secondly, if during consultations the child discloses new information indicating a 
substantial danger of injury or death to herself or another person, her representative should 
be immediately obliged to disclose such confidences to the court.63 The proposed code 
should state that a child's representative must endeavour to explain this exception to 
attorney-client confidence at the first pre-hearing interview with her. 
                                                 
58 Ibid. 
59 Groenewald (2000) supra note 6. 
60 It has been alleged that legal aid lawyers in South Africa sometimes meet child-clients for the first time at 
court on the day that proceedings commence: Wessels (2003) supra note 5; and Vermooten (2003) supra note 
34. On the importance of the lawyer engaging with the child beforehand see Green & Appell (2006) op cit 
note 10 at 581. 
61 See the ABA provisions cited in note 54 above. As just one example of wording which could be 
considered, the ABA comment to standard B-4 in its Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who Represent 
Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases (1996)   loc cit, at p4 includes the following useful suggestion: '[t]he 
lawyer should inform the child of the relevant facts and applicable laws and the ramifications of taking 
various positions, which may include the impact of such decisions on other family members or on future 
legal proceedings'. 
62 See part 4.2.4, above. 
63 See Atwood (2005) op cit note 37 at 217. 
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Although a client-directed model has been recommended for children who can 
communicate it is not suggested that their lawyers should never assert best interests 
because the two positions sometimes converge.64 In other cases where a child's lawyer 
reaches a conclusion that she is not able to give instructions or convey evidence this must 
be conveyed to the court at the outset of proceedings.  In such a case legal representation 
can only be on the basis of assisting the court to establish what is in the best interests of the 
child.65  In view of the dangers of subjectivity and limitations of lawyers’ training as 
referred to earlier, in these matters a lawyer will need the assistance of a welfare expert 
such as a social worker.66 
 
 Turning to legal representation of adult family members, it is of concern that, as 
noted in part 5.2, even less attention has been devoted to this in South Africa than to 
representation of children.  In considering whether directions covering adult clients should 
be included in the proposed code the vulnerability of many caregivers and the criterion 
requiring that their voices be properly heard need to be kept in mind.  It is arguable that 
just as with children there is a need to indicate expressly that an entirely client directed 
approach must be followed if an adult client has sufficient ability to communicate.  
 
                                                 
64 As noted by N Thomas & C O’Kane 'When Children's Wishes and Feelings Clash with Their "Best 
Interests" ' (1998) 6  International Journal of Children's Rights 137 at 151 this occurs where it is possible to 
contend that what a child wants is in her best interests. They refer to an example of a girl with terminal 
cancer. As they point out, her wish to spend her last few months with a mother who suffered from 
agoraphobia was arguably more in her best interests than immediately being removed to a distant institution 
as proposed by welfare.                                                                      
65 South African wording could be along similar lines to s 99 of the Children and Young Persons (Care and 
Protection) Act 1998 of New South Wales, Australia. Subsection 99(2) of this Act describes the role of a 
child's lawyer at court as follows: 
'(a) ensuring that the views of the child or young person are placed before the Children's Court, and 
(b) ensuring that all relevant evidence is adduced and, where necessary, tested, and 
(c) acting on the instructions of the child or young person or, if the child or young person is incapable of 
giving instructions: 
(i) acting as a separate representative for the child or young person, or 
(ii) acting on the instructions of the guardian ad litem.' 
Subsection 99(3) establishes a rebuttable presumption that any child of at least ten years old 'is capable of 
giving proper instructions to his or her legal representative.  This presumption is not rebutted only because a 
child or young person has a disability' -accessed at <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw>. 
66 Since the investigating agency will be an opposing party such social worker could not be one employed by 
it. On the importance of children's lawyers knowing when to collaborate with professionals from other 
disciplines see Green & Appell (2006) op cit note 10 at 581. 
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Where factors such as stress induced by spousal abuse, a fear of losing one's child, 
low intellectual capability or dependence upon drugs or alcohol are present in adult clients, 
the temptation to substitute what the lawyer sees as best may be just as strong as where 
children are represented. 67 Therefore, role-directions along similar lines to those proposed 
above for child-clients would be valuable in guiding lawyers.68 Generally the approach in 
South Africa should be that the factor of client vulnerability ought to be treated as a 
possibility, regardless of whether adult or younger private parties are to be represented in 
children's court care proceedings. Even a duty to disclose a substantial danger of injury or 
death to any person as proposed above for children's representatives seems appropriate for 
lawyers representing adult clients in care cases.69 
 
A final point regarding the proposed code concerns scope of work. As has been 
noted in chapter 3,70 under the 2005 Act there will be substantial reliance upon ADR in 
many care cases. Experience in other systems indicates that this requires the role of 
lawyers to be extended.71 In many cases supporting clients during ADR becomes just as 
important as assisting them at court.72  This will tend not to involve a lawyer appearing 
directly at ADR processes -but rather preparing clients before, and advising them 
afterwards on whether to sign agreements reached. As in other countries  where ADR has 
become prominent, South African lawyers will  need to develop what  are commonly 
termed   'collaborative and cooperative law practices' geared to supporting clients involved 
                                                 
67 Blinn (2004) op cit note 45 at 832 has pointed out that in care cases the client-competency issues which 
lawyers must take into account are not substantially different between older children and the adult parties 
typically involved.  
68 It was found necessary in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (2006 ed) supra note 54 to direct 
expressly in r 1.14 (a) that where clients have diminished responsibility or capacity lawyers should in all 
types of cases 'as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.' 
Again, in terms of possible wording for a South African code, valuable guidance on how lawyers should 
interact with and represent vulnerable adult clients can be drawn from the ABA commentary to this rule: see 
supra note 54. 
69 R Lindley, M Richards & P Freeman 'Advice and Advocacy for Parents in Child Protection Cases-What Is 
Happening in Current Practice?' (2001) 13 Child and Family LQ 167 at 189 proposed that represention of 
adult clients must be subject to not increasing dangers for children. Atwood (2005) op cit note 37 at 207 
suggests more broadly that lawyers ought to disclose a substantial likelihood of harm to the client or anyone 
else.  
70 See part 3.6. 
71 See G Firestone & J Weinstein 'In the Best Interests of Children: a Proposal to Transform the Adversarial 
System' (2004) 42 Family Court Review 203 at 213. 
72 Based on research in Australia Sheehan (2001) op cit note 2 at 189-90 found that in some cases appropriate 
legal representation could significantly improve the chances of achieving a successful ADR outcome. 
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in ADR rather than merely encouraging adversarial confrontations in court.73 As part of 
guidance on their functions some direction on the ADR support to be provided by lawyers 
should therefore be included in the proposed practice code. 
 
5.4  Criteria and a Process for the Allocation of State-Appointed Representatives 
 
  Even in developed systems with substantial resources there is no absolute rule that 
the state must provide legal representation for all indigent parties in care cases.   In 
Canada, for example, poor parents have sometimes been denied legal aid.74     This also 
happens in the US.75  There the supreme court has expressly held that there is no absolute 
right for parents to be funded76 and children are often unrepresented.77  In England in In re 
G., S. and M. (Wasted Costs) it was held that the seriousness of the risk of losing their 
children entails that parents ought to be provided with proper representation by the state78  
but for children, although a guardian ad litem will be appointed, it is usually considered 
that a legal representative is not also required.79  The tandem system of guardians ad litem 
who can be supplemented by state appointed lawyers is used in some developed systems.  
It is not recommended as a standard approach for South Africa, however, because paying 
for both a guardian and also a lawyer would be prohibitively expensive.80 
                                                 
73 Firestone & Weinstein (2004) op cit note 71 at 213.   
74 This was noted with disapproval by Claire L' Heureux-Dube`J in New Brunswick (Minister of Health and 
Community Services) v G.J. (1999), 177 D.L.R. (4th) 124, at 169. Subsequently, rates of representation were 
somewhat increased: see N Bala and R Jaremko 'Canada: Non-marital Unions, Finality of Separation 
Agreements and Children's Issues' in A Bainham (ed) The International Survey of Family Law (2002) 109 at 
129. 
75 H O'Donnell 'What's Wrong with the Picture: the Other Side of Representing Parents in Child Protection 
Cases' (2005) 4 Appalachian Journal of Law 73 at 87. 
76 Lassiter v Department of Social Services of Durham County, N.C. 452 U.S. 18 (1981) at 33; Santosky v 
Kramer 455 U.S. 745 (1982) at 753. 
77 According to TB Harding 'Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights: Reform Is Needed' (2000-2001) 39 
Brandeis LJ 895 at 907 the US supreme court has avoided opportunities to rule on whether children should 
be entitled to representation. Duquette (2000) op cit note 38 at 441 pointed out that some US states fund the 
costs of children's representatives where abuse or neglect is alleged. However, Blinn (2004) op cit note 45 at 
829 mentioned that the overall situation is one in which US states rarely provide counsel for children in 
proceedings to terminate parental rights. 
78 [2000] 1 FLR 52 at 60. 
79 CM Lyon 'Child Protection in the Civil Law' in K Wilson & A James (eds) The Child Protection 
Handbook (2002) 191 at 225. 
80 Even in Germany and England with their far greater resources there have been difficulties because of the 
expensiveness of the tandem system: see M Stötzel & JM Fegert 'The Representation of the Legal Interests of 
Children and Adolescents in Germany: A Study of the Children's Guardian from a Child's Perspective' (2006) 
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 In South Africa since the numbers of appropriately skilled legal representatives 
and available state funds are likely to remain limited for the foreseeable future criteria and 
procedures for the appointment of lawyers at government expense must also not produce 
an uncontrollable explosion of large numbers of applications. In the next two subparts 
below proposals for a cost-effective system are made.  Firstly, guidelines for deciding 
applications are considered.  Secondly, procedures for appointing suitable representatives 
are recommended.       
 
5.4.1 Allocation Guidelines  
 
The high stakes for private parties in care cases are sometimes put forward as a   
ground for subsidised representation.81  There have also been suggestions that certain types 
of case can be singled out as particularly serious.82 However, such delineation is 
problematic because it is well arguable that all care cases have serious consequences.83 
State subsidisation for legal representation in care cases is inherently expensive, 
                                                                                                                                                    
20 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 201 especially at 221-222; and C Blacklaws & S 
Dowding 'The Representation of Children: From Aspiration to Extinction?' (2006) 36 Family Law 777 at 
778-79.  It may not be a particularly effective system either. O'Donnell (2005) op cit note 75 at 82 claims on 
the basis of US experience that guardians ad litem have proved relatively ineffective. 
81 BG Fines, RE Oliphant & N Ver Steegh 'Termination of Parental Rights: Case Law Development' (2006) 
<http//www.lawprofessors.typepad.com/family_law/termination_of_parental_rights/index.> discuss the case 
of Walker v Walker 2006 Del. Lexis 81 (Feb 9, 2006). In this case the supreme court of Delaware held that 
indigent parents have a right to apply for state-financed legal representation in termination of parental rights 
cases because of the degree of jeopardy to them. For a similar approach in England see the text 
accompanying note 78, above. Gallinetti (2002) supra note 6 proposed that in South Africa children should 
be considered for free legal representation where removal from their families is a likely outcome. Sloth 
Nielsen (2005) op cit note 17 at 535 suggested more generally that in our system 'the likely impact of any 
decision on the day-to-day life of the child –such as… the placing of a child in residential care (for example, in 
an industrial school)– should play a weighty role in any decision as to whether legal representation is 
required'. 
82 M Ells, RB O'Neill & V Weise et al 'Unravelling the Labyrinth: A Proposed Revision of the Nebraska 
Juvenile Code' (2004) 82 Nebraska LR 1126 at 1157 suggested that where applications are made to have 
children locked up in secure care representation for them is essential.  For a similar view see E Pitchal 
'Children's Constitutional Right to Counsel in Dependency Cases' (2006) 15 Temple Political and Civil 
Rights LR 663 at 670-71. As noted in part 1.3.2 above, it is recommended in art 48 of the UN Guidelines, 
2007 that parents be provided with legal representation where they do not agree to removal of their children. 
83 As stated by MJ Mossman 'New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G.J.: 
Constitutional Requirements for Legal Representation in Child Protection Matters' (2000) 112 Canadian 
Journal of Women and Law 490 at 503 the interests at stake in child protection proceedings are always 
significant. 
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particularly if lawyers are to be reasonably compensated.84  Since it is therefore not 
possible to afford subsidised representation in all or even a high proportion of cases in 
South Africa it is impracticable to propose seriousness as a legal ground.  
 
As has been illustrated by the non implementation of reg 4A of the 1983 Act 
having any grounds at all may be too expensive.85  Grounds are potentially costly, simply 
because they are binding.  As soon as a first wave of applications is granted these establish 
precedents strengthening the claims of later parties for state-financed representation. The 
result is a snowball effect in which the numbers of claims which cannot be denied 
increases over time. It therefore appears that non-binding guidelines rather than actual 
grounds are required.  
 
In the Grootboom case the constitutional court made it clear that, despite the 
paramountcy of the best interests principle, the claims of vulnerable persons (including 
children) may be interpreted with reference to resource constraints that require the state to 
follow an ordered plan for gradual upliftment of the population.86 In line with this 
approach, practicable guidelines for the children's courts should permit control over the 
numbers of cases in which subsidised representation is provided.   
 
  To facilitate cost effectiveness the proposed guidelines must deliver competent 
representation and only for the worst affected persons. They must target impoverished 
parties whom lawyers can assist to make a significant participatory contribution. They 
must be parties who are constrained from doing so by themselves because of an 
impediment beyond their control.  This group can be further narrowed to parties whose 
contributions would relate to the existence of grounds for mandatory alternative care 
                                                 
84 Experience in some systems has shown that inadequate rates of pay reduce the quality of legal 
representation both directly and by preventing appeals.  See O'Donnell (2005) op cit note 75 at 86; and 
Blacklaws & Dowding (2006) op cit note 80 especially at 778-79. 
85 See part 5.2, above.  Since its publication in 1996 it has never been implemented due to cost concerns.  
According to commissioner P Booysen there has been a long-standing disagreement between the department 
of justice and constitutional development and the department of social development about who would have to 
budget for legal representation in terms of it:  personal communication 12 Sept 2006. 
86 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at 1203D-F, 1205A&G-H. On Grootboom see also part 1.2, above. 
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measures and/or what these should be.87  The impediment must be one which cannot 
reasonably be overcome by measures other than representation -such as the use of 
sheltered participation methods or the magistrate assisting with questioning.88  Suitable 
guidelines would thus facilitate participation by a select group of severely disadvantaged 
parties where other means will not suffice. 
  
Unless such guidelines are provided, when the 2005 Act is fully implemented the 
current unsatisfactory situation will simply continue. The only available direction will be 
the best interests ground in s 55 of the Act and the equally broad substantial injustice 
ground in s 28(1)(h) of the Constitution. As noted in part 1.3.2 above the best interests 
criterion is inherently vague. If not clarified it may therefore conduce to wastage of our 
scarce representation resources.89 What is meant by substantial injustice specifically in 
care cases is also unclear because it has not yet been authoritatively decided in South 
Africa -something which in any event would be difficult to do comprehensively.  Rothman 
has argued that it should be interpreted to mean only a significant degree of unfairness 
likely to be experienced by a child during children's court proceedings.90 However, it 
would be unfortunate if such a narrow interpretation were to be adopted. Substantial 
injustice in relation to the outcome should not be excluded.  
 
On the right to have a state-financed legal representative in a criminal matter it was 
held in Legal Aid Board v Msila that whether a person has the ability to represent himself 
and the potential outcome of the case were both relevant considerations.91 It may be 
suggested that in care cases a party's ability to express himself in relation, inter alia, to a 
proposed outcome should be relevant. Sloth-Nielsen has commented that, whilst it is 
commendable that the courts have begun to grapple with the application of s 28(1)(h), in 
                                                 
87 Thus, for example, a parent’s wish to resist potentially damaging children's court findings because these 
might open the way for a subsequent prosecution of him for child abuse should not count. 
88 Sloth-Nielsen (2005) op cit note 17 at 535 has rightly stated with reference to the substantial injustice test 
that an important factor should be whether views can be adequately ascertained other than by the expensive 
means of legal representation. 
89  For example, Rothman (2001) op cit note 11 at 8 has cited uncontested cases involving abandoned infants 
in which lawyers would have nothing to do at court.  
90 Ibid at 11.  
91 1997 (2) BCLR 229 (SE) at 243D. 
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the absence of legislation clarifying what constitutes substantial injustice this is occurring 
in a highly undesirable ad hoc manner.92  This prevents the development of a coherent and 
uniform set of criteria.93 In addition, whether or not the child’s right to legal representation 
is raised at all in court often depends on the inclination of individual judges.94 
 
Even if some direction is forthcoming from higher courts, the vague best interests 
and substantial injustice grounds will continue to compel decisionmakers to make 
uncertain predictions about future events which may be impossible to forecast.  Without 
sufficient amplification these grounds will remain difficult to implement in a coherent and 
logical manner.  Furthermore, as has been noted they apply only to representation for 
children and not other vulnerable parties faced with significant communication barriers. It 
will be shown below that by considering experience locally and elsewhere it is possible to 
formulate a list of much more specific guidelines for deciding whether to allocate a state 
funded legal representative to any party.  In creating such guidelines a factor to be kept in 
mind is that applicant parties may need to be considered separately95 or have their ability 
to communicate considered relative to that of other parties.   
                                                
 
A comparison of capabilities may lead to a conclusion that a legal representative is 
necessary as an equaliser where a party’s voice is in danger of being silenced by the 
contentions of a much more powerful and assertive opposing party or parties.96 South 
African commentators Sloth-Nielsen and Van Heerden have rightly argued that 
particularly children in danger of intimidation by opposing parents should have a strong 
right to be considered for representational support.97  Based on her experience in children's 
courts in the Cape Groenewald proposed that special consideration be given to providing 
 
92 Sloth-Nielsen (2005) op cit note 17 at 538. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 D Telfer 'In Re T.M.: Who Protects the Indigent Parents?' (2004) 6 Journal of Law and Family Studies 161 
at 161-162 makes the point that there may be a conflict of interests between parents in care cases.  This 
should therefore always be investigated when deciding whether they can share state appointed counsel. 
96 Scottish researchers A Griffiths and RF Kandel 'Hearing Children in Children's Hearings' (2000) 12 Child 
and Family LQ  283 at 298 found that children's advocates can play a useful role in helping children put their 
views across where extreme power imbalances present a barrier. 
97 J Sloth-Nielsen & B Van Heerden 'Putting Humpty Dumpty Back Together Again: Towards Restructuring 
Families’ and Children’s Lives in South Africa' (1998) 150 SALJ 156 at 159. 
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lawyers to children who wish to speak out but are going to be overawed in multiparty 
cases.98  
 
What is sometimes referred to in England as 'equality of arms' should be extended 
to any vulnerable party of any age  whose voice is  being or is reasonably likely to be 
drowned out.99 As will be recalled it was noted in the previous chapter that where an 
opposing party has sufficiently powerful legal representation even welfare may need its 
own lawyer if it is to put forward its case effectively.100  A substantial disparity in 
communication abilities should thus be one guideline for possible appointment of a state 
funded legal representative.    
 
In a demographically mixed society such as South Africa a second guideline should 
be whether a language or cultural barrier significantly disadvantages a party in her attempts 
to communicate.101 In support of this is Centre for Child Law and Another v Minister of 
Home Affairs and Others.102 In this case De Vos J of the Transvaal provincial division held 
that unaccompanied refugee children involved in children's court care proceedings, as an 
especially vulnerable group who are often unable to communicate, must be assessed for 
possible state representation.103    
 
It will be recalled that reg 4A(1)(g) of the 1983 Act provides innovatively that 
where a language barrier prevents direct communication by a child  a lawyer speaking the 
same language as the child should if possible be provided to represent her.104  Rothman 
criticised this on the ground that it could lead to bilingual lawyers taking over the functions 
                                                 
98 Groenewald (2000) supra note 6. Although criteria for a allocating some persons a lesser participant rather 
than full party status have been proposed in part 4.3.2 above, her concern will clearly remain valid for some 
cases where crowding is an issue.  
99 CJ Ross 'The Tyranny of Time: Vulnerable Children, "Bad" Mothers, and Statutory Deadlines in Parental 
Termination Proceedings' (2004) 11 Virginia Journal of Social Policy and the Law 176 at 202 noted cases 
where the assertive powers of an investigative agency are strengthened to such an extent by their legal 
representative that a vulnerable opposing parent becomes 'intimidated, inarticulate or confused' and needs a 
legal representative of her own. O'Donnell (2005) op cit note 75 at 78 & 85 similarly draws attention to the 
need for representation for parents who are completely 'outgunned' in some cases. 
100 See part 4.3.1.   
101 As noted in part 1.3.2 above the factor of language differences is important in South Africa. 
102 2005 (6) SA 50 (T). 
103 Ibid at paras 29 and 31. 
104 See the quotation in part 5.2, above. 
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of interpreters in the children's courts.105 The law commission likewise rejected the 
provision as 'unworkable in practice'.106  These criticisms do not, however, take account of 
the fact that interpreters and lawyers perform very different functions.107  Nor do they 
sufficiently appreciate the considerable advantages which clients may derive from having 
direct communication with a lawyer even outside the courtroom.108 Moreover, South 
African research findings indicate that children can be severely disadvantaged when 
compelled to rely only upon interpreters without any direct communication with their legal 
representatives.109  
 
Also, children who have appropriate language familiarity but have had a strongly 
traditional upbringing may be unable to counter completely false suggestions made in 
court because they have been taught not to disagree with adults.110 Where linguistic or 
cultural barriers are not sufficiently compensated for children sometimes withdraw 
psychologically in court and provide such minimal information that it becomes difficult for 
the adjudicator to make an appropriate decision.111  
 
  It is true that cultural or linguistic differences are common in South Africa and an 
interpreter will often suffice to overcome them.  However, where this is insufficient and 
they seriously impede parties consideration should be given to the appointment of a 
lawyer. And although it will not always be feasible wherever possible this should be a 
                                                 
105 Rothman (2001) op cit note 11 at 10. 
106 Review of the Child Care Act (2001) op cit note 20 vol 1, p100. 
107And para (g) does not state that interpreters should be displaced where bilingual lawyers represent 
children. Moreover, confusion with the role of a court interpreter is completely irrelevant where a client is 
too vulnerable to appear at all and wishes to be represented in her absence. 
108 For example, prehearing consultations with a lawyer regarding what and how a child will communicate at 
court may be crucial. Experiential and not merely linguistic factors may be relevant.  S Walker 'Consulting 
with Children and Young People' (2001) 9 International Journal of Children's Rights 45 at 54 pointed out 
that child participation research in some countries is beginning to show that many children can participate 
more effectively when interviewed by someone from their own ethnic group -or at least by someone who has 
shared similar experiences and been similarly 'conditioned by racism and other social disadvantages'. 
109 See the analysis of research in CR Matthias & FN Zaal 'Hearing Only a Faint Echo?  Interpreters and 
Children in Court' (2002) 18 SAJHR 350 especially at 354-64 & 368.  See also FN Zaal 'Hearing the Voices 
of Children in Court: a Field Study and Evaluation' in S Burman (ed) The Fate of the Child: Legal Decisions 
on Children in the New South Africa (2003) 158 at 164-66.         
110 Zaal (2003) ibid at 163; DM Chirwa 'Participation Rights: Challenging African Legislation' (2002) 6 
Children First 32. 
111 See Matthias & Zaal (2002) op cit note 109 at 355; and Zaal (2003) ibid at 183. 
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lawyer familiar with the language and/or culture of the party concerned.112  The cost of 
providing such a lawyer would often be the same as that for a lawyer unfamiliar with the 
child's mother tongue and culture.    It could even be less, since an interpreter or cultural 
expert will not be needed to assist with client-consultations.    
 
Despite the criticisms of Rothman and the law commission it would not be 
unworkable to show consideration to children who require more than just an interpreter to 
overcome a significant language or cultural barrier. As some commentators have warned, 
where racial or cultural differences obtrude between families on the one side and 
investigative agencies or courts on the other, completely incorrect decisions about 
mandatory care measures may be reached.113 In line with the contention in this chapter that 
all private parties and not only children should be viewed as potentially vulnerable the 
guideline of cultural or language disadvantage severe enough to substantially silence a 
person who wishes to communicate should be applied also in favour of adult applicants for 
subsidised representation.  
 
Disability which significantly reduces a party's ability to understand or participate 
in the proceedings114 should be a third guideline.115  Again, the eligible group should be 
persons who wish and are able with assistance to participate and have a position to convey 
to the court.  An example might be parents anxious to prove that their parenting is 
adequate, but faced with communication difficulties in court because of causes such as 
                                                 
112 There are no reported South African authorities directly in point.  But in the divorce matter Soller NO v G 
and Another 2003 (5) SA 430 (W) Satchwell J replaced a child’s lawyer with one from the same cultural 
background: see the judgment at 436H. As noted by Green & Appell (2006) op cit note 10 at 581 a viable 
alternative may sometimes be a lawyer who has relevant cross-cultural knowledge and competence.    
113 Ross (2004) op cit note 99 at 190-91; WJ Sammon Advocacy in Child Welfare Cases: A Practitioner's 
Guide (1985) 80. MCJ Olmesdahl reported instances of this in the children's courts: personal communication 
28 Oct, 2002. On linguistic and cultural barriers in South Africa see also CR Matthias 'Shadows of Apartheid 
Lingering?  Cross-cultural Work with Children in Need of Care' in S Burman (ed) (2003) op cit note 109, 
p32 especially at 40-42.  
114 Care should be taken in reaching this conclusion.  As noted in ABA comment 1 to rule 1.14 (a) of the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (2006 ed) supra note 54 a client with diminished capabilities may still 
retain an ability 'to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters'. 
115 See generally C Watkins 'Beyond Status: The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Parental Rights of 
People Labeled Developmentally Disabled or Mentally Retarded' (1995) 83 California LR 1415.  
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mental retardation116 or a speech defect.117 The effects of physical injuries or illnesses on 
communication capabilities should also be a relevant factor.118 
 
   Another special needs group who surely merit consideration is parties whose 
communication skills have been severely limited as a result of psychological trauma.119  
This category may include abused persons like children and their 'co-victim' caregivers.  
The latter are often battered mothers experiencing ongoing abuse from fathers who have 
also harmed children who are the subject of proceedings.120  US findings have shown that 
children are sometimes inappropriately removed from co-victim caregivers by courts 
which unfairly blame them for permitting the actions of the abusive caregiver.121 In Miami 
Dade County, Florida, was found that families often benefit when legal representatives 
who can correct misperceptions by courts are provided for co-victim mothers.122  
                                                 
116 On the vulnerability of parents with intellectual disabilities see further part 7.3.2, below. 
117 D McConnell & G Llewellyn 'Disability and Discrimination in Statutory Child Protection Proceedings' 
(2000) 15 Disability and Society 883 at 891-92 concluded that welfare and courts are frequently biased 
against parents with disabilities.  They further conclude, ibid at 892, that this vulnerable group will 
sometimes need additional support during care proceedings to avoid children being inappropriately removed. 
See also AC Collentine 'Respecting Intellectually Disabled Parents: a Call for Change in State Termination 
of Parental Rights Statutes' (2005) 34 Hofstra LR 535 at 536.  American judge RS Sackett  'Terminating 
Parental Rights of the Handicapped' (1991) 25 Family LQ 253 at 295-96 contended that it is particularly 
where parenting abilities are at issue that a legal representative may be able to provide valuable assistance.  
This can sometimes be done by showing that the disability can be sufficiently overcome to provide adequate 
parenting.  The lawyer may need to make a case for family support services.  This is relevant in South Africa 
since, as will be further discussed in part 8.3.2 below, under the 2005 Act our children's courts will be able to 
order such services. 
118 This is especially important at the height of an AIDS pandemic. As a foreign example, in West Virginia in 
In the Interest of Betty J.W., 371 S.E.2d 326 (W.Va. 1988) it was held by Miller J that a lawyer should have 
been appointed for a father who was unable to attend because he was in hospital. For similar cases a rule is 
required in South Africa which allows seriously ill persons to provide evidence to a children's court via 
telephonic link -and this will sometimes obviate the need for legal representation.  On the representation 
needs of mentally ill parents see N Wasow 'Planned Failure: California's Denial of Reunification Services to 
Parents with Mental Disabilities' (2006) 31 New York University Review of Law and Social Change 183 at 
222. 
119 The incidence of this problem in the South African children's courts has been noted in part 3.4.2, above. 
120 AJ Jackson 'Nicholson v. Scoppetta: Providing a Conceptual Framework for Non Criminalisation of 
Battered Mothers and Alternatives to Removal of Their Children from the Home' (2005) 33 Capital 
University LR 821 at 861. 
121 TD Lyon 'Are Battered Women Bad Mothers?  Rethinking the Termination of Abused Women's Parental 
Rights for Failure to Protect' in H Dubowitz (ed) Neglected Children: Research, Practice, and Policy (1999) 
237;  CA O'Riley, & CS Lederman J 'Co-Occurring Child Maltreatment and Domestic Violence' (2001) 10 
The Florida Bar Journal  40; and Ross (2004) op cit note 99 at 188-189. Blinn (2004) op cit note 45 at 821-
22 argues that the danger of courts overreacting to an abusive parent by removing a child from a co-victim 
who is a relatively good parent justifies legal representation in these matters. 
122 A successful strategy involving specially trained legal representatives for parallel domestic violence and 
care cases was developed there: see O'Riley & Lederman ibid. 
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Trauma may be caused or exacerbated during court proceedings themselves.  
Parties may become overwhelmed and frozen in court -for example, because they are 
terrified about being separated from loved ones.123   As Masson has pointed out, support 
from a legal representative can enable some of these parties to maintain sufficient self-
control to respond to allegations and assert their views effectively, despite the emotional 
stress they experience at hearings.124  This group should therefore also be eligible for 
consideration for subsidised representation.  As noted in part 4.2.4 above it may in some 
cases be appropriate for a presiding officer order the removal of a vulnerable party from 
court  so that she does not hear upsetting  evidence. Where there is to be substantial 
reliance on evidence which a vulnerable party will not be able to challenge in person 
because of a courtroom removal   this may strengthen the case for appointment of a legal 
representative to such party. It would minimise prejudice to her and thus accord with the 
right to a fair court hearing in s 34 the Constitution. 
 
A fifth factor which has sometimes been proposed as an indicator of whether 
representation ought to be provided at state expense is the complexity of a case.125  
However, to limit the number of applications it may be suggested that complexity should 
only apply if it substantially compromises the participatory contribution of a party. Where 
for example a novel or convoluted point of law renders the adjudicator’s decision in a case 
complex but there is no impact upon the ability of parties to deliver their evidence 
effectively, this should not count.126 Complexity should thus be evaluated in conjunction 
with the capacity of applicants for self-representation.  As it was put by Lamer CJ in the 
Canadian case of New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v G.J. 
'[w]hether it is necessary for the parent to be represented by counsel is directly 
                                                 
123 See O'Donnell (2005) op cit note 75 at 76. 
124 J Masson 'Representation of Children in England: Protecting Children in Child Protection Proceedings' 
(2000) 34 Family LQ 467 at 469. 
125 Sloth-Nielsen (2005) op cit note 17 at 535. For data indicating that some South African children's court 
commissioners favour appointments of legal representatives in complex cases see Zaal (1996) op cit note 3 at 
56. The South African law commission (2001) op cit note 20, vol 5 at 1195-96 recommended that state 
funded representation only be available in complex cases. 
126 However, as noted by JA Dunlap 'Sometimes I Feel like a Motherless Child: the Error of Pursuing 
Battered Mothers for Failure to Protect' (2004) 50 Loyola LR 565 at 611 some care cases are both 'factually 
and legally complex'. 
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proportional to the seriousness and complexity of the proceedings, and inversely 
proportional to the capacities of the parent'.127  
 
The recommended scheme of two resource-related threshold criteria and five 
applicant-focused secondary guidelines may need to be refined or expanded as experience 
with screening applications builds up over time.  However, improved and financially 
practicable guidance is clearly feasible.  A question which remains is what procedures 
should be used to implement the proposed guideline-driven decision-making.  This will be 
discussed next. 
 
5.4.2 The Appointment Process 
 
 In relation to cost-effective utilisation of precious state funding two important 
considerations are how applications for representation should be decided and who should 
provide such representation. 128  Each of these issues will be considered in turn.  On how 
applications should be decided it will be remembered that although it was never 
implemented s 8A(4) of the 1983 Act provided that presiding officers could simply order 
that a legal aid representative be appointed if they considered this to be in the best interests 
of a child.129   Under s 55(1) of the 2005 Act they will merely refer children to the local 
legal aid board office which will then make a final decision.130  This raises the question of 
whether it is better for court adjudicators to make a final ruling or else refer cases for 
consideration by another decisionmaker. 
 
 The secondary guidelines recommended in part 5.3 above would tend to manifest in 
ways that children's court magistrates would recognise.  They should usually be able to 
observe that a party is substantially unsuccessful in her efforts to participate at court.  And 
they will even in many cases be able to discern  causes such as language or speech barriers, 
                                                 
127 (1999) 177 D.L.R. (4th) 124 at 155.  
128 Although only children's court care cases will be considered below, there is a general need in our law for 
appointment mechanisms for all cases which arise in terms of s 28(1)(h) of the Constitution: see further 
Sloth-Nielsen (2005) op cit note 17 at 538. 
129 See part 5.2, above. 
130 Ibid. 
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fearfulness, damaging revelations in pre-court documentation, intimidation, low 
intellectual functioning or being significantly outmatched by an assertive opposing party.  
They will therefore frequently discern at an early stage that a party appears to need 
representational assistance although in some cases this will admittedly only become 
obvious later on.131  Although it is true that adjudicators will often be in a good position to 
make an initial assessment it may be suggested that they should then make a referral for 
further investigation rather than take the final decision themselves.  One reason for this is 
that a merely prima facie determination by adjudicators would be fairer to applicants 
whose capabilities they may later be judging.132    Also, as will be further argued the 
proposed threshold criteria would best be established outside the courtroom.     
 
Discovering whether an applicant satisfies a means test and whether sufficient state 
funds and a suitably skilled legal representative are available would require a partly 
administrative investigation and processing of applications that should not be part of a 
court hearing.  Moreover, if there is a need for representation, a children's court magistrate 
should not be deciding which particular lawyer should appear before him.133 Thus before 
referring an applicant a magistrate should merely decide whether there is a prima facie 
case for representation.  Another advantage to having an extra-curial decision-maker is that 
parties could then also make applications directly for themselves prior to proceedings 
which could save court time.   
 
This leads to the question of who would conduct the proposed further investigation 
and then make a final determination. Our existing law in the form of both s 8A(4) of the 
1983 Act and s 55(1) of the 2005 Act would require referrals to legal aid  justice centres.  
Whilst they are certainly familiar with applying financial means tests, legal aid board 
                                                 
131 For example, after available sheltered participation methods have proved insufficient. 
132 In New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v G. (J.) (1999) 177 D.L.R. (4th) 124, at 
168-69 L'Heureux-Dube`J of the supreme court of Canada warned that final decisions on legal aid criteria 
were problematic for adjudicators because this compelled them to prejudge persons whose care capabilities 
they would subsequently assess. 
133 American researchers RF Kelly & SH Ramsay 'Legal Representation for Parents and Children in Child 
Protection Proceedings: Two Empirical Models of Acquisitorial Processes and a Proposal for Reform' (1985) 
89 Dickinson LR 605 at 609 found that where lawyers are dependent on court adjudicators for possible future 
briefs their independence -and thus the vigour with which they assist clients- may be compromised. 
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representatives are not generally specialists in domestic cases involving children.134  This 
combined with the lack of uniformity and other shortcomings in their services noted earlier 
raises doubts about whether they should carry final responsibility for deciding 
applications.135  Children's court assistants based at children's courts might usefully have 
been trained as specialist application assessors but, as has already been noted, this officer 
will unfortunately cease to exist once the 2005 Act is implemented.136 
 
 In the absence of in-house capacity being created at children's courts themselves, 
the best option currently available would be to utilise our national network of family 
advocates for making final decisions on whether state subsidised legal representation 
should be provided in children's court care matters.137  Family advocates should also 
further decide in particular cases whether they themselves or other lawyers should 
represent parties. What befits them for these tasks is that they already specialise in child 
related aspects of some domestic matters such as divorce and international parental child 
abduction.138  An important additional advantage is that they routinely work jointly with 
social workers termed family counsellors.139  Not only does this mean that family 
advocates tend to understand factors which affect the welfare of children, but the family 
                                                 
134 See part 5.2, above.  
135 Parkinson (2001) op cit note 53 at 268 noted that in Australia generalist legal aid lawyers have proved to 
have a limited capacity for care case screening.  See also Howe as quoted in note 138, below. 
136 In proposals for upgrading children's courts the South African law commission (2001) op cit note 20 at 
part 2 p303 & p310; and also in its draft Children's Bill (2002) at clause 94 rightly emphasised the 
importance of a screening component staffed by well-trained middle-ranking officers.  In the USA, court 
screening sections are frequently utilized: see, for example, the reference 'court-appointed lawyers' in MR 
Forte 'Making the Case for Effective Assistance of Counsel in Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights 
Proceedings' (2003) 28 Novo LR 193 at 202-03. 
137 As noted in part 2.5, above family advocates are appointed in accordance with the Mediation in Certain 
Divorce Matters Act 24/1987.  In terms of s 2(2) of that Act it is only persons who have had sufficient 
'involvement in or experience of the adjudication or settlement of family matters' who can be appointed.   
138 The system proposed is similar to the 'Office of the Child Advocate' in Delaware. As noted by TM Culley 
'What Does It Mean to Represent Delaware' s Abused, Neglected and Dependent Children?' (2001) 4 
Delaware LR 77 at 85 it manages 'a programme to provide pro bono or contractual attorneys to represent… 
Delaware's abused, neglected and dependent children… in all relevant proceedings'. Using family advocates 
is also supported by developments in Canada. Representation in child protection cases has been successfully 
managed there by specialist child advocates since the late 1990s: see RB Howe 'Implementing Children's 
Rights in a Federal State: The Case of Canada's Child Protection System' (2002) 9 International Journal of 
Children's Rights 361. He notes at 368 ibid that part of the motivation was that generalist lawyers 'often were 
not well trained to interact with children and represent children'. 
139 Assistance by family counsellors is provided for in s 3(1) of the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act 
24/1987. 
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counsellors could play a valuable part in helping to assess the applicability of secondary 
guidelines such as those recommended in this chapter because of their social work training. 
 
 If an application for representation at state expense is successful the final question 
is who should provide it.  Since the aim must be to enable representation in all jurisdictions 
it would not be wise to confine eligibility only to family advocates -and particularly since 
they already have other responsibilities.  Also, research at Australian children's courts has 
indicated that overall quality of representation is maximised if private lawyers are amongst 
those who provide subsidised representation in children's cases.140  It has been noted above 
that the law commission proposed in 2002 that state-funded representatives should be 
drawn from a family law roster containing the names of lawyers with expertise in domestic 
matters.141  Rosters of lawyers with an interest in family litigation have been successfully 
established in a number of jurisdictions.142 They typically volunteer for special training 
and then choose the numbers of domestic-dispute cases and the jurisdictions in which they 
will appear (sometimes pro bono).143 
 
The unique nature of representation in care cases and the importance of lawyers 
who have specialist expertise has been appreciated in some systems even to the extent of 
recognising a right to competent representation.144  Failure by states to provide competent 
subsidised lawyers may lead to court decisions being challenged as invalid.145 In South 
Africa the need for competent representation will be even greater   when the 2005 Act is 
                                                 
140 McConnell & Llewellyn (2000) op cit note 117 at 883. 
141 See part 5.2. 
142 Blinn (2004) op cit note 45 at 836 notes the examples of New Jersey, New York and Ontario.  
143 Ibid. 
144  In L.W. v Department of Children and Families 812 So. 2d (2002) 551 at 554 Florida’s first district court 
of appeal held that there was a right to competent representation.  It cited recognition of this in an 
'overwhelming' number of US jurisdictions. On the right to competent counsel in the US see also MD 
Bustamante J 'Incorporating the Law of Criminal Procedure in Termination of Parental Rights Cases: Giving 
Children a Voice through Matthews v Eldridge' (2002) 32 New Mexico LR 143 at 164-65; Telfer (2004) op 
cit note 95 at 164; and Green & Appell (2006) op cit note 10 at 587. In Australia Sheehan (2001) op cit note 
2 at 189-90 concluded that quality of legal representation often made a crucial difference in achieving 
constructive outcomes. English researchers Lindley, Richards & Freeman (2001) op cit note 69 at 325 
concluded (although not only in relation to lawyers) that 'an advocate working in child protection needs to 
have specialist knowledge and experience of the law and practice in this field'.  
145 Telfer ibid; Forte (2003) op cit note 136 at 202-05. 
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fully implemented.146  Waldfogel has commented that in systems where legislation 
requires courts to customise social services for particular families the work of lawyers 
becomes even more specialised.147 As will be shown in part 8.3.2 below it is precisely such 
solutions that will be required under the 2005 Act. 
 
A simple and workable system would be to allow any lawyers to become eligible to 
act as state representatives by attending a short course covering relevant aspects of ADR, 
child welfare methodologies and locally available care services.148  Upon completion of 
the course they should also have to observe a set number of hours of children's court 
hearings. Once sufficient lawyers had become qualified new lawyers could be required to 
observe cases in which experienced lawyers are involved. Gradually, eligibility 
requirements could be improved in the longer term.  
                                                
 
 If initial requirements are kept manageable, all family advocates and a significant 
proportion of legal aid justice centre and private lawyers should hopefully find it 
practicable to qualify. If support can be obtained from community-minded members of the 
profession through bodies such as the Bar Council and Law Societies149 and a practice 
code for lawyers is developed as proposed in part 5.3 it should become possible to 
overcome the problem of ineffective lawyers and improve the current rates of 
representation in the children's courts. It might even prove feasible to encourage some 
private lawyers to fulfil roster requirements as a form of community service pro bono or 
for a reduced fee.       
 
 
146 There is currently no reported South African precedent which specifically supports a need for competent 
representation in care cases. However, in the divorce matter of Soller op cit note 112 at 438B-D Satchwell J 
found it necessary to arrange for a child to have a highly competent lawyer.  
147 J Waldfogel 'Protecting Children in the 21st Century' (2000) 34 Family LQ 311 at 323. 
148 Special training on child welfare is a requirement for state-appointed lawyers who represent children in 
care cases in Delaware: see Culley (2001) op cit note 138 at 85.  On the need for this see also Lindley, 
Richards & Freeman (2001) op cit note 69 at 326-27. 
149 Masson (2000) op cit note 124 at 479 noted that in England it was the Law Society which responded to a 
shortage of lawyers with sufficient experience in representing children at care proceedings. In 1984 it set up 
training courses and arranged a 'Children's Panel' so that only lawyers who had been specially trained, tested 
and selected could henceforth represent children in such proceedings. The Bar Council and Law Societies in 
South Africa are in principle willing to increase levels of pro bono representation of vulnerable children: see 
E Bertelsmann J Report on the National Initiative on the Reduction of Overcrowding in Detention Centres 
Activities for the Year 2007 (2007) p2. 
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The problem of privately appointed legal representatives who appear only 
notionally for children because they are paid for by parents150 requires special 
consideration. Waiting to see how a lawyer behaves and then possibly terminating his 
services as recommended in clause 78(2)(b) of the 2002 draft Children's Bill is not an ideal 
solution.  It is contrary to the approach long established for civil magistrates’ courts.151 In 
cases of seriously inappropriate behaviour by any lawyer civil court magistrates are 
expected to inform the Bar Council or Law Society.152 This would be sufficient for 
children's courts if lawyers will in future need to retain their places on a roster. Applying 
the drastic alternative of termination partway through proceedings as proposed by the law 
commission might disrupt working relationships which children have formed with persons 
whom they trust and delay proceedings. It might also deter some lawyers from acting with 
maximum vigour and independence because of fears of dismissal.153   
 
In cases where a lawyer’s fees are to be paid for by a different party from the client, 
the paying party should not have the right to choose the lawyer.154  Instead, the money 
should be paid to a fund kept at the local family advocates’ office, which would then select 
a roster representative.  This process could also be followed in referrals by magistrates or 
direct applications for subsidisation where the ordinary legal aid means test indicates that a 
guardian or spouse of an impoverished applicant is sufficiently wealthy to pay for 
representation.   
 
 
 
                                                 
150 See part 5.2, above. 
151 In a commentary on s 20 of the Magistrates' Court Act 32/1944 HJ Erasmus & DE Van Loggerenberg 
Jones and Buckle: the Civil Practice of the Magistrates' Courts in South Africa (2004) vol 1 p29 concluded 
that this provision provides parties with a right to have their legal representative 'carry to completion' any 
legal proceedings. 
152 Under s 23 of the Magistrates' Court Act which is entitled 'Misconduct of practitioners'. 
153 This has been found to be a negative consequence in some US jurisdictions where adjudicators have 
extensive powers to control which lawyers may appear before them in care cases: see Kelly & Ramsey 
(1985) op cit note 133 at 609. 
154 Article 9 of the European Convention on the Exercise of Children's Rights 1996 provides for a separate 
process for appointing a representative to a child in any situation where holders of parental responsibilities 
have a conflict of interest. 
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 5.5 Conclusion 
  
 Whilst legal representation is potentially a valuable resource for supporting the 
participatory capacity of parties and more generally improving children's court services the 
review of South African law and practice in this chapter reveals grounds for concern.  
Available data indicates that lawyers currently appear in very few children's court cases. 
When they do, they are often ineffective and occasionally even obstructive in the 
achievement of an appropriate outcome. The poor performance of many South African 
lawyers can be attributed to a system which provides insufficient guidance on their 
functions. 
 
 It has been shown that what is needed to improve lawyers’ performance is proper 
direction that takes account of the specialised nature of care matters. In broad terms, a 
primarily client-directed model is what is required.  Thus the legal representatives of 
sufficiently capable children or other private parties should be confined to putting forward, 
defending and advocating their clients’ wishes and versions of evidence, subject to a duty 
to reveal new information which indicates a danger of serious harm to the child or any 
other person. 
 
 A client-directed model is not contradictory to the paramountcy of the best interests 
of the child as established in s 28(2) of the Constitution.  In seeing that the voices of 
vulnerable parties with communication difficulties are properly heard lawyers would help 
to place our children's courts in possession of full and accurate versions of the evidence -
and this will assist them in making decisions that are genuinely in the best interests of 
children. Lawyers undertaking the task of conveying the evidence of private parties should 
not be simultaneously expected to put forward what is in the best interests of the child 
from a neutral position.  Imposing such a contradictory and dual role will simply continue 
the existing problem of ineffective representation. 
 
Where a lawyer is needed to assert a child’s best interests from a neutral position 
the ideal solution is for such lawyer to appear as a representative of welfare.  In a model 
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where the investigative agency, a possible legal representative for the agency and a 
children's court presiding officer applying inquisitorial powers can all seek to establish the 
best interests of the child a quite sufficient proportion of resources will have been allocated 
directly to this function. 
 
 The differentiation in their primary orientation according to which clients are 
represented as proposed in this chapter could provide a practicable framework for a 
lawyers’ code of practice which is urgently needed.  Such a code would help to create 
uniform standards and improve overall quality of representation.  However, the second 
problem of how to increase the proportion of cases in which lawyers appear would still 
remain.  The pervasive poverty which affects families involved in care matters means that 
the only solution is an effective mechanism for state-subsidised representation. Section 
28(1)(h) of the Constitution, in requiring such representation for children in any civil case 
where substantial injustice would otherwise result, is so broadly worded that it needs to be 
supplemented with more detailed criteria. As regards the form of these, it has been shown 
that our recent legislative history indicates that binding grounds which confer an absolute 
right to representation regardless of available state resources need to be avoided. 
 
 An effective system for state-financed representation must include discretionary 
guidelines rather than grounds if it is to be sustainable in the long-term.  It is essential that 
local availability of both the necessary funds and sufficiently skilled lawyers be established 
as threshold criteria.  Since only a few parties can be provided with lawyers at state 
expense it is also essential that additional secondary guidelines be formulated to further 
narrow down the number of persons represented.  This must be done so as to direct 
representation resources to applicants who can benefit most from these. However, the 
criterion of hearing the voices of all core persons involved indicates that the guidelines 
must not be age-limited. 
 
 It has been shown in this chapter that by drawing on local and foreign experience it 
is possible to formulate a test mechanism for selecting suitable secondary guidelines.  
These must identify persons who need to communicate relevant information at court but 
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are substantially disadvantaged by communication barriers too serious to overcome by 
other available means.  A corollary is that representation must be reasonably likely to be 
successful in overcoming those barriers.  Applying this test it has been recommended that 
five suitable secondary guidelines are:  extreme inequality between parties in advocacy 
capabilities, serious linguistic or cultural barriers; and disability, psychological trauma or 
exceptional case complexity which inhibit participation.   
 
Significant communication barriers resulting from these causes will generally be 
discernible before or early in court proceedings. Children's court magistrates are well 
placed to recognise possible candidates for subsidised representation. However, they 
should only make a prima facie determination.  It is family advocates who should make 
final decisions -and these should be on direct applications as well as referrals from 
magistrates. Family advocates are appropriate both because of their own potential to 
develop specialist expertise and the assistance readily available to them from family 
counsellors.   
 
Although family advocates should also be empowered to actually undertake 
representation of clients they select, they must also be able to utilise legal aid justice 
centres or private lawyers.  This is in order to have sufficient lawyers available and 
because experience in developed systems shows that a wider choice assists the quality of 
subsidised representation.  Both experience in such systems and local difficulties in our 
own children's courts reveal that competence is a crucial issue. It is therefore essential that 
only lawyers with at least some specialist training be eligible for state appointments.  
 
 In order to encourage some private lawyers to become appropriately qualified state 
fees should be realistic and support from their professional associations should be sought.  
Training requirements for all lawyers should initially be modest, but could be developed as 
the numbers of specialist representatives are increased over time. In conclusion, it is clear 
that feasible means can be developed for addressing the two fundamental problems of 
quality and sufficiency of legal representation in children's court care proceedings. In the 
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next chapter, attention is turned to how a different group of professionals -presiding 
officers themselves- also need their role to be clarified and developed.
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CHAPTER 6 
THE ROLE OF ADJUDICATORS: PUTTING THE CASE FOR A NEW 
APPROACH IN THE CHILDREN'S COURTS 
 
6.1  Introduction   
 
Because of the resource constraints in South Africa even if the proposals in the 
previous chapter are implemented many parties will continue to be unrepresented in 
children's court care cases.  For them the only person available to support and guide their 
testimony may be the presiding officer.  In this chapter the role of adjudicators in ensuring 
that appropriate voices are heard is explored. It will be suggested that although presiding 
officers could potentially do a great deal to assist with communication our law requires 
major development. The chapter is divided into two main parts.  Part 6.2 provides a critical 
evaluation of current South African law governing the functions of children's court 
presiding officers in care cases. Part 6.3 contains some proposals on how it should be 
substantially reformed and extended. 
 
 In part 6.2.1 it is shown that a basic shortcoming which has for many decades 
impeded the work of children's court magistrates is inadequate guidance on the procedures 
to be followed at hearings. In part 6.2.2 it is demonstrated more specifically that despite 
the unique nature of the work involved our law provides little coverage on magistrates’ 
functions in care cases.  In part 6.2.3 local empirical data and accounts of practitioners are 
analysed to discover the consequences. Particular attention is paid to the effects of a vague 
and limited legislative framework on attempts by persons appearing in the children's courts 
to communicate. It is concluded that there is now a strong case for enabling presiding 
officers to specialise and furnishing them with rules that will provide better guidance on 
their duties in court.  In part 6.2.4 the capacity of the 2005 Act to address the main 
problems with the role of adjudicators is evaluated. It is shown that the wording of the Act 
is inadequate and that therefore amendments and also more detailed supplementary 
provisions are needed.  
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The nature of the reforms required is considered in part 6.3. Reference is made to 
both the South African situation and, by means of some comparative and cross-disciplinary 
analysis, to what has been found to be effective in developed systems elsewhere. Particular 
attention is paid to Australia where challenges for adjudicators in children's courts are 
similar to our own, and generally to systems confronted with analogous transformation 
requirements because of historically-similar court traditions to South Africa. 
 
It is shown in part 6.3.1 that there are strong arguments in favour of requiring 
children's court adjudicators to become much more active in managing care proceedings. It 
is specifically argued that they must be directed to adopt a primarily inquisitorial function. 
It is further proposed that this core directive must be amplified by more detailed legislative 
guidance indicating how the inquisitorial role should be implemented in specific situations.  
The nature of this guidance is discussed in part 6.3.2. 
 
6.2  Role-Confusion: An Overview of Its Origins and Consequences  
 
Magistrates serving as commissioners of child welfare in the South African 
children's courts currently operate with little guidance about how they should function 
during hearings. As will be shown in the next part below uncertainty about their role is just 
one aspect of a broader lack of clarity about children's court procedures generally.  
Children's courts function as part of magistrates’ court centres with little separate identity. 
Commissioners work without their own dedicated set of procedural rules.  They are 
expected to use their discretion in drawing upon the rules of ordinary civil magistrates’ 
courts.  As will be seen this has led to confusion.   
 
 It will further be shown that although only limited data is available there is 
sufficient information to prove that the confusion about procedures generally and 
adjudicative role functions in particular has been prejudicial to many persons involved in 
care proceedings. It has resulted in serious barriers to effective participation by children 
and other family members.  This assertion will be substantiated with local research 
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findings and anecdotal accounts of South African practitioners with substantial children's 
court experience. 
 
6.2.1  Inadequate Development of Procedural Law  
 
  To appreciate the difficulties concerning the role of commissioners in care cases it 
is necessary to understand how procedural law has developed in the children's courts. 
When they were formally established in terms of the Children's Act 31/1937 they were 
provided with only a limited list of some briefly-worded procedural and evidential rules.1 
These enabled them to hold care hearings concerning children (referred to as 'enquiries') at 
which parties would have 'the same rights and powers as a party to a civil action in a 
magistrate’s court in respect of the examination of witnesses, the production of evidence 
and of address to the court'.2  Although civil magistrates’ court practice was thus imported, 
the rules did create two special capabilities for presiding magistrates.  They were expressly 
empowered to call or recall witnesses mero motu and accept uncontested written reports as 
documentary evidence.3  It was thus recognised that the nature of children's court work 
required a modified approach to information gathering. 
 
 Under the 1937 Act, except for the two variations mentioned above, formal rules 
of procedure and accusatorial functions for magistrates identical to those in the 
contemporary civil magistrates' courts applied in the children's courts.  And children's 
courts remained accommodated at and were part of magistrates’ court centres. Until the 
early 1950s there was a degree of separate identity, however. As has been noted, this was 
because individually selected magistrates were encouraged to specialise in children's court 
work.4  It was generally agreed within the department of justice that the children's courts 
functioned well under these dedicated, often full-time adjudicators.5 Van Reenen indicated 
that during this period children did appear in court.6  He noted that when they did so the 
                                                 
1 Rules 8-11 of the Rules of Court and Regulations promulgated under s 86 of the Children's Act 31/1937. 
2 Ibid, r 8. 
3 Ibid, r 10 & r 11, respectively.  
4 See part 2.3.3, above. 
5 Hoexter J Commission of Inquiry into the Structure and Functioning of the Courts (RP 78/1983) 493. 
6 TH Van Reenen Handbook on the Children's Act (1953) 6. 
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specialist magistrates tended to be successful in balancing the required formality with 'a 
simplified procedure, which a child can readily understand, and with a more friendly 
atmosphere… in the nature of a discussion in the child's interests, rather than a trial'.7  
 
It will be remembered, however, that the nationalist government ended full-time 
presiding officers and began rotating magistrates between the children's and other courts.8  
The absence of a comprehensive set of dedicated procedural rules was now felt as ordinary 
magistrates’ court procedures began to predominate and many children's courts functioned 
less effectively.9 However, as noted in chapter 2, the nationalist government was primarily 
concerned about using the children's courts to assist with racial segregation.10  It is thus not 
surprising that attention was not devoted to fashioning a separate procedural dispensation 
to provide comprehensive guidance for the often less experienced magistrates now 
working in these courts. 
 
When the 1937 Children's Act was repealed the brief list of summary procedural 
and evidential rules provided under it was re-enacted almost verbatim as an adjunct to the 
Children's Act 33/1960.11 In 1964, in considering the position under the 1960 Act it was 
decided by Marais J in the supreme court case of Napolitano v De Wet, N. O. And Others 
in relation specifically to children's court care hearings that a rather different approach 
from the friendly discussions noted by Van Rensburg was required.  He stated that: 
'At an enquiry the issue is whether the circumstances of the child in question are such as to justify 
interference by the State.  It may be entirely ex parte, as in the case of a deserted child; normally it 
would be a dispute between the custodian of the child and the State, and evidence would be adduced 
by the custodian against the allegations of the State, and on behalf of the State by the children's 
court assistant.'12 
 
This indicated that contested proceedings should be adversarial and that children's court 
assistants (as officers who provided general support at these courts) were required to lead 
                                                 
7 Ibid.  
8 See part 2.4.2, above. 
9 Hoexter Commission (1983) op cit note 5 at 493. 
10 See parts 2.4.2-3, above. 
11 See r 8 of the 'Children’s Courts’ Rules and Regulations' in Government Notice No. R.523 of 30 March, 
1961 as contained in Government Gazette Extraordinary No. 6659 (Regulation Gazette No. 93) of 30 March, 
1961. 
12 Napolitano v De Wet, N.O. and Others 1964 (4) SA 337 (T) at 344D. 
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evidence on behalf of the state. The implication was that presiding magistrates should 
generally apply an accusatorial function because they would not need to derive evidence 
directly for themselves during hearings.  
 
As will be remembered from the reference to this judgment earlier13 Marais J in 
Napolitano also held that children's courts were 'bound in the main to observe all the rules 
of … procedure commonly observed by other courts of law'.14   And he expressly rejected 
the idea 'that they might pardonably function less formally than any other court of law'.15 
As has been pointed out, he concluded that children's courts must proceed in the same 
manner as other courts to the extent that '[w]hat would, generally speaking, constitute a 
reviewable irregularity in the latter would have the same consequences in the case of 
proceedings of a children's court'.16 From a procedural perspective, the conclusions of 
Marais J clearly did not support a relaxed and interventionist approach for adjudicators in 
children's court care proceedings.  
 
The judgment of Marais J was confirmed on appeal in Napolitano v Commissioner 
of Child Welfare, Johannesburg.17 But in this decision Holmes JA unfortunately provided 
rather a mixed signal.  On the one hand, he held  that an inquiry under s 30 to determine 
whether a child was a child in need of care  'is a much more informal proceeding'  than an 
adoption application in a children's court.18 However, he also expressly confirmed that 
children's courts must be subject to review for any procedural irregularities.19 It was this 
second message that was most strongly received by other supreme court judges 
considering appeals, and the Napolitano judgments were subsequently taken by them as 
requiring substantial conformity wherever possible with civil magistrates’ court 
procedures.20  
                                                 
13 In part 2.3.4, above. 
14 Napolitano op cit note 12 at 342F. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid at 344A.  
17 1965 (1) SA 742 (A). 
18 Ibid at 745G. 
19 Ibid at 745F.  
20 In Snyder en Andere v Steenkamp en Andere 1974 (4) SA 82 (N) at 87 D-G, and J and Another v 
Commissioner of Child Welfare, Durban 1979 (1) SA 219 (N) at 222E. 
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  When the Children's Act 33/1960 was replaced by the 1983 Act the list of 
children's court rules was not re-enacted a third time.21 The idea of a separate body of rules 
governing procedures in these courts therefore fell away completely. However, as will be 
further discussed below, some new procedural rules were included amongst the substantive 
provisions in the 1983 Act. Some features of previous law, such as the description of care 
hearings as 'inquiries'22 and the expectation that children's courts should mainly borrow 
from the procedures of ordinary civil magistrates’ courts, were preserved in the Act.   
 
 Section 13(3) of the 1983 Act refers to the holding of a care inquiry 'in the 
prescribed manner'.  However, the Act does not 'prescribe' in the sense of including any 
detailed instructions on the conduct of proceedings.23  What it does do is lay down a 
general rule in s 9(1) that '[s]ave as is otherwise provided in this Act or in any other law' 
the provisions of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32/1944 and the rules made under it 'shall 
apply mutatis mutandis' to children's court proceedings, in so far as those provisions relate 
to: 
'(i) the appointment and functions of officers; 
(ii) the issue and service of process; 
(iii) the appearance in Court of advocates and attorneys; 
(iv) the conduct of proceedings; 
(v) the execution of judgments; and 
(vi)the imposition of penalties for non-compliance with orders of Court, for obstruction of execution 
of judgments and for contempt of court… ' 
 
The effect of this is to continue the importation to children's courts of the processes used in 
ordinary civil magistrates’ courts.   
 
The Magistrates’ Courts Act and the rules published under it provide a substantial 
body of procedural directions which have developed over many decades. However, the 
inclusion of the words 'mutatis mutandis' in s 9(1) of the 1983 Act showed some 
recognition of the different nature of children's court work.  It left the precise extent of the 
                                                 
21 The 1961 'Children’s Courts’ Rules and Regulations' had been published as part of the regulations to the 
Children's Act 33/1960 as provided for under s 92 of that Act.  Since they were not re-enacted they ceased to 
have effect when the Children's Act was repealed. 
22 See ss 13-15. The 1937 Act had used the spelling 'enquiries'. 
23 Section 8 of the Act is entitled 'Procedure in Children's Courts'.  However, it does not deal with the conduct 
of proceedings in court.  It refers to extraneous aspects such as where children's courts shall sit, persons who 
may attend, the service of subpoenas and witness fees. 
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applicability of the Magistrates’ Courts Act uncertain.  Mutatis mutandis has unfortunately 
not been judicially considered specifically in relation to s 9(1).  Its internationally well 
known meaning denoting a broad discretion to make alterations as required by changed 
circumstances24 has, however, been approved by our courts in a variety of other contexts.25   
 
 What has remained entirely uncertain under s 9(1) of the 1983 Act is the scope of 
commissioners’ discretion to alter procedures created by the mutatis mutandis proviso. 
And unfortunately no contemporary direction on this question has ever been obtained from 
higher courts. In the absence of such, the Napolitano judgments have continued to be cited 
by some commissioners as the leading precedents on procedure in the children's courts.26 
Being an interpretation of the wording of a repealed Act they are, strictly speaking, no 
longer binding.  However, in some important respects the 1983 legislation is exactly the 
same. As noted above it continues to refer to care proceedings as inquiries and perpetuates 
ordinary civil magistrates’ court processes as a primary point of reference for children's 
courts. In an interpretation vacuum and with a continuance of relatively similar legislation 
it is not surprising that Napolitano gained an extended life as an aid to applying s 9(1) for 
some commissioners. 27 
 
 A major difficulty which arose from continuing to apply Napolitano to care 
proceedings was the mixed nature of its messages.  Not surprisingly, children's court 
                                                 
24 Mutatis mutandis is in use in various contexts in many legal systems and tends to mean 'the necessary 
changes having been made': see BA Garner A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage (1987) at 368. 
25 In South African Fabrics Ltd v Millman 1972 (4) SA 592 (A) at 600C it was held that '[t]he words mutatis 
mutandis mean subject to the necessary alterations'. The meaning of mutatis mutandis in s 25 of Prevention 
and Treatment of Drug Dependency Act 20/1992 was considered in In re Afrikaner [1996] 2 All SA 298 (C).  
In Waymark and Others v Meeg Bank Ltd [2003] 1 All SA 518 (Tk) the meaning '[s]ubject to the necessary 
alterations in the changed circumstances' was applied. For earlier cases, see RD Claassen   Dictionary of 
Legal Words and Phrases (1997) vol 3 at p M-74. 
26 De VM Horak  'The Abused Child as a Child in Need of Care: the Role of the Children's Court' in RR 
Graser & WS Winship (eds) Child Abuse -a Southern African Problem (1984) 109 at 113; MM Eckard 
Geldigheidsvereistes in Kinderhofondersoeke by Versorgingsverrigtinge Ingevolge Artikel 13 en 
Aannemingsaansoeke Ingevolge Artikel 18 Van Die Wet Op Kindersorg, 74 Van 1983 (1988) 63; B Van 
Heerden 'Judicial Interference with the Parental Power: The Protection of Children' in B Van Heerden, A 
Cockrell & R Keightly et al,  Boberg’s Law of Persons and the Family (1999) 497 at 621.  
27 As pointed out by MW McConnell 'Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism and 
Originalism?' (2006) 119 Harvard LR 2387 at 2389-90, 2400 & 2414-15 where there are intransigent 
interpretative difficulties a typical reaction by some presiding officers is to become originalist in the sense of 
looking backwards in historical time for precedents which others might regard as outdated. 
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commissioners became divided into two camps utilising very different approaches.28  On 
the one hand there were those who felt that they had a broad license to deviate from civil 
magistrates’ court procedures. They drew support from the fact that 'enquiry' had been 
interpreted in the Napolitano appeal as permitting informal care proceedings and from the 
broad meaning of 'mutatis mutandis' in s 9(1).29 On the other hand, there were many 
commissioners who gave more weight to the Napolitano dicta which required conformity 
with civil magistrates’ court processes on pain of being negatively reviewed by a higher 
court.30 This was of course also a convenient solution since it required little adaptation of 
their methods as they rotated between courts. As noted by senior magistrate Horak in 1984 
commissioners in this conformist group insisted that proceedings must remain formal and 
predominantly adversarial.31 They thus attempted as far as possible to ensure that 
children's court care hearings indeed proceeded as if they were trials in the civil 
magistrates’ courts.32  
a very serious adverse effect on the child or others involved in a children's court 
nquiry'.33 
 
 
The divergence in approaches by the two groups of commissioners had some 
unfortunate consequences.  In 1983 it was asserted before the Hoexter Commission that 
'[t]he complete lack of any kind of uniformity in approaches of the commissioners leads to 
confusion and real distress on the part of children and families, and indeed, on occasions 
can lead to 
e
This situation still exists.  Research by Matthias indicated that in the late 1990s 
there was a considerable lack of uniformity in different jurisdictions, and sometimes 
amongst different commissioners in the same jurisdiction.34 She even found instances of 
                                                 
28 See Hoexter Commission (1983) op cit note 5 at 480-81. 
e establishment of this approach see Van Heerden (1999) op cit note 26 at 621.  
les of different procedures followed. 
29 For th
30 Horak (1984) op cit note 26 at 113. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Hoexter Commission (1983) cit note 5 at 481. 
34 C Matthias Removal of Children and the Right to Family Life: South African Law and Practice (1997) 46-
48 provided examp
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individual commissioners changing their processes from case to case.35  In corroboration 
of the Hoexter commission submission more than ten years earlier she found that 
unpredictability about how hearings would be conducted continued to cause difficulties for 
investigative social workers and other persons who appeared at care inquiries.36 As further 
evidence that confusion reigned during this period, in 1998 the then department of welfare 
found itself constrained to note in a practice guide for social workers that only a tentative 
outline of children's court procedures could be provided because individual commissioners 
decided on their own approaches.37  
ormal 
proceed issioners could impose individually-tailored procedures.38  
e 
ngoing situation of unclarity about procedures generally is clearly a matter for concern. 
.2.2  Confusing Direction on the Role of Adjudicators 
 
Anecdotal accounts by practitioners with substantial children's court experience are 
consistent in indicating that the absence of uniformity in procedures has continued in the 
new millennium.  Attorney Essack, for example, observed a continuation of the divergence 
between the two groups of commissioners who preferred, respectively, formal, 
predominantly adversarial proceedings based on the magistrates’ courts, and inf
ings where comm
 
Not all commissioners are comfortable with their freedom to conform to civil 
magistrates’ courts or else craft solutions of their own on the basis of mutatis mutandis.  In 
2005 Rothman, in conducting training sessions for commissioners based throughout the 
country, noted a widespread feeling amongst them that they had been procedurally 'left in 
the dark'.39  In view of the importance of the functions carried out by children's courts th
o
 
6
                                                 
35 One respondent interviewed by Matthias complained that even where the same commissioner presided 'the 
commissioner changes the rules from one case to the next which makes it very difficult for the social worker'.  
See ibid at 47-48.  
36 Ibid at 47. 
37 Department of Welfare Information Guide for Social Workers on the Practical Application of the Child 
Care Act 74 of 1983, As Amended and Regulations (1998) 49. 
38  M Essack 'The Role of the Lawyer in Children's Court Proceedings' (Unpublished Masters seminar paper, 
University of Durban-Westville 4 Sept 2002) 2.  See further the observations of practitioners see part 6.2.2, 
below.  
39 DS Rothman 'The Functioning of Children's Courts' (Visiting lecture: University of KwaZulu-Natal 8 Sept 
2005).  
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 On the question specifically of how commissioners should function during 
children's court hearings the 1983 Act and regulations published under it unfortunately 
provided signals that were at least as mixed as those which flowed from Napolitano.  The 
statement in s 9(1) of this Act that the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32/1944 is to apply 'mutatis 
mutandis' to the 'functions of officers' and 'the conduct of proceedings' arguably indicates 
an accu
patently unrealistic. The sheer 
powerlessness and vulnerability of most children and parents involved in care proceedings 
would 
ing to promote contestation as is done in regs 5(3)-(4) and 10(1)(b)  by requiring 
parties to offer challenges. These regulations also do not empower commissioners to 
                                                
satorial function and limited management of adversarial proceedings since this is 
the approach the latter Act establishes for ordinary civil magistrates’ courts.  
 
Regulations 5(3)-(4) and 10(1)(b) published in terms of the 1983 Act40 expressly 
support a passive-accusatorial function because they direct commissioners to accept 
evidence which is not challenged in cross-examination as valid.41  The requirement that 
vulnerable parties (including presumably children) who typically appear at care hearings 
must challenge assertions they disagree with and that commissioners should draw an 
adverse inference against them if they do not is 
in many cases render it absurd for a commissioner to draw such a conclusion unless, 
of course, the party concerned was legally-represented.  
 
It is one thing to accept that adversarial phases may sometimes have to be allowed 
in care proceedings when there is no other way to establish the truth; but it is altogether 
another th
 
40 Regulations 5(3)-(4) were inserted by Government Gazette 18770 (GN R416 of 31 Mar 1998). Regulation 
10(1)(b) was part of the original regulations: see Regulation Gazette 4030 (GN R 2612, GG 10546 of 12 Dec 
1986). 
41 Regulation 5(3) requires that parties be given the opportunity to cross-examine the writer of any 
authoritative report that has been accepted by a court.  The purpose is 'to refute any statement appearing 
therein'. This clearly envisages a formal, adversarial approach and consequently creates uncertainty about the 
extent to which an amicable atmosphere should be maintained. Regulation 5(4) strongly promotes an 
adversarial approach.  It requires the commissioner to 'clearly explain to a party… the consequences of a 
failure to refute a statement appearing in a report referred to in subregulation (1)'. This is supported by reg 
10(1)(b) which provides that commissioners must note 'reports, documents and submissions' for which 'the 
contents were not disputed'. 
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interve
ain 
care he ring implies at least some inquisitorial powers for commissioners. It could thus be 
claimed
ross-examine any person who adduces evidence for or on behalf of any 
party'.  Also, reg 4(4)(b) allows the commissioner to 'examine any person who is present 
althoug
has more recently noted widespread uncertainty about the specific aspect of the extent to 
ne to cure ineffective questioning of witnesses, but simply add to the confusion in 
our law. 
 
Since ordinary magisterial conduct of proceedings is merely a reference for 
children's courts in terms of s 9(1) of the 1983 Act an alternative interpretation is that there 
is scope for commissioners to take on an inquisitorial rather than accusatorial function. At 
the time when the Act was being finalised the Hoexter Commission proposed that a more 
inquisitorial approach was appropriate for cases involving children.42  In line with this, it 
could be argued that the term 'inquiry' as used in the 1983 Act to refer to a dispositive m
a
 that it enables them to 'enter the arena' and question parties and witnesses to the 
extent needed to establish the best option for the child who is the subject of the case.43 
 
 Regulation 4(5) published in terms of the 1983 Act expressly provided 
commissioners with some powers of an inquisitorial nature.44  This states that a 'children's 
court… may c
h not summonsed' and to 're-examine any person who has already been 
examined'.45   
 
Given the mixed signals and different possible interpretations of the 1983 Act and 
regulations it is not surprising that empirical findings in 1996 indicated profound concern 
amongst many commissioners about what they saw as a confused duality of expectations 
about their role-functions.46  Rothman, in providing in-service training for commissioners, 
                                                 
42 Hoexter Commission (1983) op cit note 5 at 482 & 523. 
43 Even under the accusatorial system as utilised in civil and criminal courts in South Africa it is accepted 
that adjudicating officers have a right to conduct limited questioning of witnesses, including putting leading 
questions: see A St Q Skeen & SE Van Der Merwe 'Oral Evidence' in PJ Schwikkard & SE Van Der Merwe 
tion Gazette 4030 (GN R 2612, GG 10546 of 12 Dec 1986). 
ers in the Children's Courts? (1996) 13-14. 
(main authors) Principles of Evidence (2002) 337 at 349. 
44 Regula
45 Ibid. 
46 FN Zaal Do Children Need Lawy
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which they are entitled to intervene during the presentation of evidence by parties.47 A 
consequence has been that commissioners tend to select personal-management styles along 
a spectrum ranging between opposite extremes of active-inquisitorial or else passive-
accusat
issioners to require 
vestigative social workers to go through their reports with the parties (and any legal 
51  
 
6.2.3  
ers who believe they must follow a predominantly accusatorial approach 
orial approaches when presiding.48   
 
Attorneys Essack and Wessels observed, for example, a variety of responses by 
commissioners to viva voce substantiation of investigative social workers’ reports during 
care hearings.49 Some commissioners take on a strongly inquisitorial role and question 
social workers in detail.  Others preserve an accusatorial function by assigning their 
children's court assistant or clerk to lead oral testimony by the social worker and to conduct 
re-examination if any other party disagrees with evidence thus presented.  Yet other 
commissioners simply ask the parties whether anyone disagrees with anything in the 
investigative report.  If no one expresses an objection the social worker may be excused 
from giving any oral evidence at all.50  A further variation is for comm
in
representatives) outside court immediately before the inquiry.
The Negative Consequences of Inadequate Direction 
 As noted earlier, where parties do appear in court there may be fertile ground for 
fiercely adversarial confrontations because parents appreciate that their children may be 
removed and are in contest with welfare services or each other.52 Essack has commented 
that commission
                                                 
47 Rothman (2005) supra note 39. 
48 Attorney T-L D Wessels: personal communication, 16 June 2004; commissioner A Bacharam 'A Children's 
Court Field Study' (unpublished Masters research paper, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 18 Oct 2004) 1; and 
social worker G Job: personal communication 21 Oct 2004. Researchers D McConnell, G Llewellyn & L 
Ferronato 'Disability and Decision-making in Australian Care Proceedings' (2002) 16 International Journal 
of Law, Policy and the Family 270 at 278 noted  exactly the same consequence of insufficiently clear 
legislation in New South Wales, Australia.  Here too, children's court magistrates chose whether they would 
l manner -with the latter often disadvantaging vulnerable 
) op cit note 38 at 3. 
work in a predominantly inquisitorial or adversaria
parties. 
49 Wessels ibid; Essack (2002
50 Wessels ibid. 
51 Job (2004) supra note 48. 
52 See part 3.4.2, above. 
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tend to
sively hostile cross-examination by opposing parties or their lawyers where 
commissioners adopted an entirely passive-accusatorial role.54  And as noted earlier, even 
experie
ts.     
Practitioners with experience in these courts have expressed the view that a primary cause 
                                                
 sit back and allow hostility to take its course as a supposedly necessary part of the 
proceedings.53  
Emotions may run particularly high where a person's competence as a parent is in 
question.  Olmesdahl, when appearing as a legal representative in the children's courts 
during the period 1988-2002, noted frequent instances of family members being subjected 
to inten
nced social workers are sometimes intimidated where adversarialism is given free 
rein. 55  
Of particular concern are stresses on children where commissioners view their 
function as noninterventionist.56 In 1989, in an investigation of the situation of child 
witnesses in the South African courts generally, the law commission found that the neutral 
role which many presiding officers tended to take on as part of the adversarial system 
meant that they were reluctant to control cross-examination.57  As a result, child witnesses 
in particular were frequently subjected to intimidating questioning which went far beyond 
what was required for ascertaining the truth.58 There is some empirical research which 
indicates generally high levels of stress specifically for children in the children's cour 59
 
limit the degree to which they 'enter the arena' and should allow the parties a considerable 
ommunication 28 Oct 2002.  This is despite a general rule against 
es of court proceedings see K 
of South 
ave reduced 
53 Essack (2002) op cit note 38 at 3. This accords with the idea that in an adversarial system presiding 
officers should 
degree of latitude even in the nature of their cross-examination: see Skeen & Van Der Merwe (2002) op cit 
note 43 at 346. 
54 Professor MCJ Olmesdahl: personal c
gratuitous or disproportionately hostile or insulting cross-examination in our law: see Skeen & Van Der 
Merwe (2002) op cit note 43 at 347-48. 
55 See part 4.3.1, above.  For this problem in the United Kingdom see M Lane & T Walsh 'Court Proceedings 
and Court Craft' in K Wilson & A James (eds) The Child Protection Handbook (2002) 342. 
56 For research findings linking stress to a noninterventionist approach in all typ
Müller & M Tait 'Are Children Beheaded and Fed to Wild Animals?  A Study of the Perceptions 
African Children Relating to the Judicial Process' (1998) 115 SALJ 447 at 455. 
57 South African Law Commission Protection of the Child Witness (Working Paper 28, 1989) 7. 
58 Ibid. K Müller & K Hollely 'Empowering Child Witnesses against the Legal System' (2001) 34  De Jure 
330 at 333-35 showed that in South Africa presiding officers sometimes allow lawyers who are conducting 
cross-examination to continue using aggressive and even insulting language even after they h
child witnesses to tears. See also K Müller & A Van Der Merwe 'Judicial Management and Child Abuse 
Cases: Empowering Judicial Officers to Be "the Boss of the Court" ' (2005) 1 SACJ 41 at 51-52. 
59 See the findings of FN Zaal 'Hearing the Voices of Children in Court: a Field Study and Evaluation' in S 
Burman (ed) The Fate of the Child: Legal Decisions on Children in the New South Africa (2003) 158 at 162. 
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of this, just as in other courts, is insufficient curbing by presiding officers of extreme 
adversa
ed for numerous lawyers to provide 'equality 
of arms' surely represents a significant disadvantage of the accusatorial system given the 
limited
all cases.63  This is 
because their professional qualifications and greater court experience enable them to 
present
 their essential function of serving as a check and balance disappears and they 
                                                
rialism because they believe that it is improper for them to 'enter the arena'.60   
 
Olmesdahl has observed that, aside from the direct psychological harm, where 
hostile questioning is not restrained the outcome of care cases can be adversely affected.  
He has stated that such questioning is, for example, sometimes unduly sustained   until 
caregivers concede that they are dangerously neglectful when in fact they are not. 61  He is 
of the view that in order to correct the problem of inappropriate cross-examination within 
an accusatorial framework it would be necessary to provide lawyers to represent all parties 
in care cases.62 It may be commented that a ne
 resources available in South Africa.    
Based on her involvement in children's court cases, attorney Wessels has also 
expressed the view that serious weaknesses in the passive-accusatorial approach tend to 
manifest when parties are not legally represented. She considers that a non-interventionist 
stance by many commissioners exacerbates inequalities between parties.  She claims it 
produces a situation where welfare is completely successful in nearly 
 more plausible evidence than unassisted lay family members.   
Wessels has argued that commissioners should be required to assist unrepresented 
family members by closely-interrogating the evidence of social workers.64  In failing to do 
so, children's courts frequently tend to become mere rubber stamps for the latter.65  She has 
claimed that
 
ug 2003) 3. R Govender (legal aid board attorney) personal 
ng particularly to rural jurisdictions; and commissioner P Booysen: 
 communication 12 Sept 2006). 
.  
magistrates are generally cognisant of this danger, often 
60 Commissioner A Vermooten 'Protecting the Child Witness' (Unpublished Masters seminar paper, 
University of Durban-Westville 13 A
communication 1 Jun 2005 -referri
personal
61 Olmesdahl (2002) supra note 54
62 Ibid. 
63 Wessels (2004) supra note 48. 
64 Ibid. 
65 By contrast, in New South Wales children's court 
override the wishes of welfare, and are careful not to simply rubber stamp their requests: see  McConnell, 
Llewellyn & Ferronato (2002) op cit note 48 at 281. 
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may si
need of care and issuing a 
placem  order'.   In Swarts v Swarts, in a rare recent reported high court case arising out 
of a c
ings.   
As a result hearings frequently extended over months and even years.   It has been 
general
 
                                                
mply give legal effect to the sometimes serious errors of overburdened welfare 
services.66  
 Interestingly, Rothman, having served for many years as a commissioner, has 
expressed a view almost directly opposite to that of Wessels.  He suggested that the role of 
children's courts in conducting inquiries should ordinarily be a relatively passive and 
minimalist one.  In his opinion, in alternative care matters commissioners tend to have less 
expertise than social workers.  Therefore, the decision-making role of the latter should be 
predominant and the function of a children's court  should be  'significant only to the 
degree that it provides a judicial forum for confirming the intervention and role of welfare 
bodies by the making of a finding that the child is indeed in 
67ent
hildren's court matter, Bertelsmann J supported this approach of considerable 
deference to the expertise of social workers in care matters.68   
   
 As against the less active function, however, another consequence of not 
rigorously testing the preferences of welfare has been commented on by Denge. She noted 
that some of her fellow-commissioners with a more passive impression of their role tended 
to be very cooperative when social workers sought adjournments of care proceed 69
70
ly noted in chapter 3 that delays in case processing is one of the potential pitfalls 
for courts.71  The problem of adjournments has also been a concern in the USA.72    
 
66 Wessels (2004) supra note 48.  Wessels expressed the view that case overloads caused by the AIDS 
pandemic have produced an over-readiness of some social workers to recommend administratively-easier 
placements of children at poorly-resourced institutions, rather than with suitable extended family members or 
foster parents, even where these are available.  She stated that many children's courts tend to accept such 
recommendations without engaging in sufficient interrogation to discover that they are confirming second-
best placements.  
67 DS Rothman 'The Need for Legal Representation for Children in Children's Court Proceedings -Fact or 
Phobia?' (2001) 4 The Judicial Officer 4 at 7. 
68 [2002] 3 All SA 35 (T) at 42b, 44b & 47i. For a discussion of this case see part 7.2.1.2, below. 
69 NE Denge 'The Best Interests of the Child and Speedy Determination of Children's Court Matters' (April 
2004) News and Views for Magistrates 7. 
70 Ibid.          
71 See part 3.4.2, above. 
72 JK Heldman 'Court Delay and the Waiting Child' (2003) 40 San Diego LR 1001 especially at 1023. 
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Unfortunately, where courts too readily allow delays children may be seriously 
disadvantaged. They may die at the hands of abusive caregivers or else bond too strongly 
with temporary substitutes from whom they later have to be removed.73 As hearings drag 
on the chances of older children being adopted diminish.74 A second group of 
commissioners are well aware of these dangers.  They are extremely resistant to delays that 
might prejudice children.75 Some members of this group develop and apply techniques 
designed to create intense pressure on social workers and other participants to complete 
cases a
ted.79  The likelihood of this is increased by the practice, still 
continuing in many jurisdictions in recent years, of rotating magistrates between children's 
courts 
                                                
s quickly as possible.76  
 
  A problem with the diverse approaches of commissioners is that parties are 
impeded in preparing for court.  Gaining clarity before hearings on how a particular 
commissioner will proceed is sometimes difficult. Citing the need to avoid any appearance 
of partiality, some commissioners are not available beforehand to provide information 
about how they intend to manage a case.77  Others consider it proper to allow only indirect 
communication via children's court assistants or court clerks.78  And even where sufficient 
prior guidance from a commissioner can be obtained, on the day of court it may be 
discovered that another commissioner with an entirely different interpretation of her 
function has been substitu
and other courts.80 
 
73 Ibid at 1007-09. On the problem of delays in Australian children's courts see McConnell, Llewellyn & 
Ferronato (2002) op cit note 48 at 285; and RJ McLachlan 'The Children’s Court’s Power to Limit the 
Presentation of Evidence or the Cross-examination of the Deponents of Documents' (2004) 4 Children's Law 
News 47 at 56. 
74 Heldman ibid at 1020. See also the cases discussed by M Guggenheim & C Gottlieb 'Justice Denied: 
Delays in Resolving Child Protection Cases in New York' (2005) 12 Virginia Journal of Social Policy and 
the Law 546 at 549-553. 
75 Denge (2004) op cit note 69 at 7. 
76 Ibid. Some commissioners responded to adjournment requests by requiring satisfactory written motivations 
and issuing finalisation deadlines.  Others subpoenaed social workers to appear before them to explain delays 
and summarily terminated the authority of places of safety to continue to hold children. 
77 L Dhabcharam (deputy-director, Childline): personal communication 20 Sept 2002; Job (2004) supra note 
48. 
78 Job, ibid. 
79 Dhabcharam (2002) supra note 77. 
80 Govender (2005) supra note 60; Wessels (2004) supra note 48.   
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Examples of what appears to be the extreme of disengagement from involvement 
with participants have been noted by commissioner Bacharam.  Based on personal 
observation and empirical research in 2004 she recorded wide variations on such a basic 
aspect as the extent to which commissioners required appearances in court by persons 
involved.  She noted that some commissioners were running care cases mainly as paper 
exercises.81  They encouraged parties to provide documentary evidence, and because many 
involved family members are illiterate and unrepresented, this was usually forthcoming 
only in the form of investigative agencies’ case reports.  Commissioners then merely read 
the documentation privately.  They made a final decision on alternative care without 
anyone
ecause they are unable to prepare properly, face difficulties of 
access because of courts’ preferences for documentary evidence83 or alternatively are 
subject
ings compliance with s 34 of 
 appearing to give viva voce testimony before them unless this was specifically 
requested.82  
Based on the evidence reviewed above, it must be concluded that the long-
subsisting uncertainty about even fundamental aspects of the role of commissioners has 
had some unfortunate effects. Although only limited data is available it provides strong 
indications that expecting them to utilise civil magistrates’ court practices as a primary 
guide, but with the vague mutatis mutandis proviso and some mixed signals arising from 
scattered provisions in the 1983 Act, has not proved successful.  Effective participation by 
parties is often prevented b
ed to demeaning cross-examination and expected to return to court many times 
because of adjournments.   
 
The serious problems which have arisen because of insufficient direction on the 
role of commissioners raise troubling questions of fair-hear
                                                 
81 Bacharam (2004) op cit note 48 at 6. 
th Africa is that for most parties language and literacy barriers inhibit the submission of 
82 Ibid. 
83 It is true that in countries such as Australia and England there is a considerable emphasis upon the 
mandatory prior lodging of most evidence in documentary form: see, for example, McLachlan (2004) op cit 
note 73 at 53 & 56 (Australia); and J Brophy Research Review: Child Care Proceedings under the Children 
Act 1989 (2006) 61 (England and Wales: accessed at http://www.dca. gov.uk/research/2006/05_2006.pdf). 
The problem in Sou
such evidence. 
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the Constitution.84 The review undertaken above indicates that much better guidance is 
ssential.  In the discussion below, wording of the 2005 Act which relates to adjudicators is 
analyse
s if anything been increased by the host of 
extrem y demanding new judicial functions in the Act.88And our own historical 
experie
d' presiding 
officers it is clear from s 42(2) that any magistrate can preside, and without any particular 
training
                                                
e
d to establish whether it will provide such guidance. 
 
6.2.4  The Children's Act 38/2005 
 
The 2005 Act certainly makes some important changes.  Children's court 
adjudicators are to lose their distinguishing title of 'commissioners of child welfare'.85 
They will thus in future presumably have to be referred to simply as magistrates who 
happen to be currently presiding in children’s courts.  This is unfortunate because as has 
been noted children’s court work is unique in nature.86 The need to recognise children's 
court adjudicators as dedicated specialists87  ha
el
nce in the period 1937-1950 as referred to in part 6.2.1 above provides indications 
that such adjudicators are needed to create child-friendly and relaxed court environments 
which optimise the quality of communication. 
 
 The failure to retain the distinguishing title of commissioner runs contrary to the 
Act’s major purpose of continuing the evolution of the children's courts as specialist 
forums that perform skilled and unique functions. Although s 42(3) of the Act expressly 
allows for the possibility of some magistrates being appointed as 'dedicate
 requirements.89 This will permit continuing rotation of magistrates between 
children's courts and other courts.  It will thus perpetuate impediments to the development 
of appropriate expertise and implementation of suitable procedural methods.    
 
84 On this provision see further part 1.3.2, above. 
85 Section 42(2). 
86 See especially parts 3.7 and 5.2, above. 
87 One of the key findings in some English research has been that adjudicators require high levels of 
expertise: see E Larkin, D McSherry & D Iwaniec 'Room for Improvement?  Views of Key Professionals 
Involved in Care Order Proceedings' (2005) 17 Child and Family LQ 231 at 243.                   
88 Aside from the new functions noted above in parts 3.6-7, 4.2.5 and in this chapter, further additional 
important responsibilities for children's court magistrates will be discussed in part 8.3, below. 
89 This subsection follows our previous legislation in rendering every magistrate and additional magistrate ex 
officio 'a presiding officer of a children's court'. 
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 A relatively low status for children's courts will unfortunately also continue 
because it is stated in s 43 that they are to have 'a similar status to that of a magistrates’ 
court at district level'. It has been recognised in England that many care cases are too 
omplex or serious to be dealt with at magisterial level.90  Given the nature of their work91 
ildre
lowest 
should 
t is s 52 of the 2005 Act. This reads: 
provided in this Act, the provisions of the Magistrates’ Courts Act, 1944 
thereof as well as the rules made under the 
 of 1985), apply, with the necessary changes 
quired se provisions relate to- 
ss; 
 
 orders; 
 
 e) pena
  
  and 
  
(2) Rule  (1) must be designed to avoid adversarial procedures and 
(a) appropriate questioning techniques for- 
s once again the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32/1944.92  Similarly to the currently 
pplicable s 9(1) of the 1983 Act, a broad discretion to depart from Magistrates’ Courts 
Act pr
                                                
c
ch n's court presiding officers should surely be accorded a higher status than that of the 
ranking district magistrates. To attract and retain suitable candidates their status 
at least be that of regional magistrates and preferably higher. 
 
  The nearest equivalent to s 9(1) of the 1983 Ac
 '(1) Except as is otherwise 
(Act No. 32 of 1944), and of the rules made in terms 
Rules Board for Courts of Law Act, 1985 (Act No. 107
re  by the context, to the children's court in so far as the
  (a) the issue and service of proce
 (b) the appearance in court of advocates and attorneys; 
 (c) the execution of court 
 (d) contempt of court; and 
 ( lties for- 
(i) non-compliance with court orders; 
(ii) obstruction of the execution of judgments;  
(iii) contempt of court, 
s made in terms of subsection
include rules concerning- 
 (i) children in general; 
(ii) children with intellectual or psychiatric difficulties or with hearing or other physical 
disabilities which complicate communication; 
(iii) traumatised children; and 
(iv) very young children; and 
 (b) the use of suitably trained or qualified interpreters.' 
 
As can be seen, just as in the 1983 Act a basic point of reference for children's court 
processes i
a
ocesses is perpetuated -although in place of 'mutatis mutandis' appears the more 
 
90 See A Head 'The Work of the Guardian ad litem' in Wilson & James (2002) op cit note 55, 355 at 356. 
91 On the unique and demanding nature of adjudication in care cases see further part 6.3, below. 
92 A definition of 'lower court' in s 1 of the Rules Board for Courts of Law Act, 1985 Act 107/1985 allows for 
rules to be formulated at a future unspecified date for magistrates’ courts but not directly for children's 
courts.   So the most important guide is still the Magistrates’ Court Act. 
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modern but equally vague terminology 'with the necessary changes required by the 
context'.   
 
Key differences from s 9(1) of the 1983 Act, however, are the omission of 
references to 'the…functions of officers' and 'the conduct of proceedings' in the list of 
processes included in s 52(1). Prima facie, this suggests that children's courts are no longer 
to use magistrates’ courts as a default guide to the role of adjudicators and hearings-
procedures.  What immediately renders this interpretation doubtful, however, is that s52(2) 
expressly relates s 52(1) to matters that quite clearly do relate to the conduct of 
proceedings. The statement in s 52(2) that rules made under s 52(1) must be designed to 
void adversarial procedures and cover appropriate questioning techniques for children 
makes 
re rules of court must be designed to avoid adversarial procedures, as noted in part 
4.2.5 above s 58 of the Act expressly provides for the adversarial technique of cross-
examin
                                                
a
little sense if the conduct of proceedings is not part of s 52(1).  It would therefore 
appear that the phrase 'the conduct of proceedings' was accidentally omitted from s 52(1). 
The resulting unclarity in s 52 renders it difficult to interpret and is likely to reduce its 
value in countering the procedural confusion that currently exists. 
 
 The omission also of any reference to the functions of officers in s 52(1) raises, 
inter alia, the question of the nature of the role of adjudicators.  Like the 1983 Act before 
it, the 2005 Act provides only limited and somewhat dissonant specific information on this. 
Section 48(1)(c) allows magistrates to impose time deadlines and this could usefully 
strengthen their hand in countering the problem of delays.93 Although it is stated in s 52(2) 
that futu
ation by persons appearing and also for addressing children's courts 'in argument' if 
the adjudicator grants permission.   The new power to grant or withhold such permission 
implies intervention powers for magistrates that go beyond the traditional accusatorial 
model.  
 
 
93 Also, ss 65(2)(ii) and 155(2) allow specifically for  time limitations on preparation of social workers’ 
reports. 
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But are magistrates empowered to become inquisitors and actively enter the arena 
under the 2005 Act?  A limited inquisitorial capability in all types of children's court 
hearings is certainly allowed for in s 50(1).  This directs that a magistrate may in any 
matter 
in a relaxed and non-
adversarial atmosphere which is conducive to attaining the co-operation of everyone 
involve
rectly relevant in the matter'-94 has been 
quite unnecessarily limited to witnesses called by magistrates themselves.  The direction in 
s 60(3)
                                                
order any person to conduct an investigation and then report findings that may assist 
in resolving a case.  Another discrete inquisitorial allowance is to be found in s 60(1)(a)-
(b).  Here, presiding magistrates are empowered to call before court any person and then 
either 'question or cross-examine' them. This shows that, at least in respect of witnesses 
whom they call themselves, adjudicators are to have an inquisitorial function. 
 
Some further information on the role of adjudicators is provided in s 60(3).  This 
possibly suggests an active function because it states '[c]hildren's court proceedings must 
be conducted in an informal manner and, as far as possible, 
d in the proceedings'. Could this be broadly interpreted as meaning that magistrates 
must take on a primarily inquisitorial function in managing care cases?  On the other hand, 
the long-established word 'inquiry' is no longer utilised in the 2005 Act to describe care 
hearings. This could be understood as weakening the basis for presuming that adjudicators 
must utilise a predominantly inquisitorial function in these cases.  
 
 The broad requirement in s 60(3) that magistrates must as far as possible avoid 
adversarialism begs the question of how. And it is confused by the references elsewhere in 
the Act to cross-examination by parties and other participants. It is a pity that the one piece 
of specific direction provided -the statement in s 60(1)(c) that magistrates should allow 
parties and participants to question or cross-examine witnesses only 'to the extent this is 
necessary to resolve any factual dispute which is di
 that proceedings must be so managed as to retain a relaxed atmosphere is likely, as 
our historical record shows, to be undercut by the move away from a specialist status for 
adjudicators. The instruction in s 52(2) that rules covering appropriate questioning 
 
94 See further part 4.2.5, above. 
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techniques for children must be developed is encouraging, but leaves unsettled the 
important question of what form they should take. 
 
It must be concluded that the sketchy and somewhat discordant allusions to the role 
of mag
 in s 75(1)(a) of the 2005 Act  that '[t]he Minister 
for Justice and Constitutional Development, after consultation with the Minister [of Social 
Develo
pediments to 
effective participation for other persons involved in care proceedings.  It has also been 
pointed
istrates in the 2005 Act fall far short of the kind of coherent guidance on role 
functions in children's courts that is required.   And the removal of the previous legislative 
references to ordinary magisterial conduct as a default model means that they are currently 
the only guidance.    Unless they are supplemented, the relatively bare 2005 provisions will 
at best have only a limited impact on the serious problems that have been identified in the 
previous parts of this chapter.  
 
On the positive side, it is stated
pment], may make regulations concerning -the procedures to be followed at or in 
connection with the proceedings of children's courts...' [insertion added].95  It is to be 
hoped that this will be interpreted as including regulations on the role of magistrates.  With 
reference to the problems that have emerged in our system, some recommendations 
concerning the nature of the guidance most urgently required will be put forward below. 
6.3  Some Directions for Reform   
 It has been shown above that for more than half a century inadequate legislative 
guidance has caused both uncertainties for adjudicators themselves and im
 out that s 52(2)(a) of the 2005 Act will in future require that 'appropriate 
questioning techniques' be maintained during all children's court hearings. And it has been 
noted that s 60(3) of the same Act requires that adversarialism be minimised and 
cooperation amongst involved persons encouraged. A question which arises is how our law 
on the role of presiding officers in children's courts should best be developed to overcome 
the current problems and achieve the laudable aims of the Act.  
                                                 
95 It may be suggested that the s 52(2) qualifications concerning the nature of procedural rules as discussed 
above should have been made applicable to this provision rather than s 52(1). 
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Experience in Australia supports the argument above that the move away from 
recognition of children's court adjudicators as specialists is a serious shortcoming in the 
2005 Act.  In 1998 findings on the unique and complex nature of the work of children's 
court presiding officers in Victoria were published.96 Soon afterwards, in terms of the 
Children and Young Persons (Appointment of President) Act 2000, Victoria children's 
courts were separated from the magistrates’ courts establishment.  They now formed an 
entirely independent network with its own judge-president.  The aim of the division was 
stated as 'to demonstrate the important role played by the Children's Court in our judicial 
system
Specialist, child-related non-legal knowledge is also 
required.100 From an American perspective Heldman has proposed that it is essential for 
adjudic
                                                
 in providing a specialised court catering for children and young people'.97 In New 
South Wales it has also been found necessary to provide dedicated full-time children's 
court adjudicators who receive ongoing specialist training, are appointed for three-year 
terms and serve under a senior children's magistrate.98  
Reviewing the English experience, Brophy stated that different judgecraft skills not 
historically valued for other types of legal proceedings are increasingly being found to be 
important for care matters.99  
ators to be accountable to their own court president.101 Experience elsewhere thus 
supports the view that in our 2005 Act a valuable opportunity to create a separate court 
 
96 One respondent described it as 'the most difficult area that a magistrate could work in':  see R Martyn & G 
 specialised nature of care adjudication see also 
t website 'The Role of the Magistrate' 1: accessed at <http://www 
Levine 'If Your Worship Pleases: An Australian Perspective on the Role of the Magistrate in Child 
Protection' (1998) 7 Child Abuse Review 254 at 262.  On the
ibid at 260 & 264. 
97 The quoted phrase is taken from the Victoria children's court website 'History' 1 at 3: accessed at: 
<http://www.childrenscourt.vic.gov.au/CA 256CA811129>. 
98 New South Wales children's cour
lawlink.nsw.gov.au/law link/children's_court>. On the functions of the senior children's magistrate see s 16 
of the Children's Court Act 1987: accessed at <http://www.austlii.du.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/cca1987>. 
99 Brophy (2006) op cit note 83 at 63. 
100 Australian children's court magistrates interviewed by Martyn & Levine (1998) op cit note 96 at 260 
considered that they needed training in aspects of psychology and family welfare. M Ells, RB O'Neal, V 
Weisz & J Conner 'Unravelling the Labyrinth: A Proposed Revision of the Nebraska Juvenile Code' (2004) 
82 Nebraska LR 1126 at 1146 concluded that experience in Nebraska showed care case adjudicators needed 
'specialised knowledge regarding children and the services available to them and their families'.  
101 Heldman (2003) op cit note 72 at 1034.  As is noted, ibid, real accountability can only be achieved with a 
court leader who is sufficiently knowledgeable about care proceedings to conduct meaningful discussions 
with adjudicators.  It is thus little wonder that the South African children's courts, being placed under the 
leadership of generalist chief magistrates who manage a variety of courts, continue to manifest serious 
shortcomings. 
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structure and thus recognise the need for independence and a specialist status for children's 
court magistrates was missed.102  
 
With reference specifically to the role of adjudicators in encouraging effective 
participation at care proceedings, the assessment of primarily South African data in part 
6.2 above indicates a fundamental aspect on which a firm and clear legislative position 
must be taken. This is whether they should adopt a primarily inquisitorial or else 
accusatorial function. It has been demonstrated that the more passive role associated with 
the latter is behind many of the participation problems in our children's courts.  Evidence 
that it may even impede discovery of the best possible outcome for the child has also been 
noted. 
ge viva 
voce evidence at hearings.  The nature of direction required on this is discussed in part 6.3, 
g their evidence, 
reventing systemic abuse at hearings, managing the leading of evidence, controlling 
cross-e
pelling arguments in favour 
of an inquisitorial approach at care hearings.  Just as has been noted above in relation to 
Aside from our own experience, it will be suggested in part 6.3.1 below that 
experience in other systems also shows that there are strong reasons in favour of a 
predominantly inquisitorial rather than accusatorial function as a basic norm.  It will 
further be proposed that this could most easily be implemented with regulations that 
expand upon the 2005 Act. 
 If an inquisitorial role is to be successfully established magistrates will obviously 
need guidance.  In particular, such guidance must clarify how they should mana
below.  The aspects covered are: supporting participants and supplementin
p
xamination, and time management.  Proposals on appropriate rules are put forward. 
These are related to experience both locally and in foreign systems where historically-
imposed accusatorial functions and the adversarial system have been transformed. 
6.3.1 Reasons in Favour and Basic Purposes of an Inquisitorial Function 
 
Experience in developed systems provides further com
                                                 
102 The argument that it would be difficult to provide specialist adjudicators in rural jurisdictions is not 
tenable.  With lower caseloads in these, it would be feasible for small numbers of presiding officers to go on 
circuit and thus serve large geographical areas. 
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South Africa, so too in the USA it has been found that the accusatorial system encourages 
aggre
allows parties to show other participants in the worst possible light rather 
than encouraging a joint exploration of available options.106 Despite a long tradition 
favo
ventionist, inquisitorial role for adjudicators. In South Africa, the arguments 
about requiring adjudicators to actively protect vulnerable parties and redress imbalances 
ssiveness between opposing parties.103 American commentator Wriggins has made 
the same point as Wessels above that the equal contest basis for an adjudicator serving 
relatively passively as umpire is inappropriate because welfare tend to have far greater 
resources at their disposal than opposing family members.104  
 
On the basis of research in Australia Sheehan reached a similar conclusion and also 
linked uncontrolled adversarial behaviour to a hostile win-or-lose approach amongst 
parties.105 In England, non-interventionism by adjudicators has been discarded in care 
cases because it 
uring an accusatorial role for court adjudicators it has been recognised there that under 
the 1989 Children Act children's cases must be managed differently from other forms of 
litigation.107 The judicial function in care cases in particular is thus becoming increasingly 
inquisitorial.108 
 
It seems telling that even in Anglo-American systems that have traditionally favoured 
an accusatorial function and legalistic approach109 there is support for moves towards a 
more inter
                                                 
103 ML Zwiers & PJ Morrissette Effective Interviewing of Children. A Comprehensive Guide for Counselors 
and Human Service Workers (1999) 100. 
104 J Wriggins 'Parental Rights Termination Jurisprudence: Questioning the Framework ' (2000) 52 South 
Carolina LR 241, at 258-59. For the same problem in Australia see McConnell, Llewellyn &  Ferronato 
 '[t]he State’s ability 
 (Oct 2001- accessed at <www.wlu.ca./pcfproject>) at 12; Lane & Walsh (2002) op cit 
o reach a result that is in the best interests of the child.                                                       
t vi. 
(2002) op cit note 48 at 279. As H O'Donnell 'What's Wrong with the Picture: the Other Side of Representing 
Parents in Child Protection Cases' (2005) 4 Appalachian Journal of Law 73 at 77 puts it
to assemble its case almost inevitably dwarfs the parents’ ability to mount a defence'.  
105 R Sheehan Magistrates’ Decision-Making in Child Protection Cases (2001) at 62 & 66. 
106 N Freymond 'Using Intermediary Structures to Support Families: An International Comparison of Practice 
in Child Protection'
note 55 at 343. 
107 See R Probert Cretney's Family Law (2003) at 288. Probert, ibid, cites In Re L (Police Investigation: 
Privilege) [1996] 1 FLR 731, HL.  She points out that in this case the House of Lords approved of an earlier 
conclusion by Sir Stephen Brown P in Oxfordshire CC v M [1994] Fam. 151 at 161.  He held that 
proceedings under the 1989 Children Act are not adversarial. Rather, they fall into a special category because 
courts need to take all steps necessary t
108 Brophy (2006) op cit note 83 a
109 See further part 1.3.1, above. 
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obviously apply with at least equal force. It could even be claimed that there is a stronger 
case for our adjudicators intervening to redress disadvantages because lawyers are less 
likely to be available to perform this function than in the developed systems referred to 
above.110  
As Lyon has pointed out from an English perspective, diminution of an accusatorial 
function is particularly valuable for care cases because it frees adjudicators to make 
decisions about children which are quite independent from what is urged by any of the 
parties.111  And Australian children's court magistrates interviewed by Martyn and Levine 
were quite clear that they sometimes need to make such decisions.112   This has 
implica
It must be concluded that because of the numerous benefits magistrates in our 
childre
egulations the main purposes of an 
interventionist role at hearings.   
                                                
tions for the relationship between adjudicators and investigative agencies. Despite 
the more supportive interaction favoured by Rothman and Bertelsmann J,113 as part of a 
vigorous inquisitorial approach which avoids rubberstamping, presiding magistrates should 
ensure that at court no special status is enjoyed by welfare. This is again supported by 
Australian children's court research in which preserving independence from agencies was 
found essential and linked with a need to enhance the status of children's courts and their 
adjudicators as much as possible.114 
n's courts should in future be required to adopt a predominantly inquisitorial role-
function as a standard norm in care cases. The best way to end the current confusion and 
achieve this would surely be a clear and unequivocal115 statement to this effect in a 
regulation published in terms of the 2005 Children's Act.  However, as noted above merely 
to direct an inquisitorial function without indicating what this should entail would be 
insufficient.  It will further be essential to indicate in r
 
110 See the low legal representation statistics in part 5.2, above. 
111 C Lyon Child Abuse (2003) at 372. 
112 Martyn & Levine (1998) op cit note 96 at 256-57. 
113 See part 6.2.3, above. 
114 Martyn & Levine (1998) op cit note 96 at 258-59. A related finding (at 261 ibid) was that a low status for 
children's courts is problematic because it increases pressures on magistrates to defer to social work agencies. 
115 As noted by McConnell,  Llewellyn & Ferronato (2002) op cit note 48 at 278-79 in New South Wales  legislation which provides 
only hints of an inquisitorial function has allowed many children's court magistrates to retain a predominantly adversarial role.  This has tended to disadvantage parents 
when faced by opposing investigative agencies.  
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Arising from the problems noted in part 6.2 above it may be suggested that two 
main purposes should be expressed. Firstly, it should be stated that a key aim is to enable 
magistrates to balance or supplement the efforts of parties and legal representatives to 
obtain relevant information.  Secondly, magistrates should be required to maintain an 
atmosphere that is as conducive as possible to an amicable joint exploration of information 
about care intervention grounds and outcome options.  
The current state of procedural disarray in the children's courts indicates that, aside 
ore specific 
guidance on the application of the proposed inquisitorial function.   Important aspects are 
when 
e 2005 Act it was proposed that 
presiding officers in children's courts be accorded an express power to 'intervene in the 
 court finds that this would be in the 
best in 117
specific guidance will be put forward below. 
 
from the general directions recommended above, magistrates will need m
116
they should intervene whilst parties and other participants are attempting to 
communicate at hearings and how they should do so.  The need for direction on these 
responsibilities is increased by the fact that we do not have a firmly established 
inquisitorial tradition.  How magistrates should intervene will be considered next. 
 
6.3.2 Guidance on How Adjudicators Should Manage Hearings                       
    
In the Children's Bill 70/2003 which preceded th
questioning or cross-examination of the child if the
terests of the child'.  Best interests provided rather a vague ground in this 
provision and also showed no consideration of the needs of older vulnerable witnesses. It 
did not appear in the Act, and the question of how and when exactly magistrates should 
intervene during the testimony of witnesses remains entirely open.  Suggestions for more 
6.3.2.1 Supporting and Supplementing Questioning 
                                                 
116 Brophy (2006) op cit note 83 at vi concludes that it has been detailed rules in the form of '[p]ractice 
directions, guidance and protocols' that have successfully moved care hearings to a more inquisitorial model 
in England and Wales. 
117 Clause 61(1)(c). 
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As noted in the previous chapter, stress experienced at care proceedings may cause 
particularly private parties to become inarticulate.118 In the proposed regulations it could 
therefore be required that one ground for intervention by a presiding officer is where a 
questioner proves to be unable to question a particular witness effectively.119 This ground 
could be broadly worded to state that '[w]here an attempt by a witness to communicate in 
court appears to be hampered, inappropriately managed or incomplete, the adjudicator 
must consider the feasibility of helping with the formulation of questions'. This is wide 
enough to apply where there is a lack of competence on the part of the questioner or 
witness, or both.120 Where this proves to be insufficient magistrates should be expressly 
empowered to take over questioning themselves.121 The proposed supplementary 
es should also apply when another participant has 
finished questioning a witness but the adjudicator considers there is additional information 
which 
irect magistrates to be aware that 
questions put to vulnerable witnesses can be inappropriate not only because of the way in 
which 
questioning function for magistrat
could be sought.122 
 
6.3.2.2 Preventing Systemic Abuse 
 
Aside from intervening where there is inadequate questioning, presiding officers 
must be required to do so where it is harmful to the extent of constituting secondary, 
systemic abuse.  A future children's court rule must d
they are asked but because of the information which they are intended to derive. For 
                                                 
118 See part 5.4.1, above.  McConnell, Llewellyn & Ferronato (2002) op cit note 48 at 289 note that 
intellectual disabilities and sometimes simply unfamiliarity with the court environment are other factors that 
may render it necessary for parents to receive assistance in communicating in care proceedings. 
119 This is supported by Brophy (2006) op cit note 83 at 59-60. In S v Department of Community Services 
(2002) 29 FAMLR 144 at 153 para 40 Davies AJA of the New South Wales court of appeal suggested that 
lack of legal representation or high levels of stress in participants might be amongst factors rendering it 
n's Law News 6.  Accessed at 
lian children's court magistrates noted by McConnell, Llewellyn & Ferronato 
n incompetent questioning 'might result in a disposition that is dangerous for 
esiding officers need to derive further testimony 
etter assess proposals of welfare. 
necessary for magistrates to intervene and assist them with questioning in children's court care proceedings.  
For a discussion see RJ McLachlan 'The Unrepresented Party: What Duty Does the Court Owe to Assist in 
the Presentation of Their Case?' (February 2003) 2 Childre
<http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/children's_court/II_cc. nsf>. 
120 See the approach of Austra
(2002) op cit note 48 at 278.  
121 See Martyn & Levine op cit note 96 at 262. From a US perspective WW Patton Legal Ethics in Child 
Custody and Dependency Proceedings: A Guide for Judges and Lawyers (2006) 6 notes the example of a 
judge needing to intervene whe
the children before the court'.   
122 An example noted by Martyn & Levine ibid is where pr
from family members to b
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example, as has been noted in chapter 4 it is usually inappropriate for a child to be asked to 
choose between living with one parent or the other.123   
 
 Considering whether assertive questioning has reached the point of being unduly 
harmful for a particular witness clearly requires an exercise of discretion. However, 
magistrates should be directed to note the degree of hostility or coercion evinced by a 
questio
capabilities of witnesses as described in pre-hearing documentation and manifested at 
ner.  It is now known that a variety of methods including repetition,124  voice 
tone,125 comments to third parties,126 and non-verbal inducement of fear127 can be 
coercively misused to influence the evidence of vulnerable persons at care proceedings. 
These examples should therefore all be noted in our rules as techniques that magistrates 
must remain alert for and discourage.  
 
 In deciding whether they need to intervene because questioning has become 
unduly harmful magistrates should additionally be guided by a principle of proportionality.  
This must require them to take into account the developmental and psychological 
court. These will have to be balanced against the degree of pressure being exerted by a 
                                                 
123 See part 4.2.4, above. 
124 C Wilson & M Powell A Guide to Interviewing Children (2001) at 59 cite the example of a lawyer who 
asks '[j]ust tell me where Uncle Joe touched you… Go on, tell me... Where did he touch you?…It's okay, just 
tell me'.   As they comment this use of repetition increases pressure and is 'likely to result in errors in the 
 a signal to change 
cough in the hearing and I couldn't speak': see Scottish Office Scotland's Children Speaking 
child's account'.  W Bourg, R Broderick & R Flagor et al, A Child Interviewer’s Guidebook (1999) at 117 
concluded that research showed that particularly young children may interpret repetition as
their answer to please the questioner.  
125 For example, if a questioner’s voice tone becomes friendlier and she increases eye-contact whenever the 
child talks adversely about his mother, he is being encouraged to portray her negatively.    
126 Zwiers & Morrissette (1999) op cit note 103 at 100 explain that a hostile professional may attempt to 
intimidate and discredit a child by making critical remarks about her in her presence.  For example, a lawyer 
may use conversation with the presiding officer to undermine a child who understands his remarks. 
127 LM Copen Preparing Children for Court.  A Practitioner’s Guide (2000) at 37 explains that non-verbal 
intimidation often takes the form of 'control cueing'.  This is behaviour by the adult which the child 
recognises from previous experience. It is intended to intimidate the child and thus interfere with her ability 
to give evidence. As Copen has explained it can 'take place in the courtroom and in front of everyone, but 
unless you know to look for it, it can be so innocent and subtle, it is missed by all except the intended target -
the victim/witness'. As an example, Copen (ibid, at 37-38) cites a case where a child-witness suddenly 
stopped giving evidence and froze in fear when an adult put on a pair of dark glasses.  Afterwards the child 
explained that this particular adult always put on the glasses when he was about to abuse the child.  In a care 
case recorded in Scotland, a child stated 'my stepdad always used to cough, just a little cough to warn me.  
He gave me that 
Out: Young People's Views on Child Care Law in Scotland (HMSO, 1994) 4. See also C Hallett & C Murray 
'Children's Rights and the Scottish Children's Hearings System' (1999) 7 International Journal of Children's 
Rights 31 at 37. 
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questioner.  Although fair trial considerations are important and will be further considered 
in the next sub-part below, they must be expressly rated in our rules as secondary to 
protecting witnesses from systemic abuse in court.128  In applying the principle of 
proport
d over what may be a 
long series of questions, rather than any one particular inappropriate question, that is most 
ide inaccurate information.130 Our future rules 
must e
trate should be described as initially merely a limited one in 
guiding evidence so that time is not wasted with irrelevant or repetitive testimony. An 
issue w
                                                
ionality magistrates must as already suggested necessarily be allowed a degree of 
discretion.  But gratuitous or disproportionate attacks upon persons who testify must be 
thwarted or stifled by them.  
Another way in which questioning may be inappropriate is through being extended 
over too long a period of time relative to the capabilities of a witness. This may have a 
wearing down effect. Cases have been recorded of children, for example, being subjected 
to days of cross-examination -particularly in matters where an adult is determined at any 
cost to refute an allegation of abuse.129  To assist them in deciding when questioning is 
being unduly extended children's court magistrates will need to be trained to recognise that 
it is gradual build-ups of pressure in coercive relationships establishe
likely to cause vulnerable witnesses to prov
xpressly require that adjudicators are to intervene once they decide that questioning 
is being extended for too long, given the capabilities of the witness.  
 
6.3.2.3 Managing the Leading of Evidence 
   
To facilitate participation a future children's court rule should indicate that parties 
and other participants must in the first instance be free to communicate their personal 
evidence and lead their witnesses.   As evidence in chief is presented, the management role 
of the adjudicating magis
hich may soon arise during the presentation of evidence in chief, however, is the 
 
128 With reference generally to all types of court cases Skeen & Van der Merwe (2002) op cit note 43 at 355-
58 rightly argue that protection of child-witnesses should take precedence over fair trial assertions by adults 
who wish to engage in confrontational questioning. 
129 NW Perry & LS Wrightsman The Child Witness: Legal Issues and Dilemmas (1991) at 5 noted the 
extreme example of a ten-year-old child being required to defend his evidence for sixteen days. 
130 See Bourg, Broderick & Flagor et al (1999) op cit note 124 at 89. 
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extent to which parties, participants or adjudicators themselves should be permitted to 
utilise leading questions.  
 
In the useful definition of Wilson and Powell leading questions are ones 'that 
suggest a certain answer is desired or assume the existence of facts that have not yet been 
proved or have not already been mentioned' by a witness.131 On the one hand, the crucial 
need t
   Entirely 
preventing the use of  these can render it impossible to prove that a child is in need of 
alterna
 
evidence, a magistrate or another questioner leading evidence should be permitted to move 
o obtain sufficient information supports a less restrictive approach to leading 
questions.  On the other hand, the potentially drastic consequences for the child and other 
family members raise fair trial considerations if witnesses are unduly influenced and 
therefore provide inaccurate replies. 
It is certainly true that suggestible children and even adults can sometimes be 
influenced by inappropriate leading questions to give false or misleading evidence.132 
However, it would not be correct to assume that a blanket prohibition on putting any 
leading questions during evidence in chief would be a correct solution.
tive care because lay witnesses with a limited understanding of forensic needs may 
be unresponsive to open, non-leading questions. It is thus understandable that in English 
care proceedings the usual rule against asking leading questions during evidence in chief 
is, as Lane and Walsh put it,  'often relaxed to the point of being ignored'.133    
In order to meet evidence validity and fair trial considerations, however, it should 
be indicated in a future South African regulation that as a general rule adjudicators must 
ensure that questioning of a child or other witness during evidence in chief is as non-
directive as possible in relation to the capabilities which the witness exhibits in court.  
However, where it is clear that a witness is having difficulty in providing relevant 
                                                 
131 Wilson & Powell (2001) op cit note 124 at 58-59. They further describe 'closed' questions (at 58 ibid) as 'a 
form of specific question because they focus the child on the specific information that is required'.  In their 
depiction a closed question is the same as a leading question because it limits the answers that the child can 
 '[d]id 
en the child has not stated that Joe has touched him.   
provide to -'yes' or 'no'.  Alternatively, it requires a choice between two other possible answers. 
132 Wilson & Powell ibid provide the following two examples of particularly inappropriate use of leading 
questions: '[d]addy hurt you, didn't he?' when the child has not yet claimed Daddy did anything; and
Joe touch your front bottom or back bottom?' wh
133 Lane & Walsh (2002) op cit note 55 at 348.  
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to questions of a partially directive kind. The choice in this situation need not be between 
the opposite extremes of putting words in the mouths of witnesses or leaving them totally 
adrift. As Bourg, Broderick and Flagor et al have pointed out a compromise between the 
two is 
 express power to use or allow multiple-choice questions during evidence in 
chief where non-leading questions have been found to be ineffective. Where the 
commu
                                    
a multiple-choice question.134  This includes a range of possible answers and the 
witness is requested to select one.  For example '[d]id it happen at your house, at your 
grandmother's house, or at someone else's house?'135  
Although concerns about reliability of information may arise where a witness is 
offered possible answers Bourg, Broderick and Flagor et al argue that an appropriate 
situation in which to use a multiple-choice question is 'when children indicate that 
something happened, but they are having difficulty providing details'.136  Such situations 
can obviously arise in care proceedings.   Children's court adjudicators should therefore be 
accorded an
nication abilities of a child or adult witness are very poor there could be a natural 
progression from multiple-choice questions to leading questions with limited answer 
options.137 
It may be concluded that future rules  must indicate that in order to meet the fair 
trial requirement in s 34   of the Constitution  evidence in chief should be obtained in as 
nondirective manner as possible.  However, presiding magistrates need to be provided with 
a discretion to allow multiple-choice questions where they decide that the incapability of a 
             
y he didn't like, but when asked where he was touched, provided no response.  The 
 in allowing a questioner to use 
r he had penetrated her digitally. 
134 Bourg, Broderick & Flagor et al (1999) op cit note 124 at 81. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid. An example which they provide (ibid, at 96) is where: '[t]he child has disclosed that someone 
touched him in a wa
interviewer could ask, “ Were you touched on your nose?”; “Mouth?”; “ Belly button?”; “ Private part?”; “ 
Leg?” and so forth'. 
137 In support of this is § 767(b) of the California Evidence Code (accessed at 
<http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=evid & group=>).  This states '[t]he court may, in 
the interests of justice permit a leading question to be asked of a child under 10 years of age or a dependent 
person with a substantial cognitive impairment…'.  In the Rhode Island case of State v Brown 574A. 2d  745 
(R.I. 1990) at 748 it was held on appeal that the trial court  acted correctly
leading questions after a child witness stated that the defendant 'touched her vagina' but did not understand 
further questions intended to show whethe
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witness indicates this is necessary.138  Magistrates must initially allow parties or other 
participants to speak for themselves or lead their own witnesses.  But as proposed in part 
6.3.2.1 above where incapacity or other factors hamper this process or leave it incomplete 
 supplement it.  Magistrates must do this by asking 
questio
oss-examination with the 
permission of the magistrate it might perhaps be questioned whether it should be allowed 
at all. 
ing techniques.139    Whilst there is 
still disagreement amongst researchers on points of detail, numerous studies have begun to 
show
                                                
our rules must expressly require them to
ns that assist the party/participant.  They must also be empowered to obtain 
whatever evidence they themselves believe is still required. 
  
6.3.2.4 Controlling Cross-Examination 
Once the evidence of a witness has been led the issue of how it should be tested 
may arise.  Since experience in our system indicates that vulnerable witnesses have been 
intimidated and even traumatised when subjected to inappropriate forms of cross-
examination future rules for children's courts must provide direction on the use of this 
technique. Although as will be recalled the 2005 Act allows for cr
Traditional wisdom has it that cross-examination is one of the greatest tools ever 
developed for ensuring that a court hears the truth, but this may be far from correct if it is 
too intensively applied to vulnerable witnesses such as children.  
 
What is currently known is that, although many children can under appropriate 
conditions recall even stressful events with considerable accuracy, their ability to 
remember details tends to be 'contaminated'  -to use the description of Wilson and Powell- 
when they are subjected to intensely coercive question
 that adversarial questioning which puts high levels of pressure on children 'to give a 
particular type of response' not only tends to derive less accurate information, but may also 
have negative psychological effects on them.140   
 
 
138 And the children's court hearing record will provide evidence of the witnesses’ incapacity, should the case 
go to a higher court on appeal or review. 
139 Wilson & Powell (2001) op cit note 124 at xv.  Previous research is cited ibid in support. 
140 The quoted phrase is that of Bourg, Broderick & Flagor et al (1999) op cit note 124 at 86. For a discussion 
of research see ibid at 86-89. 
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Despite the dangers of intensely-coercive questioning, there are strong arguments in 
favour of finding ways to test evidence properly in care cases. As Perry and Wrightsman 
have contended this is essential because 'incorrect reports of neglect or abuse by caregivers 
may be made by paranoid or delusional individuals and result in court cases because of 
inad
ant fair trial considerations. It is 
understandable that in England, for example, these have been a major consideration in 
preserv
ensuring that evidence is properly tested emerge.  Obviously, children's testimony is not 
always reliable.  In care cases they occasionally lie about the behaviour of their parents 
                   
equate investigatory follow-ups undertaken by inexperienced or case-burdened social 
workers'.141 Ramsey supports the view that matters may come to court simply because 
investigative social work agencies have made mistakes in case preparation or failed to 
explore all alternative avenues.142  
 
Testing of evidence may also be needed because family members hoping to avoid 
removals of children or consequent criminal law sanctions collude with a view to 
misleading courts.  And there are as noted earlier import
ing parties’ rights to challenge disputed evidence in care cases despite the move 
towards a more active function for adjudicators in reducing hostile competitiveness.143  In 
the Australian children's courts it has also been found necessary to maintain the possibility 
of adversarial phases for dealing with contested issues.144 
 
In a child participatory model as supported in this thesis further reasons for 
                              
 South African perspective 
 '[t]hus where the ultimate sanction of 
 birth parents, mechanisms for cross-examination and the 
141 Perry & Wrightsman (1991) op cit note 129 at 4.  See also their discussion of the 1990 American case of 
Buckey at 4-10 ibid. 
142 H Ramsey 'The United States Child Protective System -A Triangle of Tensions' (2001) 13 Child and 
Family LQ 25 at 32. See also Martyn & Levine (1998) op cit note 96 at 261. For a
on the danger of inappropriate recommendations by social workers see the assertions of Wessels (2004) in 
part 6.2.3, above. On mistakes by welfare see also parts 1.1, 1.3.1 & 3.4.1, above. 
143 Lyon (2003) op cit note 111 at 372. Brophy (2006) op cit note 83 at 60 recorded that early in the existence 
of the Children Act 1989 some English researchers and commentators took the view that 'traditional 
adversarial approaches to cross-examination, drawn from criminal proceedings, were inappropriate to care 
proceedings'.  But subsequent British research has qualified this impression.  She points out that it has been 
found that some cases, particularly where child abuse is alleged, require a robust questioning of evidence.  
Evidence by either social services or parents may need to be properly tested in court.  Even expert witnesses 
are not infallible and may also need to be tested. She concludes ibid
society is the permanent removal of children from
testing of evidence remain crucial to a fair and just legal system…' . 
144  Martyn & Levine (1998) op cit note 96 at 258. 
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because of feelings of anger or motives of revenge.145 Alternatively, guilt or a desire to 
protect a parent may influence a child’s evidence.  As has been noted in part 4.2.4 above a 
child may have been intimidated, bribed or in other ways influenced and coached to give 
false replies on key issues.146  Some children tailor their answers to provide what they 
believe will please or satisfy questioners.147 There have been findings which suggest that 
this last problem is particularly relevant with black South African children who have had a 
traditio
sion is granted by the 
agistrate.152  This represents a significant procedural change because the general 
             
nal upbringing in which they have been taught not to disagree with elders.148 Thus 
testing of evidence should include that offered by children. 
 
It must be concluded that the many reasons in favour of testing the evidence of all 
categories of witnesses indicates that cross-examination is sometimes appropriate.149 The 
general requirement in s 52(2) of the 2005 Act that rules must be developed to enable 
adversarial procedures to be 'avoided' will thus hopefully not be interpreted as rendering it 
exceptional.150 But if it needs to be utilised, how is cross-examination to be controlled to 
prevent the problem of systemic abuse of witnesses as discussed above?151  The solution 
put forward in s 58 of the 2005 Act is that it may only occur if permis
m
                                    
 false allegation made 
ible young children are to giving false 
ed by Zaal (2003) op cit note 59 at 174. 
h perspective Lyon (2003) op cit note 111 at 380 supports the need for procedures which 
n cases involving children.  
145 The New Zealand case of B v Attorney-General [1997] NZFLR 550 arose out of a
by a daughter to a school friend that her father had abused her.  
146 For a discussion of research findings which indicate how suscept
information if they have been influenced by their parents beforehand or believe that they are protecting them 
see SK Hewitt Assessing Allegations of Sexual Abuse in Preschool Children: Understanding Small Voices 
(1999) at 67-68; and Bourg, Broderick & Flagor et al (1999) op cit note 124 at 169-70. 
147 For an analysis of the problems of coaching of children and tailored replies see Wilson & Powell (2001) 
op cit note 124 at 85-87. 
148 See the comments of respondents interview
149 From an Englis
allow for a testing of evidence generally i
150 This will depend on the interpretation of the wording once this section is implemented. As noted in part 
4.2.5 above s 58 & s 60(1)(b) expressly allow for some cross-examination. McLachlan (2003) op cit note 119 
at 6-7 has pointed out that a statement in s 93(3) of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) 
Act 1998 of New South Wales that proceedings are 'not to be conducted in an adversarial manner' has 
necessarily been interpreted by children's courts as indicative of a 'general complexion' of proceedings and 
not as entirely precluding adversarial phases. 
151 In part 6.3.2.2. 
152 On s 58 see further part 4.2.5, above. 
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approa
 
Act.  As will be remembered, this reads '[c]hildren's court proceedings must be conducted 
in an in
 
ch in South African courts has been to permit a right of cross-examination with a 
considerable degree of freedom from intervention by adjudicators.153 
  
What the 2005 Act unfortunately does not also include is a power for magistrates to 
control or even terminate cross-examination once they have given permission for it to be 
undertaken.  Since children's courts are entirely creatures of statute such a power cannot 
necessarily be implied.154 And surely it should be put beyond doubt that they are able to 
change their ruling if cross-examination becomes abusive or gratuitously 
confrontational.155  A capability to so intervene would be in line with s 60(3) of the 2005
formal manner and, as far as possible, in a relaxed and non-adversarial atmosphere 
which is conducive to attaining the cooperation of everyone involved in the proceedings'.  
 
Generally, how adjudicators should utilise intervention powers when evidence 
needs to be tested is a question of balance. Their task of protecting vulnerable witnesses 
must obviously not be taken so far as to completely stifle questioners so that they cannot 
effectively seek the truth.  This would be to deny the constitutional right to a fair hearing. 
In fairness to parties, adjudicators must allow them a reasonable degree of space to 
challenge evidence.156  To do so, magistrates should as recommended above initially adopt
                                                 
153 DT Zeffertt, AP Paizes &  A St Q Skeen The South African Law of Evidence (2003) at 753 describe the 
freedom ordinarily accorded to cross-examiners as follows ' [t]he cross-examiner should be allowed as far as 
possible to question the witness without interruption from the court…Questions cannot be disallowed merely 
rration -but a limitation on cross-examination 
ons… repetitive cross-examination is permissible within reasonable bounds, because it is a 
 work 
because the witness has already answered a similar question in chief, because asking a witness to repeat his 
or her evidence is one way of testing his or her accuracy of na
will be justified… if the cross-examiner appears to be unreasonably attempting to exhaust the witness by 
repeating questi
means of testing consistency'. See also Skeen & Van Der Merwe (2002) op cit note 43 at 342 & 345-46. 
154 The failure to issue clear legislation on this point has caused problems of interpretation in New South 
Wales: see McLachlan (2004) op cit note 73 especially at 49.  
155 See further PJ Schwikkard 'The Abused Child: A Few Rules of Evidence Considered' 1996 Acta Juridica 
148 at 157-58. 
156 Brophy (2006) op cit note 83 at vi is clear that care hearings adjudicators have been successfully guided in 
England and Wales to balance 'rigorous testing of evidence if that becomes necessary' with the provision of 'a 
protected, managed space in which assessments can be undertaken and where parties can attempt to
towards a solution.  In that process all parties, including the local authority, are made accountable to courts 
for actions and decisions'. 
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a passive role similar to the accusatorial approach.157  However, a difference is that they 
must remain ready to intervene, guided by the capabilities of participants as manifested in 
court.158 This accords with the principle of proportionality proposed in part 6.3.2.2 above.  
 
  In particular, magistrates must be required to ensure that testing does not exceed 
what witnesses are able to endure without harm.  As an example of how rules could be 
orded §765(a) of the California Evidence Code provides that courts must 'exercise 
reasona
 
g
                                                
w
ble control over the mode of interrogation of a witness so as to make interrogation 
as rapid, as distinct, and as effective for the ascertainment of the truth, as may be, and to 
protect the witness from undue harassment or embarrassment'. And § 765(b) states  '[w]ith 
a witness under the age of 14 or a dependent person with a substantial cognitive 
impairment, the court shall take special care to protect him or her from undue harassment 
or embarrassment, and to restrict the unnecessary repetition of questions'.159 
The stage of proceedin s is also a relevant consideration in deciding whether to 
limit testing.  In England, judges usually restrict adversarial questioning almost entirely at 
the final, outcomes stage.160 Although our law has not developed to the point of 
delineating separate phases of care hearings, the case for this will be put in part 8.4 below.  
If this is done our magistrates could be directed to follow the English approach once 
grounds for intervention have been established and only alternative care options are being 
considered. 
 
157 As pointed out by McConnell, Llewellyn & Ferronato (2002) op cit note 48 at 279 in New South Wales 
s noted ibid at 288 that assessing participants and drawing conclusions from their courtroom behaviour 
w, Policy and the Family 317 at 319 describes 
ction has been made between the trial procedure at the threshold and welfare stages. 
many children's court magistrates have found it appropriate to reduce their interventions and allow 
adversarial phases at stages in proceedings where disagreement between parties needs to be expressed. 
158 It i
of participants is a basic function of adjudicators at care proceedings. 
159California Evidence Code:  accessed at <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=evid & 
group=>. See further JL Richards 'Protecting the Child Witness in Abuse Cases' (2000) 34 Family LQ 393 at 
404. 
160 A Sealey 'Comment: A Plan for Parents' (2002) 32 Family Law 247 at 247 & 253 indicated that a practice 
was emerging in terms of which English judges restrict the adversarial approach in care cases by preventing 
its application in the final stages where the emphasis falls on deciding upon an appropriate outcome for the 
child. C Cobley 'The Quest for Truth: Substantiating Allegations of Physical Abuse in Criminal Proceedings 
And Care Proceedings' (2006) 20 International Journal of La
this as follows '[a] distin
Whilst the courts commonly adopt an inquisitorial approach at the welfare stage, it seems that the primary 
approach adopted at the threshold stage is an adversarial one, although the courts may take a more proactive 
role and adopt a quasi inquisitorial approach if necessary'.  
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As has been proposed,161 it is essential that our future rules require magistrates to 
maintain an overall characterisation of proceedings as primarily a joint exploration to find 
the best care option for the child, rather than a contest between adults.162 In order to 
achieve
m
d other forms of 
communication.  In particular, because this has been a problem in our system164 it is 
essenti
e
 taking over themselves or acting 
as a conduit, adjudicators should be able to respond by ordering a sheltered method for 
ide the courtroom or in the absence of other parties.167 In 
suppor
 this in a way that balances fair trial and protection requirements they will need a 
range of options allowing different degrees of intervention.  Where slightly inappropriate 
questioning methods are utilised what adjudicators should first have to apply is mere 
guidance or a warning.  This might be sufficient to nip in the bud, for example, mildly 
disproportionate atte pts at pressuring sensitive witnesses by opposing parties or their 
legal representatives.163  
Where limited intervention does not suffice children's court magistrates must be 
expressly required to more extensively control questioning an
al for them to firmly limit cross-examination which is so hostile as to inflict 
psychological harm.165  As an example of a provision designed to achieve this, s 6(3) of 
the South African Domestic Violence Act 116/1998 provides magistrates in dom stic 
violence cases with a discretion to decide whether an alleged abuser should be denied the 
right to cross-examine witnesses directly.  Instead, he may be required to direct his 
questions via the magistrate.166  Children's courts need to be given a similar power. 
Aside from terminating inappropriate questioning,
giving testimony from outs
t of this, in § 3509(b)(1) of the Child Victims’ and  Witnesses’ Rights Statute 2005 
                                                 
161 In part 6.3.1, above. 
162 In England answerability and establishing partnerships with families and children is increasingly being 
recognised as the ideal approach: see C Wattam 'Making Inquiries under Section 47 of the Children Act 
rkers in Child Care Proceedings' (2005) 19 International Journal 
mily 73 at 80-84. 
is duty should apply generally in 
1. 
d to in this thesis as sheltered participation methods see part 4.2.3, above. 
1989' in Wilson & James (2002) op cit note 55, 238 at 241. 
163 On the need for even welfare to be curbed in some cases see J Dickens 'Being "The Epitome of Reason": 
The Challenges for Lawyers and Social Wo
of Law, Policy and the Fa
164 See part 6.2.3, above. 
165 JA Lipovsky 'The Impact of Court on Children: Research Findings and Practical Recommendations' 
(1994) 9 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 238 at 255 considered that th
cases involving children.  See also Brophy (2006) op cit note 83 at 6
166 Section 6(3) applies only if the alleged abuser is unrepresented. 
167 On what are referre
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US federal courts are directed to allow a child to give evidence from outside court if  
'[c]onduct by the defendant or defense counsel causes the child to be unable to continue 
testifying'. This provision also allows them to do so on grounds of fearfulness, significant 
likelihood of trauma and mental or physical infirmity.168  
6.3.2.5 Time Management  
Generally in any situation where time in court is being wasted adjudicators must be 
required to utilise inquisitorial powers to speed cases along. In an English practice 
directio
le questioners traverse similar ground.  We thus require 
a rule to enable us to emulate Australian children's court practice172 by constraining 
subseq
 have been issued specifically to encourage adjudicators to expedite 
 date set for 
n issued in 1995 Sir Stephen Brown P stated that in order to reduce costs and 
delays in civil cases courts should 'assert greater control over the preparation for and 
conduct of hearings than has hitherto been customary'.169  A similar direction for South 
African children's courts would be useful in helping address our problem of delays as 
identified by Denge.170  In care cases where parties often have closely-allied interests time 
can easily be wasted when multip 171
uent questioners in this situation.       
As regards how to intervene to expedite proceedings, in Brown P’s 1995 practice 
direction he specified that courts should not hesitate to control the length of time spent on 
oral submissions by parties and  leading and cross-examination of witnesses.173 They 
should also regard themselves as empowered to curtail witnesses and legal representatives.  
And finally, they should limit parties to addressing them on relevant issues which they 
needed to be addressed upon.174  
 To counter the problem of unnecessary or lengthy adjournments, in California 
detailed provisions
children's cases. The California Family Code at § 7667(b) provides that on the
                                                 
168 18 U.S.C. (2005).  
n of 31 Jan 1995 [1995] 1 All ER 586-87 at 586C. 
rt 6.2.3, above. 
169 Sir Stephen Brown JP Practice Directio
170 See pa
171 McLachlan (2004) op cit note 73 at 53. 
172 See ibid. 
173 Brown (1995) op cit note 169 at 586D. 
174 Ibid. 
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trial te
matters ') be granted 'only upon a 
showing of good cause.  Neither nor the convenience of the 
ot
 
contain 177
procedural 
ing of witnesses, delays and failure to achieve the best outcomes 
which currently appear to be not uncommon.  As has been demonstrated, it would not be 
           
rmination of parental rights proceedings must be given precedence over all other 
. And § 7668(c) requires that adjournments ('continuances
a stipulation between counsel 
parties is in and of itself a good cause'. It also requires in § 7668(d) that an adjournment 
can only be allowed for the minimum time justified by evidence.175 In New South Wales s 
94(4) of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 directs that a 
children's court: 
'should avoid the granting of adjournments to the maximum extent possible and must n  grant an 
adjournment unless it is of the opinion that: 
(a) it is in the best interests of the child or young person to do so, or  
(b) there is some other cogent or substantial reason to do so'.176  
Heldman, in an analysis supported by extensive evidence from the USA, has argued that 
provisions like this which provide some leeway should be replaced by more detailed ones
ing specific and mandatory time deadlines that adjudicators  must enforce.  She 
has asserted that research findings prove it is essential for them to take a very active role in 
care case management -and be especially strict when delays are requested.178 These 
suggestions could usefully be incorporated as part of rules guiding implementation of 
s48(1)(c) of the 2005 Act179 and enabling a more active role for children's court 
magistrates in South Africa. In addition, the local South African measures noted by 
Denge180 should be evaluated and the most successful ones considered for incorporation. 
It may be concluded that a set of children's court rules requiring magistrates to 
utilise different methods of intervention proportionate to the needs of children and other 
persons is quite feasible.  It would go a long way towards addressing the 
confusion, traumatis
                                      
 at <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/display code?section=fam&group =...>. And r 8.474 (a), 
Title 8 'Appellate Rules' of the California Court Rules (Jan 2007 renumbering) requires superior and 
175 Accessed
reviewing courts to 'expedite the processing of all appeals and writs in juvenile cases'. Accessed at 
<http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/rules/documents> p146. 
 176 Accessed at < http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/nsw/consol_act.>. However,  McConnell,  Llewellyn &  
Ferronato (2002) op cit note 48 at 276 found that in practice cases are rarely finalized within 42 days. 
177 Heldman (2003) op cit note 72 at 1028 & 1033. 
178 Ibid at 1022. 
179 As noted in part 6.2.4 above this enables children's court magistrates to impose time deadlines. 
180 See part 6.2.3, above. 
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difficult to formulate the rules so as to provide a repertoire of intervention and time 
management options appropriate to different situations.  The rules could also indicate with 
a fair degree of precision how presiding officers should manage presentation of viva voce 
evidence.  If published in the form of regulations in terms of the 2005 Act they would 
make the proposed inquisitorial function for magistrates much more effective.   
 6.4  onclusion 
 functioning of the children's courts 
has been impeded.  Persons involved in cases are often at a disadvantage both when it 
comes 
g officers.  Whilst requiring a host of extremely 
demanding new duties which will certainly require dedicated specialists it counteractively 
demote
C
 
Ever since the official establishment of children's courts in 1937 there has been 
inadequate guidance on the procedures to be followed at hearings. Using ordinary civil 
magistrates’ court practice as an approximate guide has proved to be inappropriate.  In 
particular, attempts to apply this to the role of presiding officers in care cases have been 
problematic.  Commissioners are confused about their functions and therefore adopt 
widely differing interpretations.  In consequence, the
to preparing beforehand and in participating at hearings.   
 
Especially where magistrates adopt a relatively disengaged accusatorial role, 
participants face communication barriers and are highly vulnerable to secondary, systemic 
abuse caused by inappropriate questioning at court.  With reference to the evaluative 
criteria requiring fair proceedings and hearing the voices of children and caregivers the 
inadequate dispensation on how presiding officers should function is a major weakness in 
our system.  Not merely prejudice at proceedings themselves but even failures to discover 
best possible outcome for the child sometimes result. 
 
In part 6.2.4 it has been shown that the 2005 Act does relatively little to improve 
our law on the functions of presidin
s the idea of specialisation by taking away the title of commissioner of child 
welfare and making it clear that any magistrate can preside -and on even a part-time basis. 
The need to provide children's courts with a separate structure and leadership has 
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unfortunately not been recognized. Whilst the hortatory provisions in the Act requiring 
appropriate questioning methods for children, a relaxed atmosphere and a minimum of 
adversarialism are laudable,   they beg   the question of   what exactly magistrates should  
actually do to achieve all this effectively and expeditiously. And the removal of the 
conduct of   presiding officers in civil magistrates’ courts as a point of reference   takes us 
from inappropriate to almost no law.  
 
 rules must be a clear statement that their normal mode is 
inquisitorial.  As has been shown, in many developed systems with similar historical roots 
to our 
 of these (as far as possible) as amicable explorations of care grounds and 
outcom s by all concerned. 
Despite its shortcomings, a positive feature of the 2005 Act is the scope it creates 
for publishing future regulations on children's court procedures. Although it will take time 
to develop a detailed body of these a start should be made by issuing rules on the key 
functions of presiding officers.  With many of our current problems attributable to 
magistrates functioning too passively in accordance with an accusatorial approach the 
foundation of the proposed
own the role of adjudicators in care cases has been shifted to predominantly 
interventionist. 
 
An inquisitorial function would represent such a break with our past that some 
description of its content will be needed for successful implementation.  The proposed 
rules should as an introduction express teleology. Their two primary purposes should be 
described as facilitation by magistrates of information-gathering at hearings and the 
maintenance
e
 
An inquisitorial approach will clearly require magistrates to exercise a realm of 
discretion.  However, because children's courts are creatures of statute, and since there are 
training concerns and serious participation problems, it will be essential to provide some 
detailed guidance.  A crucial aspect is how they should manage presentation of viva voce 
evidence during care hearings.  The proposed rules should require them to intervene 
whenever questioning by other persons is ineffective, harmful to the extent of constituting 
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secondary, systemic abuse, or wasteful of time through being unduly drawn out or 
irrelevant.  
 
The proposed inquisitorial role must not be so extensive as to preclude opposing 
parties testing evidence.  This recommendation accords with the criterion of a system in 
which proposals such as those by welfare can be subjected to real challenge.  Although it is 
essential that evidence be sufficiently tested for veracity, this must be expressly rated in the 
proposed rules as secondary to protecting vulnerable witnesses.  Protection at hearings 
should be guided by a principle of proportionality which will require magistrates to 
monitor the capacity of witnesses to manage coercive questioning.  As in England such 
questioning should particularly be limited when only care alternatives remain to be 
considered. 
 
In relation to how magistrates should intervene, it has been shown that it would be 
quite feasible to provide a gradated repertoire of different remedies in the rules.  These 
should be proportional to the nature and seriousness of communication problems which 
need addressing.  They should range from mere warnings directed at questioners, 
allowance of multiple-choice questions, limited direct assistance, serving as a conduit, to a 
complete taking over of questioning by a magistrate.  The rules must additionally facilitate 
sheltered participation methods for vulnerable witnesses of all ages.  They must further as 
in some developed systems direct magistrates to be strict with adjournments so as to 
counter the serious problem of time delays which frequently harm children. 
 
 Aside from the urgent need for introducing a primarily inquisitorial role, it has 
been shown in this chapter that it is essential that a future dispensation recognise children's 
court adjudicators as specialists who undertake a unique function. A final point is that, just 
as with the ADR responsibilities noted in chapter 3, the proposed new inquisitorial 
function will obviously have training implications -although guiding rules and 
specialisation as recommended in this chapter would minimise these. Proper directions on 
the core role functions of presiding officers would be a big step forward; but they also 
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require guidance on when precisely  available to provide court services.  
T .
they should be
his question is taken up in the next chapter
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CHAPTER 7 
PRELIMINARY AND INTERIM HEARINGS: A PROPOSAL FOR IMPROVED 
SERVICES 
 
7.1  Introduction 
 
 In a typical case once a child has been identified as potentially a candidate for 
mandat
ervices 
at initiation of formal proceedings and during the interim period which subsists whilst the 
investig
children's court services pending the dispositive hearing.  This will be shown in part 7.2 by 
means of an evaluation of the 1983 and 2005 Acts.  It will be demonstrated that little scope 
ory alternative care her needs and situation will have to be investigated by welfare 
personnel and perhaps other professionals.  The investigation will probably extend over a 
period of weeks or even months.1  Upon its completion, a decision will need to be taken on 
what if any medium- or longer-term measures are required.  In our system if they are to be 
mandatory they will be ordered by a children's court at a care hearing after an evaluation of 
the evidence.2 Although this terminology is not included in our legislation, for purposes of 
clarity the words 'dispositive hearing' will be used in this and subsequent chapters to refer 
to such a post-investigation hearing.3 The focus in this chapter is on earlier court s
ation of the child’s situation is ongoing.  
 
Of particular relevance for this chapter is the primary evaluative criterion that 
alternative care services should be incrementally available over a period of time. Children's 
lives obviously do not go on hold during care investigations.  It will be contended that yet 
another way in which our law is underdeveloped is through very limited provision for 
for interlocutory relief has been provided in these statutes.  
 
                                                 
1 As has been noted in part 6.2.3 above, cases sometimes unfortunately extend even over years. 
2 The 1983 Act s 15; 2005 Act s 46 & ss 155-56. 
3 It will be shown in this chapter that care hearings are inadequately categorised in our legislation.  The terms
'dispositive' and 'disposition' are used with reference to outcomes hearings in some developed systems.  A
 
n 
below. See also parts 8.1 & example is s 2-27(1.5)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act, Illinois as cited in part 7.3.2, 
8.4.3, below. 
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In part 7.3 it will be shown that there is a wide range of valuable functions courts 
can perform pending dispositive hearings.  This will be done by means of a comparative 
review. Foreign systems with well developed law will be selectively drawn upon for the 
purpos
It will be shown in part 7.4 that the concepts of preliminary and interim children's 
system. It is not suggested that this 
imple, binary naming system is the only approach.  An alternative is to formulate a variety 
 defined as the first formal appearance 
efore a children's court of any informant, party, participant6 or applicant for such status.  
 guidance can be provided on preparations for the 
ispositive hearing and any necessary initial decisions can be taken by the court.7 
e of illustration.  The aim of the comparisons is to provide a foundation for 
recommendations on how our legislation should be expanded to provide much better 
protection for children whilst their cases are being prepared.  
 
court care hearings need to be introduced into our 
s
of descriptions according to different court functions performed at many kinds of 
predispositive hearings.4 From a South African perspective, however, it will be suggested 
that in view of our lack of development the binary model would be a suitable way forward.  
Its advantages include avoiding a proliferation of court hearings and the danger that a 
needed service in a particular case might fall outside more detailed hearing 'labels'.  
 
A preliminary hearing may be understood for the purposes of this chapter as a first 
formal court proceeding in a case.5 It could be
b
As will be further explained, at it
d
Subsequently, and prior to the date of the dispositive hearing, the child’s circumstances 
                                                 
, Illinois as amended and contained in chapter 705, Illinois 
mpiled Statutes <http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs4.asp> provides for 'temporary custody hearings' 
 2-9), 'shelter care hearings' and 'shelter care rehearings' (s 2-10(3)), 'restraining orders' hearings (s2-23(3)), 
 o
inois 
the Connecticut Practice Book. Accessed at <http://www.jud.ct.gov/Publications/PracticeBook/PB2.pdf
4 For example, the Juvenile Court Act 1987
Co
(s
'orders f protection' hearings and 'orders of protective supervision' hearings (s 2-26(1)) (hereafter cited as 
'Ill Juvenile Court Act'). For other examples see P Chill 'Burden of Proof Begone: The Pernicious Effect 
of Emergency Removal in Child Protective Proceedings' (2004) 42 Family Court Review 540 at 541 N14. 
5 A detailed definition of a preliminary hearing is provided in the Connecticut 'Definitions Applicable to 
Proceedings on Juvenile Matters' at s 26-1(f)(4).  It reads 'means a hearing on an ex parte order of temporary 
custody or an order to appear or the first hearing on a petition alleging that the child or youth is uncared for, 
neglected or dependent'. The 'Definitions Applicable to Proceedings on Juvenile Matters' comprise s 26-1 of 
>. 
6 On the difference between parties and mere participants see part 4.3.2.3, above. 
7 See part 7.3.1, below. 
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may change or new issues may arise on which parties need guidance.  It is for these 
situations that the concept of interim hearings becomes relevant.  
  
Aside from generally motivating for the introduction of preliminary and interim 
hearings as a means of improving children's court services in care cases, in this chapter an 
attempt will be made to show that our law should be further developed to indicate when 
they ought to be held and what functions should be performed at them. 
 
 7.2  
's courts is not strongly developed 
in eith
conduc
 
.2.1  
 In the 1983 Act children's court care hearings have not been systematically 
categorised by type or purpose. Some pre-dispositive functions are certainly provided for  
ry'.  
Current South African Law and Practice   
 
  In the next two subparts the 1983 and 2005 Acts are separately considered. 
Although the former Act is due to be replaced its approach to predisposition functions 
requires some analysis because of its influence in some important respects on the 2005 
Act. Also, its application has revealed weaknesses in our system which need to be 
considered from a reformist perspective.  It will be demonstrated in relation to care matters 
that the concept of pre-dispositive hearings for children
er statute. It will further be shown that this disadvantages participants and is 
ive to confusion and a lack of uniformity. 
The Child Care Act 74/1983  7
 
 In the next two sub-parts first the wording and then the application of the 1983 Act 
is evaluated. 
 
7.2.1.1 The Wording of the 1983 Act 
 
but the nature of these is not clearly depicted. Where formal court proceedings are 
unambiguously referred to, the term most commonly used to describe them is 'inqui 8
                                                 
8 See ss 13, 14, 15 & reg 9.    Gazette publication details for the latter are provided later in this part. 
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South African commentators have noted that this word primarily indicates a main post-
investigation care hearing9 (dispositive in the sense described above).  However, in the 
bsence of any authority on the question it has been speculated that since 'inquiry' is not 
defined
t to be in need of mandatory alternative care are to be immediately 
removed to a place of safety. In s 11(1) a court of any kind (not merely a children's court) 
is give
'If it appears to any commissioner of child welfare on information on oath given by any person that 
n be brought before a children’s court.' 
ative care.  It further entitles 
other persons authorised by them or by commissioners to undertake such removals.  Police 
and soc
                                                
a
 it could possibly include earlier hearings as well.10  What renders such a broad 
interpretation somewhat uncertain is that (as will be discussed further) the different term 
'review' is used with reference to preliminary appearances and court assessments of 
emergency action in reg 9 published in terms of the Act.  
 
At ss 11(1), 11(2), 12(1) and 13(2) the Act provides four different methods for 
instigating care cases.  These are, respectively, initiation by any court, commissioners, 
persons undertaking emergency removals and children's court assistants. With the first 
three, children though
n the power to instigate this process if a child appearing to need care comes to its 
notice in the ordinary course of any proceedings before it.  In s 11(2) an instigation power 
is conferred on commissioners themselves.  This states: 
there are reasonable grounds for believing that any child who is within the area of his jurisdiction 
has no parent or guardian or that it is in interest of the safety and welfare of any child who is within 
the area of his jurisdiction that he be taken to a place of safety, that commissioner may issue a 
warrant authorising any policeman or social worker or any other person to search for the child and 
take him to a place of safety, to be there kept until he ca
 
 The third preliminary removal power arises in emergencies when there is no time to 
obtain court authority. Section 12(1) authorises the police and certain social workers11 to 
immediately remove children thought to be in need of altern
ial workers can take a decision on the spur of the moment because no authority is 
required from anyone else.  With an authorised person (who could even be an untrained 
 
9 HM Bosman-Swanepoel & PJ Wessels A Practical Approach to the Child Care Act (1995) 35-37; and B 
ntal Power: The Protection of Children' in B Van Heerden, 
10 N378. 
 the employ of the state or 
Van Heerden 'Judicial Interference with the Pare
A Cockrell & R Keightly et al (eds) Boberg’s Law of Persons and the Family (1999) 497 at 6
10 Van Heerden ibid. 
11 In terms of the limited definition of 'social worker' in s 1 only social workers in
authorised welfare organisations have this power. 
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ordinary member of the public) there has to be a prior written instruction from a police 
member, social worker or commissioner.12  
 
Under s 12(1) of the 1983 Act the ground is that the person undertaking an 
emergency removal must have 'reason to believe that the child is a child referred to in 
s14(4) and that the delay in obtaining a warrant will be prejudicial to the safety and welfare 
of that
ny child in regard to whom a children's court assistant is of opinion that he or she is a child in 
 
ith all four methods of instigation there is a proviso that the child be 
subsequently 'brought before a children's court'.16 However, no specific time is provided 
en all is ready for 
 child'. This sets an objective standard13 but does not insist on imminent harm. 
Section 14(4) of the Act contains the grounds for children being found to be in need of 
alternative care at dispositive hearings and so the person would reasonably have to believe 
that one of them applied.14  Without any specific deadline, the person must also under 
s12(2)(b) inform a children's court assistant of the reasons for the child's removal 'as soon 
thereafter as may be'. 
 
Whilst preliminary removals of children will sometimes be necessary they are a 
drastic way to initiate a case.15  For less serious instances the power to commence without 
a preliminary removal is accorded to children's court assistants in s 13(2) of the Act. This 
reads: 
'A
need of care may be brought before the children's court of the district in which the child resides or
happens to be, by any policeman, social worker or authorized officer, or by a parent, guardian or 
other person having the custody of the child.' 
 
There is no indication about how the assistant should reach such an opinion or whether the 
validity of this should subsequently be tested. So it is not clear whether s 13(2) was 
intended to give rise to a preliminary hearing of some kind.   
 
W
for this. A possible interpretation, therefore, is that it need only occur wh
                                                 
12 See the definition of 'authorised officer' in s 1. 
her part 8.2, below. 
on to s 12(1) this is provided for in s 12(2)(c). 
13 See the conclusions of Zaal, Van Huyssteen and Robinson as cited in part 7.2.1.2, below. 
14 On s 14(4) see furt
15 The serious consequences which typically result are noted in part 7.4.1, below. 
16 In relati
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the disp
the Ac
y child from the quotation above in s 13(2) there is a 
rned and to 
port to the court thereanent' [emphasis added].17 The drafters thus only envisaged the 
 
stage.   It states: 
ositive hearing. This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that it is not stated in 
t that there must be an earlier hearing at which the child appears. With instigations 
ren's court assistants, as can be seen b
variation which indicates that the child 'may' rather than must be brought. This could be 
understood as permitting no appearance of the child at all even at the dispositive stage. 
 
Concerning extracurial care assessments of children by experts s 14(1) of the 1983 
Act states that any children's court holding a care inquiry 'may at any time during the 
inquiry order any medical officer or psychologist to examine the child conce
re
ordering of an examination once an inquiry had begun. As noted above 'inquiry' has not 
been defined -and so there is uncertainty about whether examination can occur only after 
the beginning of the dispositive hearing proper.  A question which arises is whether it 
would not be better to provide expressly for forensic examinations well before dispositive 
hearings so that the results are available to the courts at them. In care cases assessments -
and particularly mental health assessments- often need several sessions, so that a period of 
time is typically essential.18 
Some types of assessment require periods of observation of individuals or child-
parent interactions in controlled environments as opposed to direct examination.19  For 
example, welfare may regard this as necessary for gaining evidence on whether a child or 
one of her parents has special needs because of a mental or physical problem.20 In s 14(3) 
it has arguably been implied that forensic observation can only begin at the dispositive 
 
                                                 
17 Section 14(1) was substituted by s 5(a) of the Child Care Amendment Act 96/1996.   
18 R Holt, J Grundon & R Paxton 'Specialist Assessment in Child Protection Proceedings: Problems and 
Possible Solutions' (1998) 7 Child Abuse Review 266 at 267. See also J Cohen & C Hale 'Treatment or 
Therapy: the House Of Lords Decision in Re G (Interim Care Order: Residential Assessment)' (2006) 36 
Family Law 294 at 295. 
19 For an English case which involved lengthy observation of parenting skills at a specialised hospital unit see 
Cohen & Hale ibid. 
20 As noted in part 2.3.4 above, observation was first provided for in our law in s (1)(i) of the Children's Act 
33/1960. 
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'The court holding such inquiry may, if it deems it expedient, from time to time postpone or adjourn 
the inquiry for periods not exceeding 14 days at a time, and may order that in the interim the child 
remain in a place of safety or be kept in a place of safety for observation for the information of the 
court.' 
 
It must be concluded, however, that neither s 14(1) or (3) are entirely clear about when 
exactly forensic processes that might arguably be seen as part of welfare’s pre-disposition 
care in
shortly before it was 
promulgated, Barlow defended this approach. He argued that mandatory assessments are 
sometim
lved in care cases are 
withou
is there
concern [w]henever 
                       
vestigation should be undertaken. Special adjournments as envisaged in s 14(3) 
could obviously delay completion of cases.  As noted by Holt, Grundon and Paxton, courts 
should make requests for assessments at an early stage in care proceedings because where 
they impose unrealistic timeframes the quality of assessment tends to suffer.21 
 
 And what of the feelings of recipients?  By not including a right of refusal for 
children s 14 allows them to be subjected to compulsory forensic assessments regardless of 
whether or not they are willing.  Reviewing the wording of the Act 
es essential for obtaining vital evidence.22  In support he cited cases of family 
collusion which had rendered it very difficult to prove sexual abuse without subjecting 
children to medical examinations.23  
  
In s 54 of the Act age estimations, as another form of forensic assessment, are 
provided for somewhat differently. Many South African children invo
t birth documents, identity documents or other proof of their ages.24 A remedy that 
fore frequently required is a legally binding estimation of the age of the child 
ed. 25  Section 54 enables commissioners to provide age assessments '
                          
& Paxton (1998) op cit note 18 at 270. 21 Holt, Grundon 
22 G E Barlow 'Ch
23 Ibid. 
24 Social 
Should 
Commis
with you
25 Jood i inted out that this may be needed urgently to obtain a place of safety accommodation grant 
during the period pending the main inquiry. Where birth documents are not available a children's court age-
plication.  Jood has drawn attention to the fact that 
ecome available.  As she notes, this is unfair and disadvantages children.  An 
ild Care Bill -Best Interests of the Child?'  1982 (July) De Rebus 339. 
 Jooworker C d 'The Post-Court-Order Phase for Children in Need of Care.  What Happens and What 
Happen?' (Unpublished Masters seminar paper, University of Durban-Westville, 21 Oct 2002); 
sioner P Booysen: personal communication 12 Sept 2006. This is particularly likely to be a problem 
ng, abandoned children. 
bid has po
estimation will be essential before welfare can apply for an identity document.  The department of home 
affairs may take several months to process such an ap
where a private individual acts as a place of safety for a child the state grant is not payable to that individual 
until identity documents b
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in any proceedings in terms of this Act the age of any person is a relevant fact'. The 
termino
inquirie
age est
 
ny other 
preliminary action that might be undertaken by welfare or a children's court. Nor is it 
stated 
rovides some consequential 
nctions for commissioners.  This reads in relevant part as follows: 
eration of the reasons for the detention of the child as stated 
in the authority and such other information as he or she may obtain or as may be furnished to him or 
her by the parent or the guardian of the child, the person, institution or place of safety in whose 
… 
(e) No authority shall be set aside in terms of paragraph (d) (ii) without prior consideration of any 
information given on oath as to the grounds of the removal, which may be furnished any stage of the 
review proceedings by the policeman, social worker or authorised officer concerned'  [Emphasis 
added]. 
logy '[w]henever in any proceedings' is much broader than the confinement to 
s in s 14(1) and (3). It thus appropriately provides clearer scope for completing an 
imation prior to the onset of a dispositive hearing. 
It is not indicated in the Act that children’s courts should be available for parties 
who wish to challenge assessments or indeed pre-disposition removals or a
that children’s courts should review these mero motu. However, it was recognised 
by the legislature that more direction was needed. In an attempt to address this at least 
partially reg 9(2) was published in 1998.26  It is limited to cases where there has already 
been a preliminary removal of the child.  And it is further limited only to s 11(2) or s 12(1) 
removals. It thus applies to only two of the four instigation methods.  
 
As will be remembered s 11(2) and s 12(1) provide, respectively, for preliminary 
removals authorised by commissioners and those undertaken where there is no time to seek 
their authorization. Under reg 9(2)(b)(i) it is made necessary in both cases for the person 
undertaking the removal to notify a children's court assistant about its implementation 
within forty-eight hours afterwards. And reg 9(2)(d)-(e) p
fu
'(d) The commissioner shall, after consid
custody the child was immediately before the removal or apprehension, the child, the children's 
court assistant, the social worker, policeman or authorised officer, as the case may be- 
(i) confirm the detention of the child by issuing an order of detention in the form of Form 5 
with such special requirements, subject to variations, as may be deemed necessary in the 
interests of the child from time to time; or 
(ii) set the authority aside and direct that the child be restored to the custody of his or her 
parent, guardian or person in whose custody he or she was immediately before the removal; 
                                                                                                                                                    
official court estimation of the age of a child and place of safety order should be sufficient to allow for 
payment of the grant -and if necessary retrospectively. 
26 Child Care Act 74/1983 Regulation Amendments of 1998 (Government Notice R416, Government Gazette 
18770 of 31 March 1998). 
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Van Heerden has suggested that the intention: 
'… is apparently to enable the Commissioner of Child Welfare concerned either to confirm the 
detention of the child in the place of safety and "open" the children's court inquiry, or to set aside 
the detention authority and direct that the child be restored to the custody of his or her parent or 
guardian or of the person in whose custody the child was immediately before the removal, without 
any further inquiry. '27 
 
This appears to be both a logical and appropriate interpretation, but an important question 
is what
s revoking a removal as unwarranted this cannot be done 'without prior 
onsideration of any information given on oath as to the grounds of the removal, which 
may be
 How then, has the sparse wording on preliminary and interim functions been 
applied in practice? Empirical findings and anecdotal accounts show unsurprisingly that it 
ent in s 13(2) that children 'may' be brought before 
 kind of process should be followed when making such a crucial decision. 
 
In relation to process, some of the language in reg 9(2)(d)-(e) is against an 
interpretation that requires children's courts to sit in formal session. As can be seen, it 
refers to 'the commissioner' (not the court) considering 'information' (not evidence) 
provided by relevant persons.28 This language appears to contemplate something less than 
a formal, preliminary hearing.  However, in terms of reg 9(2)(e) if the commissioner 
contemplate
c
 furnished at any stage of the review proceedings'. This wording, and particularly 
the last two words, could be seen as implying an actual court hearing.  It can only be 
concluded that, although reg 9(2) at least showed that commissioners needed to review 
preliminary removals, it is unclear on how this should occur. 
 
7.2.1.2 The Application of the 1983 Act 
 
has produced uncertainty on when and even whether children's courts should hold pre-
sposition hearings. Thdi e statem
                                                 
27 Van Heerden (1999) op cit note 9 at 609.  See also Bosman-Swanepoel & Wessels (1995) op cit note 9 at 
e in a New Constitutional Era' in JA Robinson 
ust include the reasons for the removal 
ild as written on a Form 4 by the person who undertook the removal. 
32; and FN Zaal 'Children's Courts: an Underrated Resourc
(ed) The Law of Children and Young Persons in South Africa (1997) 95 at 108. 
28 It is clear from the wording of reg 9(2)(d) that such information m
of the ch
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children's courts is frequently interpreted as not requiring these.29 Generally, 
commissioners have understandably been uncertain about their predisposition 
jurisdiction.30  Where they take the view that they should not be available persons in 
desperate need of a preliminary ruling require substantial financial resources to approach 
the hig
e different position that the child must be available at court if it is feasible 
for her to be brought.33 In relation to process, some commissioners require only the 
submis
ld, they may be ex parte 
ith an appearance only by the court’s informant.36  Alternatively, the commissioner may 
require
h court.31 
 
  Even where preliminary removals have occurred the requirement that the child 
must be brought before the children’s court in s 11(1)-(2) and s 12(1) is indeed sometimes 
taken to mean that the child need not be seen prior to disposition.32 Some commissioners, 
however, take th
sion of preliminary documentary evidence and a viewing of the child in chambers, 
whilst others require a formal appearance of all involved persons at a preliminary 
hearing.34   
 
Depending on the approach taken by the commissioner, where preliminary hearings 
(often referred by practitioners to as 'opening hearings')35 are he
w
 that they be inter partes with caregivers, an investigative social worker and 
possibly the child expected to attend.37 Commissioners who hold opening hearings differ 
not only on who should attend but also on whether the evidence to be provided concerning 
the child’s circumstances should be as detailed and weighty as would be required at a 
                                                 
29 Commissioner A Bacharam: personal communication 26 July 2007. See also the finding on 'the attitude of 
the commissioner' in CR Matthias Removal of Children and the Right to Family Life: South African Law and 
Practice (1997) 48 para 7.1. 
30 Bacharam ibid; Matthias ibid at 46. 
31 See the Womack case in part 4.3.2.2, above; and the Swarts case discussed later in this subpart. 
32 DS Rothman 'The Functioning of Children's Courts' (Visiting lecture, University of KwaZulu-Natal 8 Sept 
2005); Booysen (2006) supra note 24. 
 young, ill or far away: Matthias (1997) op cit note 29 at 46 & 48; 
has informed the court that a particular child is in need of consideration for 
33 In other words, if the child is not too
Jood (2002) supra note 24; and Bacharam (2007) supra note 29. 
34 Matthias (1997) ibid 46. Rothman (2005) supra note 32; Bacharam (2007) ibid. 
35 Bosman-Swanepoel & Wessels (1995) op cit note 9 at 32. 
36 Meaning the person who 
mandatory alternative care measures: Booysen (2006) supra note 24. 
37 Ibid. 
 271
dispositive hearing.38 Available data on preliminary processes thus supports the conclusion 
in the previous chapter about a general situation of procedural unpredictability and 
confusion. 
rase in other 
legislation as meaning that the belief must not only have been objectively reasonable but 
must also have been based upon pre-existing facts.40  In Robinson's view the exacting 
standard set by the courts in interpreting the same wording in other legislation could 
discourage social workers from removing children in situations where, although such a 
                   
  
Aside from leaving uncertainty about early court processes generally, a specific 
issue not settled by the insertion of reg 9(2) is what degree of scrutiny commissioners 
should apply when reviewing preliminary removals of children. It is unclear whether they 
should allow persons undertaking such removals a wide degree of discretion or else subject 
their behaviour to a close evaluation in the interests of providing a 'safety net' for the child 
and her family. 
 
 As will be remembered, the ground for an emergency removal in s 12(1) of the Act 
is that there is 'reason to believe that the child is a child referred to in s 14(4) and that the 
delay in obtaining a warrant will be prejudicial to the safety and welfare of the child'.  In 
interpreting this some South African commentators have concluded that it indicates that 
the belief of the person removing the child must be measured by commissioners against an 
objective standard of reasonableness under the circumstances.39   
 
In 1992 Robinson argued that the phrase 'reason to believe' in the s 12(1) ground 
places social workers in a difficult position when deciding whether or not to undertake an 
emergency removal.  He showed that our courts have interpreted this ph
                              
rocedures under the Child Care Act: Some New Dangers to Contend With' 
38 Ibid; and Jood (2002) supra note 24. 
39 FN Zaal 'Child Removal P
(1988) 105 SALJ 224 at 233; B Van Huyssteen 'Verwydering van Kinders Sonder n’ Lasbrief: Artikel 12 van 
die Wet op Kindersorg van 1983' (1989) 24 The Magistrate/Die Magistraat 15 at 18; and Van Heerden 
(1999) op cit note 9 at 607.   
40 JA Robinson 'Artikel 12(1) Van Die Wet Op Kindersorg En Die Posisie Van Die Maatskaplike Werker' 
(1992) 55 THRHR 74 at 75-76. 
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remova
d against the 
objective standard of a reasonable person placed in the same situation.  In Robinson's view 
the dan
mited scrutiny.45 In fact, so little 
oversight is provided that in the last two decades in many jurisdictions social workers have 
extende
l is needed in the best interest of the child, they fear that their opinion that there 
was no time to get court authority will not be upheld.41  
 
The solution put forward by Robinson is that merely a subjective and not objective 
and fact-based test should be applied to persons who undertake emergency removals.42 
This would mean that the primary consideration for a court in conducting a review would 
be whether the remover was bona fide in her motives. She would not be teste
ger of a higher proportion of inappropriate removals resulting from easier standards 
is not critical because court reviews can occur soon thereafter.43   
 
 Robinson's warning about deterring removals and his proposal for prompt reviews 
are important and will be returned to later.44 However, his fears have so far proved 
unfounded.  With neither the Act nor regulations providing clear guidance on a process for 
commissioners, in practice most of them apply very li
d their s 12(1) powers. In order to avoid the time and effort involved in going to 
court to obtain a warrant under the s 11(2) procedure they frequently invoke s 12(1) for 
removals in non-emergency situations where time is not of the essence.46  It has been 
claimed that the police have displayed the same tendency -although in their case because 
of insufficient training on what constitutes real emergencies for children.47    
 
                                                 
42 Ibid at 79.  
43 Ibid. 
w. 
ote 24; Bacharam (2007) supra note 29.  Generally on the practice of limited 
2.3, above. 
valuating the Child 
4/1983' (Pretoria, 26 June 2001); Jood (2002) supra note 24; Rothman (2005) supra note 32; 
bid.  This view was also expressed by a Pretoria commissioner, S Snyman: unpublished 
n, law commission workshop 'Evaluating the Child Care Act 74/1983' (Pretoria, 26 June 2001). 
41 Ibid at 78.  
44 In part 7.4, belo
45 Booysen (2006) supra n
scrutiny see part 6.
46 E Swanepoel, social worker: unpublished presentation, law commission workshop 'E
Care Act 7
Booysen (2006) supra note 24. 
47 Booysen i
presentatio
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The limited utilisation of emergency reviews by children's courts reduces their 
accessibility to family members who wish to challenge preliminary removals.48  Such 
members who are confronted by situations where relief is urgently required may therefore 
have to approach the high court.  However, because of the expense of high court litigation 
only a small minority of parties are able to do so.  A reported example of such a case is 
Swarts v Swarts.49 Here the high court had an ideal opportunity to provide direction on the 
role of courts in reviewing preliminary removal decisions by social workers.  
 
As noted in part 6.2.3 above, Swarts provides a strong endorsement of wide 
discreti
or was the court in Swarts swayed by the fact that a pretext of enabling access by 
the fath
on for social workers.  An 'emergency' removal from a single, divorced mother who 
was employed and maintaining her children was upheld. There was no suggestion of her 
abusing or intentionally neglecting them. Despite conceding that the motives of the father 
who instigated the removal were open to question50 the court was not swayed by the fact 
that the use of s 12(1) here had effectively reversed a fiercely contested court custody 
decision in favour of the mother only shortly before.51   
 
N
er was used to secretly remove the children while the mother was at work.52 And in 
terms of technical requirements under the 1983 Act the social worker had not followed an 
entirely correct procedure. In completing a form 4 she had not as required in s 12(1) 
indicated a prima facie s 14(4) ground.  The court noted that her entries on the form were 
inadequate because they were 'weliswaar kripties en onvolledig'.53  And furthermore, the 
father had been at the receiving end of domestic violence litigation and criminal charges 
instigated by the mother.54 In deciding that the judgment and good intentions of the social 
worker outweighed all of these counter considerations55   the court applied an approach of 
limited scrutiny.  
                                                 
48Booysen ibid.  
eaning 'undoubtedly cryptic and incomplete'.  See the judgment also at 41c. 
49 [2002] 3 All SA 35 (T). 
50 Ibid at 42j-43a. 
51 The removal had been followed by placement of the children with the father’s parents. 
52 At 40h. 
53 At 44i -m
54 At 37g. 
55 At 42b. 
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  As a rationale, Bertelsmann J in Swarts held that the act of a social worker in 
undertaking an emergency removal of a child must be defined as a quasi-judicial 
dministrative act.56 Therefore, although it was necessary for the court as upper guardian 
 removal was in the best interests of the child it should 
ot inquire so far into the merits as to substitute its own opinion for that of the social 
worker.
ngle, working mothers are an 
at-risk group for overzealous removals by welfare.59 Whether or not his approach was 
approp
pecifically is not clear about processes and the degree of scrutiny to 
be applied by courts in reviews of preliminary child removals has led to limited 
e to affected families and even 
ersons without financial means are expected to approach the high court.  The degree of 
confine
a
of all minors to consider whether the
n
57 Thus, the court should not try to decide whether the removal had been justifiable 
because one of the s 14(4) grounds reasonably appeared to apply.  All it need do is 
establish whether the social worker had genuinely believed that this was the case.58 
 
There were no binding precedents so directly in point as to compel the conclusion 
reached by Bertelsmann J.  And his deference to the social worker meant that an objective 
test was hardly applied.  He did not express awareness that si
riate will be considered in part 7.4, below.  Certainly, it was one which supported 
the established practice in children's courts of allowing considerable autonomy to social 
workers undertaking preliminary removals of children.   
 
It may be concluded that limited use of preliminary and interim care hearings has 
become a standard norm for children's courts under the 1983 Act.  The fact that it has little 
to say about these and s
monitoring.  Little pre-dispositive protection is thus availabl
p
ment of commissioners to pre-inquiry removals rather than less drastic preliminary 
action is also a matter for concern. In many cases the harm to a child from inadequate care 
is gradual or likely to occur only in the future.  In these instances a removal prior to the 
main dispositive proceedings is not required and may even be counter-productive. In the 
                                                 
56 At 45e. In discussing the nature of emergency removals undertaken in terms of the 1983 Act, Van Heerden 
has suggested that 'the better view is that the detention of a child is a legal procedure and not merely an 
 
nnell 'What's Wrong with the Picture: the Other Side of Representing Parents in Child 
administrative act' [emphasis in the original]. See Van Heerden (1999) op cit note 9 above, at 610 N378.  
57 At 45f.
58 At 44h. 
59 See H O'Do
Protection Cases' (2005) 4 Appalachian Journal of Law 73 at 75. 
 275
next part below the wording of the 2005 Act on interlocutory remedies will be compared 
with the 1983 Act. 
 
7.2.2  he Children's Act 38/2005  
 
he child is in need of care and protection'.61  It does, however, in s 46 include 
other orders for children’s courts which are not so confined.  
7.2.2.1
ld'.63  Such care is described in s 1 as care 
'…pending a decision or court order concerning the placement of the child…'. It is thus by 
                      
T
The 2005 Act follows the broad approach of the 1983 Act in not providing 
expressly for preliminary and interim children's court hearings. Like its predecessor it is 
strongly focused on a main hearing which follows after completion of a full investigation 
by welfare.60 Thus, although it lists fifteen different types of care orders in s 156, it is 
expressly enjoined in s 155(6) that none of these may be issued until a children’s court 
'finds that t
 
In generally providing children's courts with a broad jurisdiction to adjudicate 'any 
matter involving' inter alia, care and protection of children62 the legislature has certainly 
not entirely limited these courts to disposition functions. Their new role in providing some 
preliminary and interim services pending dispositive care hearings will be discussed in the 
next two subparts below.  Court functions that are clearly in terms of the wording of the 
Act to be undertaken prior to such hearings and those which might be so intended are 
separately considered. 
 
 Explicitly Stated Preliminary and Interim Functions 
 
 Although it does not expressly refer to preliminary or interim hearings the 2005 
Act does require children's courts to undertake several pre-dispositive functions which are 
relevant for care cases. For example, s 45(1)(g) broadly empowers them  to adjudicate 
matters involving 'temporary safe care of a chi
                           
e, the directive 'after an investigation' as used in relation to children's court processes in 
 by the title of s 156 'Orders When Child Is Found to Be in Need of Care and Protection'. 
fter issue temporary safety orders in terms of s 46(1)(a)(iii). 
60 See, for exampl
s155(5). 
61 This is supported
62 See s 45(1). 
63 They may therea
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definiti
 
ther courts besides children's courts now have only authority to refer the case of a 
child a
personnel or social workers and even withdrawal of welfare 
agencies’ licences.  Robinson's fears about social workers being deterred may at long last 
become
on clearly pre-disposition in nature.  These provisions read with s 151(2) of the Act 
enable children's courts to instigate preliminary removals to temporary safe care in a 
manner similar to removals into places of safety authorised under s 11(2) of the 1983 Act.  
 
With temporary safe care, ambiguous wording once again raises doubts about 
whether or when a prior court hearing would be needed. In s 151 it is stated that 'evidence 
given by any person on oath or information before a presiding officer'64 must lead to a 
conclusion that temporary safe care appears to be necessary for the safety and well-being 
of the child.65 This might possibly be interpreted as allowing for either an ex parte 
preliminary hearing of a formal kind or merely an informal report to the magistrate in 
chambers. 
 O
pparently in need of care to a social worker for investigation.66 This is less 
draconian than the power to summarily remove children conferred on other courts in 
s11(1) of the 1983 Act. In relation to emergency preliminary removals, the 2005 Act 
follows its predecessor in enabling specially designated persons to undertake these without 
any prior court authority.67 It is once again the police, social workers or specially 
authorised persons who are empowered.68  The latter category has been narrowed, 
however, because they can now only be authorised by a children's court magistrate.69  
 
 The legislature was clearly concerned by the widespread use of emergency powers 
in non-emergency situations.  In s 152(5)-(7) are detailed new provisions indicating a 
variety of sanctions for 'misuse' of emergency removals.  These include disciplinary 
proceedings against police 
 a reality when s 152 enters into force.  
                                                 
64 Section 151(1). 
65 Section 151(2). 
66 Section 47(1). 
67 Section 152(1). 
68 Section 152(1). 
69 Section 151(5). 
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That good intentions will not suffice is made clear by s 152(1).  This clearly sets an 
objective test. It indicates that at the time of the removal there must have been 'reasonable 
grounds for believing' that a child 'needs immediate emergency protection' and that a delay 
to obtain court authorisation 'may jeopardise the child’s safety and wellbeing'.  A further 
requirement is that 'the removal of the child from his or her home environment is the best 
way to secure the child’s safety and well-being'.70 Although the test continues to be 
objective its additional legs combine to set a higher standard than under the previous 
s12(1) 
r investigation'. Since it is expressly stated that either would have to be undertaken 
before a children's court 'decides a matter' it would seem that they would occur, 
respect
 care. It is not clear whether or 
when a hearing is required. 
 
 Aside from a power to instigate investigations, yet another new predisposition 
wording. Curiously in view of the strong stand taken against inappropriate 
removals, no explicit provision is made in the 2005 Act for children’s court review 
hearings after preliminary removals have been undertaken.  Although the broad wording of 
s 45(1)(g) might be interpreted as allowing for them, they are not established as a standard 
norm. 
 
Aside from instigating preliminary removals, children's courts are also empowered 
to order the less drastic alternative of merely a care investigation by a social worker. 
Although these two concepts are not defined, s 50(1) specifies orders for 'an investigation 
or furthe
ively, at preliminary or interim stages of a case. This if correct may be seen as a 
slight improvement on the 1983 Act which hardly distinguishes between preliminary and 
interim aspects. However, in relation to the actual process when a magistrate wishes to 
instigate an investigation or further investigation the new legislation is not entirely 
satisfactory. Since s 151(1) again applies, the same uncertainty exists as with court 
decisions about preliminary removals into temporary safe
function for presiding officers has been created in s 153.  This arises in cases where the 
police, either on their own initiative or at the request of a designated social worker, decide 
                                                 
70 This includes an assessment on whether it would be better to remove another person rather than the child.  
ive applies to perpetrators of domestic violence.  It is discussed later in this subpart. The new removal alternat
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that a 
earing' to be heard and a court order subsequently being 
issued.  Such order could confirm the perpetrator’s removal if the evidence justified this 
and co
                                              
perpetrator of child abuse rather than the child victim must be removed from a 
family home.71  The involvement of a children's court in terms of this provision72 is only a 
post-removal one.  When serving a removal notice on the perpetrator the police are 
required in terms of s 153(1)(c) to include a date for a children's court hearing at which the 
perpetrator ('alleged offender') may choose to 'advance reasons why he or she should not 
be permanently prohibited from entering the home or place where the child resides'.   
 
 Section 153(1)(c) requires that the date must be 'the first court date after the day 
upon which the notice is issued'.  This short timeframe73  implies that the domestic 
violence hearing would be a separate one held long before any dispositive hearing.  That it 
is separate is put beyond doubt by s 153(6)(d).  This allows for the normal predisposition 
welfare investigation to be instigated by a children's court at the end of its domestic 
violence hearing.  That the latter is in fact a formal hearing is clear from s 153(6).  This 
refers to an alleged offender 'app
uld also deal with related aspects such as family maintenance and contact with the 
child.74 
 
The new capability to confirm removal of abuse perpetrators rather than children in 
care cases and provide for consequential aspects is to be welcomed. It should be noted, 
however, that children's courts have not been expressly given the power to order such 
removals themselves as an interim measure -they are merely described as reviewing 
removals ordered by the police. The question of whether more extensive domestic violence 
powers should be described will be considered in part 7.4. 
 
   
 The police are accorded this power in s 153 read with s 105.  The latter is due to be inserted in 2005 Act 
hen the Children's Act Amendment Bill 19/2006 is promulgated. 
 The Act elsewhere at s 46(1)(ix) permits a children's court to issue an order 'instructing that a person be 
oved from a child’s home'.  It is not, however, expressly indicated that this may be predispositive in a 
are case. 
 It is so short as to render it difficult for alleged perpetrators of abuse to instruct legal representatives.  For 
further discussion of this provision see part 8.3.2, below. 
71
w
72
rem
c
73
74 Section 153(6)(a)-(d). 
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In relation to assessments, s 62(1) of the 2005 Act enables children's courts 'if 
ecessary' to order that 'a designated social worker, family advocate, psychologist, medical 
practiti
d 
be little point in including psychologists and medical practitioners in the list of 
'investi
referred
under t
mit their 
ndings in the form of a written report 'prior to the date of the hearing of the matter'.  From 
 of the process 
 be followed by a children's court when instigating such an investigation has once again 
not bee
 
 
                 
n
oner or other suitably qualified person carry out an investigation'.  It is further 
indicated that this must be to establish the circumstances of the child, a caregiver or 'any 
other relevant person'.  Particularly psychologists and medical practitioners such as 
paediatricians would tend if presented with forensic assignments of this kind to carry out 
assessments which focus primarily on the mental or physical condition of individuals.75  
Although the Act does not utilise the ideal terminology it appears that the word 
'investigation' in s 62(1) includes assessments in this sense.  If it does not, then there woul
gators'.  By comparison with the analogous provision in the 1983 Act, observation 
in a controlled environment as a form of assessment is unfortunately no longer  expressly 
 to -thus again it will be a matter of interpretation as to whether this is included 
he term 'investigation'.      
 
Section 63(2) provides that the investigators listed in s 62(1) can sub
fi
this it can be seen that the issuing of the order to investigate was envisaged by the 
legislature as an interim aspect occurring prior to the dispositive hearing.  This is an 
improvement on the opaque wording of the 1983 Act.  However, the nature
to
n delineated.  It is not even clear, for example, whether it is necessary to hold an 
interim hearing in cases where persons to be subjected to an investigation/assessment wish 
to resist it by raising a constitutional right to privacy or other grounds.  That court orders 
for investigations might be challenged as unwarranted or too intrusive seems not to have 
been contemplated. 
 
 
                                
75 See, for example, Cohen & Hale (2006) op cit note 18 at 294-95. 
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7.2.2.2 Some Possible Further Preliminary and Interim Functions 
 
Aside from children's court services that are definitely available at preliminary or 
terim
' that 
ight also be especially relevant at an earlier rather than later stage.  These include orders: 
c
 (v) is to be welcomed.  In some cases it may be essential 
 provide an immediate sanctuary -for example, against an abusing parent.  The hospital 
retentio
                                                
in  stages, there are others where the Act is so unclear or incomplete as to render this 
less certain. Section 45(1)(e), for example, empowers children's courts to give decisions on 
early childhood development services, prevention services and early intervention 
services.76 As their titles suggest, these might often best be interposed at an early stage.77 
An important question is therefore whether they can be ordered by a children's court prior 
to a formal finding that a child is in need of care and protection at its dispositive hearing. 
 
 Under s 46(1)(h) children's courts may issue forms of 'child protection order
m
'(iii) instructing a parent or caregiver of a child to undergo professional counselling, or to participate 
in mediation, a family group conference, or other appropriate problem-solving forum; 
(iv) instructing a child or other person involved in the matter concerning the child to participate in a 
professional assessment; 
(v) instru ting a hospital to retain a child who on reasonable grounds is suspected of having been 
subjected to abuse or deliberate neglect, pending further inquiry; [emphasis added] 
(x) limiting access of a person to a child or prohibiting a person from contacting a child;' 
 
The new power in subparagraph
to
n wording will also create opportunities to obtain medical evidence. 
 
A difficulty is that the s 45(1)(e) and s 46(1)(h) orders cover therapeutic as well as 
merely forensic services.  They may be expensive to supply and are likely to interfere with 
fundamental constitutional rights of persons subjected to them.  Absent any clear 
indication that they should do otherwise (except in the case of hospital retention under 
subpara 46(1)(h)(v)) presiding officers might well therefore out of caution wait  until the 
dispositive stage. Aside from the obvious cases of temporary safe care or hospital 
retention, they may interpret s 45 and s 46 orders as outcomes from dispositive hearings.  
 
76 See also s 46(1)(g). 
search findings showing this see part 7.3.2, below. 77 For foreign re
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The questions of when therapeutic services can be supplied, whether they can be 
mandatory and who is to pay should have been clarified in the Act. 
 
sitive 
finding that a child is in need of care and protection.  A logical conclusion is that if the 
nterim powers it would have indicated this explicitly. 
nctions and responding cautiously to their 
role as inferior courts and creatures of statute, simply leaving them to interpret the Act 
 In s 48(1)(a) it is stated that children's courts may as an 'addition' to their powers 
'grant interdicts and auxiliary relief in respect of any matter contemplated in s 45(1)'.  The 
terminology 'auxiliary relief' has not previously appeared in South African care legislation 
and is unfortunately not defined in the 2005 Act.  Although it might be interpreted as 
generally providing supplementary powers there is no clear indication that it enables 
children's courts to issue orders (besides those specifically indicated) prior to a dispo
legislature had intended broad i
 
As will be remembered from the discussion in chapter 3, s 49(1) of the 2005 Act 
states that 'before it decides a matter or an issue in a matter' a children's court may choose 
to order ADR.78  What is not included in relation to ADR is information on children's court 
process -so it is not clear whether a court should receive written representations from 
parties, hold a special hearing or else wait until the onset of the dispositive proceedings 
before issuing a s 49(1) order.  
 
In conclusion on the 2005 Act, although it certainly contemplates a wider range of 
preliminary and interim functions for children's courts than the 1983 Act it is just as 
unclear on the nature of the processes they are to follow. In most cases it thus remains 
uncertain whether children's courts are required to hold formal hearings.  As has also been 
noted another fundamental concern is that there is a group of functions which might or 
might not be pre-dispositive.  On the aspects of challenge by opposing parties or court 
reviews of preliminary action the Act is almost as silent as its predecessor.  Given our 
history of children's courts applying minimal fu
broadly is not a sufficient solution.  There is clearly a need for supplementary wording.   
 
                                                 
78 See part 3.6. 
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7.3  
cts have proved to be problematic.79  
 
7.3.1  
d continue with proceedings. 
 
                       
Approaches in Some Selected Foreign Systems 
 
In order to establish how to improve our legislation so as to better utilise children's 
courts for provision of preliminary and interim services in care cases it is useful to note 
approaches in other systems.  For reasons of space only some selected examples of foreign 
legislation mainly from well-developed systems are briefly considered.  This is done 
primarily for the limited purposes of showing how courts can become involved at an early 
stage, demonstrating that they can perform a wide range of useful preliminary and interim 
functions, and thirdly for discerning which aspe
Preliminary Hearings  
 
  By comparison with South Africa in some systems there is more specific legislative 
wording on how court proceedings are to be initiated. For example, in s 26-1(j) of the 
Connecticut Practice Book   it is directed that care cases are to be commenced by 
'petition'.80  This is defined as 'a formal pleading, executed under oath' which must 'invoke 
a judicial hearing'.81  At that hearing the court must decide whether there is sufficient 
reason to instigate a welfare inquiry an
 In the General Laws of Massachusetts, s 24 of chapter 119 provides an extremely 
detailed commencement process.82  Similarly to Connecticut, any person may provide a 
'petition under oath' alleging that a child is in need of care.  Upon reviewing this, a juvenile 
court must decide whether there is a prima facie case for an urgent preliminary removal or 
merely for commencement without one.  Where it decides that there is a prima facie case 
for commencement the court must order a preliminary hearing. The hearing (as in 
Connecticut) serves the useful purpose of enabling the court to decide whether there are 
sufficient grounds for proceedings to continue. 
                          
79 Additional aspects such as procedures in detail, the role of lawyers and nature or weight of evidence 
efore either not considered or touched upon only briefly. 
//www.mass.gov/legis/laws/mgl/119-
required are ther
80 'Definitions Applicable to Proceedings on Juvenile Matters' op cit note 5. 
81 Ibid. 
82 The General Laws of Massachusetts, chapter 119 -accessed at <http:
24.htm>. 
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It is further stated in s 24 of the Massachusetts legislation that the child must be 
present at the preliminary hearing.  This avoids the kind of uncertainty which has existed 
in our law.  And both welfare and the parents must be summonsed 'to show cause why the 
child should not be committed to the custody of the department [providing welfare]or that 
any other appropriate order should not be made' [insertion added].  After considering 
evidence at the preliminary hearing the court must 'at that time, determine whether 
mporary custody shall continue until a hearing on the merits'. Thus the court not only 
decides
rder transferring custody of the child to the department or to a licensed childcare agency 
or indi
 preliminary hearing functions include decisions on whether the child 
hould present evidence at different stages of the case84 and on state subsidised legal 
representation for indigent parties.  Similarly under s 1022 of the Family Court Act, New 
York, a form of preliminary order is the appointment of a state-financed legal 
te
 on whether there is a case for continuation of proceedings; it also decides whether 
any immediate care measures are necessary.    
 
If a court in Massachusetts decides that a petition indicates that 'there is reasonable 
cause to believe' that the child may need an immediate preliminary removal s24 further 
requires it to summon the petitioner to provide a 'recitation under oath…of the facts of the 
condition of the child who is the subject of the petition'.  If this confirms its view on the 
papers that the child requires an immediate removal 'the court may issue an emergency 
o
vidual'.  It will then commence with preparations for the preliminary hearing as 
described in the previous paragraph.  
 
Courts may be involved in other aspects besides commencement decisions and 
initial temporary care arrangements.  In s 2-10(3) of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act83 
expressly described
s
representative for an indigent caregiver.85  Usefully, under s 1027(f) it is expressly 
required that when any preliminary order is granted or refused the court must 'state the 
grounds for such decision'. 
                                                 
83 Supra note 4. 
84 On special hearings to determine participation status for children see further the findings of Kleinman and 
 Scotia legislation cited in part 4.2.4, above. the Nova
85 Family Court Act, New York State Consolidated Laws: accessed at 
<http://www.caselaw.1p.findlaw.com/nycodes/c42/a82.html>. 
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In England, initial court involvement often takes the form of a 'directions hearing'.  
This can be requested by any party who wishes to receive early guidance or support from 
the court. Directions hearings are frequently used to settle timetabling and dates issues.86  
The approach usually followed by courts is to consult with the parties to establish their 
perspectives on time-frames.  They then use their authority to impose a timetable that is 
realistic but does not allow for undue delays that would prejudice the child.87  
 
Directions hearings are also used to clarify what documents or other materials need 
 be disclosed to parties and to identify the contested issues that will need to be focused 
on at 
way of saving time and resources.91    
                                                
to
the dispositive hearing.88 Courts also use them to direct in broad terms what 
information should be given to and provided by any proposed expert witnesses.89 As 
Masson has pointed out the purpose of this is 'to ensure that they provide well-informed, 
impartial, and relevant evidence, which clarifies rather than confuses decisions'.90 In 
general it has been concluded that active case management by courts from an early stage as 
permitted by directions hearings is an effective 
 
Whilst early court involvement in matters that are not urgent does not appear to 
have been controversial, the same cannot be said about emergency cases.   As has been 
shown, the position in South Africa is that certain categories of persons are permitted to 
undertake urgently needed removals of children without obtaining prior court 
authorisation. Since this power is frequently misused, approaches in other systems are of 
particular interest.  
 
 
 s 32 of the Children Act 1989 and r 4.14(1)(b) of the English Family Proceedings Rules 1991 (SI 
ngs and Court Craft' in K Wilson & A James (eds) The Child 
f Dame Margaret Booth’s report Avoiding Delay in Children Act Cases (1996) by CM 
ection in the Civil Law' in Wilson & James (2002) op cit note 88, 191 at 226. 
86 J Masson 'Representation of Children in England: Protecting Children in Child Protection Proceedings' 
(2000) 34 Family LQ  467 at 471 indicated that deadlines for filing evidence and submitting reports are 
typically considered. 
87 See
1991/1247). 
88 M Lane & T Walsh 'Court Proceedi
Protection Handbook (2002) 342 at 347. 
89 Masson (2000) op cit note 86 at 472. 
90 Ibid. 
91 See the discussion o
Lyon 'Child Prot
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 Under the influence of the European court of human rights the balance in Europe 
has swung in favour of preliminary removals without court authority only in limited 
ituations when there is imminent, serious danger for the child concerned.92  Gillespie has 
pointed
workers gained more discretion to intervene and remove children in emergency 
situations because courts were now given 'less ability to control and delay the process of 
cy workers had 
removed a baby from the hospital where she had just been born.  This was because of 
s
 out that English law does not favour the idea of social workers having the power to 
undertake unauthorised removals.93  He has explained that the effect of r 4 of the Family 
Proceedings Courts (Children Act 1989) Rules 199194  is that '[e]ven in an emergency, the 
local authority has to apply for an emergency protection order -albeit that ex parte 
applications are possible'.95   
 
In Canada, a different approach has been taken. Howe noted that several widely 
publicised cases of child deaths in the early 1990s tilted the balance in favour of children's 
rights and protection rather than family autonomy.96 One result was that Canadian child 
protection 
apprehension through tight procedural rules'.97 
 
 In Winnipeg Child and Family Services v KLW the supreme court of Canada 
approved even a non-emergency removal without prior court authority.98  It had to 
consider whether s 21(1) of the Manitoba Child and Family Services Act99  contravened 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This provision permitted Manitoba welfare  
agency staff, without prior judicial authorisation, to search for and remove any child whom 
they believed was 'in need of protection'.  Using this broad allowance agen
                                                 
92 M Verheyde 'The Protection of Children's Rights by the European Court of Human Rights' in A Alen, H 
Bosly, M De Bie et al (eds) The UN Children's Rights Convention: Theory Meets Practice (2007) 107 at 110. 
93 AA Gillespie 'Establishing a Third Care Order in Care Proceedings' (2000) 12 Child and Family LQ 239 at 
State: The Case of Canada's Child Protection 
248. 
94 SI 1991/1395. 
95 Gillespie (2000) op cit note 93 at 248. 
96 B Howe 'Implementing Children's Rights in a Federal 
System' (2002) 9 International Journal of Children's Rights 361 at 371-72. 
97 Ibid 372. 
98 [2000] 2 SCR 519. 
99 SM 1985-86. 
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concerns about the parenting abilities of the mother based on her previous neglect of her 
older children.   
 
Since the removal in Winnipeg Child and Family Services was clearly not 
undertaken in an emergency the mother challenged it.  However, the supreme court upheld 
the validity of s 21(1).  In a majority judgment Madame L’Heureux-Dube` stated that what 
was determinative was the underlying purpose of the legislation -that of protecting children 
from harm.100  Removal of children in non-emergency situations without prior court 
uthority was thus held to be justifiable when undertaken for this purpose.  Bala and 
emk
ls have been permitted by statute.104 The predominant approach in 
the USA, however, is something of a via media -unauthorised removals are legislatively 
permitted only in situations of potentially serious harm, even if it is not imminent.105  
a
Jar o have pointed out that the position adopted in Canada has been influenced by fears 
that a legislative requirement of prior judicial authority might increase the risk of harm to 
children by reducing the willingness and ability of social services workers to remove 
them.101   
 
   Chill, in an analysis of emergency removal legislation in the USA, has noted three 
broad approaches.  Some US states prefer the strict approach favoured in Europe.  They 
thus place considerable emphasis on a prior court hearing except in cases where very 
serious harm to the child is clearly imminent.102  A few states follow the opposite 
Canadian approach of allowing non-emergency unauthorised removals.103 In Illinois, for 
example, such remova
                                                 
100 At para 80. 
101 N Bala & R Jaremko 'Canada: Non-marital Unions, Finality of Separation Agreements and Children's 
Issues' in A Bainham (ed) The International Survey of Family Law 2002 Edition (2002) 109 at 130. 
102 Chill (2004) op cit note 4 at 541. The California Welfare and Institutions Code at s 305(a) allows for 
removals into the temporary custody of the police or welfare without a court warrant only in situations of 
emergency where there is 'reasonable cause for believing' that the child's needs are 'immediate': accessed at 
<http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=wic &group=00001-01000 &file=>. 
ompassionate Removal Standards' (2006) 28 Hamline Journal of 
Juvenile Court Act, Illinois op cit note 4. 
e Family Court Act, New York supra note 85 allows for an 'Emergency removal 
rder' provided there is not time to apply for one and the removal is necessary 'to protect a 
lth'. The Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act: chapter 325 Illinois Compiled 
103 Chill ibid at 547. T Liebmann 'What's Missing from Foster Care Reform? The Need for 
Comprehensive, Realistic, and C
Public Law and Policy 141 at 147 NN 22-23 places nine states in this category. 
104 See s 2-5 of the 
105 Chill (2004) op cit note 4 at 540-41, 544 & 547. Liebmann (2006) op cit note 103 at 145-46. 
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without court o
child's life or hea
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 ed to be taken into public care.108   The Illinois Juvenile Court Act attempts to 
nsure that a review will happen very quickly by requiring that the child must be released 
'if not b
                                                                        
Where preliminary court authorisation is required there is generally a recognition 
that expeditious procedures are needed. A common solution, therefore, is to permit 
applicants to appear at ex parte hearings rather than entitling family members to offer an 
initial challenge.106  In some systems welfare agencies have even been permitted to make 
rapid ex parte applications for emergency apprehensions of children simply by telephoning 
courts.107 Under s 7(1) of the Children's Protection Act 6/1980 of Lesotho where there is 
no time to go to court emergency removals in rural areas may be undertaken 'after 
obtaining a temporary removal order from the Chief of the area'. 
 
  Although there is variation on when, how or even whether courts should be 
involved prior to preliminary removals it is widely accepted that they should certainly have 
a review function afterwards. The European court of human rights has held that there is a 
strong obligation on states to have proper procedures in place for assessing whether a child 
really need
e
rought before a judicial officer' within 48 hours.109  It also indicates expressly that 
there must be a formal court review hearing.110  It usefully requires that at this hearing 
welfare must not only prove the need for the removal but also that at the present time 'no 
efforts reasonably can be made to prevent or eliminate the necessity of removal of the 
minor' continuing. 111 
 
                                                                            
lfare department employees to take 'temporary protective 
ustody' of a child provided there is no time to apply for a court order and if there is 'reason to believe that 
nnot be cared for at home or in the custody of the person responsible for the child's welfare 
without 
Statutes, at art 5/5 s 5 authorises the police or we
c
the child ca
endangering the child's health or safety': accessed at 
<http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs3.asp?ActID>. 
106 See Chill (2004) op cit note 4 above at 540. Examples are General Laws of Massachusetts op cit note 82, 
at chapter 119 s 24; and the Family Court Act: New York State Consolidated Laws op cit note 85, at s 1022.  
See also Gillespie's explanation of English law at the text accompanying note 95, above. 
107 See S Grover 'On Meeting Canada's Charter Obligations to Street Youth' (2002) 10 International Journal 
of Children's Rights 313 at 336. 
108 See the discussion of Haase v Germany, 8 April 2004 <http://www.echr.coe.int> by Verheyde (2007) op 
-9(3). Under chapter 119 s 24 of the General Laws of Massachusetts supra note 82 the 
(2). 
cit note 92 at 110. 
109 Supra note 4 at s 2
time deadline is 72 hours. 
110 Ibid s 2-10. 
111 Ibid s 2-10
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Some US jurisdictions place considerable stress on the right of family members to 
initiate post-removal challenges. Under s 1028 of the New York Family Court Act 
caregivers must be informed that they have a right to apply to court for a 'reversal'.112 
Under s 1028(a) if a caregiver was not present at an application or review hearing she has 
an absolute right to require the court to hear her application for the return of the child 
within 
 
urt hearing will be held.  In her view they should also 
ave a right to be represented by a lawyer.116  
A useful example of legislation which facilitates challenges by children is the 
Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 of New South Wales, 
three days. 'Reviews of reviews' are also possible under the Illinois Juvenile Court 
Act.113 Under s 2-10(3), where a family member was not present in court to contest a 
removal, regardless of the reason for the absence court authorisation is only valid for ten 
days.  To prevent expiry of the right to retain the child away from her family 'the moving 
party' will have to prove 'diligent efforts' to serve further notice.  In such further notice 
caregivers must be informed of their absolute right to a 'rehearing on temporary custody'. 
And under s 2-10(4) caregivers, relatives and children themselves all have the right to 
require that the rehearing be held 'not later than 48 hours, excluding Sundays and legal 
holidays'. 
From a Canadian perspective Grover has argued that it is essential that sufficiently 
mature children who have undergone preliminary removals receive appropriate assistance 
if they are to be placed in a position to offer an effective challenge.114 She has proposed 
that they must immediately be informed of a right to dispute their removal in a court where 
they will be able to talk freely to the presiding officer.115 In order to prepare them for this 
she considers that they must be provided with the reasons for the removal and information 
about when and where the first co
h
 
Australia. Section 51 expressly requires that when there is an emergency removal a child 
of ten years or older must be given information about how to challenge it.  Section 234 
                                                 
112 Supra note 85. 
113 Supra note 4. 
114 Grover (2002) op cit note 107 at 331. 
. 115 Ibid 331-32
116 Ibid 332. 
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furthe  assists by requiringr  that the reasons for the removal be provided.  And it is stated in 
 234(4) that 'in giving such notice to a child or young person, the person must do so in 
languag
moval.119 The 
New York Family Court Act120 gives consideration to the difficult choices which often 
have to
 in developed systems indicate, however, that an aspect with which particular 
care will need to be taken in developing our law is the role of courts in cases where urgent 
remova
 
s
e and in a manner the child or young person can understand having regard to his or 
her development and the circumstances'.117  
 
In relation to the test to be applied by courts in reviewing whether unauthorised 
preliminary removals are lawful most US states require (similarly to our legislation) an 
objectively reasonable standard of decision-making by the remover.118  A few states set the 
standard higher by requiring clear or compelling grounds at the time of the re
 be made under trying circumstances.  In s 1024(c) it provides an immunity clause 
which states '[a]ny person or institution acting in good faith in the removal or keeping of a 
child pursuant to this section shall have immunity from any liability, civil or criminal, that 
might otherwise be incurred or imposed as a result of such removal or keeping'. 
 
It may be concluded in relation to preliminary functions that examples of detailed 
legislative guidance on how precisely court involvement should commence are certainly 
available to guide reforms in our system.  It is also clear that there is a wide variety of 
valuable services which courts can be empowered to provide at an early stage.  Differences 
in approach
ls of children are required. 
 
 
                                                 
117 See further P Parkinson 'The Child Participation Principle in Child Protection Law in New South Wales' 
(2001) 9  International Journal of Children's Rights 259 at 264. 
118 For example, art 5/5 s 5 of the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act in chapter 325, Illinois 
Compiled Statutes supra note 4 authorises the police or welfare department employees to take 'temporary 
r and if there is 'reason to 
child’s 
bid. 
 Supra note 85. 
protective custody' of a child provided there is no time to apply for a court orde
believe that the child cannot be cared for at home or in the custody of the person responsible for the 
welfare without endangering the child's health or safety'. For other examples see Chill (2004) op cit note 4 at 
544 N51. 
119 Chill i
012
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7.3.2  Interim Hearings 
 
An example of a system where the concept of interim court involvement in care 
cases is well established is England.  Detailed wording on interim orders is contained in 
s38 and s 44 of the Children Act 1989. Despite having extensive interim powers, English 
courts follow a general policy of not overusing them in attempts to micro-manage welfare 
or other parties pending disposition.121  However, where disputes or serious difficulties 
arise which may impede preparation for the dispositive proceedings or endanger the child 
English courts are available to provide a variety of interlocutory remedies.   
n also deal with issues of 
interim
may so
                                                
 
For example, under s 38(1) of the English Children Act 1989 a court can issue an 
interim supervision order. This allows for the care of the child to be supervised by social 
workers until disposition.  Under s 44(4) where access to the child by investigative social 
workers is being prevented a court can order that the child be produced to them.  And it 
can even if necessary instruct that the child be removed to a place that will enable them to 
have better contact and/or conduct their investigation properly.122  Throughout the United 
Kingdom, where an investigation by social workers is hindered by an unreasonable refusal 
of access to a child whose care is in question such a refusal may constitute grounds for 
welfare taking over temporary custody in terms of an emergency protection order issued by 
a court.123 
 
Under s 44(6) and (13) of the 1989 Act English courts ca
 contact between the child and family members.  It has been recognised that this 
metimes be essential where parents utilise access for abusing the child or attempting 
 
ith 'Re W a121 C Sm nd B; Re W (Care Plan) and Re S (Minors) (Care Order: Implementation of Care Plan); 
Re W (Minors) (Care Order: Adequacy of Care Plan) Human rights and the Children Act 1989' (2002) 14 
n courts making decisions about 
hich will have a major impact on a child's future, and welfare authorities being left with sufficient 
ct 1989; s 57(2) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995; and art 66 of the 
d) Order 1995.  For detailed discussion of the Scottish provision see K McK Norrie 
Child and Family LQ 427 at 443 explained that a distinction is drawn betwee
matters w
discretion to deal with the smaller decisions involving 'day-to-day management' of a child's alternative care. 
122 Article 63 of the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995 is to a similar effect. 
123 See s 47 of the Children's A
Children (Northern Irelan
Children (Scotland) Act 1995 (2ed 2004) 115; and K McK Norrie Children's Hearings in Scotland (2005) 
229-30. 
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to influence the evidence that she will later give at the dispositive hearing.124 Sealey has 
interpreted the English experience as showing that it is particularly where domestic 
iolence is a factor that courts may need to hold interim hearings to consider possible 
limitati
nder s 2-10(2) the welfare agency responsible for the 
child m st, within ten days of the initial court hearing, file with the court and serve on the 
parties 
d family, and not by the convenience of Department 
ersonnel. Child development principles shall be considered by the court in its analysis of how 
equent visitation should be, how long it should last, where it should take place, and who should be 
v
ons on contact.125   Kaganas has noted that there has been a need to sensitise 
English judges because for many years opposition to access by allegedly violent fathers 
manifested by mothers and children tended to 'cut little ice with the courts'.126 She further 
notes that English courts are becoming more willing to limit contact in domestic violence 
cases -a gradually better understanding of the harm that may result is permeating the 
judiciary.127  
 
On the other hand, as the European court emphasised in Roda and Bonfatti v 
Italy128 it is essential that sufficient access be provided for family members with whom 
contact will be constructive for the child.  The Illinois Juvenile Court Act supports this by 
providing extremely detailed coverage on interim access where children have been 
subjected to preliminary removals. U
u
a detailed 'parent-child visiting plan'.  This provision states that the plan 'shall set 
out the time and place of visits, the frequency of visits, the length of visits, who shall be 
present at the visits, and where appropriate, the minor’s opportunities to have telephone 
and mail communication with the parents'. It further stipulates that any party has the right 
to require the court to hold a review hearing in which it will receive evidence on whether 
the visiting plan is appropriate.  The court must then decide if it: 
'is reasonably calculated to expeditiously facilitate the achievement of the permanency goal and is 
consistent with the minor's best interest.  The frequency, duration, and locations of visitation shall 
be measured by the needs of the child an
p
fr
present.'  
                                                 
124 See A Sealey 'Comment: A Plan for Parents' (2002) 32 Family Law 247. 
125 Ibid. 
126 F Kaganas 'Re L (Contact: Domestic Violence); Re V (Contact: Domestic Violence); Re M (Contact: 
ontact: Domestic Violence) Contact and Domestic Violence' (2000) 12 Child 
. 
ber judgment (2006). Damages were awarded in favour of a mother and brother of the child where 
en unduly impeded. Accessed at 
t/t/transversalprojects/children/caselaw/default_en.asp>. 
Domestic Violence); Re H (C
and Family LQ 311 at 312
127 Ibid at 314-15.  
128 Cham
their contact had be
<http://www.coe.in
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Further detailed provisions allow Illinois juvenile courts to issue orders against any person 
impeding implementation of the visiting plan. 
 
Useful provisions on interim contact are also contained in s 1030 of the Family 
Court Act, New York. As a basic norm, caregivers have an automatic right 'to reasonable 
and regularly scheduled visitation' to a child subject to a preliminary removal 'unless 
limited by an order of the family court'.129  Where reasonable contact is not provided by 
elfare a caregiver can apply for a direct order from the court.130  When approached for 
such a
 be utilised for 
odifying other aspects of preliminary care arrangements.  In s 2-10(9) of the Illinois 
Juvenil
 
w
n order family courts are directed to grant reasonable and regularly scheduled 
visitation 'unless the court finds that the child's life or health would be endangered 
thereby'.131  Courts may order that the visitation be supervised by welfare personnel if this 
would be in the best interests of the child.132  The section further provides for visitation 
modification hearing procedures.  It states that any party may apply for such a modification 
hearing. And it requires that at the hearing all other parties 'shall be afforded an 
opportunity to be heard thereon'.133 
 
Aside from dealing with access issues, interim hearings may also
m
e Court Act134 wide grounds are provided for 'any interested party' to 'file a motion 
that it is in the best interests of the minor to modify or vacate' preliminary removal 
arrangements.  Grounds include availability of a relative to take over care or an 
improvement in the child's home circumstances which justify a return.  The court must 
hold a hearing within fourteen days.  This subsection thus supports the minimum duration 
of preliminary removals wherever possible. 
Another valuable function at interim hearings is provision of authoritative decisions 
on access to information. It is not unusual for disputes to arise concerning sharing of 
                                                 
129 Op cit note 85 s 1030(a). 
130 Ibid s 1030(b). 
131 Ibid s 1030(c). 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid s 1030(d). 
134 Supra note 4. 
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inform
  
ation is 
taken into account.  This is done through the useful requirement that the court must weigh 
up the 
ation between parties.  And difficult questions of confidentiality -for example in 
relation to sensitive materials held by welfare- may arise where family members demand 
access to such materials as essential for their court preparations.  In 2002 Charles J of the 
English family division held in Re R (Care: Disclosure: Nature of Proceedings) that in 
care proceedings an interlocutory hearing should be sought as the appropriate route 
whenever access to information or material is required and this is prevented because 
welfare or another party is unwilling to make it available.135  
The need for courts to be able to remove violent adults pending disposition in care 
cases has been recognised in the USA.136 In England s 38(A) of the Children's Act 1989 
specifically allows for the exclusion of domestic violence perpetrators from their homes as 
a form of an interim court order.137  And factors which a court should consider when 
deciding whether to do so are set out in s 44(A)(2).  It must be satisfied that there is 
reasonable cause to believe that if the person who perpetrates or threatens violence is 
excluded from where the child lives the child will be likely to avoid significant harm.  It 
must also establish that another person living in the home is able and willing to give the 
child care which it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give him.138   
 
As can be seen, the English wording is somewhat different and also more nuanced 
than that contained in the 2005 Act in South Africa. It is courts rather than police which 
have the power to instigate removal of perpetrators.  And the child’s future care situ
nature of the care which the child is likely to receive at home if the perpetrator (who 
may be a caregiver) is removed from the household. 
                                                 
135 (2002) 32 Family Law 253 at 254.  As has been noted in part 7.3.1 above, if access to information issues 
are pertinent ab initio English courts can deal with them at directions hearings. 
136 An example is s 1029 of the Family Court Act, New York note 85 supra. According to LM Copen 
Preparing Children for Court. A Practitioner’s Guide (2000) 33 such an order is referred to in some US 
states as a 'no-contact order'. Perpetrator rem vals may also be used to protect co-victim mothers: see JA o
Dunlap 'Sometimes I Feel like a Motherless Child: the Error of Pursuing Battered Mothers for Failure to 
Protect' (2004) 50 Loyola LR 565 at 618-19. 
n (Northern Ireland) Order 1995 as inserted by art 29(2) of the Family Homes 
olence (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 is to a similar effect.  The latter was accessed at 
9>. 
137 Inserted by schedule 6, Family Law Act 1996. 
138 Article 57(A) of the Childre
and Domestic Vi
<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si1998/81,071--d.htm#2
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The equivalent Scottish provision is s 76 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995.  This 
includes a condition in s 76(9) that the court 'shall not make an exclusion order if to do so 
would be unjustifiable or unreasonable'.  This caveat has had the effect of discouraging 
inclusio
tent with the health, safety, and best interests 
f the minor'.  In terms of process, it can be urgently sought ex parte, but under s 2-25(4) a 
person 
legal authority compelling cooperation by recipients. Alternatively, where persons to be 
 somewhat different issues arise in relation to 
n of domestic violence exclusion injunctions in emergency child protection orders 
in Scotland.139  Whilst it is obviously important to protect the rights of alleged abuse 
perpetrators it would appear that any legislative conditions which discourage the use of 
interim removals of adults could be disadvantageous to abused children. 
 
In domestic violence cases other solutions besides access restrictions and removal 
of perpetrators may be needed. Under s 2-23(3) of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act140 
'restraining orders controlling the conduct of any party' can be provided.  In addition, an 
'order of protection' obtainable under s 2-25(1) provides courts with very wide powers to 
order any person, inter alia, to stay away from the child or 'to abstain from offensive 
conduct against' the child or a family member.  It is stated in s 2-25(5) that 'an order of 
protection may be sought at any time during the course of any proceeding conducted 
pursuant to this Act if such an order is consis
o
thus subjected to it must be given an opportunity for a challenge hearing 
subsequently. Under s 2-26(1) violation of an order of protection constitutes contempt of 
court.  If it decides this is necessary for the protection of the child the court can even issue 
a warrant for an 'alleged violator' to be immediately arrested and brought before it. 
 
As regards interim therapeutic services and forensic assessments of children and 
family members, in many developed systems it is necessary to obtain court orders if these 
are to be provided.  As will be shown, the role of a court may be coercive in providing 
subject do not evince resistance, a court order may be utilised simply as a means of 
suring that the state pays the costs.141 Sinceen
                                                 
139 Lyon (2002) op cit note 91 at 201.  For a detailed analysis of the wording of this provision see Norrie 
23 at 172. 
 (2006) op cit note 18 at 297. 
(2004) op cit note 1
140 Supra note 4. 
141 See Cohen & Hale
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primarily forensic assessments and primarily therapeutic services examples of foreign 
court involvement in applications for these will be noted separately. 
 
 Forensic assessments have for many years been viewed as useful in care cases. In 
Denmark, for example, there was an emphasis on them in the early 1990s when it was 
conclud
s well towards 
staff and children'.144  
 
can only be made when essential,146  can allow only seven days for assessment147 and can 
include specific court directions on how it is to be carried out.148  Significantly, in s 43(8) 
ed in the Graverson Committee Report that they would often be an essential 
prerequisite to deciding on appropriate help in care matters.142  In England they have also 
been found useful. Humphreys and Harrison have gone so far as to state in relation to care 
matters involving abuse that '[w]ithout comprehensive assessments, the wishes and 
feelings of children, the safety of survivors and the risks from perpetrators and whether 
they have the capacity to change over time cannot begin to be ascertained'.143  They 
concede that risk assessment 'is an imperfect tool that can only allow informed decision-
making and planning, not the elimination of risk' but maintain that 'in the absence of 
comprehensive assessment it is comparatively easy for a dangerous history of abuse to be 
overlooked, particularly if the abuser is superficially charming and behave
As regards legislative wording on forensic assessments a difficult issue on which 
there is a variation is whether or when children should be compelled to be assessed. In 
England what are termed 'child assessment orders' are provided under s 43 of the 
Children's Act 1989.145  And in s 38(6) of this Act it is made quite clear that medical 
examinations or other assessments of children may be the subject of interim hearings. The 
detailed wording of s 43 includes many protective limitations. For example, such orders 
                                                 
142 J Melbye 'Denmark' in MJ Colton & W Hellinckx (eds) Child Care in the EC (1993) 34 at 42. 
d the Role of Child Contact 143 C Humphreys & C Harrison 'Focusing on Safety -Domestic Violence an
Centres' (2003) 15 Child and Family LQ 237 at 250.  
144 Ibid. 
145 See also s 55 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 and art 62 of the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 
1995.  The latter was accessed at<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si1995/uksi_19950755_en_1>. On these 
systems see further note 149, below. 
146 See s 43(1)(c). 
147 Section 43(5)(b). 
148 Section 43(6)(b). 
 296
it is provided that a child 'of sufficient understanding to make an informed decision' can 
'refuse to submit to a medical or psychiatric examination or other assessment'.  It would 
appear that the analogous s 55 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 places courts under a 
similar
r an assessment'.  
According to Jordan J of the provincial court as quoted by the Queen's bench mandatory 
assessments are often found necessary to evaluate 'the child's physical and nutritional 
, drugs and other intoxicating substances; the child's risk of 
 limitation in respect of medical examinations of mature children.149 
 
Mitchels and James have stated that in England courts are generally reluctant 'to 
overrule a child's refusal of an assessment for forensic purposes'.150 Thus only limited use 
is made of the power to compel an unwilling child to submit on the basis that she is 
insufficiently mature to offer an informed refusal.  Occasionally, however, courts decide 
that assessment is so essential for a particular case that it is necessary to take this route 
even for an older child.151 In Australian legislation very similar to that in England it is 
stated in s 53(4) of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 of 
New South Wales that 'if a child or young person is of sufficient understanding to make an 
informed decision, the child or young person may refuse to submit to a physical, 
psychological, psychiatric or other medical examination o
 
However, in s 2 of the Alberta regulations 5/1999152 a very different approach to 
forensic assessments of children has been taken.  This allows for a child in Alberta, 
Canada, to be subjected to a compulsory seventy-two hour assessment period. Its validity 
was upheld in the Queen's bench decision Alberta (Director of Child Welfare) v K.B.153 
he d's use of alcoholalth; the chil
                                                 
149 See the discussion of Norrie (2004) op cit note 123 at 107 & 198.  In Northern Ireland a right of refusal 
for children of sufficient understanding has been expressly created. It applies to assessments generally: see 
 13 Child and Family LQ 243 at 261 
e describes as the controversial decision of Douglas Brown J in the case of South 
d permitted a local authority 'to take 
r 
in Prostitution Act RSA 2000 (S.A. 
76. 
arts 57(6) & 63(7) of the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995. 
150 B Mitchels & H James Child Care Protection Law and Practice (2001)115. 
151 J Fortin 'Children's Rights and the Use of Physical Force' (2001)
N144  is critical of what sh
Glamorgan County Council v W and B [1993] 1 FLR 574 at 584.  He ha
all necessary steps' to remove a 15 year old child from her home against her wishes, and thereafter to take he
to doctors at a specialised unit where she could be assessed and treated. 
152 Published in accordance with the Protection of Children Involved 
1998, Chapter P-19.3). 
153 2000, ABQB 9
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self-harm and of engaging in or attempting to engage in prostitution; and whether the child 
is in need of protective services under the Child Welfare Act'.154  
childre
ey are necessary for the state’s care investigation.156  If essential to ensure co-operation 
 wide, there are qualifications.  It appears that 
hildren mature enough to refuse cannot be forced to submit to assessments which take the 
form o
e
 
In Scotland, in terms of s 69(3) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 even lay 
n's hearings panels155 can compel children to undergo forensic assessments where 
th
they may under s 69(4) issue a warrant for a child to be confined in a suitable place (if 
necessary under secure care)157 for up to twenty-two days so that the assessment can be 
carried out.158  Although the powers here are
c
f medical examinations.159  Compulsion in other situations can only be applied 
where a subsequent continuance hearing has become necessary160 -thus it is never a first 
resort. A mandatory assessment cannot be ordered if it is disproportionate to the needs of 
the case.161  And furthermore, the panel must take careful account of the child's view if sh  
is able to express one 162 -although it can be overridden. 
 
In an approach opposite to that in Scotland, in some US legislation only medical 
assessments -as often of great value in deriving evidence of children's physical condition- 
are specified as mandatory.  For example, under s 2-19 of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act163 
where the court decides that a medical examination of a child is needed there is no right for 
                                                 
154 Ibid p ra 76.  
155 See part
 Norri
v.
See also Norrie (2005) ibid 199.  Norrie points out ibid at 196-97 that the panel merely provides discretion to 
a local authority chief social work officer to make a final decision on secure care. 
158 Norrie (2005) ibid at 130 & 198; and Norrie (2004) op cit note 123 at 151. 
159 It is probable that any assessment which is physically intrusive enough to constitute assault if unconsented 
is unlawful in Scotland.  See Norrie, ibid (2004) 198; and (2005) 195. 
160 Norrie (2004) ibid 151. 
4)(a)(ii) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995.   
her attendance at a place of assessment is made quite clear by r 26(1)(a) read with r 26(1)(d) of 
rings (Scotland) Rules (SI 1996/3261).  Accessed at 
v.uk/si/si 1996/Uksi_1996 3261_en_7.htm#mdiv 26>. 
a
 3.2, above. 
156 e (2004) op cit note 123 at 151.  Norrie (2005) op cit note 123 at 129-30. 
157 Section 69(11) Children (Scotland) Act 1995 as amended by the Antisocial Behaviour etc (Scotland) Act 
2004: schedule 4. Accessed at <http://www.opsi.go uk/legislation/scotland/acts2004/asp_20040008_en_1>. 
161 See ss 16(3) and 16(
162 Norrie (2005) op cit note 123 at 130. That the duty to seek the child’s views applies before issuing a 
warrant for 
the Children’s Hea
 <http://www.opsi.go
163 Supra note 4. 
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the child to refuse.  And it is specifically directed in s 1027(g) of the Family Court Act, 
New York that: 
'In all cases involving abuse the court shall order, and in all cases involving neglect the court may 
order, an examination of the child… by a physician… As part of such examination, the physician 
shall arrange to have colored photographs taken as soon as practical of the areas of trauma visible on 
such child and may, 
164
if indicated, arrange to have a radiological examination performed on the 
child.'  
 
because, as noted earlier, assessment can be used to obtain important evidence.  However, 
Gillesp
 
The contrary pressures of the need to respect children's refusals and obtain what may be 
crucial evidence have thus produced a range of very different responses on the issue of 
mandatory forensic assessments of children. 
In relation to forensic assessments involving or including caregivers as opposed to 
children, encouragement or coercion rather than actual compulsion appears to be the 
predominant approach.165  As noted by Gillespie welfare investigators can usually 
persuade parents who wish to keep their children to submit to forensic assessments.166  
And with other parents mandatory assessments would tend to be a waste of resources. 
Although court powers to compel parents who have expressed objections in court appear to 
be rare, they are often strongly encouraged by welfare to agree to such orders.  This is 
ie has warned that 'a technique sometimes employed by welfare services in England 
is to put great pressure upon caregivers to cooperate under threat of their child being 
removed'.167  As he notes, this can be abusive of parents and does not promote an 
atmosphere of genuine cooperation in undergoing assessment.168 
 
   In the USA using a desire of parents to regain their children as a way of pressuring 
them to cooperate is a standard technique.169 Threats of removal have actually been made a 
                                                 
164 Supra note 85. 
165 See Gillespie (2000) op cit note 93 at 241.  Examples are noted in the discussion immediately following. 
p cit note 4 at 545. 
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid at 241-42. 
168 Ibid at 242.         
169 Chill (2004) o
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requirement in the Illinois Juvenile Court Act.170  Under s 2-10(2) where a child has been 
subjected to a preliminary removal: 
'the cou
mu  cooperat
rt shall admonish the parents, guardian, custodian or responsible relative that the parents 
st e with the Department of Children and Family Services, comply with the terms of the 
rvice plans, and correct the conditions which require the child to be in care, or risk termination of 
 
illespie's concerns about pressuring parents have been corroborated in a review of 
North A
 T
x
te that evaluators often 'over-
predict dangerousness and lack the tools to assess parental competence accurately'.174  She 
points 
reveals to the assessor will be reported in court.  She will thus tend to be defensive and 
                              
se
their parental rights.'  
And to ensure that this is less likely to be regarded as an idle warning, under s 2-28(4)(b) 
the Illinois state attorney has power to file a motion to finally terminate parental rights 'of 
any parent who has failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions which led to 
the removal of the child or reasonable progress toward the return of the child'. 
 
G
merican research by McConnell and Llewellyn.  They have drawn attention to the 
vulnerability of the large proportion of intellectually disabled parents in care cases.  They 
note that they are often coerced to 'agree' in court to assessments.171 hey conclude that the 
results as later put before court are frequently unduly negative172 and they propose that 
courts should therefore generally refuse to support welfare by issuing assessment orders 
unless the need for these has been e tremely well motivated.173  
 
Similar conclusions have been reached by Wasow.  She agrees that courts should 
be cautious about agreeing to assessments of parents.  She no s 
out that empirical studies have shown that they frequently conduct too few sessions 
and are less than candid about sharing with courts limitations which affect the accuracy of 
their predictions.175  Of particular importance is that at mandatory assessments the trust 
needed for providing full information is absent because the parent knows that whatever she 
                   
tion Proceedings' (2000) 15 
California's Denial of Reunification Services to Parents with Mental 
es' (2006) 31 New York University Review of Law and Social Change 183 at 207. 
170 Supra note 4. 
171 D McConnell & G Llewellyn 'Disability and Discrimination in Child Protec
Disability and Society 883 at 890. 
172 Ibid 890. 
173 Ibid 892. 
174 N Wasow 'Planned Failure: 
Disabiliti
175 Ibid 213-14.  
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have 'a strong incentive to lie'. Although being closed is therefore a natural response it is 
routinely reported to courts 'as evidence that a parent cannot put her child's needs before 
her own'.176   
 
Of particular relevance from a South African perspective is that some studies have 
also sh
ed that in some cases they should ideally 
e provided 'within twenty-four hours of the precipitating event'.181 Another reason in 
favour 
own that care assessments carried out by persons of a different culture tend to be 
much less accurate.177 A solution to the problem of less than neutral assessments has been 
found in New South Wales.  Special children's court clinics have been established there 
specifically to allow courts the benefit of entirely independent and properly conducted 
forensic assessments of both children and parents.178 
 
In relation to primarily therapeutic rather than forensic services, there is certainly a 
case for them occurring prior to disposition. There are research findings from the United 
Kingdom which suggest that this will sometimes be the best time.179  In referring to early 
intervention services in particular, Kelly has argued that family preservation is often most 
effectively achieved when they are implemented soon after the crisis that has resulted in 
the initiation of care proceedings. 180 He has not
b
of therapeutic services earlier on is that their success or failure may assist courts in 
deciding what outcome to impose at the dispositive hearing. 182  
  
However, although interim therapeutic services may be advantageous, ordering 
them can result in high costs and impose lengthy delays before disposition -and for these 
reasons English courts have moved towards an interpretation which confines s 38(6) of the 
Children Act 1989 to interim court orders for forensic assessments rather than therapeutic 
                                                 
176 Ibid 216. 
177 Ibid 217. 
178 RJ McLachlan 'Assessment Orders, The Role and Accountability of Clinicians from the Children's Court 
Clinic' (2002) 2,5 The Children's Court of New South Wales: Case Law News 2. 
179 Department of Health Child Protection: Messages from Research (1995) 54. 
 Reunification Programmes in Child Protection Cases: 
ness, Best Practices, and Implications for Legal Representation, Judicial Practice, and Public Policy' 
.  
ealth (1995) op cit note 179 at 54. 
180 See RF Kelly 'Family Preservation and
Effective
(2000) 34 Family LQ 359 at 365
181 Ibid. 
182 Department of H
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services.183  Thus rather than ordering primarily therapeutic treatment at state expense, 
courts will confine themselves at the interim stage to ordering forensically relevant 
assessm  child-parent relationships, parenting skills, 
if the court determines that welfare services to the 
child and/or family might reasonably prevent the need for the removal continuing, it 'shall' 
d interim hearing a court may order 
he child protective agency to provide or arrange for the provision of appropriate services 
urt modifies or vacates a temporary custody order but does not vacate its finding 
f probable cause, the court may order that appropriate services be continued or initiated in 
behalf 
ents on aspects such as the quality of
and the risk to the child which a caregiver presents.184 
 
Rather than avoiding them entirely, in some US states interim therapeutic services 
have been limited to specific situations.  The Family Court Act, New York, directs that 
when reviewing a preliminary removal, 
imme iately order them.185 It further provides that at an 
't
or assistance to the child or the child’s family' in two circumstances. Firstly, where it has 
found that the child has been abused and secondly where it finds these services necessary 
to avoid a preliminary removal of the child.186 And it additionally provides that emergency 
medical procedures can be authorised where necessary 'to safeguard the life or health of 
the child'.187 Since no right of refusal is included it appears that all of these services could 
be mandatory as far as recipients are concerned. 
 
The Illinois Juvenile Court Act also follows the route of mandatory therapeutic 
services in some specific, narrowly defined situations. At s 2-10(9) it states '[i]n the event 
that the co
o
of the minor and his or her family'. Additionally, s 2-11 allows for courts to order 
therapeutic 'medical, dental or surgical procedures' for children in situations where they 
'are necessary to safeguard the minor’s life or health'.  Welfare can also in terms of this 
provision compel an AIDS test of the child if it has been awarded temporary guardianship 
by a court.  In Illinois the method of pressuring parents to cooperate is utilised with 
therapeutic services. Under s 2-27(1.5)(a) of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act at a dispositive 
                                                 
183 Cohen & Hale (2006) op cit note 18 at 296. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Supra note 85 at s 1028(d). 
186 Ibid s 1022(a)(iii) & s 1027(b)(iii), respectively. 
187 Ibid s 1022(c). 
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hearing a court is directed to  take into account whether any family preservation or 
reunification services have been unsuccessful. 
 
 It may be concluded that at the interim stage between preliminary and dispositive 
hearings there is once again a wide range of useful functions which courts can perform.  As 
with preliminary services, only a minority of these are problematic because of complexities 
arising
 be made available 
crementally over time.    In line with the general orientation of the 2005 Act towards 
 expressly enacted that our 
hildren's courts must be available to hold hearings at the pre-dispositive stage of care 
cases. 
n future South African legislation 
as constituting, respectively, a first or a subsequent pre-disposition hearing. Although they 
can be
later and vice versa. The general approach in our law should therefore be that children's 
 from countervailing considerations.  In the next section below some suggestions 
will be made for reforming our system. 
 
7.4  Recommendations on Reforming Our System 
 
 As has been shown in part 7.2 inadequate wording in the South African legislation 
has led, and if not addressed is likely to continue to lead, to under-utilisation of the 
potential of children's courts and inconsistent approaches.  Our system fails badly when 
measured against the primary evaluative criterion of services that can
in
providing a much greater range of remedies it needs to be
c
 In light both of local conditions and the variety of uses to which courts have been 
put in other systems some recommendations on how best to achieve this will now be put 
forward. 
 
As a foundational proposal, it may be suggested that a simple, binary concept of 
preliminary and interim children's court hearings would be apposite as a start towards 
developing our law. They could readily be distinguished i
 conveniently differentiated in this manner it is not suggested that an absolute 
demarcation of the court services available at them be too rigidly maintained. The review 
of foreign systems indicates that, except with emergency or other urgent issues, an aspect 
usually appropriate for decision at an initial hearing might sometimes be dealt with only 
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courts, with due consideration for urgent aspects and giving parties sufficient time to bring 
evidence where appropriate, must decide predisposition matters when this is necessary in 
the interest of the child concerned. This would accord with the primary evaluative criteria 
of acco
ge, direction should be given on certain exceptions which (as will be further 
discussed below) must be completed early on. Also, it would be helpful to distinguish for 
magistr
7.4.1 ecommendations Concerning Preliminary Hearings 
 
valuable uses to which they have been put in other systems a question which arises is 
rding sufficient access to children's courts and hearing the voices of vulnerable 
participants. 
 
A useful way of empowering and educating children's court magistrates would be 
to provide them with a list of specific functions they must be available to perform at 
predisposition hearings. Whilst it should be indicated that most of these can be performed 
at any sta
ates between responsibilities usually best performed at a first hearing or only 
subsequently.  In the next two subparts, proposals on predisposition functions are put 
forward. For convenience, tasks that would tend to be most appropriate (or even essential) 
at preliminary or subsequent interim hearings are separately discussed. 
 
 R
It has been shown that preliminary hearings have considerable potential for 
assisting parties at an early stage. A first suggestion, therefore, is that they be expressly 
established in our legislation as a form of children's court hearing available in care cases.  
In defining them, it should be indicated that they are pre-dispositive, may be ex parte at the 
discretion of the court and would be the first formal hearing.  In view of the variety of 
whether they should be mandatory in all our care cases.   
 
The time saved and valuable direction given by courts in some overseas systems 
means that there is certainly a case for preliminary hearings as a standard norm.  As against 
this, in some situations (for example, of abandonment or gradual neglect) there may be no 
aspect which initially merits a formal court hearing.  Because of our limited available court 
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resources it may perhaps therefore be suggested that it would be best to provide that 
preliminary hearings are only required in four situations.   
 
Firstly, in accordance with the evaluative criterion of creating access they should 
certain
e grounds for initiating a care investigation.   
                           
ly be held when any person (including the child) can make out a prima facie case. 
This would need to be in written form or orally in chambers.  And the case to be made out 
must be for a legal decision on temporary care arrangements pending disposition188 or on a 
disputed aspect of the applicant's case preparations.189 It might, as suggested in chapter 
4,190 need to be coupled with an application by the instigator for party or merely 
participant status. 191 
 
 Secondly, children's courts must be required to hold a preliminary hearing mero 
motu where information received by them from any source indicates a prima facie case for 
one on any aspect. With reference to the approach in some US systems this should include 
cases where initial allegations (particularly by non-professionals) leave them uncertain 
whether there ar
 
 Given the significant new ADR responsibilities for children's courts discussed in 
chapter 3 above192 a third situation in which it should be mandatory to hold a preliminary 
hearing has been created.  There should surely be one, inter partes, whenever a presiding 
magistrate contemplates referring a case for any of the forms of ADR allowed in the 2005 
Act.  At the hearing the attitude of the parties, who is to participate, locally available ADR 
resources, the method to be selected, how ADR results will be utilised by the court, 
                      
urts must be expressly empowered to decide that any suitable person may have temporary 
custody and/or that the care of the child will be under supervision by social workers, pending disposition. 
189 For ex
these sho
procedure would save time on what is not a central issue.  Also, a court should often be able to determine 
sing evidence. Another person who was prejudiced should be permitted to 
o appeal if unsuccessful. 
rt 3.6. 
188 Children's co
ample, in cases where issues of confidentiality versus disclosure of information become pertinent, 
uld, just as in England, be dealt with. 
190 See parts 4.3.2.2 and 4.3.2.3, above. 
191 To avoid unnecessary hearings, future rules could indicate that any would-be party/participant who can 
establish a prima facie case on documents has a right to a decision in this regard.  See the discussion of the 
South African law commission proposal in part 4.3.2.2, above.  If the presiding officer decides to grant the 
application a special hearing should not be required.  If, however, the presiding officer has doubts the would-
be party/participant should have the right to an ex parte hearing as a matter of urgency. An ex parte 
applications without hearing oppo
offer a subsequent challenge and als
192 See pa
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payment and timetabling aspects should all be canvassed.  After considering all necessary 
evidence on these aspects the court should be obliged to issue an order, together with 
reasons, on whether or how ADR will be attempted. 
 
A fourth category is cases which require urgent preliminary removals. Because of 
the seriousness of the stakes it may be recommended that preliminary court hearings must 
occur.  However, in view of the different responses in developed systems,193 a key 
question is whether children's courts should take on a stronger pre-authorisation function. 
Again,
power to undertake preliminary 
removals without court authority should be extended in future legislation to non-
emerge
severe psychological impact of preliminary removals on caregivers and particularly 
 -they tend to cause serious reactions such as panic attacks, grief and feelings 
 it may be suggested that the factor of limited resources is overriding in South 
Africa.  So as not to overburden our system and create the danger that children are left in 
hazardous situations whilst permission is being sought the position in the 2005 Act should 
be maintained. A factor which weighs in favour of a continuation of the existing removal 
powers of social workers, the police and lay authorised officers is the sometimes limited 
access to courts, particularly in rural jurisdictions. Thus we should continue to allow for 
these classes of persons to carry out urgent removals without first obtaining court 
authorisation.   
 
The next question which arises is whether the 
ncy situations.   This has been proposed by Rothman as a realistic acceptance of the 
current unofficial practice in South Africa.194 Rothman has suggested that some overuse of 
emergency powers should be accepted as inevitable and that the way forward is proper 
court reviews afterwards.195  As will be remembered, this approach has survived challenge 
in Canada.   
 
 A crucial consideration which counts against Rothman’s proposal, however, is the 
children subjected to them.  As pointed out by Chill these are typically terrifying 
experiences
                                                 
193 As noted in part 7.3.1, above. 
194 Rothman (2005) supra note 32. 
195 Ibid. 
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of abandonment.196  They may also harm children’s later ability to form secure 
attachments.197  In view of this, from human rights and particularly children's rights 
perspec es and with reference to our Constitution198 unauthorised removals in non-
erge
rker, police member or authorised officer contemplating a preliminary removal 
should be required to make an ex parte application at the children's court which is most 
conven
 removals of children. In this 
spect they fail to meet the evaluative criterion of using courts to ensure a balance 
tiv
em ncy situations cannot be justified in South Africa, regardless of how convenient 
they may be for child protection personnel. They are in contradiction to the 'last resort' 
evaluative criterion which requires sufficient protection against premature or unnecessary 
removals. 
 
 As has been shown with reference to other systems the way to address 
convenience needs is to provide protection personnel with simple and quick procedures for 
obtaining court authorisation. Except in situations where harm to a child is imminent, a 
social wo
ient. It should be established in a rule of court that such applications must receive 
priority on the roll and may be entirely by telephone unless the court finds this insufficient 
in a particular case. As has already been done in South Africa with urgent domestic 
violence court applications199 so too with preliminary removal applications courts should 
be made contactable when necessary after regular hours.  
 
It has been shown that neither the 1983 nor 2005 Act explicitly requires children's 
courts to hold formal hearings for reviewing preliminary
re
between protection and family nurturing of children. It has been noted that such hearings 
are a standard requirement in developed systems.  The potential for serious psychological 
harm if mistakes are made surely renders it essential that in South Africa also review 
hearings must happen after all preliminary removals, whether court authorised or not.  
                                                 
196 See Chill (2004) op cit note 4 at 540-41. Liebmann (2006) op cit note 103 at 161-62 notes that 'the 
eparations on a child emotionally and physically' has been well- 
ed. 
541. 
n-emergency unauthorised removals contravene the right to respect for inherent 
he right not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily in s 12(1)(a)  and children's foremost right 
 s 4(5). 
devastating effect of even short s
document
197 Chill ibid at 
198 It is well arguable that no
dignity in s 10, t
to family care in s 28(1)(b). 
199 Domestic Violence Act 116/1998
 307
Unlike in the developed systems reviewed, in South Africa lay 'authorised officers' 
sometimes undertake removals and this further strengthens the argument for such hearings. 
   
  If it is accepted that our legislation must be amended to expressly require children's 
courts to review all preliminary removals the next question is what the nature of their role 
should be.  A first suggestion with reference to the primary criterion of accessibility is that 
e review must occur soon afterwards.  It has been noted that some developed systems 
impose
ovals may be occurring in as many as a third of all cases.202 
The causes include errors by inexperienced or overburdened social workers and false 
reports
gy with other 
                                                
th
 very short deadlines.  Chill has contended that reviews should be held 'no later than 
one week following the removal -just enough time for counsel for parents and children 
(who should be appointed immediately when the case is filed in court) to prepare for 
trial'.200 In South Africa a short timeframe between removals and reviews should also be 
required. 
 
It should further be indicated in our legislation that both space for parties to 
challenge preliminary action and an evaluation by the court itself will occur at the 
proposed review hearings.  Chill has argued that rigorous and not merely rubber-stamping 
court evaluations are imperative.201 One reason for this is US statistics indicating that 
inappropriate preliminary rem
 of harm to children.203  Another reason for careful judicial scrutiny is the inability 
of most family members to offer an effective challenge.204  
 
 The reasons for intensive evaluation noted by Chill are applicable in South 
Africa.205  Also in favour of a close-scrutiny function for courts here is that constitutional 
rights to liberty and dignity may be affected. And unless courts are going to apply a close 
scrutiny there is little point in their being involved. It may therefore be suggested that 
Bertelsmann J’s limited scrutiny approach in Swarts based on an analo
 
200 Chill (2004) op cit note 4 at 547. 
201  Ibid. 
202 Ibid at 541. 
203 Ibid at 543, 546 & 548.  
art 3.4.1, above. 
204 Ibid at 543.  
205 Here too, the problem of overburdened and inexperienced social workers is a major one: see Sewpaul 
(2006) as cited in p
 308
categor
ing procedures at reviews, three stages should be provided for. Firstly, 
persons who undertook the preliminary removal must explain their reasons and so attempt 
to just
egarding the standard for measuring the legality of a decision to undertake an 
unauth
g about setting a high threshold. 
 
           
ies of quasi-judicial administrative acts fails to meet the primary criterion of 
providing sufficient protection for children. Deference by courts to opinions of persons 
who undertake removals is surely not justifiable given the seriousness of the issues at stake 
and the lack of equality of arms likely from the side of private parties. The Swarts 
judgment set an unfortunate precedent and rendered the need for express legislative 
provisions compelling rigorous reviews even greater. 
 
Concern
ify (or in a case of prior court authority, confirm) the grounds for it with the 
assistance of any supporting witnesses.  In a second stage the child or a caregiver (and 
again their witnesses, if any) could provide testimony on record in opposition.206 This 
would accord with the criterion of hearing appropriate voices. And finally the court should 
be directed to reach a prompt decision about whether to revoke the removal, apply other 
remedies and/or instigate further investigation.   In accordance with the criterion of 
removals of children as a last resort it should be specifically required to consider 
interposing a domestic violence remedy if this would make it possible for the child to be 
returned home immediately. 
  
R
orised preliminary removal it will be remembered that s 152(1) of the 2005 Act 
provides that the test is one which combines reasonableness, imminent harm and a 
consideration of whether it is the best alternative. It may be suggested that this is a correct 
approach.  The multifaceted test meets the evaluative criterion of a balancing of protection 
and family care considerations. As has been noted, the reasonableness standard has 
predominated in the USA. And the addition of 'immediate emergency protection' and best 
option requirements fits with Chill’s findin
                                      
 of Grover and the legislative approach in New South Wales for helping children 206 The useful suggestions
prepare for reviews (as noted in part 7.3.1, above) should be drawn upon in developing the detail of our 
future provisions. 
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Although the 2005 Act is well worded on the test for a lawful preliminary removal 
it misses the mark when it comes to consequences for persons who fail to apply it 
correctly.  It will be remembered that in an attempt to stop the practice of unauthorised 
removals in non-emergency situations s 152(5)-(7) provides for disciplinary hearings and 
removal of professional licences. The Act is thus designed to work in terrorem against 
'misuse' of emergency powers.  However, as South African commentator Robinson 
warned207 and the Canadian experience has shown208 interposing barriers may result in 
child deaths.   
 
Persons applying the relatively complex s 152(1) test should surely not be deterred 
ns for fear of draconian sanctions if 
their decision is later found not to meet one of its requirements.  A subjective belief that 
there w de 
val) 
 in 
iability.  
was 
 proper 
uld be 
 curb 
from rescuing children in seemingly dangerous situatio
as an emergency dictating an immediate removal should therefore be ma
sufficient for providing immunity from any penalties. In support of a second and lower 
standard specifically for immunity (as opposed to the lawfulness of a preliminary remo
is the reality that genuine emergency action is often unpremeditated and taken hastily
very difficult circumstances.  In an overburdened child protection system the danger of 
children being left in hazardous situations is surely far more serious than occasional 
mistakes by overcautious removers.  
 
Just as in New York, proof of a genuine belief that there was an emergency should 
trigger a legislative immunity clause providing protection  from any form of legal l
And in contrary cases where a children's court finds that a preliminary removal 
undertaken in a non-urgent situation purely out of a lazy unwillingness to follow
procedures it should be accorded a power to award summary damages.209  This wo
quicker than referrals for possible disciplinary action and should be quite sufficient to
the current overuse of emergency powers. 
 
                                                 
207 See part 7.2.1.2, above. 
208 See part 7.3.1, above. 
209 An argument that children's courts should have the power to award damages in certain situations is 
developed in more detail in part 8.4.4, below. 
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 At either emergency action reviews or preliminary hearings instigated for o
purposes children's courts s
ther 
hould always, in view of the proven usefulness of directions 
hearings in England, be directed to take the opportunity to decide on timetabling. They 
should 
ginning of this chapter children's court interim hearings in 
care cases should be defined in future South African provisions as those held subsequent to 
a prelim
 be 
expressly required that if they wish to traverse issues already settled they must provide 
justific
interim hearings, from the perspective of improving accessibility and just as in many 
also give guidance on evidence required and ascertain the language-familiarity of 
the parties. Yet another standard task that ought to be carried out at preliminary hearings is 
establishing whether any party should be advised to contact the family advocates’ office 
for state funded legal representation as proposed in chapter 5.210 This would accord with 
the primary evaluative criterion requiring efficient deployment of legal representatives for 
vulnerable parties. 
 
7.4.2 Recommendations Concerning Interim Hearings 
 
As suggested at the be
inary hearing and prior to a dispositive one. It should be stated that their basic 
purpose is considering either relevant aspects not dealt with at a preliminary hearing or 
possible amendments or additions to any order made at one. It should further be stated that 
they may be initiated by children's courts mero motu.  Alternatively, parties, participants or 
persons seeking status as these should be permitted to apply for them.  
 
To prevent the time of courts being wasted applicants must be required to make out 
a prima facie case beforehand in documentary form or in chambers.211 It should
ation.  This should be by showing, prima facie, additional or more accurate 
information, a situational change relevant to the child or an inability to attend at the 
preliminary hearing which justifies the interim hearing.  Regarding court functions at 
developed systems, these ought to be described in detail, together with relevant court 
                                                 
210 See part 5.4.2, above.  The need for state-funded legal representation to be allocated at an early stage has 
ts in 
ild, are likely to be severely prejudiced: see TB Harding 'Involuntary 
ems as noted in part 7.3.1, above. 
been stressed by Harding.  She noted that experience in the USA shows that where this is not done clien
care cases, and particularly the ch
Termination of Parental Rights: Reform Is Needed' (2000-2001) 39 Brandeis LJ 895 at 918. 
211 Similarly to the use of written or oral petitions in some US syst
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orders, in guiding legislation. In the discussion below a general overview on proposed 
functions will be provided. 
 
 In accordance with the evaluative criterion of providing incremental services it 
may be suggested firstly that at interim hearings there should be scope for considering 
amendments of or additions to any care arrangements, preparation rulings or other rulings 
made at a preliminary hearing. This would provide for situations where inaccurate or 
incomp
to 
interfere with parents’ common-law right of reasonable access to their children even where 
alterna
lete information was originally received or where a change in the circumstances of 
the child or a caregiver has occurred.212  Because of the frequent need for these in care 
cases213 it should be provided that interim hearings may be held for considering late 
applications for party or participant status. It should also be specified that children's courts 
must be available at the interim stage to give rulings on access to documentary information 
or other evidential material.  
 
With interim access to children, we have had an unfortunate history.  In Van 
Schoor v Van Schoor which was heard under the 1960 Children's Act it was held by the 
then appellate division of the supreme court that children's courts have no power 
tive care measures are required.214 Although this case was praised as providing 
important protection for parents215 it unfortunately denuded children's courts of any power 
to limit or prevent access by caregivers with whom contact might be seriously damaging. 
In the absence of authority to the contrary it has been followed ever since.216   
 
In s 45(1)(b) of the 2005 Act it is stated that children's courts may adjudicate any 
matter involving contact with a child. This would certainly seem to include interim access 
but it is unfortunate that the only express reference to it pertains to domestic violence 
                                                 
212 For example, it has been shown in part 3.6 above with reference to experience in developed systems that 
interim hearings may sometimes be needed to make new decisions about ADR. As will be remembered, 
parallel ADR may sometimes be appropriate because of positive indicators that emerge subsequent to a 
preliminary hearing. 
213 See the Womack case and findings of Hunt, MacLeod & Thomas (1999) noted in part 4.3.2.2, above. 
2141976 (2) SA 600 (AD) at 610D. 
215 R Soni 'The Right of Reasonable Access by a Non-custodian Parent' (1976) 93 SALJ 383 at 384-85. 
216 Snyman (2001) supra note 47; Booysen (2006) supra note 24. 
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cases.217 It would be useful to clarify the position on interim access by explaining 
expressly in regulations that in all types of care cases children's courts can and should 
where appropriate issue interim orders for limitation, supervision or even prohibition of 
contact
idered as in the English Children's Act 1989.  This 
would accord with the standard of a balance between care and protection considerations. 
hildren's autonomy rights on the one 
hand, and scope for deriving evidence that may be vital. 218 Children's rights to human 
dignity (s 10 of the Constitution) bodily and psychological integrity (s 12(2)) and privacy 
                                                
. The legislature should draw on particularly well-developed systems such as 
Illinois and New York to create the kind of detailed legislative coverage needed on this 
important aspect. 
 
Where intimidation or domestic violence is a factor there should be an express 
power for identifying perpetrators and warning them against interfering with parties or 
witnesses. When it is necessary to remove perpetrators from children's homes, children's 
courts should not be confined to reviewing police action as in s 105 and s 153 of the 2005 
Act.  It needs to be clearly specified that they are required to respond directly to 
applications from parties or even use their own initiative in preventing perpetrators from 
having contact with a child or allowing only supervised access. In relation to criteria, 
future South African provisions should require that likely effects of a perpetrator’s removal 
on the child's care situation to be cons
 
  Concerning forensic assessments, it has been noted that there are differences in 
the approaches of developed systems.  It may be proposed from the perspective of hearing 
appropriate voices that our children's courts need to be generally empowered to give 
rulings on any questions or disputes which may arise in relation to them.  A particularly 
important issue which clearly must be properly addressed in future South African 
legislation is whether children who are subject to care proceedings should ever be 
compelled to submit to forensic assessments.   This will require a difficult judgment call 
from the legislature on the priority to be accorded to c
 
 217 See the discussion in part 7.2.2.1, above.
218 For example, where there are grounds to believe that a child has a drug-problem and she denies this,  
drug-testing may be needed so that the court will know whether to place her in a facility or program that has 
drug-rehabilitation services available. In a country with limited availability of such services, definite 
evidence may be essential. See further the reference to the Alberta regulations in part 7.3.2, above. 
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(s 14) w
ssments or only in abuse cases.     If it is decided 
by the legislature that something as drastic as compulsory assessments of unwilling 
childre
dered in exceptional cases for mandatory 
assessm nts.  They could be required to discuss both the advantages and any available 
ways o
ould have to be balanced against the paramountcy of the best interests of the child 
as provided for in s 28(2) of the Constitution.   
 
It could be argued that the primary evaluative criterion of hearing children's voices 
counts against compulsory assessments.  However, that of maintaining a balance between 
protection and undue state interference could be said to allow for occasional compulsory 
assessments where these are essential for ensuring protection. As shown by Jood, for 
example, age assessments may sometimes be crucial to secure grants in South Africa.219 
The review of developed systems shows that as a via media limitations could be imposed 
upon compulsory assessment powers. For example, they could be available only with 
immature children, only for medical asse
n should be included in any form, it should be made clear that these must be 
authorised by courts, and only as a last resort. Magistrates should be expressly required to 
carefully weigh up the motivation for, likely benefits, degree of intrusiveness and extent of 
lack of consent, before ordering them. 
 
With reference to the ideal of hearing appropriate voices magistrates could also be 
directed to consult with children being consi
e
f minimising stress.  This would once again create important training implications 
for presiding officers.  It would need to be made clear that an assessment should only be 
ordered against the will of a child where it is essential in her best interests.220 Courts 
should be required to order the least intrusive assessment that will serve evidential needs.  
In view of the potentially invasive nature of assessments ex parte applications for them 
should not be permitted unless good cause is shown.   
 
                                                 
219 See Jood as cited in part 7.2.1.1, above. 
220 For example, a court should carefully consider the evidential need before ordering the physical 
examination against the will of a child to establish whether she has been sexually abused.  If such abuse has 
occurred she may already have experienced a lack of control over her own body. A court's respect for the 
wishes of the child in this situation may help to re-establish her sense of control over her person. 
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With caregivers, a simple and pragmatic approach would be to entirely prohibit 
compulsory forensic assessments.  One rationale is that, unlike the child, they are not the 
primary subject of the proceedings.  A second is that if a caregiver’s desire to keep her 
child is not strong enough to motivate her to agree to an assessment it is probably a waste 
of resources. The review of foreign experience has shown, however, that a common 
h caregivers are subjected to pressure.  They agree to 'voluntary' 
ssessments because of explicit or implicit threats that failure to do so will increase the 
likeliho
m.   They should be directed to consider carefully whether 
applications are sufficiently well motivated, whether the caregiver’s consent is genuine and 
whethe
ys) is weaker than with forensic services.  Because the child will not 
yet have been formally found in need of care and protection it would be inappropriate to 
use the
situation is one in whic
a
od that their child will ultimately be removed permanently. The implication for 
South Africa is that we should have protective responsibilities for presiding magistrates.  
They should be required to question caregivers in the absence of welfare in order to 
establish whether consent is genuine.     
 
 Children's court applications for assessment orders should be required. In deciding 
these magistrates should protect caregivers rather than (as in some US states) adding to 
pressure by 'admonishing' the
r the least intrusive alternative has been requested.  And magistrates should be 
expected to take particular care with parents alleged by welfare to be too physically or 
mentally challenged to care for their children.  
  
  Turning to therapeutic services, it has been shown that these will often be most 
effective if applied at an early stage.   However, in compulsory form they raise similar 
constitutional issues to forensic assessments. And, unlike the latter, they are not 
implemented primarily to derive evidence. The fact that they are thus not crucial to the 
proceedings themselves means that the case for compelling them at the predispositive stage 
(with consequent dela
 best interests of the child criterion to trump caregiver’s or children's constitutional 
rights to privacy and dignity. Therefore, it is recommended that therapeutic services should 
never be imposed on unwilling recipients. Since as has been shown the 2005 Act is 
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ambiguous221 clarification to this effect is urgently needed.  In relation to consensual 
receipt of therapeutic services at the predispositive stage what should be stated in future 
regulations is that children's court orders can be issued only once magistrates have applied 
the same checks for duress as recommended above for forensic assessments.  
7.5 
as resulted in a variety of 
interpre ns in practice.  Many commissioners currently only utilise pre-dispositive 
hearing
ne particularly disturbing consequence of the low levels of early court 
involve
                                                
 
 Conclusion     
 
It emerges that, just as with responsibilities of adjudicators discussed in the 
previous chapter, there is little appropriate legislation to guide children's courts in 
providing pre-dispositive services in care cases.  The 1983 Act provides only brief 
references to age estimations, assessments and reviews of preliminary removals. Aside 
from the complete lack of coverage on other interlocutory services it is of concern that the 
Act does not create procedures for challenge or modification of initial welfare measures. 
The evaluative criterion of hearing appropriate voices indicates that it is essential that 
scope for this be created.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the sparse wording in the 1983 Act h
tatio
s for age estimations.  Amongst commissioners who allow them for other purposes 
there is little uniformity in procedures.  Some hold 'opening hearings' only if requested by 
a party or welfare. Others hold them in preliminary removal cases -particularly where there 
was no prior court authority.  Some allow ex parte hearings and others prefer hearings 
inter partes. Some accept only prima facie proof and some prefer the child to be present. 
Overall, the poor coverage in the Act has produced confusion and very limited 
predisposition services.  It thus fails badly on the criteria of court accessibility and 
incremental support. 
 
O
ment is that welfare has free rein. Child protection personnel even routinely use the 
emergency removal ground in s 12(1) of the Act as a convenient means of avoiding court 
 
221 See part 7.2.2.2, above. 
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applications in non-urgent cases.  Unfortunately, in the case of Swarts the high court 
supported wide powers for welfare by confirming a weak, limited-scrutiny predispositive 
role for courts.  This set the seal of approval on children's courts providing little real 
predisposition protection for children and families. 
 
As an intended replacement for the 1983 Act, the 2005 Act certainly contemplates 
a wider range of preliminary and interim functions for children's courts. Notable amongst 
these are decisions on hospital retention and some domestic violence remedies. 
Unfortunately, however, its approach to predisposition services is problematic in some 
important respects. In s 45(1) and s 46(1) children's courts have been accorded powers to 
order a variety of family services orders but it has not been explicitly stated whether these 
may be pre-dispositive.  Generally, the Act provides little specific coverage on 
predisposition functions.  It does not even refer expressly to interlocutory relief or 
preliminary or interim orders. Despite establishing court access for children as a 
fundam ntal right in s 14222 it does not follow through sufficiently.  It fails to provide the 
explici
court’s final decision about 
her care status. Because children's courts are long accustomed to a constrained function 
expecti
e
t procedural routes which are essential for challenging disproportionate action by 
welfare or having other disputes on preparatory aspects settled. 
 
 Like its predecessor, the 2005 Act is implicitly built around a climactic, main 
hearing, day-in-court approach.  In s 155(6) it even expressly places many children's court 
orders 'off limits' until after the child has formally been found to be in need of care and 
protection.  It thus unfortunately to some extent continues with the simplistic expectation 
that a child’s life will remain on hold in the months pending a 
ng them to overcome the limited wording in the 2005 Act by engaging in radically 
creative interpretations of its provisions is unrealistic. Extending their role by this means is 
likely to be a slow process -and will not bring the uniformity that is badly needed.   
 
The review of developed systems in part 7.3 indicates that there is certainly a 
variety of extremely useful predispositive functions that courts are able to perform.  Their 
                                                 
222 For a discussion of this provision see part 4.2.5, above.  
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early involvement can greatly improve protection of children and reduce wastage of time 
and resources.  As has been shown, the way forward in broadening and improving 
dispositive services in South Africa needs to be legalistic. Detailed rules on the nature of 
court involvement are now urgently required to provide proper guidance.  
 
An essential first step in reforming our law would be the legislative introduction of 
preliminary and interim children's court hearings. These could be effective as basket 
concepts for a wide range of services.  Future South African legislation should indicate that 
preliminary hearings must occur where applicants make out a prima facie case for direction 
on court preparations or predispositive care arrangements.  And children's courts 
themselves must also be required to consider whether they are needed for the same 
purposes. Children's courts must also be directed to hold preliminary hearings where a 
decision on ADR is appropriate and (on grounds of seriousness) in all preliminary removal 
cases. 
ct is appropriate. 
A reasonable prognosis on grounds coupled with the child’s imminent need for protection 
constitu
he contrary, it specifies disciplinary 
proceed ssible removal of professional licences.  It has been noted that the 
Canadian experience shows that leaning too heavily in the direction of deterrence may 
 
  It is clear that preliminary removal cases are a problematic category requiring 
special consideration.  The review of foreign systems indicates that there have been some 
fundamental differences on the nature of court involvement.  What causes difficulty is the 
inescapable tension between protecting children from potentially harmful domestic 
situations and from the trauma of being abruptly uprooted from their families. As a 
response, the objective test for lawful preliminary removals in the 2005 A
tes a good balance between protection and family care. 
   
However, the Act unfortunately fails to establish explicitly that court hearings to 
review preliminary removals must always occur.  Because of the drastic consequences and 
danger of error such proceedings are vital.  Another deficiency is that the Act does not 
provide immunity to persons who remove children in the honest belief that there is an 
emergency, but fail the objective test.  On t
ings and even po
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result i
's courts should be obliged to hold these 
whenever there is a need for a review, addition or amendment of an order issued at a 
prelimi
rim hearings is forensic 
assessm mple approach in the 2005 Act that these may 
be ord
 
n deaths of children left in dangerous situations.  The 2005 Act thus fails here in 
balancing protection and family care.  As a replacement for the sanctions in s 152(5)-(7) a 
children's court power to issue summary damages against persons who intentionally 
misuse emergency procedures would be a quicker and more focused response. 
 
In relation to interim hearings, children
nary hearing.  They should also have suitable powers such as those in developed 
systems for domestic violence cases.  As has been shown, the limited role of children's 
courts in such cases envisaged in the 2005 Act is entirely inadequate.  Children's courts 
also need better guidance on interim contact disputes and remedies. And when contact has 
been granted but is impeded children and other family members must be given effective re-
access to the children's courts as in Illinois and New York.  
 
A final aspect which has emerged as appropriate for inte
ents and therapeutic services. The si
ered by children's courts as compulsory shows little appreciation of the 
constitutional rights at stake.  Also, a practical consideration is that compelling caregivers 
is likely to achieve little more than a waste of precious resources.  Thus, the orientation in 
our law should be fundamentally changed from compulsion to a supportive recognition of 
the extreme vulnerability of caregivers who want to keep their children.   
In considering assessments or services for caregivers, the role of children's courts 
must be amended to one of careful scrutiny aimed at ensuring that their rights to dignity 
and privacy are protected against undue pressure.  Presiding officers must be empowered 
to order where appropriate that assessments or services be not initiated. As has been 
pointed out this does not preclude a useful function (similarly to some developed systems) 
in incorporating genuinely consensual and appropriate agreements as orders of court so 
that parameters and costs-liability are formalised.  
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In relation to children, their auto icipatory rights dictate that they 
should not be unwillingly subjected to mandatory tic services prior to being found 
in need of t 
wh s 
perspective.  There is an urgent need for regulations which make it quite clear that 
compu  prior to disposition.  
fficiently for pre-dispositive children's 
court hearings.  In view of their considerable potential, express legislative provisions 
should 
nomy and part
 therapeu
 care in protection at dispositive hearings.  The uncertainty in the 2005 Act abou
en such services are to be interposed is therefore dangerous from a children's right
lsion may not occur
 
With forensic assessments of children, tensions between the need to gain vital 
evidence and yet respect the right of children to refuse have produced contrary approaches 
in developed systems.  In South Africa if the legislature decides that compulsion is 
sometimes justified on a best interests basis it will need to choose whether to add 
limitations.  The review of other systems indicates that mandatory assessments are 
sometimes confined to less mature children, certain categories of cases or forms of 
assessment. In South Africa it would be appropriate to allow for them where it reasonably 
appears that essential evidence cannot be derived by other means. 
 
 If the legislature opts to continue with any form of compulsory assessment or 
therapeutic service order, detailed regulations on court process will once again be essential.  
These must indicate that compulsion is a last resort.  Magistrates must be required to listen 
carefully and interact supportively with sufficiently mature children and other family 
members before deciding on the shortest and least intrusive alternative that is appropriate. 
 
In conclusion, it is unfortunate that the 2005 Act perpetuates a fundamental 
weakness of its predecessor by not providing su
be introduced as a matter of urgency. In the next chapter, it will be shown that the 
general failure to conceptualise care proceedings as capable of division into incremental 
stages has also constrained the quality of support which children's courts are able to 
provide at the main or dispositive proceedings which commence at the end of the welfare 
investigation.
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CHAPTER 8 
 
GROUNDS, OUTCOMES AND BEYOND -AN EVALUATION OF THE 
NEW APPROACH TO DISPOSITIVE PROCEEDINGS IN THE CHILDREN'S 
ACT 38/2005 
 
8.1 Introduction 
the stakes for parties are 
highest at this stage.  Because of the serious consequences likely to result from any court 
decisio
l be shown it will bring about 
significant changes in the role of children’s courts.  In a quantum leap, it aims to 
comple
 
The dispositive proceedings1 which begin at a children's court after the welfare 
investigation into the child’s circumstances is clearly an important phase in a care case.  It 
will now be necessary to establish whether there are sufficient reasons to formally 
designate the child as in need of mandatory alternative care measures.  And if there are, it 
will further be essential to decide what these should be.  Since long-term or even 
permanent removal of the child from her family is a possibility 
n it is crucial that our law on all aspects of disposition be well formulated. 
 
South African legislation on dispositive proceedings before children's courts has 
traditionally tended to focus mainly on the two fundamental aspects of grounds for finding 
a child to be in need of alternative care and consequential remedies.2 The current grounds 
and remedies are contained in the 1983 Act.3 The 2005 Act will replace these with very 
different provisions when it is fully brought into force. As wil
tely transform their dispositive functions.  The nature of that transformation is 
explained and critically evaluated in this chapter.   
 
In part 8.2 below the main changes which the 2005 Act brings in relation to 
grounds for mandatory care measures are considered.  In part 8.2.1 their structuring is 
                                                 
1 The Connecticut Practice Book at s 26-1(f)(3) of the 'Definitions Applicable to Proceedings on Juvenile 
Matters' describes a '[d]ispositive hearing' as  ' …a co
considering the social study or predispositional study
urt hearing in which the judicial authority, after 
 and the total circumstances of the child, orders 
whatever action is in the best interest of the child and where applicable, the community'.  Accessed at 
<http://www.jud.ct.gov/Publications/PracticeBook/PB2.pdf>.  Hereafter cited as 'Connecticut Practice Book'.  
2 See pa .3.1-2.3.5, above. 
3 Sections 14 and 15, respectively. 
rts 2
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critically evaluated. The new scheme provides for proof of both primary and sub-grounds 
in certain instances, and even complete avoidance of grounds in others. The effectiveness 
of this 
  
y members in order to achieve this goal.  
tions of the extensive changes in substantive 
law are icular, whether it is now essential for 
disposi . Possible stages 
which could be interposed are considered on is focused on how 
ld utilise new monitoring and review powers which the Act provides. 
tically evaluated.  It 
whether courts dealing with care cases ought to have a punitive function.  
 the 
e 
dispensation is discussed.  Another salient reform is the provision of definitions of 
core concepts. This has the effect of circumscribing the reach of many of the new grounds. 
In part 8.2.2 the foreseeable consequences and appropriateness of this are considered.  
 
 A significant aspect of the 2005 Act is a considerable increase in dispositive 
remedies made available to children's courts in care cases.  In part 8.3 the nature and 
effectiveness of these are explored. Again, the structuring is considered first (in part 8.3.1).  
It is shown in parts 8.3.2-3 that many of the new remedies are intended to enable children 
to remain within their families or communities rather than be removed.  Although it is not 
stated they create an expectation that children's courts must interact more supportively with 
children and other famil
 
In part 8.4, some consequences of this new expectation are explored.  A question 
considered in parts 8.4.1-2 is what the implica
 for development of new procedures.  In part
tive proceedings to be divided into a series of stages is discussed
. In part 8.4.3 attenti
children's courts shou
Once again, attention is given to the procedural implications. 
 
 In part 8.4.4 the question of what children's courts should do when their remedies 
prove unsuccessful is taken up.  Their new sanctions jurisdiction is cri
is considered first 
The question of how this could best be applied is also explored.  Thirdly, the issue of 
whether jurisdiction to award compensatory damages should have been included in
2005 Act is discussed.  An earlier theme which resurfaces in this chapter is that of th
training and status needs of presiding officers. 
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8.2  
fault g
produc g back the 'child in need of care' 
criterio
2005 A re and protection' instead of merely 'child in need of care' 
become ary, overarching formulation.7 Compared with our previous legislation, 
out any visible means of support; 
rolled by the parent or care-giver;9 
) lives or works on the streets or begs for a living; 10 
           
The New Approach to Alternative Care Grounds 
 
 As noted in chapter 2 above the 1983 Act in its original form introduced parental 
rounds.4 It was eventually recognised that the fault approach was counter-
tive.5 In 1998, s 14(4) was amended so as to brin
n which had been foundational since the Children's Act 31/1937.6 In s 150 of the 
ct 'child in need of ca
s the prim
the extending words 'and protection' are arguably significant.  Protection brings additional 
connotations. The implication is that children's courts must be available to evaluate 
whether there are reasons for protection that fall short of requiring such drastic solutions as 
removal. In an apparent extension of their functions they are therefore to be repositioned to 
act more proactively.8  
 
The grounds indicative of whether a child is in need of care and protection are 
listed in s 150(1) of the 2005 Act. This reads: 
'A child is in need of care and protection, if the child- 
(a) has been abandoned or orphaned or is with
(b) displays behaviour which cannot be cont
(c
                                      
rt 2.3.5, above.  
5For the deficiencies see G Barlow 'Child Care Bill-Best Interests of the Child?' (1982) De Rebus 341; FN 
Zaal (1988) 105 SALJ 'Child Removal Procedures under the Child Care Act: Some New Dangers to Contend 
With' 224 at 226-27; and B Van Heerden 'Judicial Interference with the Parental Power' in B Van Heerden, A 
Cockrell & R Keightly et al (eds) Boberg’s Law of Persons and the Family (1999) 497 at 604 N361.  
6 This was done in terms of s 5(d) of the Child Care Amendment Act 96/1996. 
7 Following recommended wording in clause 166 of the draft Children's Bill of 2002: see South African Law 
Commission Report on the Review of the Child Care Act (RP 17/2003) part 3 p136.  
8 As will be show
indeed the intenti
4 See pa
n particularly in part 8.3.2 below a reading of other wording in the Act confirms that this is 
on. 
)(ii) of the English 1989 Children Act the 
at the child must additionally 
be 'suffe g, or… likely to suffer significant harm' which 'is attributable to-… the child's being beyond 
parental
interven
10 In not admitting of exceptions, this takes a strict position.  The analogous s 17(2)(c) of the Botswana 
Children's Act (Cap 28:04 of 1981) provides that a child is in need of alternative care if the child 'engages in 
 of a family concern must be viewed by courts as an exception: see further B Maripe 'The Recognition 
9 The wording here is somewhat broad.  In the analogous s 31(2)(b
child being out of control is not, in itself, sufficient as a ground. It is essential th
rin
 control'.  This more nuanced wording guards better against any danger of inappropriate 
tions. The English approach is followed in art 50(2) of the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995 
(Statutory Instrument 1995 No.755 N.I.2) -accessed at 
<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si1995/uksi_19950755_en_1>. 
any form of street trading, unless he has been deputed by his parents to help in the distribution of 
merchandise of a family concern'. The exemption here indicates that parent-authorised street trading on 
behalf
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(d) is addicted to a  dependence-producing substance and is without any support to obtain treatment 
for such dependency; 
(e) has been exploited or lives in circumstances that expose the child to exploitation; 
(f) lives in or is exposed to circumstances which may seriously harm that child's physical, mental or 
social well-being; 
(g) may be at risk if returned to the custody of the parent, guardian or care-giver of the child as there 
is reason to believe that he or she will live in or be exposed to circumstances which may seriously 
harm the physical, mental or social well-being of the child; 
(h) is in a state of physical or mental neglect; or 
(i) is being maltreated, abused, 
who has parental responsibilities an
deliberately neglected or degraded by a parent, a care-giver, a person 
d rights or a family member of the child, or by a person under 
In relat is that it is not clear whether a children’s 
court can find a different ground proved from the ground/s alleged by the investigative 
cluding 
the option of a short adjournment) to do so. 
roof 
of grounds is no longer a sine qua non for every form of mandatory dispositive care order. 
                                                                                                                                                   
whose control the child is.' 
 
ion to proof, one difficulty with s 150(1) 
agency.  From a children’s best interests perspective this should be possible.  It would be 
unfortunate if a needed remedy had to be denied because the wrong ground had been 
asserted.  On the other hand, it could be argued that substitution by the court of a different 
ground would be unfair to a party who appeared well prepared to refute the grounds on 
which the agency's case was based.  A solution would be to indicate in a future 
supplementary regulation that a court could consider the applicability of a different ground, 
subject to providing any party wishing to contest it with sufficient opportunity (in
 
Whilst the choice of grounds issue could be relatively easily resolved there are two 
more fundamental difficulties which can only be addressed by amending the Act itself.  As 
will be shown these concern, firstly, whether proof of grounds should always be essential, 
and secondly, whether grounds should have been limited by linking them to definitions of 
core concepts in s 1 of the 2005 Act.  These aspects are considered separately in the next 
two subparts. 
8.2.1 Situations in Which Grounds Are Not Required 
 
By comparison with earlier legislation a substantial change in s 150(1) is that p
 
stic Law: An Assessment of the Child Protection Laws in and Enforcement of Children's Rights in Dome
Botswana in Light of Prevailing International Trends' (2001) 9 International Journal of Children's Rights 
339. 
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Section
3, s 46 provides an extensive set of children's 
court o
exampl
without any prior proof of 
grounds that a child is in need of care and protection.  This is significant because as can be 
seen s 4
(h).    A logical interpretation 
would therefore be that the latter are the placement orders requiring proof of grounds. 
 155(1) of the 2005 Act states '[a] children’s court must decide the question of 
whether a child who was the subject of proceedings in terms of section 47, 151, 132 or 154 
is in need of care and protection'.  A noticeable omission in the list of sections here is s46.  
As will be further discussed below in part 8.
rders, many of which would be appropriate for disposition in care cases.  For 
e, s 46(1)(a) reads:            
'A children's court may make the following orders: 
(a) An alternative care order, which includes an order placing a child- 
(i) in the care of a person designated by the court to be the foster parent of the child; 
(ii) in the care of a child and youth care centre; or 
(iii) in temporary safe care;' 
 
 It is stated in s 156(1) that a children's court which has formally found a child to be in 
need of care and protection 'may', inter alia, make a s 46 order.   It is not expressly stated 
anywhere, however, that such a finding is a pre-requisite for such an order.   The 
implication, strengthened by the omission of s 46 from s 155(1),   is that children's courts 
may even at the disposition stage of care cases issue a s 46 order 
6(1)(a) allows for children to be placed even in foster or institutional care. 
 
Aside from the list of children's court orders in s 46 another is to be found much 
later in the Act at s 156(1).11 This second list opens with the wording '[i]f a children's court 
finds that a child is in need of care and protection'.  This appears to indicate that grounds 
would need to be proved.  However,  a proviso in s 156(4) states that '[i]f a court finds that 
a child is not in need of care and protection the court may nevertheless issue an order 
referred to in subsection (1) in respect of the child, excluding a placement order'.12  
Grounds are thus only essential prerequisites to s 156(1) 'placement orders'.  Unfortunately, 
placement orders are not defined.  Out of the ten order categories included as paras (a)-(k) 
of s 156(1), the term 'placed' is used only in (e) (g) and 
 
                                                 
11 For the wording of this see part 8.3.1, below.   
12 This exception renders the title of s 156 'Orders when child is found to be in need of care and protection' 
somewhat misleading. 
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A question which arises is why the legislature chose to make proof of grounds 
essenti
nt' orders under s 46(1)(a)!   This is illogical and 
indicative of disjuncture in the way the Act has been structured. 
tory imposition of grounds.14  
                                                
al only with placement orders in s 156(1) and not for any orders in 46.  In this 
regard, it is necessary to compare the wording of s 156(1)(e) with that of s 46(1)(a) as 
quoted above.  The former reads as follows: 
'(e) if the child has no parent or care-giver or has a parent or care-giver but that person is unable or 
unsuitable to care for the child, that the child be placed in- 
(i) foster care with a suitable foster parent; 
(ii) foster care with a group of persons or an organisation operating a cluster foster care scheme; 
(iii) temporary safe care, pending an application for, and finalisation of, the adoption of the child; 
(iv) shared care where different care-givers or centres alternate in taking responsibility for the care 
of the child at different times or periods; or 
(v) a child and youth care centre designated in terms of section 158 that provides a residential care 
programme suited to the child's needs.' 
 
Quite strikingly, two of the same types of placement -those involving foster care or 
residential care in a child and youth care centre- appear both here and s 46(1)(a).  It would 
seem that, whilst the s 156(1)(e) versions require prior proof of grounds, this is merely  
optional for the same types of 'placeme
 
By comparison with our earlier legislation, the reduction in grounds requirements 
represents a new approach.  Aside from the seeming arbitrariness of retention for only 
some orders, a more basic question is whether any dispositive remedies should have been 
made available without proof of grounds. Diminished reliance on grounds is not without 
precedent elsewhere.  In some systems there is a preference for imposing outcomes based 
on agreement by family members rather than proof of grounds by welfare. The rationale is 
that grounds are best avoided because of their potential for stigma.  Examples of such 
systems are some anti-legalistic continental European ones such as Sweden, France and 
Germany; and also New South Wales, Australia.13  In these jurisdictions there is a 
preference for basing proceedings on requests for assistance by either children or 
caregivers rather than manda
 
13  G Cameron, N Freymond & D Cornfield et al 'Positive Possibilities for Child and Family Welfare: 
Options for Expanding the Anglo-American Child Protection Paradigm' (2001) 81 & 84: accessed at <http: 
/7171/positive.pdf>; R Sheehan Magistrates’ Decision-Making in Child Protection 
 South 
www//.wlu.ca/documents
Cases (2001) 214-15; P Parkinson 'The Child Participation Principle in Child Protection Law in New
Wales' (2001) 9 International Journal of Children's Rights 259 at 263.  
14 Parkinson ibid.  Cameron, Freymond & Cornfield ibid at 85. 
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 However, from a South African perspective arguments can be made in favour of 
retainin
ily care as contained in s 28(1)(b) of the Constitution.17 
Furthermore, dispositive measures imposed by courts may have significant effects on other 
fundam
s of family 
privacy and undue interference with fundamental rights. Of particular concern is s 156(4).  
As has
g grounds as a prerequisite in all cases. Requiring them for some dispositions but 
not others obviously complicates the 2005 Act.  It thus does not accord with the criterion 
of legislation which is user-friendly for non-lawyers.  Secondly, even in seemingly 
voluntary cases where caregivers appear to agree to court orders such as removals, there is 
the danger, as discussed in the previous chapter, of their having been subjected to pressure 
by welfare.15 In South Africa, unlike in the three foreign systems just referred to, it is not 
likely that legal representatives for caregivers will often be available to ensure that their 
agreement is genuine.16  And even if they are, there is still the issue of sufficient respect 
for the child's foremost right to fam
ental constitutional rights of family members such as privacy, dignity, freedom of 
movement and freedom of association.  
 
 Although it could possibly be argued that there may justifiably be less emphasis on 
grounds in emergency situations and even generally whilst an investigation is continuing 
pending a dispositive hearing, an order issued formally at one must surely be based upon 
prior proof of just cause.  The lacunae in the 2005 Act allowing avoidance of proof of 
grounds are a matter for concern.  They raise dangers of constitutional challenges based 
upon, inter alia, rights to fair proceedings, insufficiently substantiated invasion
 been noted, it goes to the extreme of permitting mandatory interventions (other than 
'placement orders') even where a court has specifically found that a child is not in need of 
care and protection.  Amendments creative of a more uniform approach requiring grounds 
always to be proved before care measures are imposed upon children and families at 
disposition are thus needed. 
 
                                                 
15 See part 7.3.2, above. 
as been noted in part 5.2, above. 
ternational] it was 
16 As will be remembered a problem of low rates of representation h
17 In the Montana case of In re P.S., 127 P. 3d 451 (Mont. 2006) at 243 para 8 [Westlaw In
held that courts are not obliged to accept voluntary termination of parental rights. 
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8.2.2 Using Definitions to Limit the Reach of Grounds 
 
Aside from whether they can sometimes be dispensed with altogether, a second 
fundamental concern with the s 150(1) grounds is their limitation by means of definitions 
in the 2005 Act.  Explanations of some key terms have been included in s 1 to provide 
general guidance.  Amongst these are definitions of abandonment, abuse, commercial 
sexual exploitation, exploitation, neglect and sexual abuse.18  They have not been 
express
nder the 1983 Act none of the grounds were limited by definitions -and thus 
presiding officers were entirely free in deciding on their parameters.  It is important to 
 whether the new approach represents an improvement. In arguing for either a 
ly linked to grounds but are clearly applicable to them because of the use (as can be 
seen from the quotation in part 8.2. above) of one or more of these terms in subgrounds (a), 
(e), (h) and (i) of s 150(1). They might also in some cases be relevant to interpretations of 
'harm' in subgrounds (f) and (g).   
 
The linking of many of the grounds to legal definitions is by comparison with our 
earlier legislation once again a new feature of the 2005 Act.  On a preliminary point of 
clarity, in view of the fact that grounds will often be selected and asserted by non-lawyers 
such as social workers, cross-references alerting readers to the relevance of the definitions 
could usefully  have been included in s 150(1). The nature of their applicability should also 
have been explained. For example, s 49-6-1(a) of the West Virginia Code shows expressly 
how definitions should be referred to in alleging grounds. It states in relevant part '[t]he 
petition shall allege specific conduct including time and place, how such conduct comes 
within the statutory definition of neglect or abuse with references thereto…'.19  
 
U
consider
definition or more explanation on when abandonment justifies alternative care measures 
Wessels noted that the undefined abandonment ground in s 14(4)(aB)(i) of the 1983 Act20 
is frequently problematic in kinship care cases.  She pointed out that it is common in South 
Africa for particularly black children to be left with extended family members -and often 
                                                 
18 These will where relevant be quoted in the discussion following. 
19 West Virginia Code -accessed at <http://www.legis.state.wv.us/WVCODE/49/WVC>.  
20 This refers simply to a child who 'has been abandoned or is without visible support'. 
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from b
ether that of 'abandoned' as now provided in s 1 of the 2005 Act assists in 
solving the problem noted by Wessels.  This definition has been formulated as 'a child 
en deserted by the parent, guardian or care-giver; or (b) has, for 
no apparent reason, had no contact with the parent, guardian, or care-giver for a period of 
at leas
s is a 
caregiver intentionally avoiding contact when nothing prevents it.24 The new South 
African
                                                
irth.21  In the absence of legislative clarification on what exactly constitutes 
abandonment for the purpose of care cases children's courts have generally adopted a 
cautious approach. They refuse to apply the abandonment ground in kinship care situations 
even when parents have maintained no contact for years.22  This has caused difficulties 
because many children living with relatives are denied alternative care measures such as 
foster child grants.23  
 
As a test of the appropriateness of appending definitions it may be useful to 
consider wh
who- (a) has obviously be
t three months'. Where children have been intentionally placed with relatives it 
would be difficult to categorise this as desertion -and therefore the first part of the 
definition would not often assist.  In applying the second part, it should frequently be 
feasible to prove the fact of no contact for a three-month period. But the wording 'no 
apparent reason' is problematic. It seems to require either entering the mind of the 
caregiver to prove a negative, or else justify not investigating very deeply whether there 
was any reason. In some other systems, the essence of abandonment in care situation
 definition doesn't properly capture this and also utilises a dangerously short time 
period.25  It therefore insufficiently addresses the problem of informal kinship placements.  
 
 
21 T-L Wessels 'Problem-Shooting: Child Care Act -Problems Relating to Adoptions' (Unpublished paper, 
2002) 1.  
22 Ibid. See also Van Heerden (1999) op cit note 5 above at 626 N434; and South African Law Commission 
l 3 van die Wet op Status van Kinders 82 van 1987' (1991) 26 Die Magistraat/The 
ho case Roe v. Doe, 125 P. 3d 530 (Idaho 2005) 535 para 12 [Westlaw International]; the 
06) 530 para 4 ‘wilful failure’ [Westlaw 
nal]. 
, ibid, four six-month periods were found to be sufficient; in In re Amy A., ibid at 300, abandonment 
Review of the Child Care Act (Discussion Paper 103, Project 110, 2001) vol 3 para 17.2.2. 
23 Wessels & Law Commission ibid. That this has been a problem for many years appears from MM Eckard  
'Kan die Voog van 'n Minderjarige Moeder as Pleegouer van haar  Buite-Egtelike Kind Aangestel Word? –
Pleegsorg en Artike
Magistrate 33. 
24 See the Ida
California case In re Amy A., 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 298 (Ct. App.2005) at 301-02 [Westlaw International]; and the 
Tennessee case In re F.R.R., III, 193 S.W. 3d 528 (Tenn. 20
Internatio
25 In Roe
had been for two years; and in In re F.R.R., III, 531 para 5 ibid, the period was two and a half years. 
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The simpler approach of providing grounds unqualified by definitions has been 
predominant in some jurisdictions. For example, Zuravin has noted a prevalence of 
unqualified wording in many US states.26  As she points out, this is because many 
American judges prefer the resultant flexibility in care case decision-making.27  There has 
been debate between advocates of open and more constrained wording in the USA.  In 
particular, the question of employing definitions in American grounds has been 
controv
t is an act of 
omission; abuse is one of commission' [emphasis in the original]. 30 He is further of the 
view th
ersial.28  In the analysis below the feasibility of providing precise verbal guidance 
by defining core concepts such as neglect, abuse, harm or maltreatment of children will be 
considered. 
 
8.2.2.1 Defining Neglect 
 
Garbarino favours a definition of neglect formulated by Worlock and  Horowitz as 
'the failure of the child's parents or caretaker who has the material resources to do so, to 
provide minimally adequate care in the areas of health, nutrition, shelter, education, 
supervision, affection or attention, and protection'.29 He stresses that '[f]ailure is the key 
word here.  Neglect is easily distinguished from abuse operationally.  Neglec
at cultural sensitivity is required before deciding upon a finding of neglect.31   
 
Holden and Nabors have pointed out that it has proved very difficult to achieve 
consensus on how a definition of neglect should be worded.32  In part, this is because of 
the choices available.  Amongst the possibilities are definitions which focus on resultant 
                                                 
26 SJ Zuravin 'Child Neglect: a Review of Definitions and Measurement Research' in H Dubowitz (ed) 
Neglected Children: Research, Practice and Policy (1999) 25.  See also P Chill 'Burden of Proof Begone: 
The Pernicious Effect of Emergency Removal in Child Protective Proceedings' (2004) 42 Family Court 
Review 540 at 546.  
 Horowitz 1984 as quoted by J Garbarino & CC Collins 'Child Neglect: the Family with a 
Nabors 'The Prevention of Child Neglect' in Dubowitz (1999) op cit note 26, 174 at 176. 
27Zuravin ibid.    
28 Ibid at 26.  
29 I Worlock and B
Hole in the Middle' in Dubowitz (1999) op cit note 26, p1 at 12.  
30 Ibid.  
31 Ibid.  
32 EW Holden & L 
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harm to the child, parental acts of negligence, or the intention of the parent.33 Some 
commentators believe that different definitions are required for different forms of 
neglect.34   It has also been suggested that different definitions should be utilised for legal 
and social work purposes35 -an approach which could of course raise considerable 
difficulty in care cases where the two professions interact closely. 
 
Gelles has warned that definitions of neglect tend to direct attention towards 
parental behaviour without taking sufficient account of 'structural, cultural, and community 
influences on parents'. 36  He argues that an over-defining of neglect, by producing a 
concentration upon parental responsibility, draws attention away from failures in 
implementation of government policies which 'directly harm children'.37  In his view the 
problem with detailed definitions of neglect (and also maltreatment) is that is that they 
emphasise responsibility of and blame for caregivers, and tend to exclude the liability of 
'institutions, social policies, and organisations that directly and indirectly neglect 
children'.38  From a South African perspective these are important concerns. The definition 
of neglect in s 1 of the 2005 Act is 'a failure in the exercise of parental responsibilities to 
provide for the child's basic physical, intellectual, emotional or social needs'.  
 
With Gelles’ arguments in mind it may be asked - if an impoverished single mother 
who does not have friends, family or quality day care leaves her children unattended when 
she goes to work, is she a neglectful  parent or a victim of inadequate South African social 
service
                                                
s?  The new definition of neglect in the 2005 Act would be a serious retrograde step 
if it shifts blame to disadvantaged caregivers.  It appears to be dangerously broad and 
could easily be interpreted by children's courts in a manner that encourages poverty-based 
removals. More nuanced formulations which require a failure by a parent to have been 
'serious' and not because of factors beyond that parent’s control could be postulated, but 
 
33 See further Zuravin (1999) op cit note 26 at 25-26. 
34 Ibid at 26.   
281. 
eeds in the face of economic disadvantage and discrimination'. 
35 Ibid at 30-31.   
36 R J Gelles 'Policy Issues in Child Neglect' in Dubowitz (1999) op cit note 26, 278 at 
37 Ibid at 281. As Gelles also notes (ibid at 291) an important question is 'how far we expect parents to go to 
meet their children's n
38 Ibid at 281. 
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this could cause the opposite problem of deterring needed interventions.39  In view of the 
difficulties that have been encountered in attempts to find a suitable definition for child 
neglect elsewhere and the danger of strengthening a parental-fault orientation in our 
ted whether the basic definition in s 1 of the 2005 Act or any 
extension of it will improve the application of the neglect grounds in s 150(1)(h) and (i).  
parent’s capacity for judgment, and the community’s 
standar
courts 
has bee
are the here been a history of a lack of 
supervi 41
neglect it is important not to focus upon the caregiver in isolation. A court should be 
required to evaluate the caregiver in her social context.  In addition, what Bonner, Crow 
the child must also be taken 
grounds it may be doub
 
It must be conceded, however, that in the absence of a definition neglect is a 
difficult concept to work with because it is based upon inaction. In order to provide at least 
some direction it would be appropriate to include in future South African legislation 
guidelines which courts should take into account.  These could provide more flexible 
assistance when deciding whether a child must be classified as neglected to an extent 
which justifies the imposition of mandatory alternative care measures. Such guidelines 
could include, in the useful formulation of  Bonner, Crow and Logue 'the severity of the 
neglect and the resultant harm to the child, the probability that injury would appear as a 
result of this kind of neglect, a 
d of reasonable care'.40  Other factors that could be included for evaluation by 
are: the age and developmental stage of the child, the length of time that the child 
n left unsupervised, under what circumstances did lack of supervision occur, what 
caregivers’ mental and physical capacities, has t 
sion, is neglect income-related, and the ethnic-cultural context.   
 
Aside from listing criteria, future South African legislation should expressly direct 
that when evaluating whether a caregiver is unfit to continue to care for a child because of 
and Logue term any 'other systemic factors' that impact upon 
                                                 
39 Holden & Nabors and also English have argued that a requirement that parental conduct must be 'serious' 
in its consequences is problematic.  See the text accompanying notes 53-54, below. 
e formulated by D Rosenberg (1994) as cited by Bonner, Crow & Logue ibid, at 170. 
40 The quotation is from BL Bonner, SM Crow & MB Logue 'Fatal Child Neglect' in Dubowitz (1999) op cit 
note 26, 156 at 169.  
41 These factors wer
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into consideration.42 And most importantly, a contextual approach must include an 
assessment of the financial and social services resources that were available to a caregiver. 
 
8.2.2.2 Defining Abuse 
 
As an alternative to neglect, many care-intervention cases are grounded upon the 
t of abuse of children.  Here again, the question of whether it is appropriateconcep  to 
utilise f t from 
 criteria which required some form of observable 
physica
of othe
legislat
define different categories of abuse as these were increasingly recognised in other 
rsistent adverse effects on the child's emotional development… 
xual abuse involves forcing or enticing a child or young person to take part in sexual activities, 
ixed definitions arises. Howe, writing from a Canadian perspective, noted tha
the late 20th century simplistic abuse
l injury began to be supplemented by wider legislative wording that allowed proof 
r forms of harm and even substantial risk of future harm.   Subsequent43 ly, in both 
ion and guides to its application attempts began to be made in some systems to 
disciplines besides Law. For example, in England in 1999 the following definitions were 
provided in a government report: 
'Physical abuse may involve hitting, shaking, throwing, poisoning, burning, or scalding, suffocating, 
or otherwise causing physical harm to a child... 
Emotional abuse is the persistent emotional ill-treatment of a child such as to cause severe and 
pe
Se
whether or not the child is aware of what is happening…' 44 
 
The final definition above can be contrasted with a very different formulation 
which appeared the following year in s 1(3) of the Alberta Child Welfare Act in Canada.  
This described a child as sexually abused 'if the child is inappropriately exposed or 
subjected to sexual contact, activity or behaviour, including prostitution related 
                                                 
42 Ibid at 169.  These might presumably include school or peer influences. 
43 RB Howe 'Implementing Children's Rights in a Federal State: The Case of Canada's Child Protection 
nt of Health, Home Office, Department for Education in Environment Working Together to 
-Agency Working to Safeguard and Promote the Welfare of Children 
99) 5-6. 
System' (2002) 9 International Journal of Children's Rights 361 at 368. As an example of an attempt to 
provide a broad definition, the West Virginia Code op cit note 19 at s 49-1-3(a) states: ' "Abused child" 
means a child whose health or welfare is harmed or threatened by: (1) A parent, guardian or custodian who 
knowingly or intentionally inflicts, attempts to inflict or knowingly allows another person to inflict, physical 
injury or mental or emotional injury, upon the child or another child in the home'. The 1984 version of this 
definition more narrowly required substantial mental or emotional injury. 
44 Departme
Safeguard Children: A Guide to Inter
(HMSO 19
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activities'.45  The ambiguous term 'inappropriately,' whilst difficult to improve upon 
because it provides a broad reach for the definition, clearly detracts from the specificity of 
the guidance provided.   In contrast, in s 1 of the South African 2005 Act definitions are 
based l
A difficulty with including a list of varying situations in a definition is that a case may 
occur w
demonstrates 'anxiety, depression, withdrawal, 
or self-destructive behaviour'.47   He points out that alternatively it can be defined more 
ssessment.48   These two approaches can be 
           
argely on particular situations. For example,   'commercial sexual exploitation' of 
children has been defined as: 
'(a) the procurement of a child to perform sexual activities for financial or other reward, including 
acts of prostitution or pornography, irrespective of whether that reward is claimed by, payable to or 
shared with the procurer, the child, the parent or care-giver of the child, or any other person; or  
(b) trafficking in a child for use in sexual activities, including prostitution or pornography'. 
 
And sexual abuse has been defined as: 
'(a) sexually molesting or assaulting a child or allowing a child to be sexually molested or assaulted; 
(b) encouraging, inducing or forcing a child to be used for the sexual gratification of another person; 
(c) using a child or deliberately exposing a child to sexual activities or pornography; or 
(d) procuring or allowing a child to be procured for commercial sexual exploitation or in any way 
participating or assisting in the commercial sexual exploitation of a child'.  
 
hich arguably falls outside it. For example,   evidence may show that it is a child 
who is initiating inappropriate sexual relations with an adult, rather than the other way 
round.  Or a parent may be sexually molesting older siblings but not yet the youngest 
one.46    
Just as with sexual abuse, widely varying approaches are possible when attempting 
to define emotional abuse. Howe   has noted that one method is to define it by reference to 
its symptoms:  for example, where a child 
simply as harm requiring psychiatric a
                                      
Alberta Child Welfare Act, Revised Statutes of Alberta RSA 2000 (S.A. 1984, c. C-8. 1).  For a discussion 
of this provision, see S Grover 'On Meeting Canada's Charter Obligations to Street Youth' (2002) 10 
45
International Journal of Children's Rights 313 at 336. 
46 Situations occur in which evidence of abuse of other children may assist courts to reach an appropriate 
decision. US examples are the Arizona case Linda V. v. Arizona Dep’t of Economic Sec., 117 P.3d 795 
(Arizona Ct. App. 2005) 798 para 11 [Westlaw International]; and the Kentucky case Ky Cabinet for Health 
& Family Servs. v. R.H., 199 S.W 3d 201 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006) at 204-05 [Westlaw International]. Section 24 
of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 amends s 11 of the Children (Scotland) Act by inserting wording on 
child abuse.  The latter is described as including 'abuse of a person other than the child': see the new 
s11(7C)(b). 
47 Howe (2002) op cit note 43 at 368. 
48 Ibid.  
 334
contrasted with the emphasis on the persistence both of ill-treatment and its consequences 
in the 1999 English definition of emotional abuse quoted above.  
 
It would seem that, just as with negligence, there is little consensus internationally 
about how to define abuse.  And again, the question of how far to extend the reach of 
definitions is a difficult one. In the USA, even delays or failure to report abuse on the part 
of a non-abusing spouse have been used by courts as reasons for terminating parental 
rights.49  Sheehan concludes that child abuse is difficult to define precisely because it is 
not an absolute concept.  It tends to occur as part of a continuum of longer-term emotional 
and physical harm.50  This casts doubt on the idea of utilising compartmentalised legal 
definiti
emotio
South African 2005 Act.      
 attempts to create 
definitions of abuse may serve merely to fixate courts upon isolated aspects of supposed 
fault of
                                                
ons for supposedly different 'categories' of abuse -such as physical, sexual and 
nal.  It also casts doubt upon the use of lists of specific situations as in s 1 of the 
 
Sheehan has pointed out that, despite the fact that a combination of social, 
economic and environmental factors typically contribute to abuse, legal inquiries  can 
easily become preoccupied with particular abusive events rather than the processes which 
underlie them.51 It would seem that, just as in the case of negligence,
 parents.  This may discourage due appreciation of underlying social causes such as 
poverty. 
 
8.2.2.3 Defining Maltreatment and Harm 
 
Aside from neglect and abuse, two other core concepts relied on in the 2005 Act, 
namely, maltreatment and harm, have also proved difficult to define. In the USA, in 1996 
 
49 In Shapely v Texas Department of Human Resources, 581 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) a husband 
h his child and wife.  The child was removed from the wife/mother because she delayed 
sband had gone to work.  In this instance, Justice Ward of 
 the difficulties faced by non-abusing parents see further part 
1) op cit note 13 at 222 & 225. 
had abused bot
reporting the abuse of the child until after her hu
the court of civil appeals of Texas (at 254) concluded that the mother had been motivated by fear and held 
that her rights should not be terminated.  On
5.4.1, above. 
50 Sheehan (200
51 Ibid at 221-22.   
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the following definition of child maltreatment was added when the 1984 Child Abuse 
Prevention and Treatment Act was re-authorised by Congress as a guide for states:  '[a]t a 
minimum, any recent act or failure to act on the part of a parent or caretaker, which results 
in death or serious physical or emotional harm, or sexual abuse or exploitation, or presents 
an imm
lowing example: 
roken glass on the floor, 
hild has not been 
d by a needle; in fact, the child has not 
In the opinion of the English there are numerous cases of children who are seriously at risk 
h federal and state attempts to provide detailed definitions of child 
maltrea nt.57   These definitions have often been formulated upon an underlying 
assump
                                     
inent risk of serious harm'.52 Holden and Nabors criticised this as inappropriately 
limited 'to recent cases involving serious or imminent harm' [emphasis in the original].53  
English similarly criticised it for discouraging protective interventions on behalf of many 
vulnerable children by requiring proof of harm or imminent risk of serious harm.54 In her 
view, fewer high-risk cases were likely to be brought before care-proceedings courts as a 
result of this definition.  She gave the fol
'What about a four-year-old child whose mother lives in a house with b
rotten food in the refrigerator and cupboards, or used needles on the floor?  The c
cut, does not have food poisoning, or has not been pricke
experienced actual physical observable harm.'55 
 
but who will not receive child protection services because they arguably fall outside the 
1996 definition. She contended that '[i]f we value child well-being and the right of our 
most vulnerable children to an environment that promotes healthy growth and 
development, then we must address potential as well as actual harm'.56  
 
More generally, Gelles has suggested that there have been pervasive difficulties in 
the USA with bot
tme
tion that it is possible to distinguish between acts of omission which are within the 
control of parents and those which are not.  In practice, it may be difficult to decide 
whether a child is underfed or exposed to risk of harm because of deliberate behaviour by 
caregivers or because of structural or community problems which are beyond their 
            
 and Risk Assessment of Child Neglect in Public Child Protection Services' in 
52 Section 110. 
53 Holden & Nabors (1999) op cit note 32 at 176. 
54 DJ English 'Evaluation
Dubowitz (1999) op cit note 26, p191 at 194. 
55 Ibid at 195. 
56 Ibid at 206. 
57 Gelles (1999) op cit note 36 at 281. 
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control.58 These concerns expressed by Gelles are similar to those noted above in respect 
of definitions of neglect and abuse.  Once again, the danger of blaming parents who live in 
disadvantaged circumstances and receive little state assistance arises as a consideration. 
 
In England, intervention grounds have been formulated around the broad concept 
of 'harm'. In s 31(10) of the Children Act 1989 it is directed that '[w]here the question of 
whether harm suffered by a child is significant turns on the child's health or development, 
ich could reasonably be expected 
of a sim . In terms of what are often referred to as the 'threshold conditions' s31(2) 
of the C
 to suffer significant harm; and 
le to- 
As can be seen, the wording here perm ake an order only where specific 
require
appropriate attribution in relation to the harm or its likelihood. Attribution of harm must be 
his health or development shall be compared with that wh
ilar child'
hildren Act 1989 indicates that: 
'A court may only make a care order or supervision order if it is satisfied- 
(a) that the child concerned is suffering, or is likely
(b) that the harm, or likelihood of harm, is attributab
(i) the care given to the child, or likely to be given to him if the order were not made, not being what 
it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give him; or 
(ii) the child's being beyond parental control.' 
 
its a court to m
ments are met.59 As para (b) clearly indicates, these requirements include an 
linked to care and suggests that courts have to discern the source of harm.  As Perry has 
shown, this has raised difficulties in several English cases where children were at risk but 
it was not possible to prove which of several adult carers was the cause or likely future 
cause of harm.60    
 
Despite the difficulties, in the English Adoption and Children Act 2002 the 
definition of significant harm in s 31(9) the Children Act 1989 was extended to include 
'harm suffered as a result of seeing or hearing ill-treatment of another person'.61 However, 
in the current version of s 31(9) there has been a shift from cause to effect. Harm is now 
                                                 
58 Ibid. 
59 See also C Lyon Child Abuse (2003) 378. 
60 See generally A Perry 'Lancashire County Council v B Section 31-Threshold or Barrier?' (2000) 12 Child 
and Family LQ 301.  
 [England and Wales] accessed at 
his Act at s 120 inserted the additional 
see Explanatory Notes to Adoption and Children Act 2002 (The 
 5 accessed at <http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/en2002en38.htm
61 Adoption and Children Act 2002
<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2002/ukpa_20020038_en_9>. T
wording in s 31(9) of the 1989 Act: 
Stationary Office) para >.    
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broadly and simply defined there as 'ill-treatment or the impairment of health or 
development'.62 Sheehan has noted that in Australia there has been a lack of agreement on 
the fundamental aspect of what constitutes harm to a child.63   Because of the difficulties in 
reaching consensus on how to define harm, in direct contrast to English care law, there has 
been much less reliance in Australia upon legally-formulated criteria to provide thresholds 
for intervention.64  
 
8.2.2.4 The Need for Guidelines Rather Than Definitions 
Although it does not expressly state that one must be found, the cast of wording here 
clearly directs attentio
praising a move away from grounds definitions in the Children and Young Persons (Care 
 
The problem of attribution as experienced in England could as a result of the 
definitions in s 1 of the 2005 Act for the first time become an issue in our law.  For 
example, the definition of abuse reads as follows: 
'abuse, in relation to a child, means any form of harm or ill-treatment deliberately inflicted on the 
child, and includes- 
(a) assaulting a child or inflicting any other form of deliberate injury to a child; 
(b) sexually abusing a child or allowing a child to be sexually abused; 
(c) bullying by another child; 
(d) a labour practice that exploits a child; or  
(e) exposing or subjecting a child to behaviour that may harm the child psychologically or 
emotionally.'    
 
n towards a perpetrator rather than merely the nature or 
consequences of harm.  The same can be said of the definitions of abandonment, 
commercial sexual exploitation, exploitation, neglect and sexual abuse contained in s 1. 
 
If the causes of care problems are typically accretional, complex and intertwined, 
directing adjudicators to focus narrowly on fixed definitions is surely inappropriate. In 
and Protection) Act 1998 of New South Wales, Australia, Parkinson has argued that they 
simply constrain courts by compelling them either to label caregivers or categorise 
                                                 
62 Children Act 1989 [England and Wales] accessed at 
<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1989/ukpga_19890041_en_6>. 
63 Sheehan (2001) op cit note 13 at 221. 
64 Ibid, at 222 & 225.  
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situations.65 Aside from labeling and stigma, a further argument against definitions can be 
fashioned around the inherent nature of the work of adjudicators in care cases. Wriggins 
has asserted that in the utilisation of law in these inevitably 'the application of the standards 
to the f cts is murky in many instances.  The judicial determination is very different from 
that in
echanical approach this ground could be applied to a high 
proportion of South African children -particularly those living in impoverished conditions 
in shac
ncluded that grounds which leave children's courts with a degree of discretion 
would 
a
volving application of a clear rule.  The termination of parental rights context is 
radically different…'.66 It is thus in her view not possible for presiding officers to follow a 
purely mechanical approach based strictly on precise directions.  They must be left with a 
sufficient realm of discretion.67 
 
In support of the view of Wriggins, as noted above s 150(1)(f) of the South African 
2005 Act categorises a child as 'in need of care and protection'  if the child  'lives in or is 
exposed to circumstances which may seriously harm that child's physical, mental or social 
well-being'. Under a m
k settlements. In practice, it is necessary to select out from large numbers of 
children who currently fall into this category those who are in such harmful circumstances 
that they would actually benefit from alternative care measures. 
 
In light of both the technical difficulties that result from circumscribing grounds by 
appending definitions and the need for a selective application in an under-resourced child 
protection system such as South Africa’s, a recommendation can now be put forward. It 
may be co
be more suitable than those which aim to narrowly circumscribe their powers.  In 
particular, we should not have created definitions of core concepts which narrow the reach 
                                                 
65 Parkinson (2001) op cit note 13 at 263. 
66 J Wriggins 'Parental Rights Termination Jurisprudence: Quest
Carolina LR 241 at 259.  As noted by Wriggins (ibid) in Santosky 
ioning the Framework' (2000) 52 South 
v Kramer 455 U.S. 745 (1982) at 762 the 
US supr e court found that the standards for terminating parental rights tend to be lacking in precision and 
'leave de rminations unusually open to the subjective values of the judge'.  
67 As an
P. 3d 940
in favour of terminating parental rights.  In the Massachusetts case of Adoption of Yale, 838 N.E. 2d 598 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2005) 602-03 para 6 [Westlaw International] the court was confronted with the shades of 
cent abuse must be to be relevant. 
em
te
 example of a 'murky' issue, in the Oregon case of State ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs. v Rardin 134 
 (Or. 2006) 445  para 3 [Westlaw International] it had to be decided whether failure to exercise 
parental responsibilities at a time when a father genuinely did not believe himself to be the father must count 
grey question of how re
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of grounds.  And by encouraging children's courts to look for perpetrators of misdeeds the 
s 1 definitions in the 2005 Act to some extent reintroduce the fault approach that was 
abandoned in the face of severe criticism under the 1983 Act.68 
 
However, there is certainly (as has been noted above with reference to neglect) a 
need for guidance. The important concern of Wessels -that many children's court 
magistr
 have to exercise a degree of flexibility in interpreting 
and applying grounds.  
useful 
set of guidelines which presiding officers could traverse when making a determination on 
 conclusion, two major points of departure in the 2005 Act need to be 
reconsi
situations weakens the effectiveness of the new legislation. 
ent children's court remedies.  As mentioned earlier, those available 
                
ates doubt their jurisdiction to apply grounds in anything but the narrowest and 
most cautious fashion- urgently needs to be addressed.  It may be proposed that a suitable 
compromise between insufficient direction on how to apply grounds and too much 
restriction would be official guidelines.  Instead of being tied to definitions that might 
prove to be too narrow in particular instances magistrates should, on the contrary, be 
informed that they will inevitably
 
 In order to provide a suitable degree of assistance rather than control, criteria 
which courts need to consider when applying a particular ground should be included in 
future legislative regulations. As has been shown in the discussion above there are a 
variety of potential indicators based conduct or intention of perpetrators, symptomatic 
manifestations in children, palliative requirements, comparison with other children and 
domestic or community context.  These could easily be gathered together to form a 
grounds.  
In
dered by the legislature.  Restricting the s 150(1) grounds by connecting many of 
them to fault oriented definitions and even rendering them avoidable completely in some 
8.3 The New Approach to Court Ordered Remedies  
 
It has been noted by South African commentators that a serious shortcoming in the 
 691983 Act is insuffici
                                 
68 See part 8.2, above.  
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for care cases are in s 15. Aside from supervision by a social worker70 this allows for a 
child to be transferred to the custody of a separated parent or guardian71 or placed in foster 
care72 a children's home or (still following the old English terminology) a school of 
industr s courts has thus been narrowly 
conceptualised
 
vastly 
discuss
will be
by acco
the nee
art 8.3 al overview of how remedies have been structured 
and de ribed edies aimed 
at keep
these constitut  
attempt other 
remedies for situations where children need removals into new environments are briefly 
evaluated.  It i tant new options have been added. 
 
8.3.1 The Struc
 
As has rt orders are provided in s 46(1) 
and s 156(1) 
                       
ies.73 The remedies function of children'
 as primarily that of ordering removals.   
In the 2005 Act the scope for issuing different kinds of children's court orders is 
increased. The provisions of the Act which provide for these will be analysed in the 
ion below. The focus is on children's court orders that are relevant for care cases. It 
 shown that the 2005 Act entirely transforms the dispositive role of children's courts 
rding them far greater capability to provide customised solutions designed to meet 
ds of individual children.  
 
P .1 below provides a gener
sc in the Act. In a more specific focus in part 8.3.2, proactive rem
ing children in existing familial groups are considered.  It will be suggested that 
e a particularly significant reform because they enable children's courts to
measures wherever possible before resorting to removals.  In part 8.3.3 the 
s shown that even here some impor
turing of Remedies in the 2005 Act 
 been noted, two main sets of children's cou
of the 2005 Act. In order to understand the new approach specifically to 
                                                                                                                             
69 Inter-Ministerial Committee on Young People at Risk Interim Policy Recommendations for the 
Transformation o
Issue Pa e Paper 13 (Project 110, Apr 1998) para 7.2.8.; N Zaal 
& C Ma ld Law in South 
Africa (2
70 Subsection 15(1)(a).  
71 Ibid. 
72 Subsection 15(1)(b). 
73 Subsections 15(1)(c) and (d), respectively.  
f the Child and Youth Care System (1996) 57-58; South African Law Commission First 
per on the Review of the Child Care Act: Issu
tthias 'The Child in Need of Alternative Care' in CJ Davel (ed) Introduction to Chi
000) 116 at 129; South African Law Commission (2001) op cit note 22 at vol 1 p120. 
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dispositive remedies in care cases it is necessary to read the whole of these subsections 
together.  The former is entitled 'Orders children's court may make'.  It sets out a 
substantial list as follows: 
'(1) A children's court may make the following orders: 
(a) An alternative care order, which includes an order placing a child- 
(i) in the care of a person designated by the court to be the foster parent of the child; 
(ii) in the care of a child and youth care centre; or 
(iii) in temporary safe care; 
(g) an 
respon
 
 
  early intervention services and a family preservation programme; 
(h) a ch
ild remains in, be released from, or returned to the care of a person, subject to 
 an operation to be performed on, a child; 
or other appropriate problem-solving 
 on reasonable grounds is suspected of having 
 
training, treatment or 
 duty towards a child to appear 
ure; 
e the 
(i) a con
(j) an or n 50; 
(k) any o r provision of this Act.' 
 
(b) an order placing a child in a child-headed household in the care of the child heading the 
household under the supervision of an adult person designated by the court; 
(c) an adoption order, which includes an inter-country adoption order; 
(d) a partial care order instructing the parent or care-giver of the child to make arrangements with a 
partial care facility to take care of the child during specific hours of the day or night or for a specific 
period; 
(e) a shared care order instructing different care-givers or child and youth care centres to take 
responsibility for the care of the child at different times or periods; 
(f) a supervision order, placing a child, or the parent or care-giver of a child, or both the child and 
the parent or care-giver, under the supervision of a social worker or other person designated by the 
court; 
order subjecting a child, a parent or care-giver of a child, or any person holding parental 
sibilities and rights in respect of a child, to- 
(i) early intervention services; 
(ii) a family preservation programme; or 
(iii) both
ild protection order, which includes an order- 
(i) that a ch
conditions imposed by the court; 
(ii) giving consent to medical treatment of, or to
(iii) instructing a parent or caregiver of a child to undergo professional counselling, or to 
participate in mediation, a family group conference, 
forum; 
(iv) instructing a child or other person involved in the matter concerning the child to 
participate in a professional assessment; 
(v) instructing a hospital to retain a child who
been subjected to abuse or deliberate neglect, pending further inquiry;
(vi) instructing a person to undergo a specified skills development, 
rehabilitation programme where this is necessary for the protection or well-being of a 
child; 
(vii) instructing a person who has failed to fulfil a statutory
before the court and to give reasons for the fail
(viii) instructing an organ of state to assist a child in obtaining access to a public service to 
which the child is entitled, failing which, to appear through its representative befor
court and to give reasons for the failure; 
(ix) instructing that a person be removed from a child's home; 
(x) limiting access of a person to a child or prohibiting a person from contacting a child; or 
 
(xi) allowing a person to contact a child on the conditions specified in the court order; 
tribution order in terms of this Act; 
der instructing a person to carry out an investigation in terms of sectio
ther order which a children's court may make in terms of any othe
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As can
firming that the person under whose control the child is may retain care of the child, if the 
ourt finds that that person is a suitable person to provide for the safety and well-being of the child; 
 law, for the care of children with 
isabilities or chronic illnesses, if the court finds that- 
(i) the child has a physical or mental disability or chronic illness; and 
 be seen, many of these orders besides those expressly described as alternative care 
orders in para (a) appear suitable for dispositive remedies in care cases. In relation to the 
second list of orders, s 156 is more specifically entitled 'Orders when child is found to be 
in need of care and protection'. Section 156(1) reads as follows: 
'(1) If a children's court finds that a child is in need of care and protection the court may make any 
order which is in the best interests of the child, which may be or include an order- 
(a) referred to in section 46; 
(b) con
c
(c) that the child be returned to the person under whose care the child was before the child was 
placed in temporary safe care, if the court finds that that person is a suitable person to provide for 
the safety and well-being of the child; 
(d) that the person under whose care the child was must make arrangements for the child to be taken 
care of in a partial care facility at the expense of such person, if the court finds that the child became 
in need of care and protection because the person under whose care the child was lacked the time to 
care for the child; 
(e) if the child has no parent or care-giver or has a parent or care-giver but that person is unable or 
unsuitable to care for the child, that the child be placed in- 
(i) court-ordered kinship care, if the child has a family member who is able, suitable and 
willing to be entrusted with the care of the child; 
(ii) foster care with a suitable foster parent; 
(iii) foster care with a group of persons or an organisation operating a cluster foster care 
scheme; 
(iv) temporary safe care, pending an application for, and finalisation of, the adoption of the 
child; 
(v) shared care where different care-givers or centres alternate in taking responsibility for the 
care of the child at different times or periods; or 
(vi) a child and youth care centre designated in terms of section 158 that provides a 
residential care programme suited to the child's needs; 
***[sic -indicating a deletion at this point from an earlier draft] 
(g) that the child be placed in a facility designated by the court which is managed by an organ of 
state or registered, recognised or monitored in terms of any
d
(ii) it is in the best interests of the child to be cared for in such facility; 
(h) that the child be placed in a child and youth care centre selected in terms of section 158 which 
provides a secure care programme suited to the needs of the child, if the court finds- 
 (i) that the parent or care-giver cannot control the child; or 
 (ii) that the child displays criminal behaviour; 
(i) that the child receive appropriate treatment or attendance, if needs be at State expense, if the 
court finds that the child is in need of medical, psychological or other treatment or attendance; 
(j) that the child be admitted as an inpatient or outpatient to an appropriate facility if the court finds 
that the child is in need of treatment for addiction to a dependence-producing substance; or 
(k) interdicting a person from maltreating, abusing, neglecting or degrading the child or from having 
any contact with the child, if the court finds that- 
(i) the child has been or is being maltreated, abused, neglected or degraded by that person; 
(ii) the relationship between the child and that person is detrimental to the well-being or 
safety of the child; or 
(iii) the child is exposed to a substantial risk of imminent harm.' 
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A question which arises is why two sets of children's court orders were provided.  
A logic
. Although s 156(1)(e) additionally 
allows for cluster foster care and shared care with different caregivers s 46(1)(e) also 
allows 
nly real difference with the second 
another example, s 46(1)(c) provides that a children's court may make 'an adoption order, 
which includes an inter-country adoption order' without setting any prerequisites.  But 
s156(1)(e)(iii) requires a children's court first to place a child in 'temporary safe care, 
al expectation is that they are intended for different situations.  However, although 
the s 156(1) set have been more specifically described as for children formally found to be 
in need of care and protection, it is immediately indicated in s 156(1)(a) that s 46 orders 
can also be selected when a child has been so designated.  And as has been noted, the 
wording of many of those in s 46(1) renders them equally apposite for care cases. 
 
A textual comparison indicates that some of the orders in the two subsections are 
very similar.  For example, both s 46(1)(a) and s 156(1)(e) allow for foster care, temporary 
safety care or placement in a child and youth care centre
for the latter.  Section 46(1)(d) provides that a children's court may make 'a partial 
care order instructing the parent or care-giver of the child to make arrangements with a 
partial care facility to take care of the child during specific hours of the day or night or for 
a specific period'. Section 156(1)(d) similarly enables a children's court to make an order 
'that the person under whose care the child was must make arrangements for the child to be 
taken care of in a partial care facility at the expense of such person, if the court finds that 
the child became in need of care and protection because the person under whose care the 
child was lacked the time to care for the child'. The o
provision is that it specifies that the caregiver must pay. 
 
The arrangement of pairs of similar orders placed far apart offends against the 
criterion of user-friendliness.  It once again makes it more difficult -particularly for 
nonlawyers- to understand and apply the Act.  It raises difficulties of interpretation.  For 
example, does the express mention of caregiver payment for s 156(1)(d) partial care mean 
that s 46(1)(d) partial care could be at the expense of the state or another person? And, as 
pending an application for, and finalisation of, the adoption of the child'. So does the 
former provision bypass the requirement of the latter by allowing for a one stage process?   
 344
 Under a s 46(1)(f) supervision order a child and/or caregiver are to be supervised 
by 'a social worker or other person designated by the court'.  But if supervision is provided 
in term
ices.  And it is clear from the 
preamble to s 156(1) that these courts can even go beyond the listed remedies and 'make any order which is 
in the best interests of the child'. There is thus untrammelled scope to tailor individualised outcomes 
accordin
deciding whether to issue proactive services enabling children to remain at home. It is 
encouraging to note that there are research findings which indicate that deliverance of such 
s of s 156(3)(a)(i) it must be 'by a designated social worker or authorised officer'. 
Arising from definitions in s 1, the terminology 'designated social worker' and 'authorised 
officer' are restricted categories.74 But it would seem that the qualifications on supervisors 
imposed in s 156(3)(a)(i) can be avoided by using s 46(1)(f). It must be concluded that the 
pairs of rather similar orders in s 46(1) and s 156(1) are a recipe for confusion.  Eventually, 
pair members perceived as more onerous to utilise than their counterparts may become 
mere doppel-gängers that are never applied in practice. 
 
Although there are similar provisions in s 46(1) and s 156(1), as can be seen from the quotations 
above there are also many significant differences in the kinds of remedies they provide. A positive aspect is 
that when read together they equip children's courts with a wide range of cho
g to the needs of a child in any particular case.  Waldfogel has argued that care and protection 
remedies in many countries are so limited that they clumsily produce a 'one-size-fits-all' solution when what 
is really needed is a 'more customised response to the diverse array of families being referred'.75 A great 
strength of the 2005 Act is its capacity to meet this requirement.  
 
8.3.2 A Family Services Orientation for Children's Courts 
In relation to care cases what is arguably one of the most valuable features of the 
2005 Act is the remedies designed to enable children's courts not to remove children.  As 
will be shown, presiding magistrates will be expected to undertake a constructive role in 
services can sometimes be successful in improving the capabilities of even extremely 
                                                 
74 As noted in part 7.2.2.1 above an authorised officer is a person authorised in writing by a children's court 
ren in the 21st Century' (2000) 34 Family LQ 311. 
magistrate.  A designated social worker is only one employed by the department of social development, a 
designated child protection organisation or a municipality. 
75 J Waldfogel 'Protecting Child
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disadvantaged families.76  And as will be shown below the proactive services approach has 
proved effective in many systems. 
 
 As an example of a useful provision intended to enable an at-risk child to remain at 
home, under s 156(1)(k) a children's court will be able to issue two categories of interdict.  
The first would forbid any person who has 'maltreated, abused, neglected or degraded' a 
child from continuing to do so. The second would prohibit any person found to represent a 
serious risk of harm 'from having any contact with the child'.77 And s 46(1)(ix) provides 
that a children's court m ay issue an order 'instructing that a person be removed from a 
child's home'. These three remedies will for the first time enable children's courts to 
provide
Section 46(1)(b) of the 2005 Act is groundbreaking because it for the first time 
                     
 long-term78  protection in domestic violence cases.  It will thus no longer be 
necessary to subject children to a different set of procedures in a separate domestic 
violence court when it emerges that such remedies are required.  
  
provides recognition of child-headed households as a legal family form. As will be 
remembered, it allows for an order 'placing a child in a child-headed household in the care 
of the child heading the household under the supervision of an adult person designated by 
the court'. It may be assumed that in reality this would often entail legal recognition of a 
pre-existing de facto situation, rather than an actual 'placement' in the sense of a child 
being moved.  In view particularly of South Africa reportedly having the highest number 
of AIDS orphans of any country in the world79 the importance of enabling children to 
remain within their communities80 and the general undesirability of separating siblings, 
                            
in Child Protection Proceedings' 
rt 7.4.2. 
76 N Wasow 'Planned Failure: California's Denial of Reunification Services to Parents with Mental 
Disabilities' (2006) 31 New York University Review of Law and Social Change 183 at 210-11. 
77 These remedies would also be useful in cases of bullying. In England, a court hearing a care case can 
similarly grant a 'non-molestation order' as a domestic violence remedy even if one has not been applied for: 
see J Masson 'Representation of Children in England: Protecting Children 
(2000) 34 Family LQ 467 at 474. 
78 As recommended in the previous chapter, there is also a need for similarly broad powers in the interim 
phase of cases pending disposition: see pa
79 UNICEF The State of the World's Children 2007: Women and Children -The Double Dividend of Gender 
Equality (2007) at Table 4, p 116. Accessed at <http://www.unicef.org/sowc07/report/report.php>. 
80 As noted in part 1.2, above. 
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this provision is surely most appropriate.81  The idea that children can be legally required 
to care for other children may admittedly be seen as radical because it requires them to 
take on adult responsibilities.82  But it should be noted that something of a via media has 
been taken on this controversial question. A supervising adult must be appointed by the 
children's court if it makes a s 46(1)(b) order.83  And there is no suggestion that a court 
would ever be under any pressure to place a child under another child if it did not deem 
this to be the best available option.  If s 46(1)(b) results in the continuance of even a few 
successfully-functioning child-headed familial groups its inclusion in the Act will have 
been well worthwhile.84 
 
As has been noted above s 156(1)(d) of the Act provides that a children's court can 
order a caregiver to pay for attendance of a child at 'a partial care facility' (unfortunately 
not defined but suggesting something such as a creche or after-school facility) where the 
caregiver lacks 'the time to care for the child'.85 This, along with shared care in s 156(1)(e) 
                                                 
81 It is supported by recommendations from some South African researchers. V Sewpaul 'Models of 
Intervention for Children in Difficult Circumstances in South Africa' LXXX (2001) Child Welfare 571 at 582 
stated that, whilst trial projects and other research in South Africa 'indicated that many com
to care for local AIDS orphans, they lacked material capacity and needed help and supp rt'.
 
munities wanted 
o   She concluded 
that government must therefore develop community care support mechanisms. S Giese & H Meintjes 'The 
Government and HIV/AIDS: The challenge lies in implementing policy' (2003) 7 Children First: A Journal 
on Issues Affecting Children and Their Carers 42 at 43-44 argued similarly that, because of the huge 
Era of HIV/Aids' (2005) 13 International Journal of 
d-Headed Households: 
) 1 at 4-5 & 25-26. See also T Vecchiato 'Italy' in Colton & Hellinckx ibid at 140-41 & 143 and D 
 & Hellinckx ibid 153 at 156-57.  
t Bill 19/2006. Couzens & Zaal (forthcoming) op cit note 82 provide a detailed critical analysis of 
numbers of persons affected and infected by HIV/AIDS '[a] core response in South Africa and elsewhere in 
Southern Africa' must be for governments to find creative new ways to provide home and community-based 
care and support on behalf of children. 
82 For an analysis of arguments for and against legally recognising child-headed households with particular 
reference to the South African situation see J Sloth-Nielsen 'Of Newborns and Nubiles: Some Critical 
Challenges to Children's Rights in Africa in the 
Children's Rights 73 at 76-79; and M Couzens & FN Zaal 'Legal Recognition for Chil
An Evaluation of the Emerging South African Framework' forthcoming in International Journal of 
Children's Rights.  
83 In the late 20th century in some continental European systems supervised child-headed household 
placements were found to be generally successful for many older children:  see W Hellinckx, B van den 
Bruel & C vander Borght 'Belgium and Luxembourg' in MJ Colton & W Hellinckx (eds) Child Care in the 
EC (1993
van der Ploeg 'The Netherlands' in Colton
84 Some supplementary child-headed household provisions are contained in clause 136 of the Children's 
Amendmen
the scheme in the Bill and the 2005 Act. 
85 In some continental European systems, orders requiring part-day placements of children in day-care 
centres were introduced in the late 20th century and proved useful: Hellinckx, van den Bruel & vander 
Borght (1993) op cit note 83 at 4-5 & 25-26; and Vecchiato (1993) op cit note 83 at 144. 
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(iv),86 is clearly another means for enabling some children whose domestic nurturing is 
borderl
ered that financial 
assistance is amongst the remedies recommended in art 35(b) of the UN Guidelines, 
2007.88
                                                
ine-inadequate to receive supplementary care that may enable them to remain at 
home. Many parent-figures will of course lack the necessary financial means rather than 
merely the time to care for their children properly - and as has been discussed in part 8.3.1 
s46(1)(d)  may possibly allow for a different source of payment.   
 
Despite a recommendation in the 2002 draft Children's Bill87 in the 2005 Act there 
is no capability for children's courts to order payment of a short-term monthly care grant 
where this is needed to enable a child to remain in her familial group. The usefulness of 
such a remedy has been proved in the past. As noted in part 2.3.3 above, s 11 of the 
Children's Protection Act Amendment Act 26/1921 enabled children's courts to undertake 
a valuable function for many years by authorising temporary care grants to avoid removals 
of children from impoverished families.  It will also be rememb
 As noted by Telfer family services orders will often be ineffective if courts are not 
able to address the underlying problem of poverty by ordering direct support in the form of 
financial assistance.89 It is a pity that (presumably because of concerns about resource 
constraints) emergency grants have not been provided for in the 2005 Act.90  
 
86 As an illustration of the potential of shared care, in the Maine case of In re Thomas H., 889A. 2d. 297 (Me. 
2005) 309 paras 32 & 34 [Westlaw International] a court decided that termination of parental rights was not 
currently needed where contact and nurturing by different persons on different days was sufficiently meeting 
 
: accessed at  
ontrol the child is becomes 
) 34 Family LQ 
the children's needs. It has also proved successful in Sweden -a technique used here is to link two families 
together: see G Cameron & N  Freymond  'Canadian Child Welfare: System Design Dimensions and
Possibilities for Innovation' (2003) 31
<http:www//.wlu.ca/documents/7180/Canadian_child_welfare_systems_design.pdf>. 
87 In clause 175(1)(e) of the Bill the law commission proposed 'that an emergency court grant be paid to the 
child to provide for the basic needs of the child until the person under whose c
able to provide for those basic needs, if the court finds that the child became in need of care and protection 
because the person under whose control the child was and the person who is legally obliged to maintain the 
child lacked the means to care for the child'. See South African Law Commission (2003) op cit note 7 at part 
3 p143. 
88 See the quotation in part 1.3.2, above. 
89 D Telfer 'In Re T.M.: Who Protects the Indigent Parents?' (2004) 6 Journal of Law and Family Studies 161 
at 169-70. 
90 RS Sackett J 'Terminating Parental Rights of the Handicapped' (1991) 25 Family LQ 253 at 286-87 argued 
that there are cases, particularly where families are experiencing delays in accessing other forms of grants, 
where immediate, short-term financial assistance will prevent the need to remove children into alternative 
care. See also SH Ramsey 'Child Protection: New Perspectives for the 21st Century' (2000
 348
  Although emergency grants are not included other remedies requiring resource 
allocation decisions have been.  In s 156(1)(i) it is provided   quite  broadly that a 
children's court can instruct that a child must   'receive appropriate treatment or attendance, 
if need
av
s be at state expense, if the court finds that the child is in need of medical, 
psychological or other treatment or attendance'. 91  This will have to be interpreted by the 
courts or clarified in regulations.  Potentially, and particularly because of the words 'or 
other' it could cover a wide range of services.  Considering that South Africa is a 
developing country, this is an impressive financial commitment to the well-being of 
vulnerable children.  If the legislature is willing to go so far, the possibility of a court-
ordered care grant should perhaps be revisited.  It might prove to be more proactive and 
sometimes even less expensive92 in meeting a child's care needs before she reaches the 
stage of requiring treatment or attendance services under s 156(1)(i).93 
 
Aside from s 156(1)(i) treatment or attendance orders for children, it can be seen 
from the wording of s 46(1) and s 156(1) that further resources h e been committed 
because children's courts can issue a variety of other services orders that would tend to 
require state financing.  These include ones providing for rehabilitation of children 
                                                                                                                                                    
301 at 305 for a reference to American research by Kelly which indicated that success in keeping children 
given to whether other forms of support might be more cost-effective. 
at the alternative 
7 Social 
den (1996) 12 SAJHR 'Proposed 
with their families was often dependent upon providing emergency material aid coupled with other services. 
91 'Attendance' is not defined further. 
92 For example, Wasow (2006) op cit note 76 at 217 points out that family services involving psychological 
assessments tend to be particularly expensive and suggests that where they are contemplated consideration 
should be 
93 In considering the desirability of such a grant what should also be taken into account is th
will often be foster care for which a state grant is already payable or institutional care which is generally 
highly expensive. F Coughlan 'Enough, Soon Enough?  Changes in Residential Care' (2001) 3
Work/Maatskaplike Werk 343 at 346 estimated the cost of keeping a child in a state-run South African 
alternative care institution as between R2327-4000 per child per month.  He calculated that privately-run 
institutions cost about one-third of this. In relation to expense to the state Sloth-Nielsen and Van Heerden 
have argued that it will in many cases be less costly to maintain a child in her family than to remove her 
when poverty is a significant factor: see J Sloth-Nielsen & B Van Heer
Amendments to the Child Care Act and Regulations in the Context of Constitutional and International Law 
Developments in South Africa' 247 at 258-60; and J Sloth-Nielsen & B Van Heerden 'New Child Protection 
Legislation for South Africa? Lessons from Africa' (1997) 8 Stellenbosch LR 261 at 272-73. 
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addicted to dependence-producing substances94 and, as noted in the previous chapter, more 
generally early intervention, family preservation, and (for carers) parental skills or 
rehabilitation services.95  
s
ic  
providers are encouraged to work optimally.99 There is thus certainly scope for courts, 
provide
 
It might be considered that decisions about what family services ought to be 
provided should more appropriately be made by social workers than court adjudicators. 
However, Stein has pointed out that where social workers have high caseloads they tend to 
spend more time with the lea t troublesome client -the prospective alternative caregiver- 
rather than the biological parent who often has substance abuse or other serious problems 
and is difficult to work with.96 Also, if left unmonitored welfare may find it more 
convenient to supply generic services not adapted to the needs of particular families.97 
Particularly parents with problems such as mental disability may consequently not only 
receive insufficient attention; they may also be provided by welfare with inappropriate 
services intended for cognitively normal parents.98 But where courts have oversight serv e
d they have sufficient training and guidelines about services,100 to play a valuable 
role.  The importance of subjecting welfare to monitoring together with the far greater 
                                                 
94 Section 156(1)(j). Data provided by the US National Centre on Addiction and Substance Abuse indicates 
that in at least 70% of American child abuse and neglect cases which come before court a parent is addicted 
to alcohol or drugs: see Waldfogel (2000) op cit note 75 at 25. 
95 Section 46(1)(g) & (h)(vi). 
96TJ Stein 'The Adoption and Safe Families Act: Creating a False Dichotomy between Parents and Children's 
Rights' (2000) 81 Families in Society: the Journal of Contemporary Human Services 586 at 591. Wasow 
(2006) op cit note 76 at 206 similarly notes a tendency of welfare to bypass 'parents who are unappealing, or 
who present especially difficult challenges'. 
97 Telfer (2004) op cit note 89 at 169 states that welfare has a tendency to provide generalist services in 
'cookie cutter' formats. As she notes at 170 ibid courts can therefore play a valuable role in checking services.  
BA Green & AR Appell 'R
point out that familie u
 3
epresenting Children in Families -Foreword' (2006) 6 Nevada LJ 571 at 583-584 
s m st also be protected from being overwhelmed by too many or overly intrusive 
services
 General  on the usefulness of courts for monitoring welfare see also part 3.4.1, above. 
98 EN DeVault 'Reasonable Efforts Not so Reasonable: The Termination of the Parental Rights of a 
Developmentally Disabled Mother' (2005)10 Roger Williams University LR 763 at 764-65 & 785. 
25-26 concluded that drug courts in the US serve a valuable purpose 
they hold treatment providers, as well as offenders, accountable.  If a treatment provider is not 
scontinue use of that provider 
elps strengthen the quality of services on offer in the area'. 
ult (2005) op cit note 98 at 765. Wasow (2006) op cit note 76 at 187 notes that where courts are not 
milies.  On guidelines see also part 8.4.3, below. 
.  
ly
99 Waldfogel (2000) op cit note 75 at 3
'because 
providing adequate treatment or adequate reports to the court, the judge will di
and refer families to another one; this tight accountability ensures that services are delivered as intended and 
also over time h
100 DeVa
properly equipped they often fall into the habit of ordering 'a standard menu of services' which is not 
sufficiently tailored to meet the needs of individual fa
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authori
a
ey
y e useful in setting parameters.  As it was put in the New Mexico case 
of State of N.M. ex rel. CYFD v. Athena H. '[t]he court must approve a treatment plan in an 
abuse a
n to drop rates of child abuse and 
neglect'.105  Wilson, although mainly concerned with divorce cases, suggests that positive 
results for children frequently result from caregivers being required to attend parenting 
ty over family members possessed by court adjudicators are two important reasons 
in favour of a court power to  order  services.   
 
 Another factor in favour of court orders is that there may need for a form l finding 
on the main underlying causes of care problems, directly linked with an appropriate 
services order. For example, Gelles points out that after American courts establish that 
parental neglect results from drug abuse th  will often require that the parents be offered 
drug rehabilitation treatment.101 Where failures in care are due to a lack of parenting skills, 
courts would link this finding with an order for parenting classes.  And where such failures 
are due primarily to a lack of resources, a court would require that parents receive 
assistance with housing applications or job searching.102 The order of a court may 
therefore generall b
nd neglect case in order to provide the framework for the efforts of welfare and the 
parent'.103 
  
Another reason in favour is the apparent effectiveness of court-ordered services in 
some cases. Hewitt has claimed generally that child protection systems which allow for the 
ordering of services are far superior to those which merely allow for defining parents as 
failures so that their children can be removed.104  Aside from reduction in stigma, this is 
because with the authority of courts behind them consequential services and particularly 
those involving home visitations have 'been show
training programs.106  
                                                 
101 Gelles (1999) op cit note 36 at 288. 
102 Ibid. 
103 142 P. 3d 978 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) at 981 para 4 [Westlaw International]. 
 of Sexual Abuse in Preschool Children: Understanding Small Voices 104 SK Hewitt Assessing Allegations
(1999) at 275. 
105 Ibid. 
106 RF Wilson 'Fractured Families, Fragile Children-the Sexual Vulnerability of Girls in the Aftermath of 
Divorce' (2002) 14 Child and Family LQ 1 at 19-21. 
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 A strong emphasis on proactive family support services in care cases has been 
characteristic of many continental European anti-legalistic systems during the last three 
decades.107  Some commentators have favourably contrasted the 'family service model' as 
supportively and flexibly utilised in these with the Anglo-American approach.108  Howe, 
for example, notes that in Europe there has been 'a major focus on providing programmes 
of prevention and support for families, including parent education, parent support groups, 
and counselling and therapeutic services'.109 Waldfogel, in generally considering Anglo-
American child protection systems, has argued similarly that courts in these can play a far 
more constructive role  if they 'adopt a more service-oriented approach to many cases (and 
especially those cases where services had not yet been offered and failed), focusing less on 
 the underlying problems that led to the 
abuse or neglect'.110 
uments for compulsion as a 
last resort and the superiority of court orders based upon real agreement by recipients still 
apply.112 Regulations indicating that children's courts should consider whether recipients 
mily services orders.  
the act the parent had committed and more on
 
 Despite their undoubted advantages, just as with interim services discussed in the 
previous chapter, child and family services orders at the dispositive stage also raise 
fundamental questions about the constitutional rights of persons subjected to them.111  If 
the child has now formally been found to be in need of care and protection this will 
strengthen the case for a mandatory order. However, the arg
are willing to cooperate113 and apply least intrusive forms of mandatory orders are thus 
114also needed for dispositive fa
                                                 
107 Cameron, Freymond & Cornfield (2001) op cit note 13 at 79-83 & 86. 
108 Howe (2002) op cit note 43 at 369; Cameron & Freymond  (2003) op cit note 86 at 9. 
109 Howe ibid. 
110 Waldfogel (2000) op cit note 75 at 322-23. 
111 For some constitutional challenges that have been encountered in the USA see generally R Fowler 'Courts, 
Courses, and Controversies: the Constitutional and Procedural Challenges to Rules of Court Requiring 
or the child in the performance of child-rearing…'. For criticisms of a 
f justice to introduce legislation enabling courts to impose compulsory 
Attendance at Parenting Seminars' (2002) 37 New England LR 25. 
112 See parts 7.2.2.2 & 7.4.2, above. 
113 This would be in line with art 20(2)(b) of the 1990 ACC.  It imposes a duty on state parties 'to assist 
parents and others responsible f
proposal by the Dutch minister o
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On balance, it may be concluded that the new service delivery orientation and 
resource allocation functions for children's courts in the 2005 Act are entirely appropriate.  
They represent a major step forward in the modernisation of South African care law. In 
particular they accord with the criterion of minimum state intervention and removal of 
children as a drastic last resort. However, the responsibility to select appropriate proactive 
services to enable children to remain in their families will bring significant new demands 
for specialist interdisciplinary knowledge and skills required of children's court 
magistrates.115 Although they will be able to receive guidance from welfare they must 
clearly have sufficient expertise about local resources116 to avoid the dangers of mere 
rubber stamping.117    
 
8.3.3 Remedies Involving Removal of Children  
 
In further considering the nature of the remedies provided for in s 46(1) and 
s156(1) of the 2005 Act it can be seen that children's courts will of course continue to have 
the power to remove children from their families where risks are high  or care extremely 
poor.   However, as opposed to merely ordering traditional foster care or one of only two 
categories of institutional placement as under s 15 of the 1983 Act, there are now  some 
important changes and additional options for removal orders.  
                                                                                                                                                    
family services orders where parents would not accept these voluntarily as 'een stap in de verkeerde richting' 
('a step in the wrong direction') see M Bruning 'Herziening kinderbeschermingsmaatregelen: over noodzaak 
en uitstel' (2002) 4 Tijdschrift voor Familie- en Jeugdrecht 102 at 103.  
114 See parts 7.3.2 & 7.4.2, above. 
115 Ramsey (2001) op cit note 90 at 32 notes that judges who are not sufficiently experienced sometimes 
make the mistake of assuming that it is safe to return a child to parents who have complied with a court-
 138.  
s psychiatric disorders, may not be susceptible to management solely 
 L Ferronato 
rtance of a knowledge of local resources for appropriate 
 these see part 6.2.3, above. 
ordered program and not safe to return the child to parents who refused to undergo the program. She cites a 
study of 447 cases of abused children reported by B Rittner & C Davenport Dozier 'Effects of Court-Ordered 
Substance Abuse Treatment in Child Protective Services Cases' (2000) 45 Social Work 131 at 133 &
Sheehan (2001) op cit note 13 at 222 has warned that many family difficulties, and particularly those 
resulting from family violence or seriou
by family support services. Courts contemplating the ordering of such services must therefore be careful not 
to view them as a panacea. 
116 After observing in Australian children's courts researchers D McConnell, G Llewellyn &
'Disability and Decision-Making in Australian Care Proceedings' (2002) 16 International Journal of Law, 
Policy and the Family 270 at 291-92 noted the impo
design of family services orders. 
117 On
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 In relation to residen iat l care facilities, under either s 46(1)(a)(ii) or s 156(1)(e)(v)  
a children's court may place a child in a 'child and youth care centre'. These provisions read 
with s 
r that 'the parent 
or caregiver cannot control the child' or 'the child displays criminal behaviour'.122   The 
first su
158 indicate that, in place of the present children's homes and schools of industry, 
child and youth care centres will offer a much wider variety of developmental, therapeutic, 
educational and other programs for children. Different centres may specialise in offering 
different programs. This is similar to the approach taken under the English Care Standards 
Act 2000118 and follows recommendations in the South African law commission's 2002 
draft Children's Bill.119  It would appear that the purpose of the centres will be to cater 
without stigma for children with different needs, including children with disabilities120 or 
those who need secure care.121  
 
In relation to secure care s 156(1)(h) of the 2005 Act fills a gap by providing for it 
as an alternative care measure for the first time in our law. As can be seen from the 
quotation in part 8.3.1 the two subgrounds are findings by a children's cou t 
bground inappropriately bases secure care on shortcomings in a parent or caregiver.  
The second raises the question of how criminal behaviour must be proved.  A narrow 
interpretation would confine children's courts merely to utilising records of previous 
criminal trials.  An alternative interpretation could see these courts temporarily taking on 
the role of criminal courts as they attempt to decide whether conduct of a particular child 
being considered for secure care was criminal.123  This is problematic because it might 
subvert the supportive role which children's courts should maintain in relation to all 
                                                 
118 Under s 1(2) of the Care Standards Act 2000 children's homes are defined very broadly in order to allow 
for different kinds of services to be provided at different homes.  See Explanatory Notes to Care Standards 
th disabilities or chronic illnesses'. 
e programs.  
rime should have been specified as relevant to the question of secure 
Act 2000 (HMSO 2000) 8, para 25. Accessed at <http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/en2000/2000en14.htm>. 
119 Clauses175(1)(f)(vi), 177(2), 228(b) & 230(j): see South African Law Commission (2003) op cit note 7 
above at part 3 pp 144, 146 & 175-76. 
120 As can be seen from the wording quoted in part 8.3.1 above s 156(1)(g) refers to state managed or 
monitored facilities which specialise in 'the care of children wi
121 Section 156(1)(h) refers to child and youth care centres that provide secure car
122 This wording is taken from clause 175(1)(i) of the 2002 draft Children's Bill: see South African Law 
Commission (2003) op cit note 7 at part 3 p144.      
123 Only serious and usually violent c
care. 
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children in need of alternative care. Instead of the grounds included in s 156(1)(h) 
children's courts should rather have been required to consider whether the child is a serious 
danger to himself or others.124 
 
It will also be essential to formulate regulations covering admission criteria and 
arrangements for secure accommodation.125 Our regulations should indicate that secure 
care can only be ordered after presentation of expert evidence. They should require 
childre
 b laid down that the length of time that a 
secure placement is to last must be a particular concern, with courts requiring a strong 
motiva
children’s court and not welfare to determine what kind of residential care program would 
best suit a child who is the subject of care proceedings.127 This will clearly require greater 
erapeutic programs than merely deciding between a 
n's courts to evaluate whether the motivation is sufficient and ensure that there is no 
punitive intention.  They should be directed to permit only the least restrictive form of 
restraint that is appropriate under the circumstances. They should also have to give 
consideration to whether an appropriate facility with suitable resources (for example, in the 
form of skilled staff) is available. It should be expressly stated that incarceration for the 
purpose merely of confining a child, rather than working constructively with her, cannot be 
approved by a children's court. It should further e 
tion if medium to longer-term secure accommodation is proposed.126 
 
With reference to all placements in residential facilities s 158(1) of the 2005 Act 
states that a children's court may order a child and youth care centre placement 'only if 
another option is not appropriate'. This once again accords with the criterion of minimum 
intervention and removal as a last resort. It is noteworthy that s 158(2)(a) requires a 
skills and knowledge about th
                                                 
124 See s 25 of the English Children Act 1989.  Under s 158(3)(e) of the 2005 Act a provincial head of social 
development must consider 'the safety of the community and other children' when choosing a particular 
facility. But this applies only after a children's court has already ordered secure care. 
125 Some guidance in formulating secure care regulations could be derived from the Secure Accommodation 
 that secure accommodation should not be ordered  unless it has been fully justified, both as regards its 
r. 
rence to S v Van Rooi in part 2.3.4, above. 
(Scotland) Regulations 1996 (SI 1996 No. 3255) -accessed at 
 <http:/www.edinborough-gazette.gov.uk/si/si1996/Uksi_19963255_en_1.htm>. 
126 In the English case Re W (A Minor) (Secure Accommodation Order) [1993] 1 FLR 692 at 697 Booth J 
held
purposes and the length of the orde
127 On the historical origins of this approach see the refe
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children's home or school of industries as under our present law.  Just as has been noted in 
relation to family services orders, this has training implications for magistrates. And it 
strengthens the argument put forward in chapter 6 that because of the nature of their 
respons
1)(e)(i) a new possibility for placing a child in 
'foster care with a group of persons or an organisation operating a cluster foster care 
scheme
ldren rather than with 
individual foster parents.130 Thanks to pioneering work by some South African NGO's, 
be viable.131  The Pietermaritzburg 
Child and Welfare Society has even utilised it successfully for children with disabilities.132  
It thus 
ibilities our children's courts need to be established as a separate entity with 
specialist adjudicators.128  Expecting generalist magistrates to make independent decisions 
about what kind of residential care programs are required by children with special needs is 
unrealistic.   
 
In relation to foster care, aside from the traditional option of placement with 'a 
suitable foster parent' as provided in s 156(
' arises in s 156(1)(e)(ii).  This follows a recommendation by the law commission 
that there was a need for a type of care by a 'grouping of caregivers who are linked 
together to provide mutual support in the care of a number of children, and who receive 
some form of external support and monitoring'.129  
 
A key difference between cluster foster care and the traditional Western form is 
that with the former children are placed with a cluster of other chi
cluster foster care has already been tested and found to 
appears that, with ever-growing numbers of AIDS orphans,133 cluster foster care 
orders will be a useful addition to the dispositive remedies that children's courts can 
                                                 
128 See parts 6.2.4 & 6.3. 
129 South African Law Commission (2003) op cit note 7 at part 2 p217. 
130 Clause 1 of the Children's Amendment Bill 19/2006 defines a cluster foster care scheme as 'a scheme 
providing for the reception of children in foster care in accordance with a foster care programme operated by- 
a social, religious or other non-governmental organization; or a group of individuals, acting as care-givers of 
the children, and managed by a provincial department of social development or a designated child protection 
e-Based Child-Centred Development (2004) at 
organization'. 
131 Sewpaul (2001) op cit note 81 at 582; A Strebel The Development, Implementation and Evaluation of 
Interventions for the Care of Orphans and Vulnerable Children in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe:  A 
Literature Review of Evidence-based Interventions for Hom
10. 
132 Sewpaul ibid and Strebel ibid. 
133 UNICEF (2007) op cit note 79 at Table 4, p116. 
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provide.  However, detailed regulations on the precise responsibilities of cluster carers will 
be required to ensure that cluster schemes function appropriately. 
 
As will be remembered there has been a long-standing problem with kinship carers 
being unable to obtain foster care grants.134 In response the law commission recommended 
suggested that this should indicate 
express at relatives can like anyone else apply to children's courts for alternative carer 
status w
8.4. The Case for Stages in Dispositive Proceedings  
questions about how these should be implemented. With reference to the role of children's 
that a new legislative provision was needed.  It 
ly th
hich could lead to such grants.135 Unfortunately, this has not been addressed in the 
2005 Act.  It is a pity that the opportunity was missed because it would have been another 
way of assisting, inter alia, AIDS orphans.  
 
 Despite some deficiencies, it is clear that the 2005 Act is set to considerably 
improve the position on alternative care removal options.  The possibility of cluster foster 
care, the concept of a wide range of residential care programs at child and youth care 
centres and the general requirement that children's courts must provide solutions tailored to 
the needs of individual children are significant advances in our law.  The new provisions 
should potentially enable magistrates to play a far more useful role in the serious situations 
where it is not appropriate to support children within their families.  
 
  
The introduction of so many major substantive reforms in the 2005 Act raises 
courts in care cases, as has been noted in the previous chapter the Act continues to be built 
around the concept of a main hearing. In many US states care legislation instead provides 
expressly for multistage dispositive proceedings.136  These typically include grounds 
                                                 
134 See part 8.2.2, above. 
135 South African Law Commission (2001) op cit note 22 at vol 3 para 17.2.5.  See also its proposals for 
'court-ordered kinship care' in the 2002 draft Children's Bill chapter 14; and Report on the Review of the 
at 
 by the department for constitutional affairs that 
Child Care Act (2003) op cit note 7 part 2 at paras 16.2.1-3. 
136 The predominant approach in the US recognises a basic distinction between an 'adjudicatory' stage 
which grounds must be proved and a 'dispositional' stage at which the court must decide on a remedy: Chill 
(2004) op cit note 22 at 543.  In England it has been proposed
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adjudication hearings, progress reviews and final termination of parental rights hearings.137 
It will be contended in the discussion below that if South African children's courts are to 
effectively perform the greatly extended functions envisaged for them in the 2005 Act it is 
essential to provide similarly for a series of logical sub-phases in dispositive proceedings. 
 
8.4.1 Distinguishing between Grounds and Remedies 
he sub-grounds linked to particular orders may drag out proceedings unduly.  
Parties
 
  Despite requiring children's courts to perform far more complex tasks at 
dispositive hearings even such a basic division as a separation between proof of grounds 
and outcomes stages has not been provided for in the 2005 Act.138 In fact, in place of the 
silence of the 1983 Act, there will sometimes be a positive duty placed upon children's 
courts to interweave their investigations about grounds and outcomes.  As can be seen 
from the wording quoted in part 8.3.1 above, a variety of additional sub-grounds have been 
inserted throughout s 156(1) of the 2005 Act. These are prerequisites for many of the 
orders which can be made under it.139  Thus, in addition to having to reach a conclusion on 
what might perhaps now have to be referred to as one of the primary s 150(1) grounds for 
finding a child to be in need of care and protection, when contemplating imposition of a 
s156 order a children's court will need proof of any additional sub-ground required.  Courts 
will therefore have to revisit the question of proof of grounds when considering outcomes.   
  
T
 who have failed in a bid to thwart proof of a primary ground would in many cases 
                                                                                                                                                    
the grounds and outcomes stages of care proceedings be more distinctly separated: see D Jockelson 'The 
Threat to Care Proceedings' (2005) 35 Family Law 891.   
137 An example is the Juvenile Court Act 1987, as amended, in chapter 705 of the Illinois Compiled Statutes. 
At s2-18(
is suffic
decide u
later 'court review' at which a state attorney can file a motion to finally terminate parental rights 'of any 
-28(2) provides for a 'permanency 
1) and s 2-21(1) courts are directed first to hold an 'adjudicatory hearing' to establish whether there 
ient evidence showing abuse or neglect. A subsequent 'dispositional hearing' at which the court will 
pon an appropriate alternative care remedy is provided for in s 2-22(1). The latter also allows for a 
parent who has failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions which led to the removal of the 
child or reasonable progress toward the return of the child'. Finally, s 2
hearing' to decide upon a permanent new placement. Accessed at 
<http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs4.asp> and hereafter cited as 'Illinois Juvenile Court Act'. 
138 This need not necessarily require extra court hearings. The Connecticut Practice Book op cit note 1 at s26-
1(f)(3) provides courts with a discretion to complete adjudication and disposition phases at a single sitting. 
139 Note, for example, the prevalence of the phrase 'if the court finds that…' followed by subgrounds attached 
to specific orders in the wording quoted in part 8.3.1, above. 
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be mot
arise when a court might wish to be concentrating entirely on the issue of an appropriate 
avour of an interweaving of grounds and outcomes that a 
presidi
ents could result in situations where children who 
urgently need services end up on the streets.  If circular reasoning prevails and resource 
arguments are allowed
assistance an ethos
in only a small minority of cases are the grounds for an order actively contested at the time of the 
final hearing.  In rather more cases there continues to be a dispute about the plans for the child’s 
                                                
ivated to request a subsequent opportunity to dispute a sub-ground.  And this could 
remedy for the child -for it will only be when parties know which remedies a court is 
contemplating that the relevant sub-ground will emerge.  At that point they might 
justifiably request an adjournment in order to prepare. 
 
 It could be argued in f
ng officer might prefer to sound out what alternative care options are available for a 
particular child before declaring her to be need of alternative care. Thus, if no appropriate 
option seems to be available, this might influence a finding that a child is not in need of 
alternative arrangements at the present time. As against this, it can be argued that lack-of-
alternatives arguments should never be permitted to weaken a child’s entitlement to a court 
remedy if she genuinely needs one.  Her right to alternative care is, after all, very clearly 
stated as a fundamental legal right in s 28(1)(b) of the Constitution.140  And a too-ready 
acceptance of lack-of-placement argum
 to influence children's courts in deciding whether to provide 
 that encourages a laissez-faire approach by welfare personnel could 
result. This might promote inefficiency and avoidance of the application of law in child 
protection work.141   
 
An argument in favour of creating entirely separate grounds and remedies stages in 
dispositive proceedings is that it would enable parties who do not wish to dispute grounds 
to concentrate their efforts on (and perhaps only attend at) the outcomes phase. Masson has 
pointed out that in England: 
'…
 
ry child has the right-…. (b) to family care or parental care, or to 
n in care facilities where vacancies were supposedly in 
the conclusions of P Cawson and M Martell as discussed by R Bullock 'The United Kingdom' 
 judgments of Kelly J referred to in part 8.4.4, below. 
140 As noted part 1.2 above, this reads: '[e]ve
appropriate alternative care when removed from the family environment'. 
141 In a 1979 study in England it was found that the degree of determination and persistence exhibited by 
social workers in trying to obtain places for childre
short supply was a critical factor which could often overcome resistance to the acceptance of children in such 
facilities: see 
in Colton & W Hellinckx (1993) op cit note 83 p212, at 214-15. On the unfortunate consequences of a 
lethargic approach to children's needs see also the Irish
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care, for example whether social work should be focused on the rehabilitation of the child with the 
ily, supporting care by relatives, or arranging an adoption.'142 
It is lik
es accord with the criteria of 
user-friendliness and hearing appropriate voices. Also, a separate grounds phase would 
allow f
n on the best possible 
remedy  Not only will it be logical and convenient to do this at the end of a definable 
part of 
                                                
fam
 
ely that in South Africa, just as in England, some parents would not dispute the fact 
that their child needs court-imposed alternative care arrangements but would wish to give 
evidence regarding the nature of those arrangements.  By introducing a separate-phase 
approach, valuable time for witnesses and the court might be saved. 143 
 
 There are further arguments in favour of separate stages.  Involved lay persons 
(importantly, including the child herself) are more likely to understand and be able to 
participate effectively at hearings that have a single, clear purpose rather than intermingled 
purposes which produce a circularity of discourse. So stag
or a less adversarial approach and less stigma imposed upon parents if it so happens 
that they do not dispute the fact that the child is in need of alternative care.  This phase can 
then be shortened and kept amicable.  
 
 Additionally, a court which has found a child to be in need of alternative care may 
be uncertain about what measures to order.  It is thus important that, even at this advanced 
stage in the proceedings, it should have the power to remand the matter whilst the child or 
other relevant person is assessed purely to guide its decisio
.144
the proceedings but also an assessment which has the single purpose of ascertaining 
a child's needs after she has already been found to be in need of alternative care measures 
will be more likely to pass constitutional muster.145  
 
 
142 Masson (2000) op cit note 77 at 472-73. 
es which arise from the inherently intrusive nature of 
143 For example, a witness might only have information relevant to the question of whether the child is in 
need of alternative care -her evidence may not be relevant to the outcome to be selected for the child, and 
therefore she would not attend the outcomes phase. 
144 This power should be subject to the limitations on assessment orders that have been proposed in part 
7.4.2, above. 
145 Privacy and other fundamental-rights issu
assessments have been discussed in part 7.3.2, above. 
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8.4.2 The Concept of Improvement Periods 
 
Having shown that there would be substantial benefits from amending the 2005 Act 
to differentiate between grounds and remedies phases it may be further proposed that 
dispositive proceedings should not necessarily be confined only to two main stages. An 
importa
th
ly to see whether they prove successful in averting the need for more 
intrusive care measures such as removals.146 The standard norm for children's courts 
issuing
 to monitor the  success of their s 15 dispositive orders.147  Once 
they iss
nt question is what the implications of the new family services orientation are for 
the role of children's courts. Specifically, would binary dispositive proceedings divided 
into grounds and outcomes stages enable them to be sufficiently effective as family service 
providers?  This question must be answered in the negative.  What the transformed role for 
children's courts surely entails is that they should not as a standard norm merely order a 
dispositive remedy and then wash eir hands of the matter. 
 
The whole point of remedies such as professional counselling, anger management, 
parent skills training,  substance abuse rehabilitation and even ADR orders as discussed in 
part 3.6 above is sure
 family services orders should therefore become one in which they provide these for 
trial periods and then receive evidence at a review hearing on the degree of success 
achieved. Aside from protecting children more effectively this would save precious 
resources by not having services drag on where they are failing.  
 
In support of the proposal for a test period followed by a review it may be noted 
that an aspect of the 1983 Act which has drawn criticism is that it does not accord 
children's courts  powers
ue one they are functus officio.  They do not even have jurisdiction to ensure that it 
is properly implemented.148 The child now falls completely under the authority of a 
                                                 
146 And a procedural implication is that caregivers must be given the time and opportunity where they wish to 
bring expert evidence showing that they have  sufficient potential for positive change: see the Wisconsin case 
In Re Daniel R.S., 706 N.W. 2d 269 (Wis. 2005) 324 para 105 [Westlaw International].  
147 See C Matthias & N Zaal 'Can We Build a Better Children's Court? Some Recommendations for 
64; and South African Law Improving the Processing of Child-Removal Cases' (1996) Acta Juridica 51 at 62-
Commission (2003) op cit note 7 at part 2 p270. 
148 South African Law Commission ibid at part 2 p306. 
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provincial welfare (or in the case of industrial schools, education) department.149  The 
department can entirely change the children's court order. There is thus little scope under 
the 1983 Act for children's courts to follow up and check the effectiveness of their 
remedies.   
 
 It is clear that in formulating the 2005 Act the legislature aimed both to increase 
hority of children's courts and provide them with a review capability.  In particular, 
mpt has been made to enable them to ensure that their orders are implemented. 
the aut
an atte
Under s 158(3) if a children's court decides that a particular category of residential care 
ia
hearing. 
te 'improvement period' to be followed by a progress 
  This is done if they decide caregivers have potential to improve 
program is needed by a child the relevant provincial head of social development must 
ensure that the child receives it.150  Under s 48(1)(b) a children's court may, inter al  
'monitor any of its orders'.  And under s 48(1)(c) it may 'impose or vary time deadlines 
with respect to any of its orders'. In s 156(3)(b) it is stated that any s 156(1) order 'may be 
reconsidered by a children's court at any time, and be confirmed, withdrawn or amended as 
may be appropriate'. 
 
How then, should children's courts utilise these new powers to control 
implementation of their orders?  They should not merely await reports of non-
implementation by aggrieved parties.  In many cases the latter -particularly if they are 
children- may not have the capability to launch a follow up hearing.  Where children's 
courts issue proactive family services orders and also where they have any concerns about 
effective implementation or sufficient success with removal orders they should provide 
dispositive remedies on a trial basis as suggested above with a return date set for a review 
Regarding a procedural foundation for reviews of the progress specifically of 
caregivers it is useful to make reference to US law. In the USA after proof of grounds 
courts frequently permit an intermedia
review hearing.
                                                 
149 For a detailed discussion see Matthias & Zaal (1996) op cit note 147 at 62-64. 
150 As noted in part 2.3.4 above, under s 9(5) of the Children's Act 33/1960 it was similarly indicated that 
children's court orders must be correctly implemented by welfare. 
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sufficiently to justify a retention or eventual return of the child.151  An example of 
legislation is s 2-21(1) of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act.152  This enables courts to provide 
parents with a chance to 'correct the conditions that require the child to be in care'.153 In 
) of the West Virginia Code154 states (in relevant part):  
n any proceeding brought pursuant to the provisions of this article, the court may grant any 
nt an improvement period in accord with the provisions of this article.  During such period, 
od mechanism is a constructive one.  It 
accords with the criterion of minimum intervention into families because it allows parents 
an opp
more detail, art 49-6-2(b
'I
responde
the court may require temporary custody with a responsible person which [sic] has been found to be 
a fit and proper person for the temporary custody of the child or children or the state department or 
other agency during the improvement period.  An order granting such improvement period shall 
require the department to prepare and submit to the court a family case plan in accordance with the 
provisions of section 3, article 6-d of this chapter.' 
 
A more precise means of providing a second opportunity is the concept of 'specific steps' 
as used in Connecticut.  These are defined in s 26-1(n) of the Connecticut Practice Book155 
as 'those judicially determined steps the parent or guardian and the commissioner of 
children and families should take in order for the parent or guardian to retain or regain 
custody of a child or youth'.  Courts in Connecticut must thus be exact about what 
caregivers are required to achieve. 
 
As can be seen, the improvement peri
ortunity to better their skills or conditions of care in cases where this still appears 
possible.156  It would fit extremely well with the new family services orientation of our 
children's courts and provide a useful procedural mechanism for the implementation of 
some of their new monitoring powers. Children's courts in South Africa should therefore 
be encouraged by means of regulations similar to the above quoted American wording to 
                                                 
151 See TB Harding 'Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights: Reform Is Needed' (2000-2001) 39 Brandeis 
LJ 895 at 897. Children may be removed and a case plan is usually implemented by welfare during the 
improvement period: see, for example, Veronica T. v. Arizona Dep’t of Economic Sec., 126 P. 3d 154 (Ariz. 
 influence. She sought an improvement 
lling circumstance' justifying a rejection of her application 
, at 330). 
Ct. App. 2005) at 158 para 19 [Westlaw International]. 
152 Op cit note 137. 
153 See also the similar wording in s 2-22(6). 
154 Supra note 19.  
155 Supra note 1. 
156 In the Interest of Betty J.W., 371 S.E.2d 326 (W.Va.1988) illustrates the use of an improvement period 
where a mother of five children had potential but was subject to a bad
period to allow her time to develop her parenting skills. The court a quo held that the child abuse which her 
husband was continuing to perpetrate was 'a compe
(ibid, at 327).  However, the West Virginia supreme court of appeals decided that an improvement period 
should be granted, but without leaving the children in her custody (ibid
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consider the interposing of an improvement period phase whenever it appears that 
caregivers have sufficient potential to be able to respond positively.157  
 
8.4.3 Review Hearings 
ent period.159  They must decide 'whether the 
glect have been adequately improved'.  They must also 
istent with the best interests of the child' and then 
gh it does not specifically refer to review hearings the 2005 Act certainly 
setting 
and (c), 
respectively.  Section 46(2) states that a children's court 'may withdraw, suspend or amend 
 
As has been suggested above a procedural direction is needed indicating that 
children's courts should consider setting dates for review hearings mero motu so that they 
can monitor implementation and success of their family services orders and also removal 
placements about which they have concerns.  If the recommendation in favour of 
improvement periods is accepted we will require a rule indicating that court reviews are 
essential where these are ordered.   Under r 38 of the West Virginia 'Rules of Procedure for 
Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings' reviews are obligatory whenever improvement 
periods are granted. 158 Courts must hold what is called a final disposition hearing within 
sixty days after the end of an improvem
conditions of abuse and/or ne
'determine the necessary disposition cons
issue a final disposition order within ten days.   
 
Althou
facilitates the holding of these.  As has been noted, monitoring progress and 
timeframes for achieving goals are expressly provided for in s 48(1)(b) 
an order made in terms of subsection (1), or replace such an order with a new order'. And 
s156(3)(b) performs a similar function in stating that a s 156(1) order 'may be reconsidered 
                                                 
157 It would have to be selectively used, however.  Gelles (1999) op cit note 36 at 294 warns that the US 
experience has shown that courts must not provide too many or overlong improvement periods because 
'[c]hildren must not be denied permanence' in the form of a long-term new placement where their parents are 
unable to improve. The Louisiana case of State ex rel. J.P.A., 928 So. 2d 736 (La.Ct.App. 2006) 739 para 1 
te 19 provides that courts should 
[Westlaw International] reveals the dangers of overlong improvement periods.  It was found that a mother 
had failed for three years to comply with a plan for improvement. She had continued to show poor judgment 
to the extent of leaving her children alone with a known paedophile. 
158 West Virginia 'Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings' -accessed at 
<http://www.state.wv.us.wvaca/rules/abuse.htm>. 
159 This is a final deadline; art 49-6-2 (d) of the West Virginia Code supra no
hold a hearing immediately after the improvement period if possible.  
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by a children's court at any time, and be confirmed, withdrawn or amended as may be 
appropriate'. These provisions should be interpreted as allowing children's courts to 
instigate follow up hearings themselves -and would then provide them with substantial 
review powers.  
 
What is missing from the 2005 Children's Act is guidance on how children's courts 
should utilise review powers.160  In contrast, the Louisiana Children's Code provides very 
detailed
 f s of communication if their children were 
rem ved, 
• sho
minimum of whether there is now 'any reasonable expectation of a significant 
 directions on the approach to be taken by courts when reviewing the progress of 
caregivers after an improvement period.161 At art 1015(5) it states that presiding officers 
must decide whether there has been 'substantial parental compliance' with a services plan.  
At a minimum there must now be a 'reasonable expectation of significant improvement in 
the parent’s condition or conduct in the near future, considering the child’s age and his 
need for a safe, stable, and permanent home'. In more detail art 1036 C. directs courts to 
evaluate the extent to which parents: 
• kept in touch with welfare; 
• maintained the children financially;  
• complied with treatment or rehabilitation services; 
• maintained visitation contact or other orm
o
w substantial improvement in redressing problems preventing reunification;  
• have overcome conditions which led to removal or could harm their children. 
 
And art 1036 D. provides some further guidelines for deciding specifically on the 
improvement' as required by art 1015(5).  It requires courts to discern firstly whether a 
caregiver is currently affected by mental disability, substance abuse/dependency or 
                                                 
160 For example, they may have to decide whether substantial rather than absolute compliance is sufficient. 
 see the Colorado case People ex rel. T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905 
stlaw International]. In the New Mexico case of State of N.M. ex 
N.M. Ct. App. 2006) 981 para 4 [Westlaw International] it was held 
.us/lss/lss.asp?doc=72567>. 
For a case of partial yet inadequate compliance
(Colo. Ct. App. 2005) 909-910 para 10 [We
rel. CYFD v. Athena H., 142 P. 3d 978 (
that the test to be applied is not whether a parent had tried her best to improve but rather whether she had 
succeeded in becoming capable of parenting within the foreseeable future. 
161 Louisiana Children's Code -accessed at <http://www.legis.state.la
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incarceration. If this is found to be the case the court must further consider the effect on the 
caregiver’s ability to exercise parental responsibilities. In doing so, the court must consider 
expert opinion and/or patterns of behaviour.  Generally the court must also weigh up the 
willing s and commitment of the parent to provide suitable nurturing.162  It may be 
sugges
In South Africa monitoring of state implementation of care measures is likely to 
 African high court case of Ngcobo 
and Shandi v the State Levinsohn DJP recommended routine monitoring by magistrates’ 
courts to counter failures by state departments to implement placements in reform schools 
nes
ted that a similar set of guidelines would be very useful for assisting presiding 
officers in South African children's courts. 
 
 Besides assessing progress of caregivers, a second and often related reason for 
holding reviews is to see whether welfare have made sufficient efforts to supply court-
ordered services.163  Harding noted that US courts routinely perform a helpful monitoring 
function because they 'scrutinise the actions of the State's department or agency to ensure 
steps were taken to attempt reunification'.164 Waldfogel suggested more generally that 
longer-term court involvement is useful in care cases 'to make sure that the prescribed 
services were delivered… '.165  From an English perspective Masson has asserted that in 
care cases '[t]he position of the child and parents is considerably weakened without court 
supervision…'.166  Some researchers have drawn attention to the role courts can play in 
checking to see that welfare not only delivered services but tailored them properly to meet 
the special needs of the family concerned.167   
 
prove as valuable as elsewhere. In the unreported South
                                                 
162 This may involve assessing the extent to which parents have been able to take responsibility for the 
original causes of harm and the degree to which they have planned a better future for their children: see the 
New York case In re Jennifer R., 817 N.Y. S. 2d 309 (App. Div. 2006) 312 paras 4-6 [Westlaw 
International]. 
163 It has been held that the test to be applied is whether welfare made reasonable efforts: see the New 
0 P. 3d 198 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) 203 para 10 
e 
family 
Mexico case of State of N.M. ex rel. CYFD v. Joseph M., 13
[Westlaw International]. 
164 Harding (2000-2001) op cit note 151 at 897. 
165 Waldfogel (2000) op cit note 75 at 323. 
166 Masson (2000) op cit note 77 at 475. 
167 Wasow (2006) op cit note 76 at 211 warns that stereotyping and unfounded assumptions about th
capabilities of disabled parents often lead to welfare organisations providing them with inadequate 
services.  See also DeVault (2005) op cit note 98 at 764-65 & 785.  
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for juveniles convicted of less serious offences.168   As will be shown in the next part 
below there is a wider problem of non-implementation which also affects some children 
placed by children's courts.  
   
Although this chapter focuses on dispositive proceedings, it may be noted in 
passing that court review hearings may also be necessary at a later stage if a party 
subsequently applies for an amendment of a dispositive order.  To reduce the need for 
welfare agencies returning to court the South African law commission recommended that 
they should only require court permission if they wished to move a child to a more 
restrictive form of alternative care than originally ordered.169  However, in keeping with 
the legislature’s general approach of empowering children's courts to have complete 
control over their orders, no su
by Imposing Sanctions 
   
Although giving much greater control over remedies to children's courts should 
ch exception has been included in the 2005 Act. Thus any 
party seeking any form of amendment requires court permission. And s 48(1)(b) and 
s159(1)(b) imply that the department of social development has not only lost its previously 
wide powers to amend orders; it has also lost its power to extend orders -because control 
over extensions will also pass to children's courts once these sections come into force.170  
By comparison with the situation under the 1983 Act the balance of power over what 
happens to children taken into the protection system has thus been substantially shifted in 
favour of children's courts.   
 
8.4.4 Encouraging Compliance 
  
help strengthen their authority there remains the question of actual sanctions. For example, 
if it is accepted that a final stage in dispositive proceedings should often be a progress 
                                                 
168 Case No AR 359/2006 & 360/2006 (NPD) 14 Sept 2006. 
169 South African Law Commission (2003) op cit note 7 at part 2 p305. 
170 The former provision enables children's courts to extend any order.  The latter, constituting surplusage, 
arental responsibilities, any alternative care-giver' and even, where 
re the child is placed'. 
refers narrowly only to their extension of s 156 orders.  Since there is no reference to extension powers for 
the department of social welfare it must be assumed that these will fall away. It is most appropriately laid 
down in s 159(2) that before deciding on an extension a court 'must take cognisance of ' the views of 'the 
child, parents, persons exercising p
appropriate, the management of a 'centre whe
 367
review
tive they may need 'teeth' -indeed the mere possibility of adverse consequences 
may encourage more cooperation in implementing their orders.   
 hearing, what should children's courts be empowered to do if it emerges at the 
hearing that insufficient progress has been achieved?  They can clearly alter the care 
situation of the child but a more difficult question relates to imposition of punitive 
measures against other persons who have failed to assist with implementation. On the one 
hand, it may be argued that in care cases courts should only be concerned with the needs of 
children and not punishment.   Imposing sanctions might alienate individuals whose future 
cooperation is needed in the best interests of the child. On the other hand, if courts are to 
be effec
 
Under the 1983 Act, in a situation where children's courts have been accorded no 
enforcement powers, there have sometimes been difficulties with implementation of 
orders. A persistent problem has been that of social workers either delaying for long 
periods or even completely failing to implement placements.171 Although there are no 
recent reported cases directly illustrative of the problem the two departments most 
frequently involved, education and social development, have been challenged in several 
high court actions arising out of serious failures to implement placements of convicted 
juveniles in reform schools or youth centres.172 One of these provoked harsh judicial 
criticism coupled with a suggestion that there was generally an urgent need for court 
powers to protect the constitutional rights of vulnerable children against 'systemic failures' 
by government departments.173 
 
                                                 
171 DS Rothman 'The Functioning of Children's Courts' (Unpublished visiting lecture: University of 
KwaZulu-Natal, 8 Sept 2005).  The problem became so widespread that in January 2005 the department of 
social development  resorted to fining social workers who were tardy: personal communication: S Dhlamini 
(social worker, provincial department of welfare and social development: Pietermaritzburg regional office, 8 
Sept 2005).  That this is a long-standing problem is apparent from S v Van Rooi 1979 (3) 899 (NC) at 901. 
According to Rothman, ibid, there have also been problems with state physicians negligently conducting 
superficial examinations of children ordered by children's courts.  On disregard by welfare for children's 
courts see also part 2.3.5, above. 
172 S v Z and 23 similar cases 2004 (1) SACR 400 (E); S v Mouers and Slinger (Unreported: NC case no. 237 
PD Case No AR 359 & 
ses ibid at 417c-e. 
& 435/04, 11 Nov 2005); and Ngcobo and Shandi v the State (Unreported: N
360/2006, 14 Sept 2006).  In Mouers ibid at 3 Lacock J described two failures to implement court placement 
orders as 'shockingly inhumane'.  
173 S v Z and 23 similar ca
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The inability of children's courts to enforce their orders and consequent harm 
suffered by many children motivated an earlier and similar recommendation by the South 
African law commission that they needed strong powers to enforce their orders and render 
persons 174
aregivers, and those which are applicable to 
welfare
orders. 
ce parents or guardians who contravened orders that was created with s 32 of the 
Children's Act 33/1960.176  It is stated in s 45(2)(c) of the 2005 Act that children's courts 
must utilise the law 'applicable to magistrates’ courts when exercising criminal 
jurisdic
oval. In s 156(3)(a)(iii) of the 2005 Act where courts allow children to be a 
left with caregivers under supervision by social workers they may expressly direct that if 
 accountable.   In response, in the 2005 Act the legislature has provided for a 
variety of different sanctions.  For convenience these may be divided into general 
sanctions, those which are relevant for c
 personnel or other representatives of the state involved in implementation of care 
 
In relation to general punitive powers for children's courts, under s 48(1)(d) of the 
2005 Act they can 'make appropriate orders as to costs in matters before the court'. Whilst 
this might be seen as primarily compensatory, what is entirely a method for punitive 
sanctions has been created in s 45(2)(a). This enables them to 'try or convict a person for 
non-compliance with an order' or contempt of court.175 It is broader than the power merely 
to senten
tion'.   Allowing children's courts to temporarily act as criminal courts is an 
extreme measure.  It may be proposed that in order to avoid procedural  complexity  and an  
unduly adversarial atmosphere a rule of court is required indicating that they should only 
conduct criminal hearings at a separate sitting and not  as part of  care proceedings proper. 
 
In relation to sanctions directed specifically at caregivers, as has been noted in part 
7.4.2 above a form of pressure to which those who want to keep their children are sensitive 
is threats of rem
                                                 
174 See South African Law Commission (2003) op cit note 7 above at part 2 p306. 
175 As noted in part 2.3.3 above, children's courts were similarly furnished with an express power to issue 
contempt of court orders in the Children's Act 31/1937. 
176 See part 2.3.4, above. 
 369
such caregivers fail to co-operate they will 'reconsider the placement'.  This is an 
appropriate form of persuasion at the dispositive to stage.  
 
 Regarding sanctions directed at social workers, state employees or other persons 
involved ex officio in implementation it will be remembered that s 46(1)(h) enables 
children's courts, in er alia, to issue orders: 
'(vii) instructing a person who has failed to fulfil a statu ry duty towards a child to appear before 
the court and to give reasons for the failure; 
(viii) instructing an organ of state to assist a child in obtaining access to a public service to which 
the child is entitled, failing which, to appear through its representative before the court and to give 
reasons for the failure;' 
 
It is clear from this wording that the legislature was determined to enable children's courts 
to compel stat
t
to
e employees or welfare representatives to fulfil lawful obligations towards 
children.   Presumably, where a children's court issues either of these orders it could 
subsequently 'convict a person for non-compliance with an order of a children's court or 
contem
employee or caregiver who fails to provide services to the child or family that the court 
ordered.177  
ticular, however, whether a modern care-proceedings court with a supportive 
 to impose sanctions against parents is a 
pt of such court' as provided in s 45(2)(a).  This would add point to s 46(1)(h) 
orders.   
 
It is certainly clear that under the 2005 Act children's courts will no longer be paper 
tigers. But a question for consideration is whether they have been appropriately furnished 
with punitive powers. There is precedent for our introduction of criminal sentencing. 
Under s 10(4) of the Lesotho Children's Protection Act 6/1980 where a children's court 
places a child in the custody of a parent or guardian it may impose a fine and/or 
imprisonment upon any person who fails to comply with any requirement which it chooses 
to impose. This is very broad wording and allows for sentencing of a social worker, state 
 
In par
family-treatment orientation should be able
                                                 
177 See also the power of Malaysian courts to impose fines on parents as discussed below. 
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difficult issue.  In England, Gillespie has argued in favour.178  He points out that there have 
been major problems when leaving children with parents who subsequently refuse to co-
operate with supervising social workers.179 He recommends that breach of a condition 
imposed by a court should either constitute contempt of court or trigger an automatic 
power for the court to substitute a more drastic order without social services again having 
to prove grounds.
 
                                                
180 Waldfogel rightly describes caregiver accountability and the use of 
sanctions against parents as raising 'troubling issues'.181  Nevertheless, she also considers 
contempt of court to be a possible mechanism for the imposition of sanctions and even 
contemplates that the latter might in an extreme case include 'jail time'.182  As has been 
noted in part 7.3.2 above, in Illinois immediate arrest and contempt of court proceedings 
can be applied against persons who contravene domestic violence protection orders issued 
in care cases. 
 
On the other hand, in art 49-6-4 of the West Virginia Code courts have been 
expressly prohibited from applying contempt of court sanctions against any party who 
refuses to submit to assessment.183  Awal has warned generally of the dangers of taking the 
principle of parental accountability too far.184 He has noted that under s 30(9) of the 
Malaysian Children Act 2001 if a court removes a child it can order the parent or guardian 
to 'visit the child on a regular basis as determined by the court' subject to a fine for failure 
to comply. Under s 91(1) of the same Act a parent or guardian may be ordered to execute a 
bond for a child's future good behaviour, with or without security and subject to any 
further conditions which the court may decide to impose upon the parent or guardian. 
Examples of such conditions referred to in s 91(1) include a duty to report with the child to 
welfare personnel at regular intervals or to accompany the child to interactive 
 
illespie 'Establishing a Third Care Order in Care Proceedings' (2000) 12 Child and Family LQ 239 
2000) op cit note 75 at 325. 
Rights of Children: The Malaysian Experiences' at 10 (Paper: 11th World Conference of the 
nal Society of Family Law, 2002). Accessed at <http://www.jus.uio.no/ifp/isfl>. 
178 AA G
at 243. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid at 247. 
181 Waldfogel (
182 Ibid. 
183 Supra note 19. 
184 NAM Awal '
Internatio
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workshops.185 Awal has criticised the Act for placing far too much emphasis on the 
responsibilities of parents and effectively blaming them for social problems that are 
beyond their control.186  
 relation to liability of state employees or agents acting ex officio, Grover has 
contended that states sh
 
It may be suggested that South African children's courts should be required to 
carefully investigate the causes before applying sanctions against caregivers who fail to 
comply with their orders.   Because of the danger of unfairly pressuring or alienating them 
and thus subverting a family services approach they should be slow to utilise powerful 
condemnatory sanctions such as contempt of court or criminal sentences.  Instead, the main 
response should be tighter restrictions on the exercise of parental responsibilities -in 
extreme cases by removing the child or a perpetrator of abuse. 
 
In
ould be subject to high levels of accountability based upon what 
she describes as a 'fiduciary duty' to children in need of alternative care.187 Powers to call 
individual state officials to account as included in our 2005 Act may need to be exercised 
at the highest levels if they are to be effective.  This is revealed by a discussion in which 
Ward identifies a line of Irish high court judgments and focuses particularly on two issued 
by Kelly J.188 He notes that in the unreported matter of D.H. v Ireland and Others (23 May 
2000) Kelly J eventually injuncted the ministers for health, justice and education to 
immediately provide an appropriate secure care placement that had for a considerable time 
been urgently needed by a 17-year-old girl.189  He threatened them with contempt of court, 
fines, imprisonment or sequestration of departmental assets.  Within days, a placement was 
found.190  In the second case of T. D. v the Minister for Education and Others191   he 
                                                 
185 Ibid. 
186 Ibid. 
nstitutionally-Based 
 Family Law: 2001 Edition (2001) 147 at 147-51. 
187 S Grover 'Nowhere to Turn: the Supreme Court of Canada's Denial of a Co
Governmental Fiduciary Duty to Children in Foster Care' (2004) 12 International Journal of Children's 
Rights 105.  
188 P Ward 'Family Law in Ireland: Family Law Issues in the Superior Courts' in A Bainham (ed) The 
International Survey of
189 Ibid at 150.  
190 Ibid. 
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granted an injunction compelling the minister of education not to extend the timeframe for 
completing high support secure care units urgently needed for certain children.192 
 
 The fact that it may be necessary to take a robust approach involving direct 
sanctio
 is noteworthy that the sanctions provided in the 2005 Act are at opposite 
extrem
n said previously it is 
unlikely that children's courts as creatures of statute will choose to take on jurisdictional 
           
ns against individual officials at high levels of government once again supports the 
argument that South African children's courts require an enhanced status and independent 
management structure.193 As mere inferior courts within the magisterial system   they may 
find it difficult to successfully follow the vigorous example of the Irish high court in 
compelling services for children.  What would also strengthen their hand in dealing with 
recalcitrant state officials or agents is a legislative deadline for the implementation of their 
orders.  For example, under r 37 of the West Virginia 'Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse 
and Neglect Proceedings'194 welfare must prepare a family case plan for the 
implementation of court ordered services within thirty days.  
 
 It
es.  On the one hand it allows for the relatively gentle compliance mechanisms of 
prohibitions of misconduct or threats of removal of children.  At the other end of the 
spectrum it provides for contempt of court or criminal penalties -and potentially against 
even top governmental officials acting ex officio.  What appears to be missing is an 
intermediate power simply to award delictual damages. As has been mentioned s 45(1) 
provides very broadly that children’s courts 'may adjudicate any matter involving' inter 
alia, care, protection and support of children.  And it will be remembered that s 156(1) 
generally permits them to 'make any order which is in the best interests' of a child who is 
the subject of proceedings.  This could be interpreted as allowing for certain delictual 
claims and damages awards on behalf of children.  But as has bee
                                                                                                                                         
[2000] 2 ILRM 321 accessed at <http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2000/21.html>. 
192 See further Ward (2001) op cit note 188 at 148. For an evaluation of subsequent Irish supreme court 
191
judgments when the T.D. case was taken on appeal, see  C Breen 'Protecting the Rights of the Non-Offending 
Child in Ireland: Balancing State Rights with State Obligations' (2004) 12 International Journal of Children's 
Rights 379 at 384-86. 
193 See parts 6.2.4 & 6.3, above. 
194 Supra note 158. 
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powers not expressly described. And what would count against such a broad interpretation 
is that in finalising the 2005 Act the legislature chose not to retain wording expressly 
allowing for delictual damages proposed by the South African law commission.195  
 
The fact th  that e legislature appears to be against a damages award capability raises 
the question of whether children’s courts ought to have one.  An argument contra is that 
our ex
tual claim is brought on 
behalf of such a child it is dealt with by a court which is sufficiently knowledgeable to be 
able to take into account the local resources available.  Rather than automatically issuing 
damages based upon an ideal standard of care it should have sufficient familiarity with 
re facilities and services to be able to compare what was provided for the child 
stant case with what is available to others similarly placed.  
isting law of delict already allows for bringing care related delictual actions in 
ordinary civil courts.  But in reply it may be contended that the model of a broadly-
empowered children's court envisaged in the 2005 Act logically requires an inclusion of 
delictual jurisdiction.  If children's courts are to become repositories of expertise on care-
related matters it would be convenient and cost-effective for them to deal also with related 
questions of compensation.  This would avoid the need for vulnerable family members, 
including children, having to describe what may be traumatic events in testimony before 
another court in different proceedings. 
   
  It may be suggested that a power to award damages would complete the armoury 
of children's court remedies by allowing for additional sanctions against both officials and 
private individuals. And they are better placed than other courts to provide care related 
compensation.  In our over-burdened child protection system many children are receiving 
relatively poor-quality alternative care.  It is essential that if a delic
available ca
in the in
 
Whilst it is appropriate that persons in the care system who neglect or abuse 
children be exposed to delictual claims our courts must be able to strike a proper balance. 
                                                 
195 Clauses 58(w) and 59(k) of the 2002 draft Children's Bill provided, respectively, for delictual claims and 
amages awards: see South African Law Commission (2003) op cit note 7 at part 3 pp70 & 72. d
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Hardin
 Klein has argued that experience in the US shows 
very clearly that tort actions can play a vital part in curbing maltreatment of children in 
residen are situations.201 From a Canadian perspective, Freymond has drawn attention 
t may be necessary to allow for liability of managers of social workers 
where children die because of grossly negligent failures to remove them.202 As has been 
noted i
g has argued that welfare agencies should have some immunity from damages 
because of their budgetary constraints.196 However, she also rightly states that this 
principle must not be taken too far because the existence of a real 'fear of lawsuits and 
money damages' usefully motivates agencies to work more efficiently on behalf of children 
and their families.197   
 
That there is a need for such motivation is clear.  In England, X v Bedfordshire 
County Council and Others198 arose because of gross neglect at a residential facility. 
Young children had been left in filthy conditions where, for example, faeces and urine 
were not regularly cleaned up. Also illuminating is the facts of the English case of W v 
Essex County Council.199 Here, foster parents who had specifically requested a foster child 
who was not a sexual abuser sued a local authority after they were given a foster child who 
sexually abused their three daughters.200
tial c
to the fact that i
n part 7.4.1 above it would also be useful for children's courts to be able to impose 
damages on social workers who out of laziness apply emergency procedure shortcuts to 
remove children in situations they are aware are not emergencies. 
 
                                                 
196 Harding (2000-2001) op cit note 151 at 920. 
197 Ibid. 
198 [1995] 2 FLR 276.   
199[1997] 2 FLR 535.   
200 For a discussion of the Bedfordshire County and Essex County cases and an analysis of the impact of the 
European court in the sphere of care-related delictual actions see CM Lyon 'Child Protection in the Civil 
Law' in K Wilson & A James (eds) The Child Protection Handbook (200
201 SJ Klein 'Protecting the Rights of Foster Children: Suing under § 198
2) 191 at 233-34. 
3 To Enforce Federal Child Welfare 
Law' (20 5) 26 Cardozo LR 2611 at 2654. 
202 N Freymond 'Using Intermediary Structures to Support Families: An International Comparison of Practice 
in Child
0
 Protection' (2001) 2. Accessed at the Canadian Partnerships for Children and Families Project 
website: <www.wlu.ca./pcfproject>. 
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It may be concluded that our legislature should have followed the law commission's 
recommendation by expressly including delictual jurisdiction for children's courts.  From 
the wording of the sanctions that were included in the 2005 Act it is clear that parliament 
was particularly concerned to address the problem of failures to implement children's court 
orders.  It is illogical that, although contempt of court and even criminal liability 
provisions were included, the option of compensatory damages was discarded.  It is true 
that there may be difficult ethical concerns where care agencies fail because of a lack of 
resources or children bring damages claims against parents.  But as a means of 
encouraging efficiency in child care and protection services they should nevertheless in the 
light of experience in other systems have been included.  Since children's court magistrates 
have in any event been very firmly cast into the role of care specialists it would be cost-
effective (and as already noted less traumatic for claimants) to allow children's courts 
rather than other courts of first instance to adjudicate care or protection related delictual 
claims.
family.  And thirdly, 
instead of being obliged to stand helplessly by when their remedies are ignored or 
misman
 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
 
It is clear that the 2005 Act has advanced our law on care case dispositions in three 
significant ways.  Most importantly, it has provided for a far greater variety of children's 
court remedies than any previous South African legislation.  This means that it will be 
more possible to shape outcomes to fit the needs of individual children and their families.  
Secondly, the orientation of children's courts has been transformed.  As opposed to merely 
deciding between a few limited forms of mainly removal placements for children, they 
now have the more constructive task of considering whether an allocation of suitable 
family services resources will enable a child to remain with her 
aged, they have been empowered to monitor and even enforce their orders.  As has 
been stated, our children's courts are no longer paper tigers. 
 
Although children's courts are now poised to play a far more important role in 
supporting children than ever before, the legislature's new vision for them has been 
 376
somewhat imperfectly realized in the 2005 Act.  As shown in part 8.2 the dispensation for 
grounds indicative of children requiring mandatory alternative care is problematic.  Of 
particular concern is that proof of grounds can be entirely dispensed with in many 
instanc
exploitation in s 1 of the 2005 Act.  As has been shown in part 8.2.2, although they have 
been pr
ault attribution.  This is likely to lead them astray because grounds-related 
factors are more typically accretional over time.  And an overemphasis on fault distracts 
courts from giving due attention to contextual factors such as poverty or a lack of social 
es.  Where children's courts propose to issue any of the wide range of s 46(1) orders 
proof of a ground is not a prerequisite.   But if no ground is proved, children's court 
decisions will be highly vulnerable to challenges based on constitutional rights to fair 
proceedings and due protection of children's right to family care.  This danger will be even 
greater if children's courts choose to utilise the extreme power accorded to them in s 156(4) 
of applying mandatory alternative care measures (except undefined 'placement orders') to 
family members even in cases where they have specifically found children not to be in 
need of care and protection.  Aside from failing on the criterion of balancing protection 
and children's right to family care, uncertainty about when grounds will be required causes 
the Act to fall short also on that of user-friendliness in wording. 
 
Another basic deficiency which relates to grounds results from the decision to 
include definitions of abuse, sexual abuse, neglect, exploitation and commercial sexual 
ovided for general guidance in interpreting the Act, they limit the reach of the main 
grounds for finding children to be in need of alternative care.  This occurs because of the 
inclusion of the defined terms or similar ones where the grounds are listed in s 150(1).  It 
has been demonstrated with reference to international literature that using definitions 
which restrict grounds is problematic. There is no consensus on how harm-related concepts 
such as neglect and abuse should be defined. And attaching definitions to grounds for 
alternative care measures opens possibilities for technical defences that may prevent them 
from being applied on behalf of children who require interventions.  
 
A further danger -particularly with perpetrator or situation oriented definitions as 
included in s 1- is that they tend to fix the attention of courts narrowly on specific instances 
requiring f
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service
cause there is also parallelism.  They include pairs of very similar orders with 
no indication of the reasons for the overlap. An interpretative difficulty which thus arises is 
whethe
 to 
be successfully achieved it will also be essential to develop our procedural law. In part 8.4 
it has b
s.  Also, as was discovered under the 1983 Act in its original form, it stigmatises 
caregivers in ways that may be counterproductive. 
 
Aside from fundamental deficiencies in the way that grounds have been provided 
for, dispositive remedies have also not been ideally formulated in the 2005 Act.  Although 
having two main lists of children's court orders in s 46(1) and s 156(1) connotes different 
purposes a cross-reference to s 46(1) in s 156(1) expressly indicates a degree of 
interchangeability.  Confusion about when to utilise s 46(1) or else s 156(1) orders is 
increased be
r choices can always be freely made between the pairs where they contain slightly 
different requirements.  The failure to distinguish logically between the main two sets of 
remedies again causes the Act to fail on the criterion of clarity to enable user-friendliness.  
Even members of the legal profession seeking rhyme or reason may find its blurred 
scheme for orders perplexing. The confusingly-similar remedies in s 46 and s 156 need to 
be integrated and proper direction given on when each of these sections should be utilised.  
 
If a substantial transformation in the dispositive functions of children's courts is
een shown that the key to doing this is to divide proceedings into logical stages.  
Firstly, a basic division needs to be made between proof of grounds and ascertainment of 
care remedies phases. Unfortunately, the 2005 Act in its present form does not facilitate 
this.  In addition to providing primary grounds for finding a child to be in need of care and 
protection in s 150(1) it links most of the remedies provided in s 156(1) to further sub-
grounds. This complicates dispositive proceedings and introduces circularity by forcing 
children's courts to return to the question of grounds at a stage when they are ready to 
decide upon outcomes.  As has been contended, the benefits to be gained would justify 
amending the Act to allow for a simpler approach in which grounds and remedies are 
separated. 
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 In cases where caregivers have the potential for sufficient positive change 
childre
 
provisions. 
other systems, criminal penalties attendant on non-implementation of children's court 
orders should only in rare instances be applied against caregivers.  Dangers of 
counterproductive alienation or unfairly punishing parents who are primarily victims of 
poverty or a lack of social services are reasons why children's court magistrates should be 
directed to exercise caution in implementing their new sentencing powers. 
n's courts should be enabled to interpose an intermediate 'improvement period' 
between grounds and final disposition stages as in US law.  Whilst the 2005 Act does not 
expressly allow for this, its new provisions on setting timeframes and monitoring provide a 
suitable context.  And the proactive family services remedies it contains will often best be 
implemented under a condition of fulfilment of preset goals that will need to be achieved 
within a fixed time period.  Improvement periods should thus be established in our law by 
means of a procedural rule which could be formulated by making reference to US
 
As recommended in part 8.4.3 children's courts should be required to evaluate 
achievements during improvement periods at subsequent review hearings. It has been 
shown that these should not merely be used to evaluate the progress of caregivers.  In order 
to counter the currently widespread problem of inadequate implementation of children's 
court orders by employees or representatives of the state acting ex officio presiding 
magistrates should be expressly directed also to evaluate the contributions of these 
participants.  As a final leg of dispositive proceedings, review hearings would be an ideal 
mechanism for adjusting care measures in the light of progress made by all concerned.   
 
As suggested in part 8.4.4, the proposed review hearings would also provide 
opportunities for children's courts to employ the new enforcement measures with which the 
2005 Act has furnished them. It has been shown by means of a comparative review that 
having a repertoire of different grades of coercive powers can be useful for courts which 
specialise in care matters.  Even the extreme of criminal penalties as provided for in s45(2) 
of the 2005 Act has its place as a response to blatant disregard of responsibilities which 
leads to serious harm for children.  However, despite the fact that there is precedent in 
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 It has risdiction for 
children's courts to award delictual damages.  Compensatory awards are a less extreme 
enalties for, inter alia, encouraging proper implementation of care 
orders.  Their availability at children's courts would assist some children who have been 
harmed
ushers in considerable advances.  But as 
s and has 
ing the desirability of cluster foster care, selecting from 
plement children's court orders properly is not a group of tasks which 
gly supported by the escalated demands 
been shown that a gap in the 2005 Act is the omission of ju
means than criminal p
 by enabling them to provide testimony which they may find traumatic before only 
one court.  And they would accord perfectly with the legislature's new vision of children's 
courts as powerful multitask fora with specialist expertise in care and protection disputes. 
 
In conclusion, the evaluation of the new approach to dispositive proceedings in this 
chapter reveals the 2005 Act to be something of a flawed diamond.  By comparison with 
earlier South African legislation it undoubtedly 
has been demonstrated -and perhaps understandably given the extent of the historical gap 
which it attempts to overcome- it contains fundamental structural deficiencie
some serious lacunae.  Two related final points need to be made.  Even more than with 
aspects considered in previous chapters, the demanding dispositive tasks set for presiding 
officers in the 2005 Act have significant training implications.  Choosing the most 
appropriate proactive family services remedies, evaluating whether children should be left 
in child-headed households, assess
amongst different residential programs at child and youth care centres, monitoring the 
progress of children and caregivers, and sentencing social workers or government officials 
who fail to im
generalist magistrates can be expected to perform efficiently.  The recommendations made 
earlier about the urgent need to establish children's courts as a separate network and 
improve their management and status are stron
which the disposition provisions of the Act will impose.
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS 
9.1  
ust be treated as the least desirable 
of all. 
• Con
• An effective system requires that legal representatives and court presiding officers be 
effi
 
Introduction 
 
A general finding in this thesis is that our law applicable to children's court services 
in care cases is in many important respects poorly developed. This has emerged from the 
application of the primary evaluative criteria described in part 1.3.2. For convenience, 
these may be briefly restated as follows: 
• Removals of children from their families must only be permitted as a measure of last 
resort -and removals to large residential facilities m
structive nurturing of children by parents, within their families or within their 
communities must receive the maximum support which is feasibly available. 
• An appropriate system consistently produces careful assessment and balancing of the 
care and protection needs of children whose domestic situations require consideration.  
This entails that mandatory measures proposed by welfare must be subjected to 
rigorous and independent evaluation at fair hearings guided by well-developed 
procedural law. 
• Communication about care -and particularly by children themselves and primary 
caregivers- must be encouraged and fully taken into account so that appropriate voices 
are heard. 
ciently utilised -and especially for facilitating meaningful communication by the 
persons most directly involved in care cases. 
• Relevant law and procedures must be sufficiently clear and straightforward to attain 
transparency and user-friendliness for mature children and other nonlawyers. 
• Care solutions must be readily accessible as an incremental, monitored and flexible 
process; and there must be an adequate systemic capacity for responding timeously to 
changes in the situations of children. 
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• To protect children and encourage effective implementation of alternative care 
measures there must be real accountability for persons involved. 
 
 The analysis in chapter 2 has provided a context by revealing historical causes for 
retardation in the evolution of our system as measured against these criteria.  Throughout 
the rest of the thesis modern local conditions as experienced by participants at children's 
court proceedings have been considered.  Our underpinning legislative framework has 
been compared with international standards and dispensations for courts in developed 
erged that our law tends to fail in 
providing adequately for authoritative decision-making by children's courts on behalf of 
childre
pplementation. 
. Part 
9.3 contains the main findings on assisting direct communication at children's court 
hearings.  It describes the recommendations on legislative provisions and practical 
foreign national systems.  It has consistently em
n in need of alternative care and their families. 
 
At the level of detail, the nature of key deficiencies in our law and best means of 
addressing them have been explored.  It has been demonstrated that our children's courts 
urgently need much better guidance, particularly in relation to procedures.  They also 
require improved status, independence and scope for specialization.  With respect to staff, 
better training for presiding officers and the addition of a middle ranking support staff 
member are needed. It has been shown that children's courts are underutilised and need to 
provide a considerably wider range of services.  The 2005 Act in some respects begins the 
much-needed process of modernisation of our care legislation.  However, although it 
addresses some of the fundamental problems that reduce the effectiveness of children's 
courts, parts of it require reconsideration or su
 
 The rest of this chapter describes the main findings of the thesis in more detail.  It 
follows the sequence of the substantive chapters.  In part 9.1 it assesses the interaction of 
the most important historical influences which affected children's court services.  In part 
9.2 the primary reasons in favour of a continuing court function in care cases, despite the 
difficulties experienced in our system, are put forward. The recommendations on the best 
model for a link between children's courts and ADR processes are also summarised
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techniq
 
9.2  
rnest desire to provide the best 
possible resources for nurturing 'European' children in need of alternative care.  The idea 
that low
uth African care legislation relatively advanced 
in the period 1913-1960.  Of particular significance were the introduction of court-ordered 
care gr
ues for facilitating such participation. Part 9.4 covers appropriate functions and 
selection methods for legal representatives. Part 9.5 summarises the reforms needed to 
improve the role of presiding officers in children's courts. The proposals for better 
legislative provisions covering preliminary and interim care hearings are described in part 
9.6. And the strengths and weaknesses of the new approach to dispositive proceedings in 
the 2005 Act are summarised in part 9.7.  Part 9.8 contains some closing remarks and 
suggestions on avenues for further research.
 
Historical Reasons for Underdevelopment 
 
It has been shown in chapter 2 that the most significant historical influences which 
shaped South African care legislation and children's courts were disparate in their effects 
and sometimes even camouflaged. In understanding our current limitations it is firstly 
important to appreciate that in the pre-democratic period the politically dominant white 
group was fixated by two concerns.  These were fears about children of colour from the 
under-classes flooding urban areas and secondly an ea
er courts could play a key part in addressing both these concerns can be traced 
back to English colonial influences in the 19th century.  As has been shown in part 2.2 the 
most important measures received from England were the indiscriminate use of juvenile 
courts for both care and crime cases involving lower-class or 'difficult' children and large, 
regimented institutions for containing them.  
 
The second aim of favouring children viewed as European was disguised 
throughout most of the 20th century because of political concerns and a realisation that the 
edges of the European group could not be legally defined with any precision. It gave rise to 
constant modernisation which rendered So
ants in 1921 and the unofficial creation of the first children's courts in 1926.   
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Although their title was copied from Australia the children's courts represented a 
major South African innovation because they were specialised forums designed only to 
deal with care matters and the reallocation of parental responsibilities. Until the 1950s their 
effectiveness was enhanced by frequently utilising dedicated presiding magistrates. 
Available evidence indicates that these officers were generally successful in facilitating 
amicab
g that 
these were reserved for children regarded as 'Europeans'. 
so by 
ensuring that all mandatory alternative care placements for black, Asian, so-called 
ms of racial matching to 
substitute families or residential facilities. 
le proceedings at which the voices of vulnerable family members such as mothers 
and even children could be directly heard.  
 
Despite their undoubted strengths, for a balanced appreciation it is essential to take 
into account serious limitations which adversely affected the contribution of the children's 
courts. Although they were partly the result of a liberal initiative aimed at helping all 
children, this was subverted. During the first three and a half decades of their existence it 
was in practice mainly white children who appeared before them.  They thus supported a 
covert governmental racial policy by serving as gatekeepers guarding access to the best 
available alternative care resources. Their primary function was to assist in ensurin
 
With the introduction of the Children's Act 33/1960 the nationalist government 
made a significant change in the work of children's courts. This occurred as part of an 
intensification of its apartheid program.  It required them to hear cases involving children 
from all population groups. Despite rhetoric to the contrary this was only ostensibly for the 
purpose of care support. Instead of their previously limited role in ordering grants and 
placements mainly on behalf of white children, children's courts were now much more 
obviously and extensively used to promote racial segregation.  They were to do 
coloured and especially white children were 'correct' in ter
 
 As has been shown it was thought by the nationalist government that dispensing 
with the covert approach to discrimination in care services had become juridically feasible 
by 1960.  Requiring children's courts to assist with racial classification and matching of 
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children of colour was considered practicable because population classification criteria had 
been developed in 1950. And the supreme court had shown over the subsequent decade 
that it could generally be relied upon to oversee an application of these that was in 
accordance with nationalist policy.   
 
Increasing resistance by activist social workers helped ensure that the aim of 
rendering racial appearance the primary consideration in all care cases was never fully 
achieved.  However, the use of children's courts to enforce racial matching in child 
placem
st time by jettisoning the baggage of the 
past and radically modernising our law.  A key decision was taken to retain the children's 
courts.
e ineffectiveness in providing for the majority of South 
African children in the 20th century and also the recent emergence of anti-legalistic 
approa
ents caused great hardship.  Aside from direct psychological harm to children and 
caregivers from whom children were removed, the legacy of apartheid is to be seen in a 
failure to maintain the previous development of both our care legislation and personnel 
resources in the children's courts themselves.  At the end of the 20th century the 
democratic South African government inherited both an inadequate legal framework and 
children's courts where staff had been trained to compromise the best interests of the child 
principle.  This situation was clearly one which required extensive reform measures. 
 
The promulgation of the 2005 Act on 19 June 2006 was a historically significant 
attempt by the democratic government to respond appropriately.  The wording of the Act 
reveals it clearly as a major attempt make up for lo
  This was despite their chequered history and an expressed intention to eventually 
introduce family courts. It is apparent from the Act that parliament even aimed to extend 
children's court services. The appropriateness and sufficiency of this extension has been 
critically evaluated with reference to care cases in subsequent chapters of the thesis.  
  
9.3  Weighing the Respective Merits of Courts and ADR 
 
In view of their relativ
ches and a greater reliance upon ADR in some developed foreign systems, the 
appropriateness of the key decision in the 2005 Act to retain children's courts as a crucial 
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component in the South African child protection system has been investigated in chapter 3. 
Upon the basis of mainly comparative research it has been shown that the fundamentals of 
the new model put forward in the 2005 Act -requiring a system in which the children's 
courts will in future decide whether to instigate ADR, must oversee its implementation and 
subsequently consider whether to rely upon any extracurial resolutions achieved during it- 
are sound.  The criterion of optimum means for hearing of the voices of vulnerable 
children and caregivers supports this approach.  
These functions are essential as part of an all-out effort to overcome the past 
and create a modern system of care law. The use of courts as ADR directors is also 
indicat
 of participants and utilisation of untrained traditional leaders such as chiefs 
and headmen are not appropriate given the vulnerability of most families involved in care 
cases.  
 
Experience in other jurisdictions indicates that a tandem system which pairs courts 
and ADR fora is potentially effective for care cases. An advantage of this approach as 
taken in our 2005 Act is that it can be used to draw proportionately upon the differing 
strengths of both ADR and courts according to the needs of the parties in any particular 
case. The decision by the legislature specifically to establish courts as the authoritative 
partners in a future tandem system was also correct.  Children's courts can play a valuable 
role in the child protection system as managers and also help to develop authoritative case 
precedents. 
ed by the primary evaluative criteria requiring systemic oversight mechanisms and 
ready access to forums which offer fair processes. 
 
Although the comparisons and analysis in chapter 3 lead to a firm conclusion in 
support of the 2005 Act’s children's court-driven model for the provision of ADR it has 
three serious deficiencies which require amendments.  The possibility of forced ADR 
against the will
Thirdly, a failure to provide for uniform national standards preserving a high degree 
of confidentiality for communications made during ADR processes will further tend to 
undermine their effectiveness. 
 
Aside from the aspects which require legislative amendments it has been shown 
that there are two other shortcomings in the scheme for ADR established in the 2005 Act.  
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These are less serious because they simply require the formulation and publication of 
supplementary procedural rules for children's courts and guidelines for ADR participants.  
As noted in part 3.6 investigative social workers must be required to make 
recommendations concerning the need for and most appropriate form of ADR in their pre-
hearing reports.  Secondly, children's courts themselves and all parties must be accorded a 
power to instigate special court hearings for considering the appropriateness and also 
planning the initiation of ADR.   
ist them in choosing the best form of ADR in each case could certainly be 
developed. 
n experience elsewhere it has been shown that a set of these 
could easily be formulated for use in South Africa.  It has further been recommended that 
where 
 
Although s 49(2) of the 2005 Act provides appropriate threshold criteria to guide 
children's courts on whether to instigate ADR, they need secondary criteria to assist them 
in deciding what form it should take if it is indicated.  It has been shown that five 
categories of ADR have been extensively used in developed systems in recent years. The 
strengths-and-weaknesses analysis of these undertaken in part 3.3 indicates that, whilst our 
children's courts will need to retain a realm of discretion, useful guidelines which could 
greatly ass
 
An important question is whether the child who is the subject of proceedings 
should participate directly in ADR. Section 49(2)(b) of the 2005 Act contains a general 
requirement that children's courts must consider whether the child is able to participate 
beneficially in any ADR that might be instigated.  It has been concluded in part 3.6 that 
this is in principle appropriate as a threshold requirement. It facilitates the hearing of 
voices of children and is therefore in accordance with optimal support for child-
participation.  
 
However, children's courts can hardly be expected to decide whether children 
should participate in ADR if they are not, once again, provided with at least some criteria 
to guide them.  Drawing upo
the proposed guidelines indicate that it will not be in the best interests of a child to 
participate directly in ADR it must be expressly required that possibilities for indirect 
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involvement and feedback for the child be explored by ADR facilitators. Two further 
essential components need to be added to the ADR scheme in the 2005 Act.  These are 
firstly the training requirements needed to render facilitators eligible for court 
appointment.  And secondly, a best practice framework is required to show in broad 
outline what steps facilitators must normally follow with any particular form of ADR and 
in what sequence. 
 relation to deficiencies in the scheme for ADR in the 2005 Act a serious concern 
is that 
t the office of children's court assistant 
as prev usly provided for under the 1983 Act appears set for termination because it is not 
mentio
 
which could potentially enable children's courts to take on a valuable managerial role has 
 
In
the legislature may not have sufficiently appreciated the human resources that 
children's courts will require. The analysis in part 3.6  shows clearly that the ADR 
provisions will if properly implemented significantly alter and extend the range of work of 
staff at these courts.  It has been noted, for example, that they will need to develop 
considerable cross-disciplinary expertise if they are to manage and monitor ADR processes 
involving highly vulnerable family members.  Requisite staff capabilities will therefore be 
essential.  
 
On the question of staff, it is unfortunate tha
io
ned in the 2005 Act.  This middle-ranking officer would have been ideally placed to 
assist (similarly to Australian children's court registrars) with some of the new ADR-
related responsibilities of children's courts.  The decision to terminate the office of this 
functionary suggests an unrealistic expectation on the part of the legislature that children's 
courts are to do more with less.  When the ADR provisions come into force it would be 
most unfortunate, and result in a subversion of the clear purposes of the Act, if children's 
courts were to be unable to exercise their new managerial functions properly. Without 
sufficient resources there is a danger that they may be reduced to consigning a large 
proportion of cases to any ADR available and then merely rubberstamping settlement 
documents put before them. 
 
In conclusion on ADR, it has been demonstrated that a broadly correct approach
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9.4 Hearing the Appropriate Voices: Facilitating Direct Participation at Proceedings 
uestion considered in part 4.2 is whether 
direct court involvement by children who are the subject of care proceedings should be 
encour
ust never be directly exposed to care proceedings at court.  They indicate that 
the need for self-expression and the advocacy skills of many children who require 
alterna
tablished in the 2005 Act.  However, if these courts are to interact effectively with 
ADR facilitators the Act will need to be amended. It will also need to be supplemented 
with detailed rules and guidelines.  In relation to both ADR facilitators and children's court 
staff the new interdisciplinary approach creates training and other human-resource 
imperatives that cannot be ignored if it is to be implemented properly. 
 
 
Whilst in chapter 3 the focus was on extra-curial processes intended to be managed 
by children's courts in chapter 4 some aspects of direct participation in children's court 
proceedings themselves are considered.  This begins a discussion which is followed up in 
subsequent chapters on different means for achieving effective and relevant 
communication at hearings.  A crucial initial q
aged.  It is shown that available South African research data and anecdotal accounts 
by practitioners suggest that in recent decades such involvement has generally not been 
strongly promoted especially in rural jurisdictions.  
 
The issue of the desirability of direct child involvement has been resolved by 
weighing up arguments for and against, and also by drawing on local and international 
research. It is noted firstly in part 4.2.2 that some important new child-development related 
findings are beginning to emerge.  These undermine traditional protectionist views that 
children m
tive care are stronger than previously thought.  And there are other findings which 
show that giving and hearing testimony in care cases is within the capability and may even 
be experienced as positive by a significant proportion of children. The traditional view that 
children should not be directly involved in care proceedings is further eroded by children's 
rights arguments. Important amongst these is the assertion that recognition of children as 
individuals will be advanced by facilitation of direct self-expression at care proceedings.   
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Although it must be conceded that many children will be too young, 
psychologically vulnerable or otherwise incapable of direct involvement it is clear that an 
ideal model for improving the future operation of South African children's courts requires 
promotion of opportunities for children to appear and participate effectively. In light of 
this, it has been suggested that the creation in the 2005 Children's Act of new rights for 
children to approach courts and participate at proceedings are entirely appropriate. 
for 
example, choosing between parents) which are really those of the court. A further 
weakne
However, this problem could fairly easily be addressed.  It is essential that, just as has 
 
Although at the level of fundamental principle the 2005 Act adopts a correct 
approach to child involvement it has been shown in part 4.2.5 that there are deficiencies in 
regard to important details.  A requirement in s 58 that  permission must be sought from 
children's court magistrates before addressing them 'in argument' clumsily inserts technical 
and adversarial elements into what should be an entirely supportive and relatively informal 
relationship between adjudicators and children.  
 
 In s 61(1)(b) the test of whether a child should be expected to express a 'view or 
preference' is simply her willingness. This is misconceived because it does not signal that 
presiding officers should try to protect children from taking on burdens of choice (
ss is insufficient express provision for sheltered participation methods.  This is a 
serious deficiency because they are often particularly appropriate in care cases. Yet another 
omission is a failure to provide cautionary guidelines for exercising the extremely broad 
powers which adjudicators are accorded for compelling participation by unwilling 
children. 
 
Aside from the provisions on direct participation by children another measure for 
increasing participation in the 2005 Act is the allocation, for the first time in our law, of 
party status to investigative welfare agencies.  Although supplementary regulations are 
again required this represents on balance another important step forward. It has been 
shown that the main resultant difficulty which can be foreseen is a more constrained, 
legalistic approach in agency work resulting from increased exposure to costs liability.  
 390
occurred in some other systems, non-governmental agencies have their party status altered 
so that they appear in children's courts merely as representatives of the state.  Also, a 
regulation is required which indicates that agencies may not reduce services for families 
purely 
 thus improving their standards of practice, 
increased appeals and reviews would obviously assist with the development of our law. 
ce 
of hostile or numerous satellite parties with tangential interests is contraindicated. Not only 
do pro
on the basis that court proceedings are anticipated or in train.  Further regulations 
should expressly provide agencies with at least some access to free legal representation 
from state entities such as the family advocate and legal aid board. 
 
If the proposed refinements in the role of agencies are implemented they will be in 
a better position to take children's court decisions to higher courts on appeal or review.  
This is potentially significant because most family members involved in care cases lack the 
resources to do so.  As a result, in recent decades relatively few children's court cases have 
reached higher courts.  The unfortunate situation of children's courts functioning with 
almost no monitoring is one of the ways in which our system fails on the criterion of 
sufficient oversight.  This aspect could be improved if legal costs and representation 
resources for agencies are addressed as has been recommended.  Aside from helping to 
render children's court more accountable and
 
The final question addressed in chapter 4 is which persons besides the child who is 
the subject of the proceedings should be eligible to receive private party status in children's 
court care cases.  As a first step in resolving this two contrary approaches have been 
evaluated.  These involve, respectively, either facilitating or restricting the presence of 
private parties at hearings.  Although the former approach has been endorsed by some 
English commentators, by the South African law commission and in the 2005 Children's 
Act it has been shown that it is inappropriate for our system.  It has been noted that 
observation data from our own and some other systems indicate that a continuous presen
ceedings tend to be delayed and rendered more adversarial but, crucially, the core 
role players -children and their current caregivers- do not participate effectively because 
they feel intimidated.  The criterion of hearing the most appropriate voices thus reveals that 
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our children's courts need to be supplied with means for controlling the number of private 
parties. 
 
In relation to how private-party applications ought to be limited it has been 
suggested in part 4.3.2.2 that automatic party status should not have been accorded in the 
2005 Act to all biological parents and all prospective foster or adoptive parents.  
Experience locally and in some foreign systems shows that there are non-custodian parents 
who value party status only for opportunities it brings to obstruct proceedings or continue a 
pattern of intimidation of the child or a custodian.  The best approach is therefore one in 
which parents who do not currently have lawful custody or access responsibilities do not 
gain automatic party status.  Instead, they should have to approach a children's court to 
make out a case for party status.  The same should apply to prospective foster and adoptive 
parents
 provide a much better predictor of constructive 
use of party status than the happenstance of biological parenthood or claims of willingness 
sionary subcriteria should 
be whether the applicant (based on previous behaviour) would be likely to intimidate the 
child o
demonstrated this has been found to be effective in some foreign systems.  It creates 
.  In relation to these it has been noted that if they wish to become parties this will 
usually be for the purpose of discrediting existing caregivers.  They are therefore likely to 
increase levels of hostility and should certainly not have been provided in s 1 of the Act 
with a blanket right to automatic party status. 
 
In further support of the contention in chapter 4 that children's courts should be 
able to screen many more applications than allowed for in the 2005 Act it has been 
suggested that workable criteria can easily be provided.  The primary ground for 
discretionary private party status should be whether the applicant has provided substantial 
care for the child in the past.  This would
to provide future foster or adoptive care.  Two additional exclu
r her present caregiver or else merely duplicates the position of an existing party. 
 
In part 4.3.2.3 it has been shown that the case for taking a restrictive approach to 
private party status applications is strengthened by yet another significant new feature of 
the 2005 Children's Act -the creation of the concept of participant status.  As has been 
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greater flexibility by allowing for partial involvement rights which stand between the 
opposite extremes of full party and mere witness status.  Unfortunately, however, 
inadequate wording in s 58 of the 2005 Act has resulted in a failure to provide sufficient 
differen
Optimising the Effectiveness of Legal Representation 
members and welfare representatives. In chapter 5 two fundamental questions have been 
tiation between the categories of full party and participant.  This section indicates 
that the primary distinguishing right for participants is that of adducing evidence. This 
creates ambiguity between the position of participants and mere witnesses.  It would be 
better to direct that the distinguishing right for participants is that of addressing the court, 
with the possibility of requesting additional forms of communication during proceedings. 
Because of their valuable potential for enabling children's courts to prevent 
disproportionate involvement by satellite role players the participant provisions in the Act 
ought to be refined. 
 
It emerges from the analysis in chapter 4 that, just as with the new ADR oversight 
responsibilities in the 2005 Act, so too with the in-court direct participation provisions 
high levels of skill will be needed from children's court staff for effective implementation.  
In particular, they will require an insightful appreciation of what is appropriate for children 
at different levels of psychological vulnerability and social development. Their 
effectiveness will depend upon an ability to make sound on-the-spot decisions about 
permitted forms of communication and who should be present at different stages of 
hearings. The Act will thus undoubtedly impose high demands on the competence of 
particularly magistrates -and the more so if clarification of unclear parts of the Act and 
more detailed guidance are not provided. 
 
9.5  
 
What could greatly assist presiding officers in meeting the challenge of effectively 
implementing the 2005 Act is more frequent appearances by competent lawyers acting on 
behalf of parties. Limited local data and experience in other systems indicates that in many 
care cases legal representatives can provide valuable support for vulnerable family 
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considered. These are what the basic function of lawyers should be and how greater levels 
of effective representation can be achieved.   
 
In relation to the role of lawyers it has been shown that available South African 
data indicates that in children's court cases they are sometimes ineffective, and even 
occasionally obstructive, in the achievement of an appropriate outcome.  This is not 
surpris
le with the paramountcy of 
the best interests of the child as established in s 28(2) of the Constitution.  A lawyer 
represe
s’ evidence, regardless of the 
age of the client. It will be important to include a provision which expressly frees such 
lawyer
ing in a system where no specific guidance concerning their functions has ever been 
provided.1  It has been argued that such guidance is urgently needed and should take the 
form of a practice code.  It has been shown that there are several such codes for lawyers in 
other systems that could usefully be drawn upon when formulating one for children's court 
work in South Africa.  
 
With reference to local conditions and as a framework for the proposed code it has 
been recommended in part 5.3 that a primary orientation for lawyers must be established.  
The best model for South African care cases would be one which utilises the traditional 
strengths of lawyers.  They should as in other matters be required to advocate versions of 
the evidence which sufficiently capable clients wish to put forward. It has been shown that 
such a client-directed approach can be rendered fully compatib
nting a child who is the subject of care proceedings would support that child's best 
interests by ensuring that her voice is properly heard so that her version of events has 
sufficient impact in court.  This conduces to a full recognition of children as human beings 
with fundamental participatory rights as established in art 12 of the CRC and art 4(2) of the 
ACC. 
 
 Generally, legal representatives who appear for private parties should be directed 
in the proposed code to concentrate on asserting their client
s from any expectation that they must undertake a dual role in both advocating for 
                                                 
1 As noted in part 6.2.1 throughout much of the existence of our children's courts the only legislative 
direction has been to the effect that lawyers should function in the same way as in civil magistrates’ courts, 
but with an unspecified degree of discretion to modify their role. 
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clients and assisting children’s courts to establish what is objectively in the best interests of 
the child.  It has been noted that recent experience in other systems indicates that this is 
impracticable because it tends to impose contradictory requirements.  Only in situations 
where a private party is incapable of providing relevant evidence should her lawyer be 
expecte
arties.  In relation to client confidentiality one exception which 
has been widely recognised in many systems arises where lawyers receive information 
indicat
 a need for assistance in such assertion.  If 
children's court adjudicators are expressly permitted to perform an inquisitorial function 
(as pro
d to promote what is in her best interests from an objective standpoint. 
 
In relation to more detailed aspects, because the factor of client vulnerability is 
pervasive across all family members in care cases the proposed practice code should 
provide similar guidance for lawyers representing clients with diminished capacity, 
regardless of whether they are children or adults.  American codes provide some valuable 
wording on precisely how lawyers should interact with such clients both in and outside the 
courtroom. By drawing upon these with due consideration for local conditions it would not 
be difficult to provide detailed directions on how South African lawyers should function 
when representing private p
ive of serious danger of harm to the child or another person.  The proposed South 
African code should therefore expressly require that revelations in this regard must 
immediately be revealed by the lawyer concerned to the court. 
 
The task of asserting what is in the best interests of the child from a neutral 
standpoint should be that of the investigative welfare agency.  And with the new allocation 
of party-status to agencies in the 2005 Act it will be possible in future to provide them with 
their own legal representatives where there is
posed in more detail in chapter 6) combined efforts by agencies and adjudicators 
will ensure that a quite sufficient proportion of resources is available for establishing what 
is in the child's best interests from an objective perspective.  
 
In relation to appropriate direction on the role of lawyers as investigated in chapter 
5 it can be concluded that it is clear that a South African guide indicative of the main 
functions of legal representatives in care cases could easily be developed.  If this were 
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given official status and made available to lawyers and children's court staff it would 
remove much of the present uncertainty. And it would therefore go a long way towards 
creating a better overall standard of legal representation. 
 
On the second problem of insufficient availability of lawyers, the best way to 
increase the proportion of cases in which legal representation is provided would be through 
the development of an improved scheme for state-financed legal representation.  This is 
because the pervasive factor of poverty will obviously continue to ensure that most private 
parties and even many NGO welfare agencies will for the foreseeable future be unable to 
afford the fees of lawyers. However, governmental financial resources are clearly also 
limited. It is significant that in 1998 a detailed set of grounds for the provision of state-
finance
ditions apply, secondary guidelines 
should then be applied to ensure that lawyers tend to be appointed to the parties who can 
derive 
d legal representatives for children was published in terms of reg 4A under the 
1983 Act; however, concerns that it would prove too expensive led to a situation in which 
it was never implemented. 
 
It has been shown in part 5.4 that it is possible to create a financially sustainable 
scheme for subsidised representation in children's court care cases.  An essential starting 
point would be two threshold criteria which must be applied to all applications.  These 
should be the current availability of sufficient state funds (based on a set scale) to pay for 
the representation sought in a particular case and a sufficiently skilled lawyer who is 
locally available to undertake it.  Where these two con
the greatest benefit from their services. 
 
It would be essential to utilise secondary guidelines rather than actual legal grounds 
because the latter would subject the state to increasing numbers of applications by 
establishing binding precedents. If the snowballing problem produced by uncontrollably 
expanding precedents can be avoided it will always remain possible to keep the number of 
cases for which representation is provided within available resource limitations. The 
evaluation in part 5.4.1 has shown that, by drawing on previous South African attempts 
and foreign sources, it would be quite feasible to draft at least a starting list of appropriate 
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secondary guidelines that would limit the granting of applications to parties likely to derive 
considerable benefit.  Contrary to the narrow approach taken in reg 4A of the 1983 Act, 
not only children but also other parties must be rendered eligible to apply.   
 
As further suggested in part 5.4.1 the proposed secondary guidelines for subsidised 
representation should be worded to target parties with significant participatory 
disadvantages that could be substantially overcome with the help of a lawyer.  The 
applicant pool which needs to be created is thus one where the disadvantage is neither so 
extreme that it cannot be so addressed nor so minimal that utilisation of less expensive 
solutions -such as allowing sheltered participation at court- would suffice.  
 
Local and international experience suggests that in an initial promulgation the 
secondary guidelines ought to be based on proof of significant language or cultural 
barriers, disability, psychological trauma, unusual case complexity of a kind which 
preven
, they are not entirely 
dependent upon difficult predictions about the future.   
he 
ts the applicant’s ability to communicate relevant evidence, or extreme disparity 
produced by the overwhelming assertiveness of an opposing party. A strength of the 
proposed guidelines is that they are based on manifestations in affected parties that could 
be readily recognised by professionals with appropriate training and experience.  They are 
also practicable to implement because, unlike the vague best interests and future 
substantial injustice tests that have been relied on in our system
 
Clearly, the mere publication of threshold criteria and secondary guidelines will not 
produce cost-effective utilisation of precious state resources.  An effective process for 
applying them must also be developed.  It has been suggested in part 5.4.1 that children's 
court presiding officers will need to play a part.  They will often be in a good position to 
recognise manifestations of disadvantage in parties that are indicative of eligibility for 
subsidised representation.  It has been proposed, however, that they should merely make a 
prima facie determination and then refer applicants for a final decision elsewhere.  This is 
necessary for three reasons.  Firstly, because of their need to remain neutral, prejudging the 
capabilities of parties by adjudicators should be minimised. Secondly, application of t
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criteria
en's courts.  However, in the absence of any in-house capability being 
created in future it has been suggested in part 5.4.2 that family advocates should be 
empow
xtreme 
of rendering all lawyers eligible is also untenable. Both local and foreign experience 
at ist work. A cost-effective subsidisation 
scheme must therefore be based on utilisation of a pool of lawyers who have at least a 
degree 
 and guidelines requires administrative and other assessments inappropriate during 
court proceedings.  Thirdly, the best process would be one which encourages applicants to 
save time by applying directly to the final decisionmaker before proceedings begin. 
 
In relation to who should take the final decision on state funded representation it 
has been shown that in some systems application officers based at courts have proved 
effective.  Although in South Africa children's court assistants appointed in terms of the 
1983 Act could potentially have been trained for deciding applications, as will be 
remembered under the 2005 Act this officer has unfortunately been terminated.  This 
contradicts the clear intention in the Act to significantly extend the functions and 
capabilities of childr
ered to finalise applications for subsidised representation. 
 
In support of utilisation of family advocates is the fact that they already specialise 
in child-related aspects of certain domestic matters.  Much of their work has to do with 
pre-hearing screening of cases and they operate in teams with social workers called family 
counsellors. Not only does this mean that they have cross-disciplinary expertise, but 
further, the social work training of family counsellors would enable them to provide useful 
input about the applicability of the proposed secondary guidelines.  
 
Although family advocates are in some ways ideal for making final determinations 
the range of their responsibilities is such that they should not be the only lawyers eligible 
to actually undertake representation when applications are granted.  The opposite e
indic es that representation in care cases is special
 
of the requisite expertise.  In this regard, and drawing on both experience in several 
foreign systems and the suggestion of the South African law commission in 2002 for the 
establishment of a roster, it has been recommended in part 5.4.2 that eligibility 
requirements and inducements need to be developed for state-appointed representatives. 
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At least initially, training requirements should be relatively modest because of the 
current extremely low levels of representation.  A short workshop course in ADR, basic 
welfare methodologies and local care services should form a first phase.  The second phase 
should be a set number of hours of observation of children's court proceedings.  All family 
advocates and at least some justice centre lawyers in all jurisdictions should be required to 
qualify.  Although these lawyers would be able to provide free services improved 
capabil
state-appointed lawyers which would include 
training and thus further improve standards is also achievable.  It would be quite feasible to 
arrange
ole of adjudicators in care cases and some 
related procedural issues have been considered.  It has been noted that the children's courts 
have always operated as part of a broader magistrates’ courts establishment. Despite this, 
 facilitated child 
ity would result from also attracting private practitioners with an interest in family 
litigation.  Although there would still be a need for a budget to pay fees, experience 
elsewhere suggests that if cooperation could be obtained from lawyers’ professional 
associations their members would sometimes be willing to appear pro bono as a form of 
community service. 
 
In relation to the two main problems which currently impede the achievement of 
significant levels of legal representation and appropriate skills for lawyers it can be 
concluded that there are grounds for optimism.  Guidance on role functions for all lawyers 
appearing in children's court care cases could easily be developed.  And this could 
certainly be done in a manner that would improve overall quality of services.  A financially 
sustainable scheme for the provision of 
 it to conform flexibly to available resources, reach applicants who would be likely 
to benefit substantially and draw upon the community-mindedness of private lawyers in a 
manner that would render it optimally cost-effective.  With proper planning then, lawyers 
could become a much more significant resource. They could play an important part in the 
effort to establish a system which consistently achieves the best possible outcomes. 
 
9.6  Changing the Role of Presiding Officers  
 
In chapter 6 some basic aspects of the r
until the early 1950s the use of dedicated, full-time magistrates
 399
particip
 the 1965 supreme court case of Napolitano v Commissioner of Child Welfare, 
Johann
emained predominantly adversarial. 
s to deviate from these 'mutatis mutandis'.  As has been shown the vagueness 
of this allowance caused considerable confusion about the nature of children’s court 
proceed
ation and assured a degree of independence and specialisation.  As noted in part 
2.4.2, with the accession to power of the nationalist government a new policy of rotating 
ordinary magistrates was introduced.  A side effect was confusion in procedures as these 
generalist magistrates attempted to import civil magistrates’ court processes with which 
they were familiar, despite the very different nature of their functions in children's courts. 
 
In
esburg2 the appellate division unfortunately squandered an opportunity to provide 
clear guidance on children's court procedures.  In the judgment a quo3 Marais J had set a 
requirement for adversarial hearings with other representatives of the state besides 
presiding officers made responsible for eliciting relevant testimony. In the appeal judgment 
his suggestion of an accusatorial function for magistrates was not rejected.  However, a 
confusingly mixed message was produced by holding that care inquiries could be less 
formal than civil magistrates’ court proceedings, yet children's courts were just as subject 
to review for procedural irregularities as any other lower court.  Not surprisingly, during 
the next two decades most magistrates responded cautiously by modelling children's court 
proceedings as closely as possible on those in civil magistrates’ courts and proceedings 
thus r
 
Contemporary accounts indicate that the imposition of formal adversarial 
procedures by magistrates stifled participation by vulnerable family members.  It even 
inhibited social workers because their work methodologies were not based on legal 
technicalities. A protean recognition of the need for at least some different methods in the 
children's courts came with the promulgation of s 9(1) of the 1983 Act.  This set 
procedures of civil magistrates’ courts as a basic guide for children's courts.  But it allowed 
commissioner
ings that has lasted to the present time. 
 
                                                 
2 Napolitano v Commissioner of Child Welfare, Johannesburg 1965 (1) SA 742 (AD). 
3 Napolitano v De Wet, N.O. and Others 1964 (4) SA 337 (T). 
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In the face of uncertainty children's court commissioners have become divided into 
two camps.  One group may be termed historical-originalists because they continue to 
interpre tdated dicta in the Napolitano decisions as requiring them to adopt a 
predom
d other participants 
sometimes find it difficult to prepare matters because of uncertainty about what will be 
expecte
he 2005 Act includes limited provisions which hint at an inquisitorial function for 
magistr
t ou
inantly accusatorial function as managers of adversarial proceedings.  The other 
group are progressive-individualists who have interpreted the proviso to s 9(1) as setting 
them free to create their own personally-tailored procedures and role functions.   
 
Local empirical findings and anecdotal accounts of experienced South African 
practitioners evaluated in part 6.2 show consistently that the bifurcation into two groups of 
commissioners has produced an undesirable situation.  The disagreement about how 
children's courts should operate has created confusion. Parties an
d of them.  Difficulties in obtaining access to commissioners, abusive questioning 
during hearings which may cause trauma, unnecessary delays in completion of cases, 
insufficient interrogation of the submissions of investigative agencies and ultimately 
failures to achieve the best possible outcomes for children have all been shown to have 
arisen from the inadequate procedural dispensation which has subsisted under the 1983 
Act. 
 
The evaluation of the 2005 Act as a possible cure for our procedural ills undertaken 
in part 6.2.4 has unfortunately revealed major shortcomings.  In some important respects it 
is contradictory. Although it will require a host of highly demanding new functions from 
adjudicators it counteractively diminishes the idea of specialisation by withdrawing their 
distinguishing title of commissioner of child welfare. It refers to the possibility of 
'dedicated' presiding officers, yet continues to allow for the rotation of ordinary, generalist 
magistrates.  
 
T
ates but it withdraws the long established term 'inquiry' as a general description for 
care hearings.  It requires avoidance of adversarial procedures, yet expressly provides for 
cross-examination and argument.  Of particular concern is that it withdraws civil 
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magistrates’ court procedures as a basic guide for children's court procedures but leaves a 
vacuum by putting very little in place of these. 
 
A positive feature of the 2005 Act, however, is the facility created in s 75  for the 
promulgation of regulations on, inter alia, children's court procedures. This should be 
utilised to issue a detailed set of children's court rules. In formulating these it would be 
useful to draw upon experience in developed systems.  Locally effective mechanisms that 
have been evolved by some progressive commissioners should also be assessed for 
possible incorporation. Since many of the problems in the children's courts are directly 
traceab
nces tend to result.  These notably include secondary, systemic abuse of 
participants and failures to obtain sufficient evidence. 
t the level of detail, the proposed rules on the inquisitorial function must, despite 
the need to leave a realm of discretion, provide at least some meaningful guidance.  Crucial 
aspects which will need to be dealt with are when and how magistrates should intervene 
le to our inadequate law on the role of presiding officers this aspect must receive 
priority in the development of rules of court.  
 
A basic point of departure in the proposed rules should be an overarching provision 
which indicates unequivocally that the normal mode of functioning for children's court 
adjudicators is inquisitorial. As has been shown both local and foreign experience reveals 
quite clearly that where they retain an entirely passive, accusatorial function serious 
adverse conseque
 
It will clearly not be enough merely to rename the function of adjudicators as 
primarily inquisitorial in the proposed rules. With children's courts being creatures of 
statute and with magistrates being used to an accusatorial role as managers of adversarial 
proceedings,  proper guidance on the new function will be essential.  It has therefore been 
suggested in  part 6.3.1  that the rules should state that their two primary purposes are to 
enable presiding officers  to supplement information-gathering by other persons involved  
and actively control hearings so that these become as far as possible amicable joint 
explorations of what is in the best interests of children. 
 
A
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during the presentation of viva voce evidence at hearings. It has been shown in part 6.3.2 
that commonly-occurring situations which require intervention could easily be listed in the 
rules.  
n the important aspect of the degree to which evidence should be tested at 
hearing
quacies it cannot be claimed 
that all problems relating to the functions of presiding officers could be solved in this way. 
The ev
 
It has been suggested that these should include instances where questioning by other 
persons is ineffective, incomplete, abusive or wasteful of time.  In relation to how 
presiding officers should be guided to intervene it is essential to provide a repertoire of 
different intervention forms.  It has been recommended that they be expressly guided to 
issue warnings, assist with question formulation, take over questioning, act as a conduit to 
reduce confrontation and implement sheltered participation methods. 
 
O
s it has been recommended that magistrates must be required to give higher priority 
to protection of witnesses than forensic needs. They must also be expected to bear in mind, 
however, that rigorous testing is often useful for care cases.  In terms of keeping an 
appropriate balance it has been shown with reference to experience and rules formulations 
in developed systems that it is quite feasible to expect adjudicators to keep cross-
examination -and indeed questioning generally- within the bounds of what is manageable 
for witnesses.      
 
Although it has been demonstrated that suitable regulations published in terms of 
s75 of the 2005 Act could address many of the existing inade
aluation in chapter 6 yet again flags up training as essential because of the 
demanding and specialised nature of care case adjudication. And both our own local 
experience going back to the 1920s and findings from other systems (notably the 
Australian children’s courts) indicate that a key reform would be to create an entirely 
separate structure and leadership for our children's courts.  It is only in this way that the 
required extent of specialisation and accountability is likely to be achieved.  
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9.7  
en's court services.   
ust as noted in chapter 6 with functions of adjudicators, so too with interlocutory 
court s
preparation by family members or professionals who appear in care cases.  It corroborates 
the finding in chapter 6 about endemic procedural confusion.   
     
Utilising Preliminary and Interim Hearings 
 
Chapter 7 of the thesis begins an evaluation of what children's court orders are 
required for appropriate relief at different stages of care cases. In this chapter the focus is 
on the interim period which subsists from formal commencement of litigation until the 
onset of dispositive proceedings.  As has been noted this may extend for many months 
whilst welfare conducts its investigation into the domestic circumstances of the child.  It is 
demonstrated in part 7.2 that South African legislation is very poorly developed on 
interlocutory childr
 
The 1983 Act includes only limited and vague wording.  It refers briefly to age 
estimations, forensic assessments4 and reviews of preliminary removals of children. Whilst 
the wording on age estimations is satisfactory in indicating clearly that these can be 
completed early on at a separate pre-dispositive hearing, the same cannot be said for the 
other two categories.  The failure to indicate explicitly when or how assessments and 
reviews are to occur has had three unfortunate consequences.  Firstly, they may not occur 
at all in cases where they are urgently needed.  Secondly, they are sometimes viewed as 
requiring decisions by commissioners without formal hearings -thus reducing the scope for 
unwilling recipients to offer challenge.  Thirdly, they may be delayed until the onset of 
dispositive proceedings -and thus retard completion of these. 
 
J
ervices the inadequate wording of the 1983 Act has led to a bewildering variety of 
procedures being adopted. Whether predisposition hearings will be ex parte, include the 
child, require evidence on a balance of probabilities or even be held at all in a particular 
situation are all subject to variation according to the preference of local commissioners. 
This is obviously not conducive to maximising protection for children or efficient 
                                            
rnationally recognised sense and as explained in part 7.2.1.1, extra-curial physical or 
s of children or family members by suitably qualified specialists. 
4 Meaning, in the inte
psychological evaluation
 404
Generally, early involvement of children's courts in care cases has been very 
limited under the 1983 Act. Child protection personnel therefore have considerable space 
to exercise broad powers against which family members tend to have little recourse.  Of 
particular concern is the practice that has crept in of social workers extending their s 12(1) 
power to carry out preliminary removals of children without court authorization to 
situations which are not urgent. Although it creates dangers of insufficient protection of the 
constitutional right to family care and results in some children and their families being 
unnece
005 Act will be capable of producing only limited 
improv ents.  It is true that the wording on jurisdiction for children's courts in care cases 
has be
hat in the 
1983 Act. It refers tantalisingly to children's court orders on early childhood development, 
ssarily traumatised this practice was unfortunately upheld by the high court in 
Swarts v Swarts.5  
 
As has been shown in part 7.2.1 an application of the primary evaluative criteria 
requiring accessibility of courts, incrementally-available services, hearing vulnerable 
participants and balancing rights to protection and family care all compel a conclusion that 
predisposition services under the 1983 Act have been utterly inadequate.  It has further 
been demonstrated in part 7.2.2 that the 2
em
en framed in very broad terms.  But the new Act, like its predecessor, lacks 
specificity.  As presiding officers of inferior courts, most magistrates are unlikely to break 
from the long established tradition of limited pre-dispositive engagement.  And if a few of 
them do, without sufficient guidance their innovations will be ad hoc and thus not produce 
the uniformity that is urgently needed. 
 
In its favour, the 2005 Act does provide expressly for some predisposition 
functions.  These include preliminary removal injunctions ('temporary safe care' orders)6 
hospital retention orders7 and confirmation of domestic violence perpetrator-removals by 
the police.8 However, much of its wording on other aspects is just as vague as t
                                                 
5 [2002] 3 All SA 35 (T). 
6 Sections 45(1)(g) and 152(2). 
7 Section 46(1)(h)(v). 
8 Sections 105 and 153. 
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prevention and early intervention services9 but without stating explicitly when or even 
whether these can be issued before disposition.  In two particularly unfortunate respects it 
betrays the influence of its predecessor.  Firstly, it fails to provide for children's court 
review hearings in cases involving preliminary removals.  Secondly, it allows for forensic 
assessments and even therapeutic services to be forced upon unwilling recipients without 
indicating grounds for this or creating procedural scope for challenge. 
 
 Where the legislature clearly has attempted to overcome a shortcoming in the 1983 
Act is with preliminary removals of children that are not authorised by courts.  In the 2005 
Act it has tried to counter the currently widespread practice of utilising these as a matter of 
convenience even in non urgent situations.  But it has done so inappropriately.  Section 152 
requires disciplinary proceedings and removal of professional licences for 'misuse' of 
emergency removal powers.  This section has also created a stricter, multi-legged test for 
lawful preliminary removals which even bona fide participants could easily fail to apply 
correctly under stressful circumstances.  
 
 It has been suggested in part 7.4 with reference to approaches and experience in 
develop
 must unfortunately then be concluded that the 2005 Act provides only a little 
progres
ed systems that the s 152 test is certainly well formulated as a measure of legality.  
However, for the protection of persons who genuinely believe they are rescuing children in 
emergencies a lower threshold requiring only a bona fide belief of urgency is needed as a 
second test.  Participants who meet the second test standard should automatically benefit 
from an immunity clause similar to that in s 1024(c) of the New York Family Court Act.  
The decision to punish rather than shield child protection participants who make mistakes 
under difficult circumstances was a serious error.  It has been suggested with reference to 
the Canadian experience that setting up anti-removal clauses designed to operate in 
terrorem may simply result in the deaths of children left in hazardous situations. 
 
It
s on predisposition functions for children's courts in care cases. Like its predecessor 
it is still to a large extent implicitly built around the concept of a climactic main hearing, 
                                                 
9 Sections 45(1)(e) and 46(1)(h). 
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prior to which children's lives must remain on hold. The insufficiency of the Act raises the 
question of a way forward. In a selective review of legislative provisions from some well-
developed systems it has been demonstrated in part 7.3 that there is a wide variety of 
valuable predisposition functions which courts can perform in care cases.  Significantly, 
holding appropriate court hearings at an early stage not only provides better protection for 
children and families but can sometimes also save time and other resources. 
 
The comparative review in part 7.3 indicates clearly that detailed guidance enabling 
our children's courts to provide pre-dispositional support could certainly be developed.  
Just as has been recommended with other aspects, this would once again best be done with 
a set o
children's courts to call them mero motu whenever they decide this is initially necessary for 
obtaini
 with the criterion of court accessibility, must 
also provide sufficient scope for both private individuals (including children) and 
professional persons acting within the scope of their duties to instigate preliminary 
f procedural rules.  As basic organizational tools the concepts of preliminary and 
interim hearings should be introduced in these.  The former should be defined as the first 
formal appearance before a children's court of any informant, party, participant or 
applicant for such status.  And interim hearings should be defined as any subsequent 
hearings at which interlocutory relief pending the onset of dispositive proceedings is 
sought. 
 
In relation to preliminary hearings, the proposed rules should expressly enable 
ng evidence or providing an authoritative decision.  They should as in some 
developed systems be specifically required to do so where this is the best way to test an 
allegation about a child needing care before proceeding further. Presiding magistrates 
should also be required to call prompt preliminary hearings to rigorously review the 
appropriateness of any preliminary removal of a child (court authorised or not) and to 
decide whether separation of the child should continue until disposition.  Finally, 
magistrates must be expressly required to call inter partes hearings when contemplating 
utilisation of ADR under the 2005 Act. 
 
 The proposed rules, in accordance
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hearing
 parties who can put forward a prima facie case for 
modifying them in the best interests of the child are entitled to a hearing.  Guidelines for 
our co
s.  It should be specified that anyone who can establish a relevant prima facie case 
on documents or by oral petition is entitled to do so.  Relevant purposes of preliminary 
hearings should be limited to: making out a case for care proceedings on behalf of a 
particular child, seeking party or mere participant status, or obtaining an authoritative 
decision on a disputed and significant aspect of case preparation or care arrangements 
pending disposition. In relation to the latter, as has been shown with reference to 
experience in other systems, where child protection personnel seek permission to 
undertake preliminary removals they must be given high priority. Court hearings ex parte, 
by telephone or after hours therefore need to be provided for. 
 
Aside from preliminary hearings, subsequent interim hearings must also be 
expressly provided for in the proposed rules.  They should also be possible either mero 
motu at the discretion of a presiding officer or by application. It should be stated that their 
basic purpose is considering either relevant aspects not raised at a preliminary hearing or 
possible amendments or additions.  The rules should require that applicants who wish to 
traverse issues already settled provide justification.  This ought to be allowed by showing, 
prima facie, additional or more accurate information, a situational change relevant to the 
child or an inability to attend at the preliminary hearing which justifies the interim hearing.   
 
Because of the importance of interim contact arrangements it should be expressly 
stated in the proposed rules that
urts on factors to be considered and appropriate conditions for inclusion in any 
resultant orders should be drawn from systems such as Illinois and New York which have 
well-developed interim contact legislation. Our current allowance in s 153(6) of the 2005 
Act for children's court interim contact orders in cases where domestic violence 
perpetrators have been removed from children's homes is far too narrow.  They should be 
expressly permitted to issue interim contact orders and deal generally with the question of 
interim care in all categories of care cases. 
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Where domestic violence is a factor children's courts need much broader interim 
powers than allowed for in s 105 and s 153 of the 2005 Act.  Merely describing ex post 
facto functions for them once the police have decided to initiate removals of perpetrators is 
insuffic
s and therapeutic family services orders it is 
essential that the proposed rules require children's courts to carefully scrutinise any 
applica
o 
indicate that therapeutic services for family members can never be mandatory at the 
predisp
g appropriate provisions it should give careful consideration to the useful 
ient.  Just as in many developed systems they need to be expressly required to hear 
applications for perpetrator-removals brought by parties and permitted to instigate them 
mero motu.  As in the English Children Act 1989 they must be required to take into 
account the effect of any contemplated removal on the child's care situation.  And besides 
the drastic step of perpetrator-removals they need some of the lesser warning and interdict 
remedies utilised in US systems. 
 
In regard to forensic assessment
tions by welfare.  This is to ensure that constitutional rights to dignity and privacy 
of children and other family members are protected.  As has been shown a defect of many 
systems is routine application of considerable coercion to submit to interim services and 
assessments.  On the other hand, where courts conclude that assessment or services are 
appropriate and have been genuinely agreed to they should incorporate them in their 
orders.  This serves useful purposes by authoritatively confirming parameters and liability 
for costs. As has been shown with reference to developed systems courts can also play a 
valuable role by including protective conditions which limit duration and intrusiveness of 
assessments and interim services. 
 
It has been suggested in part 7.4 that, whilst the 2005 Act should be amended t
osition stage, there may be a case for subjecting children to mandatory forensic 
assessments in exceptional instances.  As has been shown this is a controversial issue 
which has produced a variety of approaches in developed systems.  It raises difficult best 
interests considerations by pitting protection against autonomy for children.  In order to 
provide proper guidance our legislature needs to take a much clearer position. In 
formulatin
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protect
 is a last resort.  And where assessments appear to be essential for 
evidential purposes they must be expressly required to interact supportively with 
sufficie
courts for providing a valuable array of predisposition services in care cases.  
Against a criticism that this would require holding more hearings is the counterargument 
that ti
s in the Children's Act 38/2005 
 
ive limitations on mandatory assessment powers included (as has been shown) in 
the legislation of some developed systems.  
 
If our legislature opts to continue with any form of compulsory assessment orders 
detailed regulations on court process will be essential.  These must indicate to presiding 
officers that compulsion
ntly mature children and seek the shortest and least intrusive alternative.  This need 
for interaction gives further point to the recommendation in chapter 6 that presiding 
magistrates must be directed by means of procedural rules to change over to a 
predominantly inquisitorial role function. 
 
Generally, the analysis in chapter 7 leads to an encouraging conclusion.  Simply by 
formulating a suitably detailed set of procedural rules it would become possible to utilise 
children’s 
me and other resources would be saved by resolving problems at the most 
appropriate stage.  Another benefit would be far better protection and guidance for 
participants.  Perhaps the strongest resources argument is that we already have a children's 
court network in place -so why not utilise it optimally by increasing the authoritative 
support it is capable of providing at the predisposition stage? 
 
9.8  The New Approach to Dispositive Proceeding
 
As noted in chapter 8 the dispositive proceedings which follow upon completion of 
investigations by welfare are an extremely important stage in care cases. With the 2005 
Act the legislature has aimed to completely transform the dispositive role of children's 
courts. In a critical evaluation of the new approach it has been shown that the Act produces 
three major improvements but is unfortunately inadequate in a number of important 
respects. 
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In relation to the improvements achieved the most significant feature of the Act is 
provision of a far greater variety of children's court remedies than any previous South 
African legislation.  This creates considerable potential to creatively tailor outcomes to fit 
the nee
e developed 
system    
ven where children need to be removed children's courts will under the 2005 Act 
have a 
ds of individual children and their families.  Reference to the international literature 
indicates that when the Act is fully implemented this will be an important advance in 
modernising our law.   
 
Secondly, the nature of the interactions between children's courts and families with 
care problems has been fundamentally changed.  Rather than presiding magistrates merely 
deciding between a few limited forms of mainly removal placements for children, the 2005 
Act envisages a much more constructive engagement. They will be required to consider 
whether allocation of suitable family services resources will enable a child to remain 
within or eventually return to her family.  Again, it has been shown with reference to the 
international literature that this approach has proved to be successful in som
s.
 
Although it might be considered that social workers rather than court adjudicators 
should select family services programs at the dispositive stage it has been found that the 
greater neutrality and authority of courts renders properly trained presiding officers useful 
for this function.  And social science findings indicate that court-ordered family service 
orders can sometimes bring about significant improvements in domestic environments 
even for families that are seriously dysfunctional. Thus the new family services orientation 
for our children's courts is clearly appropriate. 
 
E
much greater variety of options than under any previous legislation.  One reason for 
this is a planned transformation of residential care facilities.  In place of the current 
children's homes and industrial schools the new blanket terminology will be 'child and 
youth care centres'.  It is clear from the wording of the Act that different centres are to have 
different care programs so as to enable a wide variety of specializations.  Crucially, 
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s158(2)(a) states that it is children’s court magistrates and not welfare who are to 
determine what particular residential program a child requires.   
 
Aside from residential facility placements, magistrates will also be required to 
decide whether placements in child-headed households, cluster foster care, traditional 
foster 
 has been shown that a serious gap in the 1983 Act is the omission of provisions 
enablin
ildren's courts are now poised to play a far more important role in 
supporting children than ever before the legislature's new vision for them has unfortunately 
not bee
care, supplemented parental care in the form of 'partial care,' or shared care 
alternating caregivers at different locations is the most appropriate outcome for a particular 
child. The new range of placement options is a significant advance in our care 
dispensation; but for effective implementation it will require the requisite skills. It is clear 
that, just as in the case of family services orders, magistrates will once again require new 
forms of specialist interdisciplinary expertise if they are to independently provide 
knowledgeable determinations and not merely rubberstamp what may be most convenient 
for welfare. An inquisitorial role function is yet again indicated so that they can interact as 
constructively as possible with family members before deciding on outcomes. 
 
It
g children's courts to monitor and enforce implementation of their orders. In 
consequence, these are often not put into effect properly. This has reduced the 
effectiveness of children's courts as a component of the child protection system.  When the 
2005 Act becomes fully operational the means to change this will be at hand.  Children's 
courts will as in our pre-1983 legislation be able to exercise more control over the 
implementation of their orders.  This aspect, which will be discussed further below, 
represents the third main contribution of the 2005 Act in improving our law on care case 
dispositions. 
 
Although ch
n perfectly realized in the 2005 Act.  As shown in part 8.2 the dispensation for 
grounds indicative of children requiring mandatory alternative care is problematic.  It is of 
concern that proof of grounds can be entirely dispensed with in some situations.  Where 
children's courts propose to issue any of an extensive list of orders contained in s 46(1) 
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prior proof of a ground is not an essential prerequisite.  In relation to a second substantial 
set of orders in s 156(1) it is stated in s 156(4) that any of these except 'placement orders' 
may be utilised even where children's courts have found that the child is not in need of care 
and protection. 
 
As has been argued the new approach of allowing proof of grounds to be omitted is 
dangerous.  The drastic consequences for children and other family members which result 
from mandatory alternative care orders makes it essential that just cause be first 
established.  If no ground is proved children's court decisions will become vulnerable to 
challen
national literature that definitions which restrict 
grounds are problematic. There is no consensus on how harm-related concepts such as 
neglect
ges based on constitutional rights to fair proceedings and due protection of 
children's right to family care. The diminution of grounds requirements in the 2005 Act 
causes it to fail on the criterion of properly balancing protection and children's right to 
family care. And the resultant uncertainty about when grounds will be required by 
particular magistrates is likely to perpetuate the confusion about procedures that has been 
shown in this thesis to be a major weakness of our system. 
 
Another basic deficiency which relates to grounds has been produced by a decision 
to include definitions of abuse, sexual abuse, neglect, exploitation and commercial sexual 
exploitation in s 1 of the 2005 Act.  As has been noted in part 8.2.2 these are simply for 
general guidance in interpreting the Act.  However, one of their effects is to limit the reach 
of the main grounds for finding children to be in need of alternative care in s 150(1). It has 
been demonstrated with reference to inter
 and abuse should be defined. And attaching definitions to grounds for alternative 
care measures simply creates scope for technical defences that may prevent courts from 
assisting children.  
 
The likelihood of courts being unduly hampered is increased by the fact that the s 1 
definitions are to a large extent perpetrator or situation oriented. Experience elsewhere 
indicates that this format tends to fix the attention of courts too narrowly on specific 
instances requiring fault attribution.  This may cause difficulties where a specific 
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perpetrator cannot be identified.  Alternatively, it may lead to courts reaching incorrect 
conclusions because grounds-related factors are typically multifaceted and accretional over 
time.  A particular concern is that an overemphasis on fault as encouraged by many of the 
s1 definitions will distract courts from giving due attention to contextual factors such as 
poverty or a lack of social services.  Experience in other systems aside, it was discovered 
locally under the 1983 Act in its original form that giving prominence to fault in grounds 
simply stigmatises caregivers in ways that are counterproductive. Insofar as it reintroduces 
an emphasis on fault in grounds, the 2005 Act must be seen as retrograde. 
 this causes the Act to fail on the 
criterion of clarity in wording and structure to enable user-friendliness.  The confusingly-
similar
ds 
and choice of remedies phases. Unfortunately, the 2005 Act does not facilitate this.  
Beside
 
Besides fundamental deficiencies in the way that grounds have been provided for, 
dispositive remedies have also not been ideally formulated in the 2005 Act.  As noted in 
part 8.3.1 there are two main sets of children's court orders which are contained in s 46(1) 
and s 156(1).  Having two separate lists creates an expectation of different purposes. 
However, a cross-reference to s 46(1) in s 156(1) indicates a degree of interchangeability.  
This creates confusion about when children's courts should issue s 46(1) or else s 156(1) 
orders. The confusion is increased by overlap between the two subsections.  They include 
pairs of very similar orders with no indication of the reasons for the parallelism. An 
interpretative difficulty which arises is on what basis children's courts should make choices 
between the pairs. The failure to provide guidance on
 remedies in the two subsections need to be integrated and proper direction given on 
when each subsection should be utilised.  
 
Transforming the remedies capability of children's courts and introducing an 
interactive family services ethos will require more than merely clarifying which orders 
should be used when. It will also be essential to develop our procedural law substantially. 
In part 8.4 it has been shown that the key to doing this is to divide dispositive proceedings 
into logical stages.  Firstly, a basic division needs to be made between proof of groun
s providing primary grounds for finding a child to be in need of care and protection 
in s 150(1), in s 156(1) it includes further sub-grounds that are attached to most of the 
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remedies provided in the latter. The addition of sub-grounds greatly complicates 
dispositive proceedings. It introduces circularity by forcing children's courts to return to 
the question of grounds at a stage when they are ready to decide upon outcomes.  It could 
therefore encourage them to utilize the loopholes in s 46 or s 156(4) for dispensing with 
grounds entirely -leading to the dangers noted above. As has been contended in chapter 8 
the benefits to be gained would justify amending the Act to allow for a simpler approach in 
which grounds and remedies are entirely separated. 
 
 In part 8.4.2 it has been shown with reference to US law that where caregivers 
have the potential for sufficient positive change it is often useful for courts to interpose an 
'improvement period' after proof of grounds and before final disposition.  This is 
constru
uld also sometimes be 
suitable occasions for children's courts to employ new enforcement measures with which 
ctive because it maximises opportunities for children to keep their families.  It 
accords with the criterion of reducing removals. Whilst the 2005 Act does not expressly 
allow for improvement periods it has provisions on setting timeframes and monitoring 
which provide a suitable context.  And the proactive family services remedies it contains 
will usually best be implemented under a condition of fulfilment of preset goals that need 
to be achieved within a fixed time period.  Improvement periods should therefore be 
established as an option in our law.  Suitable procedural rules could be formulated by 
making reference to the best developed US provisions. 
 
As recommended in part 8.4.3 children's courts should be required to evaluate 
achievements during the proposed improvement periods at subsequent review hearings. It 
has been shown that these should not merely be used to evaluate the progress of caregivers.  
In order to counter the current problem of inadequate implementation of children's court 
orders by employees or representatives of the state acting ex officio, presiding magistrates 
should be expressly directed also to assess the contributions of these participants.  As a 
final leg of dispositive proceedings, review hearings would then become an ideal 
mechanism for adjusting care measures in the light of progress made by all concerned.   
 
As suggested in part 8.4.4 the proposed review hearings wo
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the 200
lia, encouraging proper implementation 
of care orders.  Their availability at children's courts would be appropriate for assisting 
 c  testimony which 
they m y well find traumatic before only one court. Generally, a delictual jurisdiction 
would 
 to restrictive definitions, the lacunae which enable grounds 
to be avoided entirely and the confusing overlap in the two main sets of remedies are 
fundam
5 Act has furnished them. It has been shown by means of a comparative review that 
having a repertoire of different grades of coercive powers can be useful for courts which 
specialise in care matters.  Even the extreme of criminal penalties as provided for in s45(2) 
of the 2005 Act has its place as a response to blatant disregard of responsibilities which 
leads to serious harm for children.  However, despite the fact that there is precedent in 
other systems, criminal penalties attendant on non-implementation of children's court 
orders should only in rare instances be applied against caregivers.  Dangers of 
counterproductive alienation or unfairly punishing parents who are primarily victims of 
poverty or a lack of social services are reasons why children's court magistrates should be 
directed to exercise caution in implementing their new sentencing powers. 
 
It has been shown that a gap in the 2005 Act is the omission of jurisdiction for 
children's courts to award delictual damages.  Compensatory awards are clearly a less 
extreme means than criminal penalties for, inter a
some hildren who have been harmed. They would be able to provide
a
fit perfectly with the legislature's new vision of children's courts as powerful 
multitask fora with specialist expertise in resolving care and protection disputes. 
 
In conclusion, the evaluation of the new approach to dispositive proceedings in 
chapter 8 reveals that the 2005 Act makes significant advances by expanding the range of 
children's court orders and providing some foundations for monitoring and enforcement. 
Given the extent to which development of our care law was historically retarded 
particularly during the apartheid period, it is understandable that this first major attempt at 
modernisation is primarily substantive, leaving essential procedural provisions still to be 
added. But as has been demonstrated the Act has some serious structural weaknesses.  The 
linking of some of the grounds
ental defects which require reformulation of key provisions. 
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 Aside from amendments to address the structural weaknesses and an addition of a 
detailed body of procedural guidelines as suggested in chapter 8, a third issue will need to 
be addressed if the legislature's vision of transformed children's court services is to be 
realised.  The demanding dispositive tasks set for presiding officers in the 2005 Act have 
significant training implications.  Selecting the most appropriate locally available proactive 
or rehabilitative family services, evaluating whether children should be left in child-headed 
households, assessing the desirability of cluster foster care, choosing from amongst 
different residential programs at child and youth care centres, monitoring the progress of 
children and caregivers, and sentencing social workers or government officials who fail to 
implem nt children's court orders properly is hardly a group of tasks which generalist 
magistr
9.9  inal Conclusion and Some Directions for Further Research 
rably improved. If the 
structural and training needs that have been identified are also attended to these courts will 
at last 
 The legislative, training and court-structural improvements that have been 
e
ates can be expected to perform efficiently.  The recommendations made in chapter 
6 on the urgent need to establish children's courts as a separate network with dedicated 
management and improved status are strongly supported by the escalated demands which 
the disposition provisions of the Act will impose. 
 
F
 
Despite an overall finding of poor development in our law, the results derived from 
the analysis in this thesis are encouraging.  The evaluation of six broad aspects of the 
modern function of children's courts in care cases in chapters 3-8 produces findings that 
are consistent in relation to solutions.  By means of a few key amendments to the 2005 Act 
and development of a detailed body of supplementary rules and regulations along the lines 
indicated the effectiveness of children's courts can be conside
be properly positioned to make an extensive contribution in protecting the rights of 
children in need of alternative care and their families. In so doing, they will become 
effective instruments for ensuring compliance with South Africa's related constitutional 
and international obligations. 
 
recommended are not generally ones which have impossibly vast resource implications.  
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And in
urning to avenues for further research, since this thesis has focused mainly on 
modern
o ADR it will be remembered that it was concluded in part 3.7 that lay 
community panels are not appropriate for South African care cases.  It was suggested that 
their s
prominence in our legislation detailed further work is needed on what the indicators should 
 relation to resources Grover has made the important point that financial costs for 
states in providing effective child protection systems 'are inevitably of a much smaller 
order then the incalculable long-term economic and societal costs involved' in failing to 
provide properly for vulnerable children.10  It is now within our grasp to build further upon 
the recent reform initiative and fully overcome the progress gap produced by 
neocolonialism and apartheid.  We can quite feasibly render our children's courts an 
exceptionally powerful resource. These courts would then become worthy of their name; 
and incidentally the dream of a few farsighted reformists in 1937 would at last become a 
reality. 
 
T
 developments there remains scope for in-depth historical research on the work and 
significance of the children's courts during the 20th century. For example, as noted in part 
2.4.3 useful further investigation could be done on causes of the significant transformation 
of welfare from abetting to opposing   application of racial criteria in the children's courts. 
  
In relation t
cope for utilizing local community expertise and tribal leaders who could 
reintroduce indigenous practices will be outweighed by the dangers of placing lay 
decision-makers in positions of considerable authority. Since this was based only on 
Scottish research and limited local findings about attitudes towards children's views in 
indigenous cultures it could usefully be tested by further research. 
 
Another question to which only limited attention has been given in the thesis is 
whether special evidential rules should be developed for care cases. On the aspect of 
sheltered participation methods, although it has been shown that they should be given more 
b
                                                
e for selecting specific types in individual cases.  
 
10 S Grover 'On Meeting Canada's Charter Obligations to Street Youth' (2002) 10 International Journal of 
Children's Rights 313 at 326. 
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As noted in part 1.4 an aspect which has not been considered at all is appropriate 
grounds and procedures for transferring cases between different jurisdictions of the 
children’s court.  Since this has been problematic under the 1983 Act11 and has been left 
for future regulations under the 2005 Act it is another area which needs investigation.12 As 
also noted in part 1.4 a subject not addressed in detail is how children's courts could best 
be utilised to protect children who have already been removed to longer term alternative 
care placements -for example, in foster care or at residential facilities.  In view of the 
extreme vulnerability of such children in an under-resourced child protection system 
aspects such as effective complaints mechanisms and means of improving post-dispositive 
court access need to be the subject of focused research. 
 
On the question of training, this thesis has mainly explored some salient aspects of 
what family advocates, other lawyers and presiding officers should be trained to do in care 
cases.  Valuable further research could be done on precisely how they should be trained.  
This should particularly include the aspects of syllabus content and training 
methodologies.   It should investigate the best content for both prior qualifications and in-
service education. 
 
The recommendations in this thesis are as noted in part 2.5 aligned to the present 
stage of development of the children's courts.  If these courts are in future successfully 
established as a more independent network of specialist fora as has been proposed, some 
important avenues for further research will become particularly relevant. Firstly, it could 
usefully be investigated whether they should as in Kenya and Australia become 
additionally involved in trying, sentencing and addressing the needs of juvenile offenders.  
Secondly, it is important to bear in mind that the legislature has signalled an intention to 
eventually establish family courts.13  It is possible that a unified family court model with 
broad jurisdiction will be selected.14 Although the proposals in this thesis would empower 
                                                 
11 Personal communications: Dr J Loffell 1 Aug 2002; and commissioner P Booysen,12 Sept 2006. 
12 JK Peters 'How Are Children Heard in Child Protective Proceedings in the United States and around the 
World in 2005: Survey Findings, Initial Observations and Areas for Further Study' (2006) 6 Nevada LJ 966 
at 969 found that there is a need for 'good coordination between jurisdictions' in abuse and neglect cases. 
13 As noted in part 2.5 this has been indicated in s 45(3) of the 2005 Act. 
14 Characteristics of unified family courts have been briefly described in part 2.5, above. 
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children's courts to serve as a st a network, whether they should 
nd how they might best be incorporated would need to be carefully investigated.
rong component in such 
a
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